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Abstract 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the role of corporate social responsibility (hereinafter 
‘CSR’) in corporate governance in the context of employment. This is done through a 
comparative study of the United Kingdom (hereinafter ‘UK’) and China in which it is 
determined whether Chinese companies can adopt UK companies’ CSR practices in 
employment. 
 
The thesis begins with an overview of the theory of corporate governance and the necessity 
of CSR in corporate governance. The different models and principles of corporate 
governance and CSR, and how the main corporate organs operate in corporate governance 
and apply CSR in decision-making to meet stakeholders’ needs are introduced. The study 
then demonstrates the rationale behind the emergence of CSR, the legal impact of CSR on 
stakeholders and the global application of CSR initiatives, especially the techniques and 
mechanisms adopted in the UK and China.  
 
The research specifically presents CSR practices in employment in the UK and China 
against a theoretical background. This comparative study is mainly dependent on 
companies’ information disclosure, since all data were collected from their official CSR 
reports. The quality of the information disclosure is assured through effective monitoring 
as stated in the various reports.  
 
The implication of the comparative research on the disclosed information demonstrates the 
difference in CSR implementation in employment between UK and Chinese companies. 
The thesis analyses the possibility of adopting UK CSR practice in employment in Chinese 
companies in terms of the economic, social and political barriers to, and current situation of, 
CSR in China. 
 
As China has opened up the global market, overseas companies have invested in the 
Chinese market. This comparative study of CSR implementation in the context of 
employment in the UK and China, and the analysis of the current status of Chinese CSR 
practices also provide foreign enterprises experience to relate their CSR policies in 
corporate governance to the Chinese context. 
 
Key words: Corporate decision-making, corporate governance, corporate social 
responsibility, employment, information disclosure, stakeholder theory. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Corporate social responsibility (hereinafter ‘CSR’) is a voluntary concept whose 
emergence is based on laws but further developed beyond legislation. It is coincident with 
the stakeholder approach that company boards of directors should make decisions with the 
view to ensuring shareholders’ profit in the long term. Following the stakeholder approach, 
CSR has become the popular trend and the strategic management tool in corporate 
governance that meets the needs of stakeholders, namely employees, consumers, suppliers, 
governments, communities and even the environment, and positively improves the 
efficiency of corporate governance.  
 
The emergence of CSR is primarily dependent on the legal basis, and driven by social and 
market concerns about sustainable development. It is necessary for public investors and 
primary stakeholders to know what corporate performance is as a point of reference, so that 
they can make sound investments or decisions regarding a company based on the 
company’s positive performance in respect of corporate operations. Information disclosure 
is currently the generally used approach whereby companies publish information about 
their CSR exercises that is monitored by public users. When companies’ performance is 
apparent to the public, it stimulates the implementation of CSR through addressing social 
and environmental issues, thereby increasing their competitiveness in the marketplace and 
enhancing their corporate image. 
 
Global adoption of CSR is developed on a legal basis and through voluntary initiatives at 
different levels. The United Kingdom (hereinafter ‘UK’) has a long history of fulfilling 
CSR in corporate governance under the stakeholder approach and broadly applying 
voluntary approaches in practice. Employees as one of the main stakeholders of 
Introduction 
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companies, to some extent, determine the companies’ fate, because they are the human 
resources and affect the efficiency of corporate operations. UK companies generally 
involve their employees in their CSR performance to ensure the employees’ human rights, 
good working conditions, fair payment and other interests in the workplace. 
 
China differs from the UK. China first introduced CSR in its domestic market in the late 
1990s and is making an effort to improve it through applicable voluntary initiatives on the 
basis of legal regulations. However, China still has a long way to go in following other 
countries that have extensive experience of CSR in corporate governance, especially with 
respect to meeting employees’ need and benefits in companies. 
 
The topic of this thesis will be analysed in terms of three research questions to evaluate the 
role of CSR in corporate governance in the context of employment through a comparative 
study of the UK and China: 
 
1. What is the role of CSR in corporate governance and what techniques are used to 
implement CSR? 
2. How is CSR implemented with regard to employees in the UK and China? 
3. Is it feasible for China to adopt UK practices with regard to CSR in the context of 
employment? 
 
The research was conducted in the form of comparative studies of information disclosure 
related to CSR between UK and Chinese companies. It is difficult to conduct primary 
interviews with employees and other participants in corporate governance or observe the 
exercise of all companies to obtain precise information on individual company’s CSR 
performance towards their employees in corporate governance, with the result that the 
research is based on reported information. Companies’ information disclosure is analysed 
Introduction 
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in terms of the data collected from companies’ official CSR reports. Through comparative 
studies conducted among many samples of UK and Chinese companies, the research will 
demonstrate and summarize the techniques used by UK and Chinese companies in their 
CSR performance towards their employees in corporate governance. As regards the 
differences between UK and Chinese companies, the feasibility of adopting UK experience 
of CSR in Chinese corporate governance in a typically Chinese context will be analysed. 
 
In this research the scope of collected corporate information disclosure is limited as it is 
impossible to collect all companies’ reports in the UK and China. Therefore, the 
demonstrated approaches to, and analysis of, CSR are limited to the information disclosure 
of selected companies. As regards those reports that are not accompanied by independent 
audit and verification, it is necessary, but difficult, to check the quality and validity of the 
information, so that it will be assumed in this thesis that all information is authentic. 
Moreover, the research is only an analysis based on the information disclosure and not an 
evaluation of the quality of companies’ substantial exercise of their CSR towards their 
employees in corporate governance, nor is it a direct observation of the real effect of each 
action in an individual company. All comparisons and conclusions of this thesis were 
drawn from the collected reporting material, which was assumed not only to be authentic 
but reliable by public users. 
 
Additionally, analysis of the research question of whether ‘it is feasible for Chinese 
companies to adopt UK models of CSR to employees in corporate governance’ is based on 
individual companies’ own situation whereby they chose to entirely or partly apply UK 
approaches in corporate governance, and are not relevant to the legal basis, political issues 
or governmental policy. In the Chinese database more than half of the companies are 
state-owned or centrally controlled state-owned companies. The result is that state control 
and government instructions will largely affect companies’ performance of corporate 
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governance and CSR. Combining external factors, such as legal development and political 
control, in all kinds of companies in this general research is complicated, because 
state-owned companies not only aim to achieve economic and social profit, but also the 
political purpose under the Chinese Communist Party’s (hereinafter ‘CCP’) control and 
government governance. Therefore, in the context of the Chinese CSR characteristics, how 
these external issues affect the feasibility of Chinese companies, especially state-owned 
companies, adopting UK CSR models towards their employees will be studied and 
developed further. 
 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter provides a general overview of the 
theory of corporate governance and the necessity of CSR in corporate governance. The 
different models and principles of corporate governance and CSR and their correlation are 
presented and discussed in terms of how the main corporate organs operate in corporate 
governance and apply CSR to enhance their performance. 
 
The second chapter first demonstrates the rationale for the emergence of CSR, the legal 
impact on CSR and globally used CSR initiatives, and then illustrates diverse techniques 
and mechanisms adopted in the UK and China. This chapter introduces the historical 
context and barriers to the implementation of CSR in China. 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 are both dependent on UK and Chinese companies’ published 
information in various corporate reports to apply empirical research and comparative 
studies to analyse the strategies and approaches UK and Chinese companies adopted in 
their CSR exercise in corporate governance. In this thesis there are two tables (Table 1 and 
2) that present precise details of each selected company’s CSR performance towards its 
employees. 
 
Introduction 
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The fifth chapter relies on the analysis and demonstration of information disclosure to 
compare the differences in CSR implementation within companies in two countries and to 
analyse the feasibility of Chinese companies adopting practices from UK models with 
respect to the fulfilment of CSR in employment in corporate governance. 
Chapter 1: Theory of Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility 
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Chapter 1: Theory of Corporate Governance and Corporate Social        
Responsibility 
 
 
In a simple market economy, input owners, who hold resources such as material, labour 
and even information, exchange their resources under the price mechanism. There is, 
therefore, no need for integrated control of the free transaction. In a firm, however, input 
owners transact through contracts leading to transaction costs due to the specificity and 
uncertainty in contractual relations, so that individual participants are interlinked through 
varied contracts. A body is necessary to coordinate the relations among all contractual 
constituents and input resources within a firm in order to reduce transaction costs.1 
Corporate governance emerged as the process of control and coordination of contractual 
transactions to reduce transaction costs in firms.  
 
With the increased focus on social and environmental development, the efficiency of 
corporate governance is not only dependent on meeting contractual constituents’ financial 
interests, but also social needs. Companies’ success is closely related to the coordination 
of internal contractual participants, and even external elements, which would affect or be 
affected by the company’s business, such as the community, government and the 
environment. CSR is the essential approach to meet social interests in corporate 
governance within the firm and among external elements, which would improve the 
efficiency of corporate governance as strategic management. 
 
                                                        
1
 The phrase ‘a group to coordinate contractual participants’ is derived from Coase’s work on the nature of 
the firm. See Coase, R., ‘The Nature of the Firm’, in Kroszner, R. S. and Putterman, L., The Economic 
Nature of the Firm: A Reader, 3rd Edition, (ed.), originally published in 1986, Cambridge University Press 
(2009), 79–82.  
Chapter 1: Theory of Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility 
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This chapter will generally introduce the theory of corporate governance and CSR. It will 
examine the relationship of both concepts with the nature of the firm, as well as the 
relationship between corporate governance and CSR. Different models and mechanisms 
in corporate governance and CSR will be presented and discussed in terms of how the 
main corporate organs operate in corporate governance and apply CSR to enhance their 
performance. 
 
1.1 The nature of the firm  
 
Before the emergence of the firm, an individual input owner freely exchanged resources 
in the marketplace under the price mechanism that each process of production was 
voluntarily and openly controlled by property investors, such as a worker owning and 
investing labour for his or her master, and then obtaining payment from the ‘labour 
buyer’. Every transaction was concluded between a seller and a buyer, with the result that 
the resource was independently operated by the input owner in the process of production. 
When the situation was changed and long-term contracts existed between some input 
providers without price mechanism and control, rights were directed by hired agents in 
the process of production, and the firm as an economic unity emerged to optimally 
coordinate and organize the resource and the participant’s activity. This process was 
defined as ‘corporate governance’, with the main organs, namely the shareholders, board 
of directors and management, necessary to direct operations relevant to the nature of the 
firm.2 This section will analyse how corporate governance acts within the distinct nature 
of a firm, as a nexus of contracts and a tool to reduce transaction costs. 
                                                        
2
 In Kroszner and Putterman’s preface to Reintroducting the Economic Nature of the Firm, firms are units 
to purchase input such as labour and materials, transform them into service and goods, and sell the fruit 
with the objective of maximizing profit. However, the firm is not the momentary assemblages of 
co-operating factor suppliers and profit-seekers, but the organization to manage and coordinate the 
activities of the individual constituents. Kroszner, R. S. and Putterman, L., The Economic Nature of the 
Firm: A Reader, 3rd Edition, (ed.), originally published 1986, Cambridge University Press (2009), 7–9. 
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1.1.1 A nexus of contracts 
 
In the nineteenth century, typically, business was owned by individuals or small groups so 
that thousands of workers and enormous wealth would be combined under unified control 
and management through a corporate mechanism.3 This form of business was then 
developed into the modern firm in which the independent worker who enters the business 
would become a wage labourer to his or her master, and the property investors surrender 
and receive the wages of capital. The gathering of capital and human resource creates an 
organized firm, in which all resources are uniformly allocated or applied by central 
control.4  
 
Bainbridge regarded the firm as a nexus of contracts that is an aggregate of different 
individual input owners coordinating together to provide goods or services.5 More 
specifically, employees offer human capital resources; creditors provide debt capital; 
shareholders provide equity capital, bear the risk of losses and monitor the performance 
of management; and the managerial group detect employees’ performance and 
coordinates the activities of all input.6 Scholars on the theory of a nexus of contracts 
contend that shareholders put the capital into a firm, and bear the most risk and 
uncertainty of future return, so that their position in the firm is different from other 
contractual constituencies and their interest should be protected. 7  According to 
                                                        
3
 Berle, A. A. and Means, G. C., ‘From The Modern Corporation and Private Property’, in Kroszner, R. S. 
and Putterman, L., The Economic Nature of the Firm: A Reader, 3rd Edition, (ed.), originally published 
1986, Cambridge University Press (2009), 58.  
4
 Ibid., 59. 
5
 Bainbridge, S. M., The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, Oxford University Press 
(2008), 28-30. 
6
 Ibid., 29. 
7
 Dodd, E. M. (Junior), ‘For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees’, Harvard Law Review (1932), 
Volume 45, Issue. 7, 1149–1159; see also Epstein, E. J., Who Owns the Corporations? Management vs. 
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academics from the Chicago School of Law and Economics, the company is the 
shareholders’ property under the agent–board of directors’ coordination in the nexus of 
contracts, so that the standard used to evaluate the success of corporate governance in any 
particular company is dependent on maximizing shareholders’ profits.8 The owner of the 
firm and the shareholders’ interests are ensured by the board of directors and management, 
while other constituencies, such as employers or creditors, would be protected and 
limited through contracts and statutory laws.9  
 
Bainbridge states that shareholders’ interests should receive primacy in corporate 
governance, because it would affect management only in a passive manner, such as in 
voting. However, other constituencies are able to safeguard their own profit and negotiate 
with management through varied approaches, such as employees individually or 
collectively bargaining with employers, or local communities bargaining with employers 
through tax abatement.10 Therefore, shareholders who invest capital in a company, but 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Shareholders, 20th Century Fund-Priority Press Publications (1986), 13; see also Berle and Means, supra 
note 3, 59–63. 
8
 Clark, T., ‘The Stakeholder Corporation: A Business Philosophy for the Information Age’, Theories of 
Corporate Governance, the Philosophical Foundations of Corporate Governance, Routledge (1995), 193. 
9
 Blair, M. M., ‘Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century’, 
Theories of Corporate Governance, the Philosophical Foundations of Corporate Governance, Routledge 
(1995), 177; Easterbrook and Fischel claimed that ‘for most firms the expectation is that the residual risk 
bearers have contracted for a promise to maximize long-run profits of the firm, which in turn maximizes the 
value of their stock. Other participants contract for fixed payouts, monthly interest, salaries, pensions, 
severance payments, and the like.’ See Easterbrook, F. H. and Fischel, D. R., The Economics Structure of 
Corporate Law, Harvard University Press (1996), 35. 
10
 In some companies, they could run effectively without seeking equity investments for years, but could 
not survive for long without regular infusion of new employees, new debt financing, or provision of 
resources. Therefore, in regularly run or well-run companies, shareholders are not as vital as other 
participants, such as employees, creditors and suppliers. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, 50–55; see also 
Kershaw, D., Company Law in Context: Text and Materials, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press (2012), 
335–340; see also Bainbridge, S. M., ‘Redirecting State Takeover Laws at Proxy Contexts’, Wisconsin Law 
Review (1992), 1088–1090; see also, Macey, J. R., ‘An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for 
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receive less protection and remedy should be ensured the maximization of share value 
and interest. 
 
1.1.2 Transaction cost 
 
From a historical perspective, Arthur Salter stated that ‘[t]he normal economic system 
works itself. For its current operation, it is under no central control; it needs no central 
survey, over the whole range of human activity and by a process that is automatic, elastic 
and responsive.’11 For example, if the price of factor A becomes higher in X than in Y, 
then A will move away from X to Y, unless the difference disappears, so that the price 
mechanism decides the allocation of factors of production.12 This description assumes 
that the economic system is able to run automatically under the coordination of the price 
mechanism, and the exchange and distribution of resource are also directly reliant on it. 
However, Coase notes that price mechanism will not always work in an individual 
economic plan for subjective reasons.13 If worker A moves from X to Y, because he was 
required to do so; or if worker A remains in X, except for the price factor, he can receive 
priority or advantages in X rather than Y, A would be willing to stay in X.14 Firms came 
about under such circumstances where an external element partly influenced the 
exchange, although personal willingness was not a very important reason for the 
emergence of the firm. Transactions conducted under the price mechanism require costs 
in order to discover what the relevant prices are and to establish contracts with other 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties’, 21 Stetson Law Review 
(1992), 29–37. 
11
 Salter’s description of price mechanism was referred to in Coase’s theory from Robertson’s approval in 
his book. See Robertson, D.H., Control of Industry, Nisbet and Co. (1930), 85; see also Coase, supra note 1, 
79–82.  
12
 See Coase, supra note 1, 81–83. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ibid. 
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constituencies, while transactions coordinated within the firm do not eliminate contracts 
but greatly reduce them. 15  Therefore, price mechanism cannot always direct the 
allocation of resources and balance transactions in an arm’s-length market in which 
‘outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is coordinated through a 
series of exchange transactions in the market. Within a firm, these market transactions are 
eliminated and in place of the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is 
substituted by the entrepreneur–coordinator, who directs production.’16  
 
Coase assumed that ‘it may be desired to make a long-term contract for the supply of 
some article or service. This may be due to the fact that if one contract is made for a 
longer period, instead of several shorter ones, then certain costs of making each contract 
will be avoided.’17 When a series of short-term contracts are substituted by a long-term 
contract, the uncertainty and risk for the future cannot be forecast. Therefore, contractual 
parties include uncertainty and complexity in contracts, causing increases in the 
transactional cost of negotiation. Contractual transaction cost might be reduced, but not 
eliminated, due to the uncertainty and complexity in the process of contracting.18  
 
In addition, transaction costs in a firm would not be totally removed, because it is costly 
to divide a large amount of firm-specific investment, depending on the degree of 
difficulty of redeploying, especially specific knowledge, skill or technology.19 When 
price is not treated as the unique and decisive element in a market transaction, firms come 
                                                        
15
 Ibid., 83. 
16
 ‘Entrepreneur’ is the definition used in Coase’s theory to refer to the person who takes the place of the 
price mechanism in the direction of resources. See Coase, supra note 1, 81. 
17
 Ibid., 83. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Blair, M. M., Firm-specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm, Business, Economics and 
Regulatory Policy Working Paper No. 167848 (September 12, 2003), available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=167848, last accessed on 23 March 2013.  
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out to optimize owned resources and coordinate the contractual relationships with input 
owners, so that transaction costs exist, no matter what the control of firm-specific 
investment or contracts is.20  
  
It was necessary to grant the authority over the coordinating function to a coordinator to 
reduce the cost of the transaction of the specialized production resource and control the 
future uncertainty. The model of entrepreneur–coordinator came about as a result of 
corporate governance which could be defined as the hierarchical arrangement that the 
coordinator governs the firm-specific resources on the basis of the degree of difficulty in 
redeploying assets to other uses.21 This means that in order to reduce the cost in 
contractual transactions, it is necessary to establish an efficient governance structure, 
which fits the requirement of hierarchical management, to deal with the uncertainty, 
complexity and specificity of firm-specific resource. When corporate governance 
effectively coordinates resources and sets up contracts with input owners, it will attract 
many more resources from the market that are willing to enter into the firm, rather than 
being exchanged in the marketplace. Accordingly, when input owners would like to enter 
into corporate business, they might give up the capital price, to some extent, which will 
directly decrease transaction costs in the process of exchange. 
 
1.2 Models of corporate governance 
 
According to Clark’s research, the term ‘corporate governance’ was derived from ancient 
Greek and Latin: the word ‘corporate’ originated from the Latin word corpus meaning 
‘body’, and ‘governance’ was developed from the Latinised Greek gubernatio, meaning 
                                                        
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid. 
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‘management’ or ‘government’.22  Therefore, corporate governance is defined as a 
process of governing a company.23 Its emergence is close to that of the existence of the 
firm, which would be more effective to coordinate the relations among contractual 
constituents and reduce the transaction costs within a firm through diverse mechanisms in 
different models of corporate governance. In the following section three models of 
corporate governance will be explained, namely (1) the principal–agent model, (2) 
stakeholder theory and (3) team production.  
 
1.2.1 Principal–agent model 
 
Before the typical business units in the nineteenth century, owners of physical property or 
human resource owned full power with beneficial ownership, and control with complete 
right of use and to the fruits and the proceeds of input. The best guarantee of owner’s 
profit was to use own property for the purpose of acquiring maximum benefit.24 In the 
modern corporation, the property owner no longer disposes of his or her own property, 
but passes it on to the gathered control of another group who secures industrial efficiency, 
produces profit and obtains interest from control of the resources.25 
 
Blair devised a saying, on the basis of the theory of private property from Berle and 
Means: shareholders, as the owners, surrendered their property right to the corporation, 
                                                        
22
 Clark, T., ‘Cycles of Governance’, International Corporate Governance: A Comparative Approach, 
Routledge (2007), 1–3. 
23
 Ibid. 
24 As regards the combination of ownership and control of the property owner, Berle and Means also 
assumed that ‘if the individual is protected in the right both to use his own property as he sees fit and to 
receive the full fruits of its use, his desire for personal gain, for profits, can be relied upon as an effective 
incentive to his efficient use of any industrial property he may possess’. See Berle and Means, supra note 3, 
59–63. 
25 Ibid. 
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which should be operated in their sole interests.26 According to Berle and Means, 
physical control over the instruments of production would not be held by the resource 
owner, but be surrendered to centralized groups who manage property in bulk, while 
control of capital assets would also be passed from individual owners who had the right 
to enjoy the interest to unified control entirely.27 Shareholders’ property rights are 
divided into a bundle of rights, including the ownership and rights to possess, use, 
dispose of, exclude others, manage and control. Shareholders, therefore, have the right to 
receive the residual claim on the property and a limited right of control, while the rights 
to use and control property go to the board of directors and top management.28  
 
As regards Fama and Jensen’s view about the separation of ownership and control, the 
power to property is divided between the residual risk bearer and decision agent that may 
cause the latter’s opportunistic behaviour to operate or make decision on their own 
interest.29 This separation led to the emergence of the principal–agent model in corporate 
governance where shareholders put a capital investment into company and bear the 
residual risk, so that they are the owners of the firm, while the board of directors controls 
the company and ensures shareholders’ interest.30 It is impossible for all shareholders 
who lack professional knowledge and skills in corporate governance to be involved in 
routine decision-making within a company. They would, therefore, grant authority to the 
                                                        
26
 See also Blair, supra note 9, 176–179. 
27
 Berle. A. A. and Means, G. C., ‘Property in Transition’, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 
This Edition, originally published in 1932, Transaction Publishers (1991), Book I, Chapter I, 7–9; see also 
Blair, supra note 9, 177–178. 
28
 In production, property was seen as the physical instrument. When men no longer controlled the 
property, they did not really own material input, but pieces of paper, known as ‘stocks’, ‘bonds’ and other 
securities that would yield capital return in bulk under the controlling group’s unified coordination of all 
physical input and human resource within the corporation. See Blair, supra note 9, 181; see also, Berle and 
Means, supra note 3, 62–64. 
29
 Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C., ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’, Journal of Law and Economics 
(1983), Volume 26, Issue 2, 304–309. 
30
 Ibid.  
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board of directors to manage corporate issues, including decision-making and 
implementation, and without control, the board of directors might make decisions based 
on self-interest.31 
 
The agency problem exists due to the separation of ownership and control, caused by the 
conflict between the shareholders (the principal) and the board of directors (the agent) in 
the process of decision-making, where residual risk-bearing is separated from the control 
of the company: shareholders invest in the company, and the agent decides how to 
employ resources according to corporate governance. In this process, the shareholders 
invest in the company and take the risk of uncertain return. So, they expect to enhance the 
benefit for themselves through control of the property by the agent; whereas managerial 
agents, who initiate and implement decisions, are more like employees with fixed 
payment. If the board of directors takes actions to deviate from a residual claimant’s 
interest or operate in its own interest, shareholders will take the risk and bear the loss of 
the inappropriate performance.32  
 
In an open and complex corporation, this agency problem between shareholders and the 
board of directors could be relieved through the separation of decision management and 
control, which includes that initiation and implementation will be monitored or controlled 
by another group of agents who will ratify and monitor the decision and its operation; the 
so-called non-executive board of directors.33 In unusual cases, residual claims integrated 
into one or a few shareholders lead to simple and direct monitoring and ratification of 
                                                        
31
 MacNeil, I., ‘Corporate Governance: Overview and Evolution’, An Introduction to the Law on Financial 
Investment, 2nd Edition, Hart Publishing (2012), 315–316. 
32
 See Fama and Jensen, supra note 29, 304–307. 
33
 Ibid., 305–309. 
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decision-making by the board of directors. Top-level decision control is separated from 
top decision management and is exercised by residual claimants.34 
 
According to the theory discussed above, corporate governance is a model of principal 
and agent, in the form of separation of ownership and control where the board of 
directors and management, as agent, make decisions and operate to maximize 
shareholders’ interests. However, the separation of ownership and control might cause the 
controlling agent to abuse his or her rights by, for example, working for self-interest, 
which means that the right of decision-making vested in the board of directors is divided 
into decision management and decision control, and the board’s behaviour and process of 
decision-making could be controlled and monitored by another group. Therefore, 
corporate governance means that an agent (the board of directors) holds the right to make 
decisions and is controlled by another group in a nexus of contracts to ensure the 
appropriate return to contractual constituents and shareholders and the maximization of 
their interests.  
 
1.2.2  Stakeholder theory 
 
In the conventional input–output model of corporations, suppliers, investors and 
employees invest input in a firm and produce output that is sold to customers; while in 
Donaldson and Preston’s foundational research of stakeholder theory, all stakeholders, 
including employees, suppliers, communities, governments and so on, participate in the 
                                                        
34
 In Fama and Jensen’s view, the open and complex company stands in contrast to the small, non-complex 
company in that the specific knowledge of decision-making in the former company is diffused among 
agents. In an open and complex company with many shareholders, it is costly and not possible for residual 
claimants to participate in decision control, so that delegation of control to other agent with specific 
knowledge will be more efficient in corporate governance. See Fama and Jensen, supra note 29, 308–309. 
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production of the firm and derive legitimate interests to obtain benefits. 35  The 
stakeholder theory emphasizes the organizational success in achieving the corporate 
objective of profitability through stakeholder management.36 In practice, the emphasis on 
relationships with customers, employees, suppliers and investors indicates that corporate 
governance is more about satisfying all constituencies’ interests than that of the 
shareholder.37  According to Anthony Cleaver, the Chairperson of IBM UK, many 
companies in the UK have adopted the stakeholder theory into corporate operation to 
‘give due weight to all key stakeholders to assure shareholder value’.38 
 
The definition of stakeholding was adopted about 400 years ago, according to the records 
of the Oxford Dictionary, and not only referred to employees in a firm, but ranged from 
contractual stakeholders, such as shareholders, customers, suppliers and lenders, to 
community stakeholders, such as consumers, regulators, government, the media and local 
communities.39 Clarkson defines a firm as ‘a system of stakeholders operating within the 
larger system of the host society that provides the necessary legal and market 
infrastructure for the firm’s activities. The purpose of the firm is to create wealth or value 
                                                        
35
 Donaldson and Preston regarded stakeholder theory as descriptive, instrumental and normative, and it 
respectively described how boards of directors made decisions concerning all corporate constituents, 
identified the connection between stakeholder management and achievement of corporate profitable goals, 
and instructed moral and normative guidelines of corporate governance with integration of stakeholders’ 
interests. Donaldson, T. and Preston, L. E., ‘The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, 
Evidence, and Implications’, Academy of Management Review (1995), Volume 20, Issue 1, 68–70 and 
75–85. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Clark, T., ‘European Corporate Governance’, International Corporate Governance: A Comparative 
Approach, Routledge (2007), 197. 
38
 RSA, Tomorrow’s Company Inquiry Final Report, Royal Society of Arts (1995). 
39
 See Clark, supra note 37, 194; see also Woodward, D. G. et al., ‘Organizational Legitimacy and 
Stakeholder Information Provision’, British Journal of Management (1996), Volume 7, Issue 4, 34. 
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for its stakeholders who play different roles in [the] company by converting their stakes 
into goods and services’.40  
 
Regarding shareholders’ profit, the board of directors is entrusted to ensure that it is 
maximized. However, the board cannot simply tell shareholders that it will work to 
maximize their interest; it must reflect whether employees work properly, customers are 
satisfied with the service or goods the company provides and so on. The success of a 
corporation is judged on the motivation of employees, the close relationship with 
customers, maintaining good relations with suppliers and even the positive reputation of 
the corporation in the community.41 Even if corporate governance aims to maximize the 
shareholders’ interest, stakeholders will be the foundation in any corporate operation.  
 
Directors should be obliged by law to act in the interest of the whole company, so that 
shareholder maximization is based on the stakeholder theory that ‘only when all of the 
other constituent relationships of the corporation – with constituent relationships of the 
corporation – with customers, employees, suppliers, distributors and the wider 
community are fully recognized and developed that long term shareholder value can be 
released.’42 Stakeholder theory is coherent with the legal requirement of corporate 
governance to promote the success of the company as a whole, because the stakeholders’ 
benefit is crucial to the company’s overall achievement. This would protect the interests 
of the company’s employees, keep positive business relationships with suppliers and 
customers, ensure a positive social reputation, and reduce the negative impact on the 
community as a whole.43 
                                                        
40
 Clarkson, M. B. E., A Risk Based Model of Stakeholder Theory, Toronto University Press (1994), 21-24. 
41
 Tricker, B., Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices, Oxford University Press (2009), 
230. 
42
 Clark, T., ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’, International Corporate Governance: A Comparative 
Approach, Routledge (2007), 281. 
43
 Ibid., 283. 
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1.2.3 Team production 
 
In contrast to Coase’s view that markets do not operate without costs, but through 
firm-to-form contract, Alchian and Demsetz contended that the firm could obtain 
comparative advantage by organizing resources through team productivity, meaning that 
the input owners would increase productivity through team co-operation.44 This implies 
that the aggregate team production is greater than the sum of the individual input. 
Through ordinary market contracts, each labour input owner could freely exchange with 
the master through contracts. This contractual exchange is described as ‘the centralized 
contractual agent in a team productive process – not some superior authoritarian directive 
or disciplinary power.’45 Team production, in contrast, is a process in which ‘(1) several 
types of resources are used and (2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each 
cooperating resource and (3) not all resources used in team production belong to one 
person’; that is, not the simple accumulation of separable individual productivity.46  
 
This model poses the problem that if a team member receives a fixed return irrespective 
of whether or not he or she works hard, it would lead to the incentive of shirking where 
the team member would allocate rewards from the surplus of total output, and the reward 
might be higher than which that team member really achieved.47 In order to avoid 
                                                        
44
 Alchian, A. A. and Demsetz, H., ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization’, 
American Economic Review (1972), Volume 62, Issue 5, 777–781. 
45
 See Blair, supra note 19. 
46
 See Alchian and Demsetz, supra note 44, 779. 
47
 The increase of total output was produced through the effort from some team member in team 
production, so that the final return to all team members would be accordingly increased. However, other 
team members who were shirking or just achieved the normal burden of work in team production would 
also receive a higher income in relation to their true performance due to the total growth of output. See 
Blair, M. M. and Stout, L. A., ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,’ Virginia Law Review 
(March 1999), Volume 85, Issue 2, 264–268; see also Alchian and Demsetz, supra note 44, 776–780. 
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shirking, it is necessary to detect and monitor the team member’s performance through 
someone who is specialized as a monitor to check the input performance of team 
members. The monitor is entitled to distribute the net earnings of the team and payments 
to other input owners, who are just involved in routine work in team production, and the 
team monitor will receive the residual product above the prescribed amounts that are 
agreed by other input owners. The person who receives the residual rewards will measure 
output performance, apportion rewards and detect or estimate the team member’s 
marginal productivity. The monitor has the authority to revise or even terminate an input 
owner’s contract without any termination of contract with other team members. This 
would discipline team member’s behaviour and reduce shirking. By observing the input 
behaviour, the central party to all contracts with input owners may alter the membership 
of the team as well.48 The monitoring is not only to avoid shirking, but also to measure 
the output and reward each team member, which ensures fair return on the relevant output 
of the individuals.49 
 
In the theory of team production, individual input is defined as the free transaction in a 
firm whereby each owner provides the resource for firm through contract, but not 
appointment. When the corporate operation is dependent on teamwork, problems of 
reward and shirking arise. Corporate governance in team production means that a small 
group of team members with authorized rights to observe the input performance for 
rewarding individuals monitors shirking in team production and coordinates the input 
owners within the whole organization as the nexus of contracts. As the agent, the board of 
directors is regarded as the mediating organ to balance team members’ interest, that is, to 
‘keep everyone happy enough’ and avoid shirking in team production.50 Corporate 
                                                        
48
 See Alchian and Demsetz, supra note 44, 785. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 The theory of corporate governance in team production refers to public corporations with wide and free 
direct control over the ‘team’; whereas a private company adheres more to the ‘grand-design 
Chapter 1: Theory of Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility 
© C. YUN 21 
governance in team production is also the extreme stakeholder model that actively offers 
better conditions to attract individual input owners’ collective work within a firm. 
 
1.3 Division of power: Shareholders, board of directors and management 
 
In terms of the separation of ownership and control, shareholders’ right of 
decision-making is surrendered to a board of directors who controls the operation of the 
company in corporate governance. However, this might lead to the agency problem that 
the board of directors might act in self-interest, in which case shareholders have the right 
of control over decision-making.51 In the early stage, shareholders, as the principal owner, 
exercise the power of control to dominate and influence the decision-making and 
implementation of the board of directors, to secure individual profit and to act in their 
own interests in matters of corporate governance. Shareholders’ control makes the board 
of directors titular and dependent on the will of the principal shareholders, which might 
cause profit-seeking in the shareholders’ interest, but not in the corporate interest as a 
whole.52 As the main organs of corporate governance, shareholders own the company 
and the right of control to decision-making; and the board of directors is entitled to 
control the property independently and ensure shareholders’ benefit and the company’s 
success through decision management and decision control. In the classical pyramid of 
management, it is only in a hierarchical structure that the chief executive officer’s (CEO) 
authority and responsibility are delegated by managers downwards and reported upwards 
                                                                                                                                                                     
principal-agent model’, because the converged share ownership, to some extent, deprives the board of 
directors of the control of the firm. See Blair and Stout, supra note 47, 280–282. 
51
 Shareholders’ right of control is distinguished from control in the board of director; the former is to 
monitor whether self-interested misbehaviour occurred in the process of decision-making among the board 
of directors, while the latter means the board of directors and management made decisions to ensure the 
company’s success, and coordinates the property and physical instruments of production in the company. 
52 Berle, A. A. and Means, C. G., ‘The Legal Position of “Control”’, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, This edition, originally published in 1932, Transaction Publishers (1991), Book II, Chapter VI, 
235–239. 
Chapter 1: Theory of Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility 
© C. YUN 22 
in return. It used to be the obvious structure between the board of directors and 
management that the board made the decisions and management hierarchically practised 
these decisions and implemented the routine operation of the company in corporate 
governance.53 However, in Tricker’s board circle and management triangle, the executive 
directors not only hold a position on the board of directors, but also sit at the top of the 
managerial triangle. In practice, top management is the catchphrase for those who work at 
the apex, and companies often define their top as a few senior officials sitting on the 
executive board of directors.54 
 
The following section will mainly present how shareholders and boards of directors, who 
respectively control and make decisions, exercise their power as the main organs in 
corporate governance.55 
 
1.3.1  Shareholder control 
 
It is said that a shareholder is the only corporate participant with the residual, unfixed, ex 
post claim on corporate investment and future return, and therefore plays an important 
role in corporate governance.56 Shareholders’ interests are easily harmed due to the 
separation of ownership and control, so the rights of decision control are conferred on a 
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 See Davis, G. F. and Useem, M., ‘Top Management, Company Directors and Corporate Control’, in 
Pettigrew, A. et al., Handbook of Strategy and Management, (ed.), SAGE Publication (2002), 247–251. 
54
 See Tricker, supra note 41, 35–36; see also Davis and Useem, supra note 53, 249–253. 
55
 In this thesis, the definition of ‘corporate governance’ is limited to complex companies, which 
distinguishes a hierarchical structure among three organs: (1) shareholders invest property and own the 
company, (2) while the board of directors makes decisions on corporate governance and (3) management 
implements the decisions made by the board of directors. Different from a complex company, are a family 
company and shareholders who own a company, who also hold the main right of control in corporate 
governance. The role of management is sometimes assumed by family members due to loyalty to the 
owners of a company, so that organs of corporate governance are not different between shareholder and 
management (including the board of directors). 
56
 See Bainbridge, supra note 5, 49–51. 
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board of directors, decision management is monitored and the board of directors is 
required to enhance the corporate portfolio.57 
 
1.3.1.1 Transferrable shares 
 
When the corporate operation and performance are not satisfactory to achieve the 
maximization of corporate profit, shareholders are allowed to sell their shares to ensure 
own interest, which indirectly affects the board of directors’ behaviour in corporate 
governance. Bainbridge adopted an example in his book that ‘the probabilities of CEOs 
being fired and replaced by executives from outside the firm are higher after large 
sell-offs by institutional investors’.58 If shareholders’ interests cannot be ensured by 
effective corporate governance, they are able to transfer their shares to avoid risk due to 
the poor corporate performance. The loss of capital and investment from shareholders is 
also a warning sign of weak corporate governance, in which case the board of directors 
has to improve decision-making and meet shareholders’ profit in corporate governance. 
 
1.3.1.2 Voting rights 
 
Shareholders normally vote at shareholder meetings, which are usually held annually and 
mostly through proxy. As the owners of a firm-specific investment with uncertain return, 
they have the right to vote to elect the board of directors; and if management fails to 
enhance shareholders’ residual claim, they could vote to remove the incumbent board of 
directors. Voting rights give shareholders de facto and de jure control to elect directors 
and ‘the right to know’ about the board of directors’ performance in corporate governance. 
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The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereinafter ‘OECD’) 
regulates that: 
 
effective shareholder participation in key corporate governance decisions such as the 
nomination and election of board members, should be facilitated. Shareholders 
should be able to make their views known on the remuneration policy for board 
members and key executives. The equity component of compensation schemes for 
board members and employees should be subject to shareholder approval.59 
 
1.3.1.3  Participation and asking rights 
 
Shareholders have the right to participate in, and be informed about, any general 
corporate changes, such as amendments to the statutes or articles of incorporation, or 
similar governing documents of the company; the authorization of additional shares; and 
extraordinary transactions.60  Shareholders should be informed efficiently about the 
position of the corporate operation and decisions; should enquire from the board of 
directors about corporate issues, including annual external audits; and should make 
advisory proposals as solutions within reasonable limitations.61 
 
Owing to the separation of ownership and control, shareholders’ a residual claim is not 
assured without limitation, so that they would be more eager to enhance corporate profit. 
Hence, shareholders’ voting and participation are not only to monitor and deter the board 
of directors and management, but also, as an auxiliary function, to provide constructive 
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 See Tricker, supra note 41, 33; see also OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004, 18, available 
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12 November 2013.  
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and valuable advice to corporate governance. This aims to ensure shareholders’ own 
interests and assist in improving corporate governance, which is mainly controlled and 
operated by the board of directors and management. 
 
1.3.2  Board of directors 
 
As the main organ of corporate governance, the board of directors is the shareholders’ 
agent in decision-making and in conducting the strategic operations of the company 
through its management. To coordinate corporate elements within the company optimally 
and ensure shareholders’ profit in corporate governance, the process of decision-making 
and implementation would also be monitored through the division of functions in the 
board of directors. In Tricker’s theory, the function is divided into four parts: (1) strategy 
formulation, (2) policy-making, (3) supervision of executive management, and (4) 
accountability to shareholders and others. 62  The OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance specify the duties as reviewing and guiding corporate strategy; monitoring 
the effectiveness of corporate governance practice; monitoring and replacing key 
executives; ensuring board nomination and election processes; and overseeing the 
information disclosure, among others.63 
 
1.3.2.1  Decision-making in corporate governance 
 
Under the circumstance of separation of ownership and control, the agent (i.e., board of 
directors) should make decisions and control the company in the interest of the principal 
(i.e., the shareholder). In the UK, with the emergence of public-held corporations, 
shareholders had been moved from positive owners to passive investors, and their 
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ownership and interest had been steadily weakened. 64  In Ireland’s view, modern 
company law emphasizes the independent existence of a company and the eroded 
shareholder ownership rights, while it fails to personify a company as a separate 
corporate personality and still grants shareholders the title of ‘owner’.65 In the period 
before the UK Company Act 2006, directors’ duties were enforced as being ‘to act in the 
best interest of the company’, which is the same as ‘in the best interest of shareholder’.66 
Therefore, boards of directors had to be extremely concerned with maximizing 
shareholders’ profit without being distracted from consideration of other corporate 
constituents when making decisions in corporate governance. The ‘shareholder-focused’ 
model of corporate governance ignored the comprehensive operation associated with 
stakeholder participation in the nexus of contracts. 
 
Directors’ duties were developed in later regulation such as the Companies Act 2006. 
Section 172 (1) modified the way in which the board of directors’ duty could be enforced: 
a director ‘must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to 
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole’, including 
the interests of employees, suppliers, customers, community and environment.67 The 
standard to judge the promotion of the success of the company was explained in a 
ministerial statement as ‘long-term shareholder value’.68 The Company Law Review 
                                                        
64
 In modern open companies, shareholders as the money capitalists, stand outside the company, whereas 
the board of directors is more directly involved in the company’s operation and production process which is 
‘moved from seeing directors as subject to the direction and control of the company’ to ‘a self-standing 
organ of the company as a separate depersonified entity’. See Ireland, P., ‘Company Law and the Myth of 
Shareholder Ownership’, 62 Modern Law Review (1999), 39–43.  
65
 See Ireland, supra note 64, 47–49. 
66
 The failure to separate corporate personality from shareholders’ ownership created the vagueness in the 
board of directors’ duty between the company’s interest and shareholder’s interest. See Ireland, supra note 
64, 47–52; see also Kershaw, supra note 10, 335–340. 
67
 UK Companies Act 2006 Ch. 46, Section 172. 
68
 Department of Trade and Industry, ‘Companies Act 2006: Duties of Company Directors’, Ministerial 
Statements (2007), available at: www.berr.gov.uk/, last accessed on 12 November 2012; also see Kershaw, 
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Steering Committee applied an enlightened shareholder value approach to reflect the 
benefit of its members as a whole in respect of shareholder value in the long term: it 
would be achieved through promoting other corporate constituencies’ interests.69 Thus, 
all corporate constituencies, shareholder and non-shareholder groups should be concerned 
about decision-making on the board of directors, which is the approach that should be 
followed to ensure the success of the company for the benefit of its member as a whole in 
the long term.  
 
Still, The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulation 2013 
also requires boards of directors to disclose information in the directors’ reports about 
business review; it should include a fair review of the company’s business and a 
description of the principal risks and uncertainties in the company; and information about 
environmental matters (including the impact of the company’s business on the 
environment), the company’s employees, social and community issues and so on.70 The 
Companies Act regulation generally confirms the accountability of the board of directors 
to stakeholders and to treat corporate benefits as a whole in decision-making. 
 
When there is litigation involving the directors’ decision, the court would issue a 
judgment on the consideration of whether the board of directors had taken into 
consideration the interests of the company in its decision-making; for example, in the 
case of Re Smith and Fawcett Limited, the incorporated company was operated by Joseph 
Fawcett and Norman Smith who both held the same portion of issued shares and were the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
supra note 9, 381–382. Department of Trade and Industry was a UK government department formed on 
19 October 1970. It was replaced with the creation of the Department for Business Department for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform and the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills on 
28 June 2007. 
69
 Company Law Review Steering Committee, ‘Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The 
Strategic Framework’ (1999), Chapter5 (1); see also Kershaw, supra note 10, 335–342. 
70
 The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulation 2013, Section 414A-C. 
Chapter 1: Theory of Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility 
© C. YUN 28 
directors of the company. After Fawcett had passed away, his wife and son would inherit 
the shares as the late Fawcett’s will had appointed. However, one of the directors, Smith, 
refused to register any transfer of shares to Fawcett’s wife and son. In the lawsuit, the 
final judgment stated that Smith had the express power to refuse to register a transfer of 
shares which they purported to exercise. As Lord Greene said:  
 
the principles to be applied in cases where the articles of a company confer a 
discretion on directors with regard to the acceptance of transfers of shares are, for 
the present purposes, free from doubt. They must exercise their discretion bona fide 
in what they consider – not what a court may consider – is in the interests of the 
company, and not for any collateral purpose.71  
 
Shareholders have normal rights to transfer shares freely. However, Smith and Fawcett 
Ltd was a private company and in this circumstance, the control of directors over the 
members would be stricter than in public corporations.72 Therefore, in order to ensure the 
company’s interests, Smith’s refusal did not violate shareholders’ free right to transfer 
shares. Based on this case, the court will not judge whether the board of directors made 
the proper decision, but whether the company’s interest was maximized in the corporate 
decision as a whole.  
 
Another typical case that could be cited to illustrate how the court judges directors’ duty 
is Regentcrest v Cohen. Here the Richardson brothers, who were the directors of 
Regentcrest, were sued by Cohen for breach of their fiduciary duty. Jonathan Parker J, 
                                                        
71
 Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304, [1942] 1 ALL ER 542, CA. There are no objective standards 
about what directors should honestly consider as companies’ interests as a whole when they make decisions. 
What directors bona fide believe is an objective issue that is based on the particular circumstance in the 
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Chapter 1: Theory of Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility 
© C. YUN 29 
concluded that the Richardson brothers were not in breach of their duty, because they not 
only honestly believed that their decision was in the interests of company, but also 
injected 5 million GBP of their own funds into the company and kept supporting 
Regentcrest even though the company might have failed. Meanwhile, their waiver of 
claw-back and their support of Scott and Farley, who were another two directors of 
Regentcrest, were essential to maintaining a unified board, which was also crucial to the 
survival of the company.73 Therefore, the Richardson brothers’ decision was judged as 
honestly taking the best interests of the company into consideration. Jonathan Parker J 
questioned ‘whether the director honestly believed that his act or omission was in the 
interests of the company’, which means that when directors make a decision, they must 
decide whether they actually believed it was in the company’s interests at that time and 
honestly achieved their fiduciary duty in the process of decision-making.74 
 
In the period governed by the Company Act 2006, the standards by which directors’ 
decisions and the process of decision-making were judged were changed so as ‘to 
promote the success of the company’ and to ‘exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence’. 
However, the approach of the courts in reviewing compliance with the duty is still similar 
to the pre-Company Act era. The court will adopt the legislation to judge whether 
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 Regentcrest plc v Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 80. In Parker’s view, directors honestly believed’ is the 
subjective issue of whether the directors actually thought it was in the company’s interests at the time of the 
decision. The assessment of directors’ behaviour depends on whether the decision was to the benefit of the 
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directors performed reasonable care, skill and diligence in the process of decision-making 
to promote the success of the company.75 
 
The situation of courts’ judgment in the United States of America (hereinafter ‘US’) is 
different from the UK: in Delaware,76 the court adopted the Business Judgment Rule to 
review directors’ decision and decision-making processes. In the case of In re Walt 
Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, Chancellor Chandler asserted that the Business 
Judgment Rule was a presumption that the directors honestly believed the decision to be 
in the best interests of the company. If, according to this rule, directors had exercised the 
duty of care and had not been guilty of any gross negligence, the court would only adopt 
a rationality review to consider whether the basis of the decision was rational. Conversely, 
if it is proved that directors had violated their fiduciary duty, the court would apply the 
entire fairness review to determine whether the decision was fair to the company.77 
Plaintiffs should take the burden to prove directors’ breach of fiduciary duty to rebut the 
presumption of the Business Judgment Rule. The gross negligence standard is the basis of 
review whether directors honestly achieved the duty of care in the decision-making 
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 Companies Act 2006, sections 172 and 174, supra note 67. Sub-paragraph (a) to (f) about employees, 
suppliers, customers and so on should be also considered as factors in decisions to promote the success of 
the company. Section 174 regulates directors to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence that the three 
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process to make a decision in the best interests of the company;78 in other words, if the 
gross negligence happened in the decision-making process, the court would have the right 
to review whether the decision itself was fair to the company in relation to the fairness 
standard. 
 
1.3.2.2  Decision management and decision control 
 
Fama and Jensen separate decision-making control from decision-making management so 
as to avoid the agency problem of decision-makers initiating decisions and implementing 
them in their own interests. In an open and complex company, the specific knowledge of 
decision-making is diffused among agents, so that the agents specialized in initiation and 
implementation of decisions may not have special knowledge in ratification and 
monitoring of decision that would lead to misbehaviour in decision-making, such as 
improper monitoring or acting in the agent’s own interests.79 Decision management, 
including initiating and implementing the decision, is operated by a decision-making 
body and top management, while decision control to ratify and monitor the decision is 
operated by other independent agents on the board of directors who are not involved in 
decision-making.80 Separation of the two functions leads to the division of function and 
powers in the board in the form of executive directors and non-executive directors, while 
the entire board is there mainly to ensure the shareholders’ interest and to safeguard the 
stakeholders’ rights through effective division of functional powers. 
 
                                                        
78
 The gross negligence standard is relatively subjective, that is, it is defined as ‘reckless indifference to, or 
a deliberate disregard for, the whole body of stockholders of actions which are without the bounds of 
reason’. See In re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation, supra note 76; see also Kershaw, supra note 10, 
464–465. 
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In Baysinger and Butler’s view, executive directors are compared to the facilitators of 
strategy formulation/implementation and are also depicted as engaging in strategic 
manoeuvres, such as providing implicit status rewards to favoured subordinates, 
facilitating the communication of relevant information to outsider directors during board 
meetings. 81  In addition, they are more suited to evaluating the performance of 
management, because they can directly and internally monitor managerial behaviour and 
observe the financial performance that is affected by corporate management. 82 
Non-executive directors have specific knowledge since most of them work in 
professional fields that are related to corporate governance, such as finance, consultancy 
and law, and are able to observe or monitor managerial conduct and performance. It is a 
requirement that non-executive directors must not currently be employed by the firm or 
have any strong psychological or economic dependence on its managers.83 Therefore, 
non-executive directors have the power to monitor and ratify the decision-making and 
implementation of executive directors, in order to impede the infringement of 
shareholder’s profit, and enhance the quality of decision-making and top management. 
 
The performance of boards of directors, which is intangible, is always monitored by 
financial performance, such as shareholders selling their shares on the stock market due 
to the poor performance of management. Davis and Useem contended that a ‘manager’s 
wealth is tied to share price through numerous devices, including outright ownership, 
stock options, and compensation keyed to stock performance that align executive and 
shareholder interest’. 84  Share price will not directly reflect the internal corporate 
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information, but whether managers efficiently co-operate with stakeholders and enhance 
corporate interests. 85  Relating managers’ rewards and punishments to financial 
performance is an effective mechanism to stimulate manager’s motivation to operate on 
corporate interest and solve the problem of shirking.86 
 
1.3.2.3 Information disclosure by board of directors 
 
Executive directors are not only in charge of initiation and implementation of decisions, 
but also disclose information about corporate governance to stakeholders and 
non-executive directors to ratify and monitor their decisions. In corporate governance, 
monitoring by shareholders and independent directors increases agency cost, because 
without applicable information, shareholders only get access to knowledge of 
management performance through communication with top management, such as 
frequent shareholder meetings.87 Therefore, if a board of directors completely discloses 
information, including agency information and accuracy information, the extra 
governance device for shareholders to monitor managerial performance and evaluate 
share value is not necessary, which leads to the reduction of agency costs.88 Although 
information disclosure involves cost, Holland believes that ‘the management will publish 
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 Any failure to achieve stakeholders profit might cause the share price to go down, such as quality 
rumours, customer complaints, environmental risk and so on. 
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 See Baysinger and Butler, supra note 81, 80.  
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 Eng, L. L., and Mak, Y. T., ‘Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure’, Journal of Accounting 
and Public Policy (2003), Volume 22, Issue 4, 329–330. 
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 Ho, S. M. and Wong, K. S., ‘A Study of the Relationship between Corporate Governance Structures and 
the Extent of Voluntary Disclosure’, Journal of International Accounting, Auditing & Taxation (2001), 
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until they reach the point when they will observe that the capital agency costs reduction 
has equaled to the increase of the information publication costs for the market and the 
other users’.89 
 
The firm-specific factors of a corporate governance structure would affect information 
disclosure, resulting in better-functioning boards of directors, greater board independence 
and effective audit committees. First, the proportion of independent directors on a board 
is connected to the quality of information disclosure, as pointed out by Ho and Wong. A 
larger proportion of independent directors on a board means that the strength of 
monitoring managerial behaviour would be increased, so that information disclosure 
required by independent directors is strictly access to knowledge about managerial 
operation and performance. Ho and Wong postulated the hypothesis that ‘companies with 
a higher portion of independent nonexecutive directors are more likely to have higher 
extent of voluntary disclosure’.90 Second, share ownership also has negative effects on 
the level of corporate disclosure in that less integration of shares among substantial 
shareholders (e.g., shareholdings of 5% and more) would lead to a much more urgent 
need for information disclosure about corporate governance; in other words, when share 
ownership is broadly diffused, shareholders would lose relatively powerful control of 
shares, so that outside monitoring of management is imperative to ensure that the share 
values are retained. Hence, managers should disclose accurate and credible information to 
shareholders for the purpose of external monitoring.91 Third, an effective audit committee 
influences the quality of information disclosure positively through professional assurance 
of reliability and accuracy of disclosed reports. In Forker’s argument, ‘the existence of 
audit committees may improve internal control and thus regarded it as an effective 
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monitoring device for improving disclosure quality’.92 McMullen supports the positive 
connection between the existence of audit committees and reliable financial reporting.93 
 
Research conducted on the interlink between corporate governance and information 
disclosure found that effective internal corporate governance enhanced the quality and 
level of information disclosure. From Verriest et al.’s study on the impact of the adoption 
of the International Financial Reporting Standards (hereinafter ‘IFRS’) in corporate 
governance, it can be concluded that higher corporate governance with strong investor 
protection would increase the level of corporate information disclosure. Their hypothesis 
stated, ‘ceteris paribus, firms’ governance strength is positively associated with the 
quality of compliance and disclosure to IFRS adoption’.94 
 
As one of the board’s duties and vital corporate governance tool, sufficient information 
disclosure provides an objective, credible and accurate portrait of corporate operation and 
performance to market participants. In information disclosure, risk and uncertainty in 
business activity would be presented through reports, so that investors are able to predict 
the value of future investment. 95  Through the board of directors’ authentic and 
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comprehensive information disclosure, investors increase their confidence in supporting 
the investment to companies with a transparent mechanism of information disclosure and 
high credit.96  Eliminating information asymmetry between companies and investors 
would reduce the cost of capital in transactions, and attract potential investment 
associated with an increase in the stock price of the offering company. Therefore, as a 
corporate governance device, information disclosure effectively enhances a company’s 
market value through obtaining investment and increasing the share price on the stock 
market to maximize the company’s interest. 
 
1.4 Emergence of CSR 
 
The emergence of the stakeholder theory, and adoption of social and environmental issues 
in decision-making, led to the establishment of CSR. Managers are currently 
encountering the need from multiple stakeholders to achieve the new notion of a wise 
approach to enhance corporate financial return, harmonize the relationship among 
stakeholders and improve corporate governance. In Dunfee’s work on stakeholder theory, 
Windsor defined CSR as ‘any concept concerning how managers should handle public 
policy and social issues’; McWilliams and Siegel, in turn, contend that ‘CSR appears to 
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further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by 
law’.97 
 
CSR has the critical and sustainable long-term objective that both external and internal 
stakeholders’ social, environmental and other interests should be integrated into the 
business operations. Such sustainable development should be connected to the main 
stakeholders and employees, and be established on a voluntary basis. CSR and 
sustainability are derived from numerous trends, namely the heightened increase in the 
population, which causes the imbalanced distribution of wealth, education, health care 
and so on; overuse of energy and its omission, which bring about environmental pollution; 
the development of urbanization and mobility; and the emergence of ecosystems.98 A 
company is an organization with a resource-based business that needs physical and 
human resources. CSR in the context of sustainability is to maintain the use of ecological 
resources and human capital continuously in future. The triple bottom line is ‘profit, 
people and planet’ that CSR not only enhances the financial performance of a company, 
but also sustains the development of people and the earth.99  
 
1.4.1 Indirect legal effect of CSR 
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The law seldom regulates CSR directly in statutes, because it is difficult to enforce the 
scope and mechanism in a company where public interests are involved in its commercial 
objectives. However, public interest is the root of all corporate legitimacy, so that social 
responsibility is strongly recommended in current legislation to avoid social harm, such 
as pollution, dangerous products or discrimination.100 As the minimum standard, the law 
reinforces the fact that boards of directors must take social respect into consideration in 
their decision-making and leave an open mind on the way in which social responsibility 
is to be practised. Boards would exercise CSR voluntarily and be incorporated into 
decision-making in terms of varied understanding and the situation in each individual 
company.101 
 
Specific regulations related to various stakeholders are the indirect basis on which 
directors perform in the best interest of the company as a whole. In order to improve 
corporate governance, boards of directors should go beyond the legal minimum standard 
and should apply CSR to ensure stakeholders’ interests are taken into account in their 
decision-making; for example, in the marketplace, the customer is safeguarded by 
relevant regulation, namely the UK Consumer Protection Act 1987, or Unfair Trading 
Regulations 2008, in respect of the provision of qualified product and after-sales service. 
Beyond the legal basis, companies should provide high-quality products with the 
achievement of CSR, because ethical issues influence consumer behaviour; the so-called 
purchasing votes on social responsibility issues, which leads to the emergence of new 
concepts, such as ‘conscience consumerism’, ‘ethical consumerism’, or the ‘green 
consumer’. Consumers support and reward companies who devote resources to CSR, 
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believing that companies with CSR are more reliable and able to provide products with 
higher quality.102 The Body Shop, which is famous for anti-product-testing on animals, is 
popular among consumers not only because of the cosmetics themselves, but also the 
consistent insistence on protection of the ecological balance. Negative achievement of 
CSR will cause consumer punishment, such as boycotts. Top management should, 
therefore, make strategic decisions on the development of CSR to cater for consumers’ 
preference, such as Fair-Trade products or ‘dolphin-friendly’ tuna.103 With the advent of 
ethical consumerism, ethical branding was subsequently introduced as the strategy to 
follow in decision-making. In Smith’s view, ethical branding is a developing method, no 
matter whether the ethical value is central to brand meaning or differentiated to other 
items to develop the ethical meaning.104 In the latter case, it is also a strategy to expand 
the range of a company’s business, because new products or services may be developed 
to accomplish the ethical value. 
 
According to basic legal protection, employees demand good working conditions and fair 
treatment; investors expect reliable and transparent financial statements; consumers 
require high quality in products and safety; and societies exert pressure for sustainable 
development and environmental protection.105 Instead of creating an adversarial effect, 
boards of directors must increase stakeholders’ interest through CSR in a positive way. 
This could be achieved by making decisions based on the achievement of CSR, which 
would pursue the economic purpose positively. In the following section, the 
decision-making in CSR will be analysed in terms of mechanism and accountability. 
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1.4.2 Theory and mechanisms of decision-making in CSR 
 
Berle and Means, and Milton Friedman support the theories that the corporate executive 
is the employee of the owners of the business, and that they should ‘make money as much 
as possible [for the] principal owners’.106 However, corporate executives also play the 
role of social employee to achieve public benefit. Therefore, the decision and activities to 
increase profit should be limited within the rules of social norms without deception and 
fraud.107 In the model of principal and agent, the corporation falls under the shareholders’ 
ownership and the board of directors is appointed to enhance and protect shareholder’s 
investment effectively, and even the OECD Principles which are alleged to ensure 
shareholder’s interests in the long term.108 With the development from shareholder profit 
maximization to the company’s interest as a whole, the goal of a company’s success 
would be achieved through the company’s long-term value of making decisions with 
complete consideration of the stakeholders’ interest. 
 
Achievement of CSR is the path to satisfying stakeholders. However, CSR is costly and 
unquantifiable if companies invest negligible amounts of money in it. In this case, the 
amount of profit that will be returned from the investment cannot be evaluated accurately 
because it is difficult to calculate the exact relationship between the cost of CSR and its 
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return. The achievement of CSR in stakeholders will definitely increase shareholder value, 
so that when the cost of CSR is equal to the profit for the shareholder, the investment of 
CSR is the most effective. McWilliams and Siegel advocated that in order ‘to maximize 
profit, the firm should offer precisely that level of CSR for which the increased revenue 
(from increased demand) equals the higher cost (of using resources to provide CSR)’.109 
The application of CSR should be maintained up to that point at which ‘the social cost 
curve interests the social benefit curve’.110 As Keay said, when managers do not concern 
themselves with constituency interest, the company might lose firm specific investment 
from stakeholders. However, according to Keay, the company should only distribute 
resources to stakeholders at the point of ‘where the marginal dollar spent yields at least a 
dollar in return to shareholders’.111 However, in practice, it is impossible to meet 
shareholders’ interests and stakeholders’ needs at the same time. Thus, the following 
conflict exists: when the achievement of CSR has increased shareholder value, can the 
company stop practising CSR? The answer is that if the performance of CSR still does 
not meet the stakeholders’ primary requirement, they may withdraw their investment 
from the company, so that the long-term profit and shareholders’ interests will not be 
ensured for a long period. Stakeholders’ interests are various and continuously enhanced. 
Therefore, it is necessary to standardize the mechanism to meet stakeholders’ requirement 
of optimization.  
 
First, as mentioned before, stakeholders are classified as primary stakeholders and 
secondary stakeholders when they are correlated to the company’s survival and future. 
Top management should make decisions on the basis of satisfying primary stakeholders’ 
needs to ensure reliable and authentic financial investment and return to investors; the 
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provision of safe working conditions and fair treatment to employees; safeguarding of 
high-quality products and services to consumers; and the protection of the environment 
and concern for sustainable development in society. Satisfying secondary stakeholders is 
also costly, but costs could be reduced or avoided in an effective corporate mechanism; 
for example, the board of directors need not pay extra to the media to improve a 
company’s reputation, because the primary stakeholders’ satisfaction itself is the 
advertisement to the media and public for the achievement of CSR. The spreading of 
favourable feedback from primary stakeholders has therefore become the persuasive 
media. 
 
Second, as regards the division of stakeholders, Mitchell et al. provide an efficient 
method, namely the so-called stakeholder saliency as the mechanism used to make 
decisions about the board of directors to conceptualize and measure the validity of 
stakeholder claims.112 ‘Stakeholder saliency’ is ‘the extent to which a stakeholder is 
powerful, legitimate, and the claim is urgent, and suggested that stakeholder saliency 
helps managers to identify who and what really matters in any given stakeholder 
decision.’113  In Mitchell et al.’s model, salience is categorized into high salience, 
moderate salience and low salience. In high salience, stakeholders’ claims should 
combine power, legitimacy and urgency. 114  In moderate salience, the claim could 
associate any two of the elements, and, in low salience, there is only one element in the 
stakeholders’ claim. In this hierarchy, the board’s decision-making will first pay attention 
to the high salience stakeholders whose claim is not only legitimately urgent, but also 
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powerful to respond to any reward or punishment of the company.115 As a long-term 
mechanism, it will avoid the unnecessary wasting of resources in the achievement of CSR 
among stakeholders and balance every single claim to satisfy all stakeholders in corporate 
governance. 
 
There is another important issue concerning decision-making that requires attention and 
that is the mechanism of fixing prices because the cost of products or services with CSR 
is higher than products or services without CSR; the price will be higher than normal. 
Consumers prefer products or services that embrace CSR, only when the price is equal or 
a litter higher than others. If the price largely exceeds the average price range, some 
consumers will move away from corporate socially responsible goods or services. The 
result is that the fixing of reasonable prices is a vital component to attract consumers 
when managers make decisions in CSR.116 
 
1.4.3 CSR: A corporate governance strategy 
 
The result of taking stakeholder interests into consideration in decision-making in CSR is 
that stakeholders’ needs are satisfied, and enforcement is voluntary and exercised beyond 
the legal requirement, which means that CSR could be defined as an effective strategy in 
corporate governance. The effects of CSR, to some extent, meet the function and 
objective of corporate governance to achieve complete success of the company as a 
whole through the adoption of a stakeholder approach and social matters in 
decision-making. In the section that follows, CSR as a corporate governance strategy to 
maximize shareholders’ profit and ensure companies’ general success will be analysed. 
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1.4.3.1 Reducing transaction costs 
 
In the nexus of contracts, not only every constituency that transacts in the firm through 
contracts causes transaction costs due to the uncertainty and firm-specificity in the 
long-term contracts, transactions cost also emerge when the board of directors 
coordinates the relationship between contractual constituent and company in the 
transaction process; 117  for example, in order to stabilize the relationship with the 
consumer, companies have to spend a large amount of money on advertising or customer 
service; some of them even offer rewards to attract consumers. If companies could 
successfully achieve CSR, to some extent, the expense of ensuring the relationship with 
consumers would be avoided. Most people prefer vegetables with the green label 
‘environmental protection’, if the price is not much higher than that of other products; as 
in the case of the Body Shop, which purchases special ingredients and formulations that 
have not been tested on animals, which is broadly welcomed among consumers. The 
specific characteristic of CSR is, therefore, to reduce the cost of attracting many more 
consumers in the transaction.118  
 
In addition, transaction costs also exist in the relationship of employment. Companies 
should establish labour unions or organize a forum for employees to assert their rights 
and to ensure that they will make an effort in their work. The cost will be decreased if 
CSR can reach employees’ satisfaction in so far as they would like to work voluntarily for 
their companies, and the moral royalty to the company would be stimulated by the 
achievement of CSR. However, when there is a shortage of human resources, the cost of 
recruitment will arise, such as of a recruitment fair or on-campus recruitment. Companies 
that achieve CSR and have a good reputation, a positive social effect and appropriate 
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working conditions would be largely welcomed, which would minimize the cost of 
recruitment. The case of Foxcoon in China is a typical example of a company that does 
not meet the requirement of socially responsible employment, due to the failure of CSR. 
It was reported that during 2010–2011, more than ten serious incidents occurred in the 
workplace, employees committed suicide and some even died as a result of being 
overworked. The feedback and investigation among corporate employees reflected that 
the work burden was extremely stressful, the payment was low and employees’ basic 
rights could not be safeguarded. The company then embarked on salvaging its 
reputational crisis by recruiting new employees: many of its employees had resigned and 
it would not be able to attract new employees to work in the company because of its 
negative reputation and inadequate CSR.119 
 
Moreover, it is costly to coordinate the relationship between the company and the 
community. Through CSR, the community could reduce or exempt the expenditure or 
provide preferential company policies; for example, the local community might provide 
competition-enhancing tax breaks or reduced regulation to companies who properly 
achieve CSR in the community, which would cut down the costs of corporate 
governance.120 
 
When companies own equal rights to capital resources, intangible strength, such as CSR, 
will play an important advantageous role in defeating competitive rivals, will resolve 
problems that arise among the contractual constituencies during transactions and reduce 
transaction costs. When consumers are attracted by high-quality products, employees are 
satisfied with their working conditions and other corporate participants are happy with 
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the requirement of CSR. Stakeholders’ support definitely brings companies extra benefits 
through the decreased expenditure on transactions among stakeholders. 
 
1.4.3.2 Stimulating team production 
 
As introduced before, team production refers to the employment in a firm and stresses the 
importance of co-operation in a company; productivity comes from teamwork. The 
reward is dependent on team productivity. However, it is difficult to measure individual 
productivity in practice, because of the unavoidable and undetected shirking in team 
production. CSR will effectively reduce shirking in team production, due to its feature of 
advantageous competition. When companies achieve CSR towards their employees, such 
as providing good working conditions, ensuring employees’ rights and appropriate 
payment; and obtain a positive reputation through performing CSR towards other 
corporate constituencies, most of their employees would prefer to stay with these 
competitive and excellent companies. As Adam Smith showed in The Wealth of Nations, 
participants will perform as best as they can, not for public interest, but primarily for their 
own self-interest.121 In order to work in the company they preferred, employees have to 
enhance individual competition in teamwork by working harder. Therefore, CSR will 
stimulate employees’ motivation to improve individual productivity and relieve the 
problem of shirking in team production. 
 
Furthermore, to some extent, CSR reflects the corporate culture and attitude of top 
executives, which directly affects employees’ attitude to their teamwork;122 for example, 
in a food manufacturer, if the company is involved in the achievement of CSR to ensure 
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high quality to consumers, a safe workplace to employees, environmental protection to 
the community and sustainable development to society, its employees will be affected 
consciously or unconsciously. They might take to heart the quality control, ensured safety 
in the workplace and concern for environmental development in the process of 
production, in order to provide the public with CSR and protect the reputation of their 
company. Thus, CSR pushes employees voluntarily to enhance the efficiency in team 
production and concern about other stakeholders’ interests in teamwork. 
 
1.4.3.3 Maximizing shareholders’ profit  
 
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance regulate that boards of directors are 
primarily responsible for maximizing shareholder profits. Under these circumstances, the 
achievement of CSR in corporate governance does meet shareholders’ needs and 
enhances shareholder value. These factors will respectively be discussed in terms of 
socially responsible investment (hereinafter ‘SRI’) and improvement of shareholder value 
through CSR. 
 
SRI implies that all social investors base their decision processes on the considerations of 
financial risk and return, combined with ethical, religious, social and environmental 
concerns; for example, shareholders whose concerns relate to social issues will not invest 
in companies involved in tobacco, alcohol, or gambling; the so-called sin stocks. Social 
investors are divided into three types: (1) value-based investors who desire investments 
that are consistent with their moral beliefs; (2) value-seeking investors who adopt social 
and environmental data to enhance portfolio performance; and (3) value-enhancing 
investors who concentrate on corporate governance to enhance investment value.123 
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SRI is subjectively coherent to some of the needs of shareholders who prefer to invest in 
companies with high CSR performance, such as people with religious beliefs or who care 
about charity. For instance, Christian shareholders believe that ‘for those who would 
follow Jesus, economic questions are really spiritual questions’. Therefore, they would 
seldom become involved in businesses that sacrifice other people’s interest, whether 
physically or in monetary terms, such as the sale of alcohol or tobacco.124  
 
Moreover, SRI objectively enhances shareholder value in the process of investment from 
other outside investors so that the companies who achieve CSR attract higher investment 
from the public. Social investors will implement social screening to choose a potential 
business when making an investment, because they have to sift businesses to find those 
with a good reputation and successful achievement of CSR, which will attract many more 
social and institutional investors, which directly affects the returns on their shares. The 
majority of social investors in the US declined to buy tobacco stocks and some Islamic 
clients will not be involved in companies with revenues from alcohol, tobacco, gambling 
or pornography.125 The US Social Investment Forum 2003 estimated that ‘the rapidly 
growing market for assets that are deemed socially, morally or environmentally 
responsible covers about 10% of the financial market as whole. The largest institutional 
investors around the world are demonstrating their interest in investing based on SRI 
principles’.126 This trend shows that CSR positively affects SRI, and vice versa, so that 
the achievement of CSR will attract much more potentially socially responsible 
investment from social investors and improve the ability to ensure shareholders’ profit 
maximization.  
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Shareholder value increases through the achievement of CSR for three main reasons. First, 
shareholder value is accomplished by establishing relationships with key stakeholders on 
the basis that that long-term value creation requires co-operation from suppliers, 
customers, employees and external stakeholders. Therefore, Hillman and Keim contended 
that ‘firms that contract with their primary stakeholders on the basis of mutual trust and 
cooperation will have a competitive advantage over [other] firms. And to increase 
shareholder value, a company must address the needs of its stakeholders more efficiently 
and effectively than the companies against which it competes’. Thus, CSR would work to 
benefit a company and improve shareholder value creation.127 Hillman and Keim also 
mentioned that other social issue participation, which is not directly relevant to main 
stakeholders, such as avoiding nuclear energy, not engaging in sin industries or refusing 
to sell to the military and so on, will not create this advantage.128 However, if a company 
is involved in research and development relevant to the field of nuclear energy, the 
technology or techniques may be applied in creating nuclear weapons in future that may 
subsequently cause a crisis of peace and even battles among countries. Investors who 
support world peace might, therefore, refuse to invest in that company, and public 
stockholders might give up the stock to protest the damage to world peace, so that the 
industry lack of social concern decreases public investment and reduces shareholder 
value creation. 
 
Second, CSR is a theme for companies to advertise and is positive for corporate 
diversification. Companies could develop new sectors or products in terms of CSR that 
will be the persuasive topic of advertisement;129 for instance, in a clothing manufacturer 
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that wants to design and produce new textile products, managers could label the products 
‘made by disabled employees’. It is not only to accomplish CSR in the process of 
manufacturing, but also to attract consumers who care significantly concerned about CSR. 
In the process of production and transaction, a company takes input out of the economy, 
and puts back output in the form of goods and services into the economy, then it makes 
profit when revenue covers cost. If a company takes the element of CSR into production 
and transaction with high-value goods or services with CSR, the cost of CSR will also be 
covered by high revenue, which produces profit and social outcomes. In this trend, 
stakeholders prefer goods or services with CSR, and value its price higher than normal 
products. Thus, the attraction of consumption with social concerns will lead to efficient 
increases in profit in companies.130 
 
Third, CSR is treated as a remedy after negative events have happened. Godfrey, Merrill 
and Hansen provided some hypothesis about this issue, namely that in a negative event, 
the decline in shareholder value is smaller for companies engaged in CSR than for 
companies that are not, while shareholder value-loss mitigation is greater for companies 
with CSR activities than companies without.131 Stakeholders might overlook a negative 
outcome for a company with CSR achievement, because they believe that misbehaviour 
that happens in the company with social and environmental concerns was essentially 
done in good faith and is comparatively forgivable due to the enhancing social effects of 
CSR. 
 
1.4.3.4 Promoting the company’s success as a whole 
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The emergence of CSR is extremely relevant to stakeholders’ requirements, especially 
institutional shareholders, such as pension funds. Stakeholder theory is the primary 
resource for CSR. If it satisfies stakeholders’ needs, CSR will be the wise investment to 
enhance firm efficiency and benefit. In a company, investors put capital into a firm, 
employees provide labour, consumers buy the products from the firm and the community 
provides resources to the company, so that the survival of the company is closely 
dependent on the positive relationship with stakeholders. The company withdraws 
resources from society, including income from customers, labour from employees and 
some natural resource from the environment, and then should provide a return to 
society.132 Jones developed a model that integrates economic purpose and ethics. In this 
model the firm conducts business with stakeholders on the basis of trust and co-operation. 
Its commitment to ethics will be its competitive advantage, because of the lasting and 
productive relationships with its stakeholders. 133  Employees require good working 
conditions, customers want low prices accompanied by high quality and the community 
expects a high charitable contribution. CSR enlightens the strategic approach according 
to stakeholder theory and coordinates positive relations with all constituents, and 
concerns the long-term interests and success of companies through satisfying 
stakeholders in corporate governance.134 The vital connection between stakeholder and 
corporate fate means that the achievement of CSR is an effective instrument not only to 
increase corporate profit, but also to stimulate the sustainable and potential development 
of companies over a relatively longer period. 
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In stakeholder theory, it is important to introduce the concept ‘corporate social 
performance’ (hereinafter ‘CSP’). CSP among stakeholders is related to the financial 
performance of a company. CSP is always interchangeable with CSR. However, it is 
described differently as the specific ‘moment’ of the overall corporate social 
performances. 135  In Wood’s description of CSP, it is ‘a business organization’s 
configuration of principles of social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, 
and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm’s social 
relationships’. 136  Some opponents thought that the implicit cost of stabilizing the 
relationship with stakeholders, such as product control or environmental protection, 
would result in a large amount of agency cost that might negatively affect corporate 
social financial performance. However, stakeholder theory predicts that the lower implicit 
costs to achieve social responsibility will incur higher explicit cost;137 for instance, 
positive employee relationships are expected to enhance employees’ morale, productivity 
and satisfaction, and if the company can provide in the special concerns of, and fair job 
opportunities for, women and minority labourers, it might establish a good reputation. 
CSP would positively affect a company’s attractiveness, because employees would like to 
be employed by employers who engage in much more social responsibility.138 In addition, 
customers are willing to choose products from companies that fulfil socially responsible 
action, which is more reliable to their publics. Efficient corporate social performance 
does positively affect corporate financial performance, both in cutting down the cost of 
corporate governance and in increasing income in the marketplace. 
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However, the concept of ‘stakeholder’ is too broad; it is problematic whether all 
stakeholders’ requirement should be treated equally. Stakeholders are theoretically 
divided into two groups, namely (1) primary stakeholders and (2) secondary stakeholders. 
The primary stakeholder group is generally comprised of shareholders, other investors, 
employees, customers and suppliers; and public stakeholders are governments and 
communities that provide infrastructure and markets.139 If individual stakeholders are not 
satisfied with the corporation, they might withdraw their investment from the corporate 
system. Therefore, the stakeholder satisfaction will directly affect the survival and 
continuing success of the company.140 If a company is unable to obey the regulations or 
laws issued by public stakeholders, it will face dire results, such as legal sanctions. 
Secondary stakeholders, ‘who influence or affect, or are influenced or affected by, the 
corporation, but . . . are not engaged in transactions with the corporation and are not 
essential for its survival’, are media or non-governmental organizations, who are involved 
in monitoring environmental protection or human rights among labours.141 Although 
secondary stakeholders do not directly participate in corporate governance, they play an 
important role in leading public opinion into a particular direction. If any opposition to 
the corporation emerges, it will directly ruin the company’s reputation, and negatively 
affect its competition and development.  
 
1.5 Correlation between corporate governance and CSR 
 
The analysis of corporate governance and CSR in previous paragraphs showed that the 
emergence of CSR is accordingly coherent with the need to reduce transaction costs, 
coordinate the nexus of contracts to enhance team production, meet shareholder value 
maximization and protect stakeholders’ interests as a whole. From the comparison 
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between these two concepts in different aspects, it is evident that corporate governance is 
closely related to the achievement of CSR in modern markets, in which the main role of 
CSR is to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of corporate governance. The 
following section will demonstrate the relationship between corporate governance and 
CSR, and how corporate governance is affected by CSR.  
 
1.5.1 CSR: Meeting stakeholder theory in corporate governance 
 
After the 1970s, stakeholder theory became popular, including social, economic and 
political perspectives that the duty of top management was to balance value for all social 
actors optimally in the long term, which might affect or are affected by corporate 
decisions.142 In terms of the legal regulation of the protection of stakeholders’ profit, 
such as the UK Companies Act, CSR is the superior, positive and voluntary approach to 
accomplishing the corporate objective of value maximization that includes individuals 
and groups, claimholders and employees, customers and communities, among others.143 
In terms of the nexus of contracts, firms not only establish the contractual relationship 
with shareholders, but also the social participants, namely employees, customers and 
even the community. Therefore, the stakeholder theory broadens the interest of all 
constituencies in a wider scope and the concept of value maximization is no longer 
limited to only shareholder profit maximization.144 
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Subsequently, the strategic management stakeholder approach was introduced through 
stakeholder theory which set up systems and methods to manage the complicated groups 
and relationships to fulfil the corporate objective and harmonize the connection between 
stakeholders.145 In decision-making in corporate governance, it is necessary to recognize 
stakeholders’ actions and needs, so that the board of directors is able to predict the 
long-term outcome and adapt the future managerial strategy effectively and accurately. 
The stakeholder approach will successfully integrate the interests of all stakeholders, 
rather than put one specific group in a better position than others. A detailed and 
knowledgeable strategy approach will provide complete support for solving the problems 
of all members within the network. 
 
The corporate objective should be unique, that is, to maximize the total market value of 
the firm, including the equity, debt and any other contingent claims of the firm, therefore, 
Jensen maintains that ‘a company that takes inputs out of the economy and puts its output 
of goods and services back into the economy increases aggregate welfare if the prices at 
which it sells the goods more than cover the costs it incurs in purchasing the inputs’.146 
As a result, the board of directors has to make the optimal tradeoff among stakeholders 
by satisfying the needs of individual constituencies and attracting investment from 
investors who are concerned about CSR in business, so that it will increase total value 
and achieve the company’s profit maximization.147  
 
However, to some extent, it is not possible to completely achieve the stakeholder theory 
to safeguard all constituencies in every individual firm, including the primary 
stakeholders, such as employees, suppliers, consumers, and external stakeholders, such as 
the environment, communities and governments. This situation might exist ideally or in a 
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communistic society, but not in the current corporate scenario, which is rife with 
competition, because it is impossible to accomplish the absolutely fair distribution of 
social profit in reality and to redistribute social welfare to every single stakeholder within 
a firm. 
 
The goal of stakeholder theory will be achieved and affected by effective corporate 
governance in a firm, where the board of directors has to satisfy stakeholders’ interests in 
improving the environment in the workplace; increasing employees’ safety and wellbeing, 
attracting many more potential labourers; stabilizing the relationship with employees; 
coordinating the positive connection with customers; enhancing the firm’s reputation 
among its customers; participating in charity; or overcoming domination to establish 
good relationships with government. The stakeholder approach is supportive in creating 
strategic corporate governance. 
 
Stakeholder theory is the basis of CSR and is aimed at performing the fiduciary duty to 
every corporate stakeholder in corporate governance, so that stakeholder theory, 
corporate governance and CSR set up the triangular relationship in which all elements 
interact with one another reciprocally (Figure 1.1). More specifically, stakeholder theory 
clarifies the goal of corporate governance in meeting all stakeholders’ needs. The relevant 
stakeholder approach is the guideline for corporate governance in strategic management, 
while efficient corporate governance will achieve the principle of stakeholder theory. The 
achievement of CSR is to ensure every stakeholder’s interests as a whole are met. The 
interaction between corporate governance and CSR is closely linked; CSR is extended 
corporate governance; the achievement of CSR will evaluate whether corporate 
governance is successful. Effective corporate governance is to satisfy stakeholders’ 
requirements and coordinate the relations among various participants internally and 
externally, which is to assist in the achievement of CSR.  
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Figure 1.1  
 
 
1.5.2 CSR: Extended corporate governance 
 
CSR comes from the concept ‘business ethics’, which refers to ‘the system of moral 
principles and rules of conduct applied to business, which is a ‘social organ’ and shall not 
conduct itself in detrimental to the interests of the society and the business sectors’.148 
Therefore, social responsibility is relevant to the implementation of good governance 
methods. The scope of corporate governance is expanded by the new concept of CSR 
contained in the decision-making mechanism. CSR is adopted into the corporate 
governance system as a new approach in different models. It is regarded as a remedy to 
the legal deficit in the process of corporate governance and is closely linked to the 
decision-making in corporate governance as a vital process. 
 
1.5.2.1  CSR in the governance system 
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The European Union (hereinafter ‘EU’) Commission declares that: 
 
by stating their social responsibility and voluntarily taking on commitments which 
go beyond common regulatory and conventional requirement, which they would 
have to respect in any case, companies endeavour to raise the standards of social 
development, environmental protection and respect of fundamental rights and 
embrace an open governance, reconciling interests of various stakeholders in an 
overall approach of quality and sustainability.149  
 
This means that CSR is present in the transaction between firms and their stakeholders, 
firms are coordinated hierarchically into authority holders and that the CSR approach 
would reduce transaction costs in corporate governance. Firms are filled with uncertainty 
and complexity, due to the uncertain and imperfect contract among all constituencies. 
Corporate governance is aimed at avoiding accidental incidents through harmonizing the 
relationship with customers and employees, internal and external audit control, and 
information disclosure in public. Effective corporate governance is able to attract 
customers through CSR-achieved products or services, such as mild or anti-animal-tested 
goods; stabilizing the relationship with employees through providing good working 
conditions and welfare; and coordinating the connection with the community, which 
would reduce or exempt the expenditure of, or limitation on, the company. If the 
performance of CSR could bring about these advantages naturally, corporate governance 
will reduce the transaction costs of obtaining the positive response and effect from its 
stakeholders. 
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In team production, all employees work and coordinate together within one firm. The 
main question is how to monitor employees working for reward and avoiding shirking 
among team members. In teamwork, the project would be entirely organized, which 
makes it difficult to evaluate individual employee’s work: who works better or who is 
shirking throughout the entire operation. Therefore, people who work better would 
balance the loss caused by people who work worse in a team. If the company improves 
the working environment and concerns of employees, the employees would benefit 
highly and the company would be competitive among its rivals. Employees have to 
compete with their peers by working hard, in order to stay in a company with good 
working conditions and a positive reputation. The achievement of CSR will indirectly 
solve the problem of how to avoid shirking in corporate governance. 
 
Moreover, the ultimate goal of corporate governance is the maximization of corporate 
value, which will be stimulated by the performance of CSR. The conclusion drawn from 
prior analysis is that companies who fulfil their social responsibilities will effectively 
promote themselves among customers who care about social ethics. They are more 
willing to accept goods with the notion of environmental protection, or services with the 
goal of improving social welfare. In addition, employees who are eager to work in 
companies with safe working condition would work harder and create more fruitful 
products. Therefore, corporate governance will increase corporate income and profit 
through the achievement of CSR. 
 
1.5.2.2 CSR: The remedy of incomplete contracting with stakeholders 
 
When firms transact with stakeholders, there are a large number of contracts among them 
that would be impossible to complete and in which all aspects related to dispute 
resolution are covered. Legal regulation is just the basic framework in specific areas, such 
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as contract law, employment law or environmental law, but cannot regulate every single 
situation in individual cases or disputes. To some extent, the notion of CSR will offset the 
deficit of contract and legal flaws due to the imperfect contract in corporate governance. 
 
In a famous lawsuit in the US, a woman sued McDonald’s because she had eaten too 
much of the company’s ‘junk’ food, which was rich in fat, calories and sugar, which led 
to obesity on her part. The reason for the lawsuit was that McDonald’s had not at any 
stage informed her that the company’s food was bad for her health if she ate too much. 
Finally, the court accepted the woman’s appeal and assessed the compensation owed to 
her. In this case, there was only a legal relationship between the buyer and seller, which 
was that McDonald’s sold the food and the woman paid for the goods. In the law of 
contract, there is no stipulation or regulation about the fiduciary duty of McDonald’s to 
inform its customers about how to eat healthily. This is, therefore, a matter of corporate 
governance, and the performance of CSR might remit the negative effects of similar 
situations. In the food business, it is the companies concerned’s social responsibility to 
take into account customers’ food safety and health, hence McDonald’s should make it 
part of its corporate governance system to inform its customers about food health, telling 
them through promotional advertising or posters to eat the fried and frozen food 
responsibly. Although the company is not obliged to disclose relevant information in 
specific contractual relations, CSR will effectively resolve and avoid the conflict that is 
beyond the scope of the law of contract and legislation. Consciousness of CSR will 
provide corporate governance with a remedy when a contract is incomplete. 
 
1.5.2.3 CSR: The process of decision-making in corporate governance 
 
Owing to the separation of ownership and control, the authority of decision-making is 
transferred from the input owner to the agency, so that claim holders’ interests cannot be 
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safeguarded, and the abuse of authority in agency might occur. Introducing CSR into 
decision-making in corporate governance amounts to strategic management and ensures 
the residual claimant’s value. Epstein defined CSR as: 
 
a system of decision making whereby corporate managers try to anticipate and 
consider the total consequences of business policies and operations before they 
act. What managers consider to be relevant to formulating and implementing 
corporate policy encompasses not only economic factors but also the social, 
political, environmental, and cultural consequences of corporate action.150  
 
CSR in the process of decision-making means that corporate managers regard CSR as one 
element when they make decisions in the process of corporate governance. Therefore, the 
company is required to adopt CSR as a decision criterion when it creates a structure for, 
and practice of, corporate governance. 
 
Companies’ decision-making should not only concern shareholders’ interests, but also 
how to accomplish the value maximization of other stakeholders. When employees want 
to work in preferred conditions, the firm will not necessarily focus on how to recruit 
potential employees and to avoid shirking in the process of work. In relation to the 
achievement of CSR towards a community, firms would be granted privileges by 
government, so that it is not necessary for corporate governance to make policy to meet 
society’s preference for receiving priority from government or the community. Therefore, 
CSR is an effective strategy in decision-making to meet companies’ profit and enhance 
the efficiency of corporate governance. 
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1.5.3 Standard to evaluate corporate governance 
 
CSR is one of the standards used to evaluate the success of corporate governance by 
indicating whether companies have performed well and achieved positive results.151 In 
this scheme, the standard evaluates how a company achieves socially responsible 
behaviours, such as ‘reducing or eliminating the amount of toxic effluents a firm puts into 
the environment, increasing the proportion of high-level jobs held by women, minority, 
and handicapped employees, improving the quality and increasing the longevity of a 
company’s products, and contributing company monies to support good works within the 
community’.152 Except for the general recognition and standard of social responsibility, 
such as environmental protection or charity, CSR also operates on the basis of the 
particular situation in each firm with reference to different economic and financial goals, 
specific competitive environment, diversified constituencies among stakeholders and so 
on.153 According to the different circumstance, CSR should be combined with the 
specific requirements of individual firms in corporate governance. 
 
The extent and effect of CSR will show the outcome of corporate governance that is 
similar to the quality of product reflecting the production process. Relating CSR to 
corporate governance is a strategic management process that plots a new direction for 
integrating all stakeholders in the long run. Although effective corporate governance is 
judged by various aspects, CSR is one of the main measures of evaluation. If corporate 
executives are able to adapt this corporate strategy or policy smoothly to cater in 
stakeholders’ requirements or to integrate economic, political and moral aspects into 
decision-making, corporate governance will be regarded as successful with respect to the 
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achievement of CSR.154 As analysed in the point on extended corporate governance, 
firms will cut agency and transaction costs, and stimulate employee’s willingness to work 
or create a good reputation for the firm among members of the public. Excellent 
representation means that the product of corporate governance is of high quality and CSR 
is properly adopted in the process of corporate governance. The quality of corporate 
governance relevant to CSR can be scored both by systematic corporate governance 
ranking service and stakeholders’ response. 
 
1.5.3.1 Corporate governance ranking 
 
It has been a common phenomenon that more investors are taking the quality of corporate 
governance into consideration when they make decisions, so that many organizations 
offer services of corporate governance ranking that provide the public with more precise, 
direct and comparable information. Institutional Shareholder Services (hereinafter ‘ISS’), 
The Corporate Library, Governance Metrics International, and Moody’s Investor Services 
are organizations who offer rating information to institutional investors, fund managers, 
small investors, executive search firms, compensation and governance consultancy firms, 
insurers offering directors’ and officers’ liability insurance, rated companies, and 
academics.155 
 
The ISS corporate governance quotient (hereinafter ‘CGQ’) will be used as an example to 
show two scores: (1) according to the relevant market index of a company in the Russell 
3000 and (2) according to the appropriate peer group.156 Each CGQ is a comparative 
                                                        
154
 See Freeman and McVea, supra note 144. 
155
 Barrett, A. et al., Corporate Governance Ratings, available at: 
http://www.directorsforum.com/resources/related_articles/corp_gov_ratings3-05.pdf, last accessed on 
12 March 2012, 4–9.  
156
 Ibid. 
Chapter 1: Theory of Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility 
© C. YUN 64 
score scaled from 1 to 100, representing the company’s rank among its relevant peer 
group. It assesses audit issues, board structure and composition, charter and bylaw 
provisions, and so forth. It does not directly refer to the evaluation of corporate 
governance and CSR, but analyses some issues in this field. In ISS, the ranking and 
analysis of sustainability in corporate governance are applied not only to the ratings, but 
also to instructions on how to improve in practice. ISS sustainability analytics established 
the ‘Peer Benchmarking Report’ to measure companies against direct and sector peers 
according to a set of sustainability criteria encompassing key environmental, social and 
governance practices. Areas of strong performance are highlighted, as well as areas 
needing improvement. The report presents specific 'next steps' to show how to apply this 
analysis in its reports to investors now and over the next several years. It also assesses the 
climate risk, sustainability risk and issues about socially responsible investment to 
conclude what are investors’ concerns in corporate governance.157 
 
All corporate governance ranking services obviously reflect the situation with regard to 
corporate governance. Although there is no direct ranking of CSR, some of its issues 
emerge in the general ranking system which affects the final score in the particular rating. 
When the score of social or environmental issues is higher in the entire corporate 
governance ranking system, it will increase the basic value of the total points. Good 
practice in CSR presents effective corporate governance, as well as positive company 
performance. ISS arrived at the conclusion through a series of comparative examinations 
that firms with weaker corporate governance performed more poorly, had lower profits 
and more risk, and accelerated principal–agent conflict faster than firms with stronger 
corporate governance.158 
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1.5.3.2 Stakeholders’ response to corporate governance relevant to CSR 
 
Taking CSR towards consumers as an example, firms implement varied approaches to 
cater for customers’ needs, such as providing complete after-sales service, ensuring 
product safety, and satisfying customers’ concerns about social responsibility, such as 
animal protection or reducing the emission of polluted air. Customers prefer firms that 
fulfil their CSR; will treat the goods or service as prime choice; and even advertise to 
people around them. Every company has to spend a large amount of money on 
maintaining its relationship with its existing customers, absorb as many future customers 
as possible and make an impact on the public through advertising. Good corporate 
governance that includes CSR will lead to stable and expanded resources of customers 
and an advantageous reputation among the public, so that the quality of the corporate 
governance process is reflected from the extent of the achievement of CSR as the final 
product. In terms of stakeholders’ replies, it is the feedback on the performance of 
corporate governance and stakeholders’ interest that makes the difference: if stakeholders 
are not satisfied and provide negative responses, it means that corporate governance is 
not effective, to some extent, due to the insufficient fulfilment of CSR.  
 
According to public anticipation, stakeholders expect to be reassured by corporate 
strategy and to establish a positive relationship with the company, which would affect the 
achievement of corporate governance. For example, employers should provide 
appropriate working conditions and welfare, and perform their duties to protect 
employees’ rights or else striking or shirking among employees will cause the loss of 
human resources and financial performance. Safeguarding the authenticity and good 
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quality of products and services is important to set up corporate integrity, which leads to a 
good public reputation; the investment in environmental protection is necessary to the 
community, which is the return on the use of social resources, so that the community will 
provide many more concessions to a firm who cares about the protection of social 
interests; a focus on the sensitive issues of human rights, the region, the protection of 
women and so on will avoid political or moral conflicts.159 Accordingly, the achievement 
of CSR among stakeholders will indirectly increase the income, reduce agency cost and 
improve the financial performance of a firm, so that shareholders’ interests can be 
ensured through sufficient financial income. In terms of the analogy, if most of a 
company’s stakeholders are satisfied with the board of directors’ achievement of CSR, the 
company’s benefits will increase, agency costs will be reduced, its reputation will be 
enhanced and conflict with its publics will be avoided, which proves that positive results 
come from good corporate governance practices. 
 
In turn, effective corporate governance is also to improve the performance of CSR 
internally and externally. When companies take concerns about CSR into account in their 
corporate governance strategy and policy, stakeholders’ interests will be safeguarded 
better; for example, in order to stimulate employees’ working motivation, some big 
companies run nurseries internally with specialized staff to look after babies. Women 
employees can bring their babies to work during lactation periods, in order to feed them 
when necessary. This will enable employees to concentrate on their work and remove the 
worry about feeding their baby. New mothers are highly likely to be fired, because 
employers are afraid that they are always distracted by taking care of their babies. 
Therefore, women employees’ working rights might be vulnerable. If boards of directors 
could consider the dilemma of employees in decision-making, it would avoid conflict in 
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employment relationships and ensure employees’ legal rights. This could be achieved 
through the adoption of a CSR strategy in corporate governance. 
 
1.5.4 CSR: A supplementary guideline for corporate governance 
 
Legislation is the legal basis of corporate governance with which all operations in a 
company should comply. Statutes, regulations and other laws are the instructive and 
directive code of corporate operation. For example, Sacconi argued that welfare state 
regulations, labour market and environmental regulations establish a general legal 
framework, but they cannot regulate every detail of firms’ decision.160 They may lay 
down minimal compulsory conditions, but in many settings their application requires 
interpretation of a ‘grey’ zone; or else the conditions for verifying compliance with them 
may not be observable.161 Moreover, even when management decisions closely affect the 
stakeholders, the law cannot regulate these decisions in every respect: the decision 
whether or not to restructure or downsize a firm is always a business decision, 
notwithstanding the requirements of the law with regard to the protection of third parties 
or employees.162 
 
Under this circumstance, there are, inevitably, insufficient regulations in corporate 
decision-making and operation, so that CSR, to some extent, fills the gap when legal 
regulation cannot cover the specific aspect or when any unexpected events or 
contingencies occur. CSR is voluntary, beyond the legal basis and derived from various 
references, such as industrial codes of conduct, internal self-regulations and international 
initiatives in specific aspects; for example, the board of directors generally applies 
employment law to coordinate the relationship between employers and employees in 
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corporate governance. In the UK, employment legislation has specifically been divided 
into different items, such as the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, the Equal Pay Act 1970, 
Employment Equality Regulations 2003, the Race Relations Act 1976, the Employment 
Rights Act 1996, EC Equal Treatment Directive 76/207 and so on. In the Employment 
Rights Act 1996, employers are regulated to carry out activities to prevent or reduce risk 
to health and safety at work, and to pay attention to protect employees from danger.163 
 
In plants where there is a lot of noise, employers have to take employees’ safety and 
health into consideration and provide them with earplugs to safeguard their hearing health 
in terms of relevant regulations. However, the regulations do not provide specific 
standards about what kind and quality of earplugs are appropriate. In order to reduce 
costs, some companies supply low-quality earplugs, which do not effectively prevent 
harm to employees’ hearing. In these instances, the companies are merely performing 
their legal obligation, but not CSR. If firms try to achieve CSR, under the circumstances 
of relatively balanced cost and interests, employer should provide earplugs of good 
quality to workers in order to fulfil a more complete and detailed protective system of 
health and safety to their workers in corporate governance. 
 
It is obvious that although the law only regulates minimum standards in companies, the 
adoption of CSR will provide a precise notion to fill the deficiency, and inform corporate 
decision-making and operation specifically and appropriately in corporate governance. It 
is aimed at filling the gap between legislation and practical operations, and introducing 
boards of directors to the accurate basis for corporate governance, in order to meet 
stakeholders’ interest comprehensively and to achieve companies’ success. 
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1.5.5 CSR: applicable instrument in Chinese corporate governance 
 
In China the model and purpose of corporate governance tend to follow Anglo-American 
corporate governance where the board of directors has the duty to ensure shareholder 
value maximization in the long term through promoting companies’ success as a whole in 
a market-based model.164 However, owing to the different institutional structures of 
boards of directors in Chinese companies, the adoption of the Anglo-American model is 
not completely appropriate in all Chinese companies.165 From the collective economy to 
the market economy, many state-owned companies that are integrally controlled and 
invested in by the majority shareholder, the state, dominate the Chinese market, which 
leads to the ‘special Chinese situation’. In the period of a collective economy, the market 
and allocation of resource were controlled under a state plan, so that it was not necessary 
for companies to compete with peers to enhance financial performance or obtain much 
more market resources; while in the period of a market economy, private companies 
emerged and competed with state-owned companies for market investment and resources. 
However, depending on powerful financing and priorities from governments, state-owned 
companies still possessed abundant resources and hampered the development of private 
companies, causing the over-exploitation of profit among these companies.166  The 
ineffective market competition between state-owned companies and private companies 
and the profit-seeking corporate governance impede the emergence and innovation of 
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CSR in Chinese markets. That is the reason for delayed development in the special 
Chinese context. This point will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
 
The separation of ownership and control in the Anglo-American corporate governance 
model is adopted in Chinese companies to ensure decision-making by the board of 
directors in favour of shareholder value maximization. In reality, it is more applicable to 
achieve independent decision-making on the executive board and independent monitoring 
on the non-executive board in private companies than state-owned companies. When 
‘state shares’ largely or completely account for companies’ shareholding, in practice the 
whole corporate governance process is arranged by the CCP and government officials to 
nominate both the executive and supervisory board.167  In the context of centrally 
controlled corporate governance, the power exercised by the CCP and government 
representatives has been more capable of satisfying state shareholder’s value, and ignored 
the wealth of minority shareholders and other stakeholders.168 In order to balance the 
market between state-owned companies and private companies, and protect minority 
shareholders and stakeholders’ profit, the China National Party Committee claimed the 
‘Revolution of Stated-owned Companies’ as the main goals of CCP’s 17th Party 
Conference that state and governments should reduce the control of state-owned 
companies and open up policies to companies’ own top management in corporate 
governance, increase the efficiency in corporate governance and minimising negative 
corporate images in public.169  
 
Moreover, when CCP and Chinese governments provide strong financial and political 
support to state-owned companies, they are required to include the administrative 
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function in the government or industrial strategy, in order to instruct other companies’ 
operation in the same industry, and achieve social and environmental benefit to societies 
for long-term sustainable value.170 CSR is a necessary and applicable instrument in the 
Chinese economic transition to avoid the over-integral state share value maximization to 
majority shareholder through independent monitoring by other stakeholders; provide 
social and environmental benefits as an administrative function through corporate 
governance in state-owned companies; and to open fair market competition to private 
companies. 
 
1.5.5.1 CSR: fulfilment of administrative function in corporate governance among 
state-owned companies 
 
In stated-owned companies, shareholder value maximization is not the unique purpose of 
corporate governance that many of them, especially centrally controlled state-owned 
companies, have. They have administrative responsibility for ‘leading the industry in 
which the company operates, and other state and provincial officials act in what they see 
as the interest of the state and the people’. 171  The existence and mechanism of 
state-owned companies largely filled the governmental governance gaps left by the weak 
and under-resourced market mechanism and government administration.172 Effective 
corporate governance in state-owned companies would relieve the unacceptable 
economic and social stress such as unemployment, bankruptcy and industrial financial 
pressure.173 
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Compared with private companies, state-owned companies are more capable of 
implementing CSR in corporate governance, because they receive adequate financial 
support and investment from government that would reduce companies’ consideration of 
the cost of implementing CSR. In order to achieve the administrative responsibility, 
boards of directors have adopted CSR and considered stakeholders’ interests in 
decision-making, so that it would provide plenty of job opportunities, ensure 
environmental protection, accomplish social welfare, set positive examples in specific 
industries and so forth.174 
 
Additionally, as mentioned before, the Chinese government is practising the ‘Revolution 
of State-owned Companies’, so that they cannot totally depend on government ‘back-up’. 
The state has relatively reduced the direct control to companies’ operation, and the 
support and priority on finance and political policy. That is to say that the Party, Party 
Committee in companies, and government have changed their attitudes from centralized 
instruction in decision-making to market-oriented competition with private and overseas 
companies.175 In the new market context state-owned companies lose the advantage of 
governmental support and have to optimize a stakeholder approach in corporate 
governance for positive internal and external relationships, so that the corporate value 
creation would be partly dependent on stakeholders’ support.176  When state-owned 
companies effectively perform CSR to ensure stakeholders’ interest in corporate 
governance and voluntarily take the administrative responsibility in respects of social, 
environmental and community matters, they would receive advantages such as a 
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reduction in tax or priorities in policy from governments to ensure long-term value 
maximization.177  
 
1.5.5.2 CSR: effective independent monitoring of misbehaviour in corporate 
governance in state-owned companies 
 
In China the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the 
State Council (hereinafter ‘SASAC’) holds the Chinese Government’s shareholding in all 
China’s stated-owned companies. It is the largest institutional shareholder in the world, so 
that the state as shareholder plays the most important role in these companies.178 Fudan 
University provided research in 2007 revealing that in Chinese state-owned companies, 
40% of directors on boards of directors were shareholder directors who were largely 
nominated by the CCP, the State Council or the SASAC. In the Chinese two-tier board 
structure the shareholder directors both sit in the positions on the executive board and 
supervisory board, and the two boards are simultaneously located under the shareholders’ 
meetings.179 Unlike the supervisory board in the German model the supervisory board in 
the Chinese model sits under the shareholders’ meeting, but is above the executive board, 
and it has ‘no responsibility on the shareholders behalf for return on investment. Neither 
does the supervisory board in China have the power to hire and fire directors as in the 
German case’.180  Officially, the directors of the supervisory board should oversee 
finances, the due diligence of directors and shareholders’ interests, and nominate an 
external auditing company to monitor the company’s performance. However, in practice 
leaders of companies’ Party Committee always take the chair of the supervisory board, so 
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that the supervision by the Party leader or members of the Party or 
government-nominated director seems more decorative than functional.181 
 
When officially assigned party members or government officers, who lack professional 
knowledge and practice of corporate governance take the seats of CEOs or top 
management, it might lead to flawed decision-making and impede efficiency in corporate 
governance.182 Meanwhile, the assigned shareholder directors dominate the executive 
board or have stronger power than other directors and in the ‘Revolution of State-owned 
Companies’ government and SASAC will reduce the direct instruction and control of 
companies’ decision-making and corporate operation. Therefore, the lack of limitation 
from other executive directors and the supervisory board, and direct control from the state 
would cause acting in self-interest, corruption, insider-trading and other misbehaviour on 
the part of top management.183 
 
In addition, there is a misunderstanding of shareholder value maximization in 
state-owned companies that is partially defined as the interest of majority shareholder or 
governmental shareholder. In the nexus of contracts, all corporate constituencies’ interest 
should be ensured in decision-making, including majority and minority shareholders, 
employees, consumers, suppliers, communities, environments and so on. Nevertheless, in 
most state-owned companies, government-nominated directors, acting in the interest of 
state assets, will maximize majority shareholders’ interests and ignore minority 
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shareholders’ value and other corporate constituencies’ interests in corporate 
governance.184 
 
Bringing CSR into corporate governance, boards of directors would include stakeholders 
in decision-making, which would engage stakeholders in corporate governance in 
state-owned companies. The adoption of CSR could balance the interests between 
majority shareholder and other stakeholders, in order to prevent the monopoly of state 
profit, and achieve companies’ value creation in long-term coordination with minority 
shareholders and stakeholders. Moreover, owing to the low efficiency in the supervisory 
board, stakeholder engagement in state-owned companies would stimulate the 
independent monitoring from stakeholders to supervise boards of directors’ illegal action 
in corporate governance, which would lead to the negative effect on stakeholders’ 
benefits. In particular, CSR to employees would directly achieve employee 
representatives’ function on the supervisory board that monitors and reflects the board of 
directors’ decision-making and behaviour in corporate governance. 
 
1.5.5.3 CSR: stimulation of investment from public investors 
 
Compared with state-owned companies, which can get strong financial support from the 
state, private companies face the difficulty of attracting investment, including individual 
and public investors. As discussed in previous sections, good performance in CSR would 
not only attract consumers in the marketplace, but also encourage investment from 
institutional investors, such as banks, investment corporations, industrial associations and 
other public investors. For example, a bank, as the creditor, would provide abundant 
capital to companies, but cannot directly engage in company’s decision-making, so that it 
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has to ensure that the company is capable of and reliable to return the loan and interest. In 
Cai and Wheale’s study, they proposed that the achievement of CSR would increase 
companies’ trust, reliability and commitment to public investors, and encourage them to 
invest in companies with good social performance and credibility.185 
 
The commencement of the Green Loan Programme helped trigger the launch of the 
Green Evolution in the Chinese banking sector. Many banks adopted the programme 
checklist to ensure companies’ environmental performance and provide loans to 
companies who made great strides in environmental protection. In this programme 
companies strictly comply with the financial and environmental regulations, and 
co-operate with international banks and NGOs for further development, so that the Green 
Programme in banks also requires reliable information disclosure from companies of their 
corporate environmental index.186 Therefore, the achievement of CSR in environmental 
matters would increase companies’ sustainable value and open ‘green access’ to obtain 
investment in the development of SRI in China. Competing with state-owned companies 
and good financial performance in CSR is a positive approach for private companies to 
receive capital support from institutional investors. 
 
1.6 Case studies on corporate governance and CSR 
 
Good corporate governance is to ensure the appropriate treatment of all stakeholders so 
that employees, consumers, suppliers and other public stakeholders can get transparent 
information disclosure, and that the capital of investors and lenders is utilized equitably 
and effectively. Meanwhile, successful corporate governance also positively affects the 
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environment, sustainability and local community. The achievement of CSR will urge 
companies to implement successful corporate governance, such as through the provision 
of clean and safe working conditions for their employees; good-quality products 
produced in a safe working environment for their consumers; a stable and credible supply 
chain with suppliers; sustainable protection of the environment; and charities or activities 
that benefit communities.  
 
In the following section the case of the world-famous Ford motor manufacturer will be 
used as an example to illustrate CSR actions in corporate governance. By 1916, the Ford 
Motor Company was sued by Dodge Brothers due to the alleged damaged caused to the 
minority shareholders’ interests.187 Parkinson described the Ford Motor Company case as 
‘a rare example of a successful challenge’ to management to fulfil CSR in employment 
and ensure long-term shareholder interest’.188 Ford had long history of CSR. In 2012 
Newsweek published the Green Ranking of corporate sustainability in the US that Ford 
was nationally ranked in the 50th position out of 500 companies rated and was in the top 
position in the industry of vehicles and components.189  
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Ford had an outstanding environmental performance and background in CSR. It adopted 
a large amount of approaches to achieve CSR and enhance its influence in the 
international market in the fields of sustainability, societal education, community 
development, employment and so on. 
 
1.6.1  Taking action 
 
1.6.1.1  MEDICOS Special School Project 
 
In South Africa, Ford established the MEDICOS Special School, which is located in 
Soshanguve, north of Pretoria. It is a special day school for children who suffer from 
mental disabilities such as infantile autism. Most of them live in the surrounding areas of 
Soshanguve, Mabopane and Ga-Rankuwa. The mentally handicapped children often 
encountered the problem on their way to and from school that they would get lost and 
some of them were even abused en route. In order to solve this problem, the Ford Motor 
Company of Southern Africa laid on a bus service for these children free of charge. The 
buses were manufactured by Ford. In addition, the company and employees often make 
cash and other donations of valuable items such as freezers to this special school.  
 
1.6.1.2 Employee involvement and protection 
 
The Ford Motor Company in the US participates in the fight for ‘labour rights’ of workers 
across the world. It makes its own employees feel comfortable that the company is 
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fighting for their reasonable rights. Ford’s website notes that the company achieves in 
employment as follows: 
 
[t]he Ford Motor Company has already taken great strides to eradicate labour 
issues all around the world. Much of [Ford’s] focus is on eradicating labour 
abuses within international supply chains, whether in pig iron from Brazil, 
cotton from Uzbekistan or cocoa from West Africa. Ford will not tolerate any of 
their suppliers abusing workers, no matter the country. Ford’s stand should be a 
model for all world companies, large and small; they understand that happier 
employees produce better products and profits, and that all people have certain 
rights.190 
 
In addition, the Ford Motor Company implements various charitable activities and 
encourages its employees to become involved in such actions; for example, the Ford 
Motor Company of Southern Africa Employee Community Action Program was set up in 
the Ford Motor Company of Southern Africa. It encouraged every employee to donate 16 
hours of community service in Tshwane and Port Elizabeth. Many of them have become 
involved in community projects over the past years. Wise and Ali comment that: 
 
[t]hrough involvement, Ford created a broader awareness and understanding as a 
caring company, which accepts its corporate citizenship responsibilities. This 
supports the company’s declared vision and values. It is planned to involve 
increasing numbers of employees in the projects; thus developing improved 
team spirit and a caring attitude amongst employees, true to the company’s 
                                                        
190
 Kinzel, S. A., Ford Motor Company and Corporate Social Responsibility, available at: 
http://cowgirlkitty.com/2011/04/17/ford-motor-company-and-corporate-social-responsibility, last accessed 
on 12 March 2014; and Ford Motor Company: available at: 
http://corporate.ford.com/news-center/news/featured-stories-details, last accessed on 12 March 2014. 
Chapter 1: Theory of Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility 
© C. YUN 80 
vision. Furthermore, these activities provide an opportunity for employees to 
demonstrate one of the key leadership behaviours, i.e., community 
commitment.191 
 
1.6.1.3 Safeguarding sustainability 
 
The Ford Motor Company keeps focusing on exploring the issue of sustainable 
development, which is a social and environmental issue. Ford treats sustainability as a 
long-term strategic priority, and effectively reduces resource use and develops innovative 
‘green’ and safer goods and technologies. One of the main problems in the automotive 
industries is fuel efficiency and related carbon dioxide (CO2) vehicle emissions, so that 
cutting down pollution emission is imperative. Ford has been making and producing 
electric and new electric and hybrid automobiles, such as the Lincoln MKZ Hybrid which 
is steadily improving the lessening of the company’s carbon impact on the world.192 Ford 
was the pioneer in adopting solar panels at its Bridgend Facility in South Wales. In order 
to reduce the local contribution to climate change through diminishing its greenhouse gas 
emissions, Ford supplies renewable energy to its plants. 
 
In addition, Ford innovated the new generation of power, namely the feasibility of using 
wind turbines on site to provide 100% of the electricity to the new local plants in 
Dagenham, East London, UK. However, the adoption of wind power would cause some 
problems, such as the potential noise to local residents or employees; or the visual 
presence of the turbines, which might be a problem for aircraft using the local London 
City Airport. Owing to these challenges, Ford tried to ensure that all issues could be 
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solved properly. It held consultations and face-to-face meetings with local residents and 
wildlife groups, and chose the gearless turbine which produces little noise. Although the 
Dagenham site is over 500 acres in size, only a few possible sites fulfilled the criteria 
needed to utilize wind power.193 Therefore, it was reported that ‘Ford would pay for the 
planning permission and lease out the land for 30 years to an energy provider, the 
specialist wind developer and green energy supplier Ecotricity’.194 During the viable 
operating time, this supplier would provide the energy direct to Ford for 12 years, and 
Ford would pay the expenditure of installation and connection. It will avoid the negative 
conflict and inconvenience on local residents, employees and municipal construction.195 
 
1.6.2 Positive effect on CSR and good corporate governance 
 
In terms of the MEDICOS Special School, the Ford Motor Company is involved in 
sharing the social burden involving the education and safety of the mentally handicapped 
children. It achieves CSR towards the community through giving care to vulnerable 
groups. This is the best and most direct way to advertise the company and the vehicles 
(buses) manufactured by Ford. The good corporate governance strategy that Ford 
followed in the process of performing CSR and charity demonstrated its conduct and 
products to the public with the result that, to some extent, it has reduced the agency cost 
of advertising in corporate governance. 
 
Ford’s attention to its employee and relevant activities also improved its corporate 
governance. The company made ‘labour rights’ an important issue in its operations and 
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strives to provide a comfortable, safe and relaxing working environment, and ensures the 
related rights to its employees. When employees are happy with their working conditions, 
they concentrate on their work and produce products of high quality. This is an automatic 
encouragement mechanism for employees and will effectively avoid shirking in 
teamwork. the result is that it is not necessary for top management to invest much more 
time and money in stimulating employees. By contrast, employees are encouraged to 
participate in charitable activities which enhances their sense of belonging and that they 
have achieved CSR for their company and have brought benefits to the whole community. 
In corporate governance, this would be an effective way to shorten the distance between 
employers and employees rather than lobby the employees through some artificial 
speech. 
 
Green energy and sustainable innovation, such as wind power and solar panel, would 
environmentally and economically bring long-term benefits to sustainability, which 
would be one of the most vital challenges to human beings. It was expected that the price 
of renewable energy would be equal to ordinary energy generation. However, the wind 
power has brought about considerable cost savings because the prices of the turbines 
were fixed prices, while other energy prices have been soaring.196 The decision to adopt 
innovation not only indirectly makes the Ford Motor Company more competitive, but 
also produces significant benefits. Instead of ingratiating publics through promotion or 
television advertisements, Ford’s achievement of CSR has enhanced its corporate image 
and identity, has had a broad impact on local residents and the community.  
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1.7 Summary  
 
When transactions are not only decided by the price mechanism but other factors affect 
the process, firms emerge to organize the resource exchange and production among 
varied input owners, including material and labour. Instead of direct transactions between 
buyer and seller, participants set up contracts with firms to conclude transactions, so that 
the firm operates in the form of a nexus of contracts. A specific body is needed to 
coordinate the transaction and the behaviour among corporate constituents and resources. 
This is called corporate governance, of which the main organs are shareholders, the 
board of directors and management. Transactions within firms conducted through 
contracts would also incur costs, due to the firm specificity and uncertainty of the 
transaction. The emergence of corporate governance has reduced transaction costs and 
enhanced the efficiency of corporate operations. 
 
In terms of the firm as property, ownership and control between shareholders and the 
board of directors has been separated, and the latter is the former’s agent in 
decision-making, based on the maximization of shareholders’ interests. However, 
contractual participants enter into a nexus of contracts which affects companies’ success, 
so that the stakeholder theory was adopted in corporate governance that boards of 
directors should take stakeholders’ profit into account (which is closely related to 
shareholders’ interest) when decisions are made. Team production is an extreme form of 
stakeholder theory: individual members are involved in collective teamwork, which is not 
an accumulation of separable single productivity. Therefore, corporate governance is a 
form of monitoring shirking among team members and measures the fair rewarding of 
each member in a production team. 
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Shareholders can make decisions and take actions through the transfer of shares when 
they are dissatisfied with corporate governance in meeting the need of profit 
maximization; the right to vote to elect the board of directors; and the rights to participate 
and ask information about corporate governance. The law requires that boards of 
directors make decisions to ensure their company’s success as a whole and so that 
stakeholders’ interests are taken into consideration in decision-making in corporate 
governance. Power is divided between shareholders and the board of directors in 
corporate governance, in order to avoid the agency problem where decision management 
and decision control are respectively conferred on the board of directors and shareholders. 
Furthermore, the two functions are shared between executive directors and non-executive 
directors in complex companies. 
 
CSR is coincidental to stakeholder theory and concerns about social issues within 
transactions. Therefore, it improves the efficiency of corporate governance to reduce 
transaction costs, stimulate team production, maximize shareholders’ profits and meet 
stakeholders’ need to achieve the company’s success. CSR is the extended strategy and 
guideline for corporate governance beyond the legal requirement to optimize 
relationships with stakeholders under the stakeholder theory and covers the deficit in a 
nexus of contracts to meet stakeholders’ interests. CSR is also the standard used to 
evaluate the quality of corporate governance through whether the board of directors 
makes decisions based on the comprehensive concern to achieve shareholders’ profit 
maximization, and the company’s success entirely with respect to financial, social and 
environmental issues, which relate to all stakeholders. 
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Chapter 2: Rationale for and Methods Used to Achieve Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, CSR meets the requirements of the stakeholder theory and is 
broadly applied in boards of directors’ decision-making to achieve companies’ success in 
corporate governance. The emergence of CSR is affected by the legal basis of, and, more 
specifically, the need for, social benefits that the public, namely consumers, employees, 
governments, markets and communities, require from companies to fulfil social 
performance. The public request for corporate information disclosure is the specific driver 
behind the emergence of CSR, because the public gains access to a company’s CSR 
performance and makes investment decisions on the basis of the information revealed. 
 
The definition of CSR and the methods used to implement CSR are both influenced by 
legal regulations, but they are developed further beyond the law in the varied 
voluntary/non-mandatory initiatives that numerous international bodies and 
non-governmental organizations (hereinafter ‘NGOs’) published and that have been 
adopted worldwide. This chapter provides the rationale behind the emergence of CSR, the 
legal impact of CSR and globally used CSR initiatives, and compares the specific 
background and techniques of CSR in a developed country, the UK, and a developing 
country, China. In doing so, the chapter explains the evolution and practice of CSR so as to 
provide an understanding of the background against which the specific CSR practices with 
regard to employees in the two countries are discussed in Chapter 3 and 4. 
 
The UK, as a developed country, applies its experience and systematic mechanism to 
achieve CSR on the basis of the stakeholder theory. In contrast, China, which is a 
developing country, lacks empirical and practical knowledge about CSR practice. 
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However, governments, industrial organizations and NGOs have been involved in the 
development of, and research into, CSR, and have published initiatives that would be 
suited to the Chinese situation. This thesis uses comparative studies on CSR conducted in 
the UK and China. The following section demonstrates the different mechanisms adopted 
in the two countries: 
 
2.1 Emergence of CSR and general methods 
 
Hohnen defined CSR as ‘the voluntary acts of the business sector – outside the realm of 
legislation – to develop sustainability in the field of business they operate in’.1 CSR is not 
included in, and regulated by, law; it goes beyond law and is achieved through voluntary 
action. Owing to the nature of CSR, its emergence and methods are not directly regulated 
through regulations, but affected by law with respect to the notion and scope used to define 
and implement CSR. The reason for the emergence of CSR and its implementation are 
more influenced by public need, and developed through voluntary methods. Section 1 of 
this chapter will present and discuss the rationale for the emergence of CSR in respect of its 
legal, social and market effects, and the different voluntary approaches to the general 
methods used in CSR. 
 
2.1.1 Rationale for CSR 
 
The emergence of CSR conforms to the global development in which people and business 
realize the importance of social responsibility. The new business trend makes stakeholders’ 
interests vulnerable, so that civil society has to put pressure on business to ensure 
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stakeholder’s rights and societal sustainability. 2  In the information age corporate 
behaviour and operation are more transparent to the public. Moreover, the legislation 
related to the relevant duties of boards of directors and companies enhances the social 
understanding of CSR. 
 
2.1.1.1 Social pressure in the new business trend 
 
Unlike traditional business, which involves direct transactions between parties, 
outsourcing and subcontracting are broader in the new era of business; for example, Nike, 
Adidas and other famous brands are merely the ‘brand’, and most of their production 
business is subcontracted to manufacturers in different areas, in order to reduce labour and 
raw material costs. Under the contract of sale, the direct contractual relationship is between 
Nike and consumers. This means that when it comes to the quality of the product, the latter 
is not directly safeguarded against subcontractors who hide behind Nike and easily escape 
from CSR. They avoid public scrutiny while under Nike’s veil. In the supply chain, 
consumers’ right to obtain quality goods will not be directly protected by the manufacturer 
and Nike. Furthermore, some manufacturing plants were established in developing 
countries where the workers are paid less than legal minimum wages and work long hours 
in bad conditions. The public, especially consumers who care deeply about CSR, will find 
it difficult to identify the series of violations of CSR, because only Nike’s CSR, and not the 
subcontractor’s or the manufacturer’s, is presented to them. Even though Nike is 
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corporately socially responsible, there is still some behaviour that works against it in the 
supply chain. Therefore, consumers’ appropriate right to know is vulnerable.3 
 
However, with the emergence of the Internet and social media such as Twitter and 
Facebook, the scope of, and speed with which, information is spread are broader and faster 
respectively. Not only journalists, but the public are able to dig up the truth and find 
information transparently and directly. This is an efficient approach to exposing the hidden 
problems in subcontractors’ corporate operation. Access to updated information allows 
society to take measures to protest against corporate behaviour that goes against human 
rights or environmental protection via campaigns, publicity and boycotts.4 In order to 
avoid social pressures, companies have to take CSR seriously, not only internally, but also 
in the operations of their subcontractors. 
 
2.1.1.2 Market pressure from consumers and investors 
 
As mentioned before, the corporate socially responsible consumer market is dominating 
significantly; a survey conducted in 2007 showed that more than a third of consumers are 
willing to spend money on ‘ethical foods’, compared to just 25 per cent in 2002.5 While in 
the US an LRN study of ethics in the market noted that ‘70 percent of those surveyed 
reported they had decided not to purchase products or services from a company they 
thought had questionable ethics’.6 From the statistics it is evident that people prefer to 
                                                          
3
 McBarnet, D., ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, for Law’: The New 
Corporate Accountability, in McBarnet, D. et al., The New Corporate Accountability, (ed.), Cambridge 
University Press (2007), 14–15. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Ibid., 17. 
6
 LRN is an authoritative company that provides education and support to companies on how to connect 
with their employees, the environment and community, and on how to create corporate values in the right 
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spend money on suppliers with CSR-oriented practices; for instance, organic products, 
such as organic cotton and sustainably produced timber, are becoming widely welcomed. 
 
Moreover, SRI is also a vital element in pushing the attainment of CSR even at the global 
level. In April 2006 former United Nations (hereinafter ‘UN’) Secretary-General, Kofi 
Annan, launched the UN’s investment principles at the New York stock exchange: ‘the six 
principles underlying the initiative, all voluntary, were developed with pension funds and 
foundations as well as experts, and are underpinned by a set of 35 possible actions that 
institutional investors and asset managers can take to integrate environmental, social and 
corporate governance (hereinafter ‘ESG’) considerations into their investment activities.’7 
Therefore, the performance of social responsibility has been the standard individual or 
institutional investors have used. The relevant initiatives are also required by the FTSE4 
Good Index in the UK and the Dow Jones in the US, which will be analysed in the 
following section. Hence, the motivations for CSR in companies are to attract public 
consumption and absorb investment from institutional and even individual investors. 
 
2.1.1.3 Public notion of CSR and legal regulation 
 
Although CSR is a voluntary action and not enforced through law, the latter increased the 
public notion of CSR through relevant regulations. For example, Article 172 of the UK 
Companies Act 2006 regulates the duty of directors ‘to promote the success of the 
company . . . a director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would 
be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
way. See LRN News, 30 January 2006, available at: www.lrn.com/news/releases, last accessed on 15 
August 2012 
7
 Standing, G., ‘Decent Workplaces, Self-regulation and CSR: From Puff to Stuff?’, DESA Working Paper 
No. 62, available at: http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2007/wp62_2007.pdf, last accessed on 21 
November 2013. 
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whole’ and ‘to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and 
others’ and to emphasize ‘the impact of the company’s operations on the community and 
the environment, in order to enhance the company’s reputation for a high standard of 
business conduct’.8 In this article, company directors are accountable for operating the 
company in good faith and for the benefit of all members, including employees, customers, 
the community and the environment. 
 
In addition, legislation enforces the protection of the environment, safeguards consumer’s 
rights and ensures employees’ working conditions, payment and so on. All relevant 
regulations provide the general framework for corporate accountability and enhance public 
attention on how companies show their corporate accountability to their stakeholders. 
When the importance of stakeholder protection is presented in public, companies must 
perform optimally to increase their market competition. Consequently, this will indirectly 
stimulate the achievement of CSR, which is voluntary, broader and a more detailed 
approach to accomplish social responsibility. 
 
2.1.1.4 Public need for information disclosure  
 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law defines the term information 
regulation as ‘a format of governmental intervention to correct the lack of information in 
the market so that when the information available to consumers from all of these sources is 
insufficient to provide complete information about a good or service, then competitive 
markets yield inefficient allocations and there is at least a potential role for government 
regulation to ‘correct’ for these informational market failures’. 9  According to this 
                                                          
8
 UK Companies Act 2006 Ch. 46, Section 172. 
9
 Newman, P., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Palgrave Macmillan (2002), 
307–308. In this definition information regulation originated from the market failure of information 
imperfection, so that governmental intervention in the form of regulation or information provision as 
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definition, consumers acquire information in the market about the characteristics and 
quality of goods or service when they consider purchases from among numerous sources.  
 
Information is provided to all market participants to evaluate and make investment 
decisions. For example, workers would like information on employers such as the 
efficiency of the management and the annual profit of a company, and the salaries offered, 
in order to decide whether they would want to be employed by a company. Suppliers, in 
turn, need to know buyers’ creditworthiness and whether they are able to pay their 
suppliers in time, in order to decide whether or not to supply products to them. Information 
is especially important in the capital market, where financial investors, lenders and other 
creditors make decisions about providing capital resources to companies. 10  Many 
companies realize stakeholders’ urgent need for information on companies’ CSR activities 
related to labour, consumers, government, the environment and their community, and the 
importance of transparency and accountability of CSR reporting to ‘grow the business, 
serve shareholders’ interests and create a better world’.11 
                                                                                                                                                                             
regulatory remedy forces firms to provide sufficient trading information to consumers in the process of 
market transactions. 
10
 International Financial Reporting Standards (hereinafter ‘IFRS’), The Conceptual Framework for 
Financial Reporting 2011, 1 January 2012, available at: 
http://www.ifrs.org/IFRSs/Documents/English%20Web%20summaries/Conceptual%20Framework.pdf, 
last accessed on 16 January 2014. This extract has been prepared by IFRS Foundation staff and has not 
been approved by the International Accounting Standards Board (hereinafter ‘IASB’). IFRS takes account 
of the financial reporting needs of emerging economies and small and medium-sized entities (hereinafter 
‘SMEs’); IASB is the independent standard-setting body of the IFRS Foundation. Its members (currently 
15 full-time members) are responsible for the development and publication of IFRSs, including the IFRS 
for SMEs and for approving interpretations of IFRSs as developed by the IFRS Interpretations Committee 
(formerly called the IFRIC) 
11
 See IFRS, supra note 10; see also Lowenstein, L., ‘Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: 
You Manage What You Measure’, 96 Columbia Law Review (1996), 1342–1345; see also Adina, P. and 
Ion, P., Aspects regarding Corporate Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosure, 1407–1410, available at: 
http://steconomice.uoradea.ro/anale/volume/2008/v3-finances-banks-accountancy/256.pdf, 407-411, last 
accessed on 28 November 2013. 
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2.1.2 CSR and the law 
 
CSR is a voluntary concept that is not enforceable through laws. However, laws set up the 
minimum standards of corporate accountability to society and, to some extent, affect the 
scope of CSR. Domestic regulations, treaties and international agreements, which are valid 
obligations in companies, have influenced the direction and content of CSR policy in 
individual companies and in specific industries. In order to avoid confusion about the 
correlation between law and CSR, it could be said that CSR exists due to the reasons 
mentioned above, and goes beyond the scope of legislation, and its implementation is 
varied and voluntarily exercised in individual companies as needed. There is, however, no 
accurate measure of how CSR is achieved in companies. Regulation is the lowest standard 
that companies should meet. They are free to exercise CSR at higher or lower levels, but it 
should be at least above the legal limitation. The conclusion that could be drawn is that 
hard law may demand voluntary approaches, for example, requiring companies to be more 
transparent and to report on their social or environmental performance but not specifying 
what that performance should be. If performance standards are found to be low, then it is 
up to such actors and entities as civil society organizations and movements, the media and 
public opinion to expose, name and shame or otherwise bring pressure to bear on a 
company to improve its performance.12  
 
2.1.2.1 Domestic legislation 
 
                                                          
12
 Utting, P., ‘Rethinking Business Regulation: From Self-regulation to Social Control’, Technology, 
Business and Society Programme, Paper Number 15 (September 2005), available at: 
http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/ab82a6805797760f80256b4f005da1ab/f02ac3db0ed40
6e0c12570a10029bec8/$FILE/utting.pdf, last accessed on 5 May 2013. 
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The legislation in Australia will be taken as a general example to present how national 
regulation affects the implementation of CSR. Section 299 of the Australian Corporate Act 
2001 regulates that the directors’ report must not only publish information about financial 
performance to public investors and other stakeholders, but also disclose the entity’s 
operations that ‘are subject to any particular and significant environmental regulation 
under a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory – give details of the entity’s 
performance in relation to environmental regulation’.13 The mandatory requirement of the 
directors’ report in respect of environmental performance forces boards of directors to take 
positive action to ensure environmental protection in corporate governance. 
 
As regards the article on corporate directors’ reporting accountability, boards of directors 
not only have the duty of reporting information about financial performance and corporate 
governance to shareholders within legally required aspects, but should also disclose 
information about how their company achieves financial performance through other 
factors with respect to CSR, such as employee entitlement, environmental protection and 
social donation to provide stakeholders with access to knowledge on how companies 
enhance corporate governance financially and socially. When CSR is included in corporate 
financial performance, the regulatory requirement of annual financial reporting, as the 
basic standard, will inspire corporates to use CSR to improve corporate governance. 
 
2.1.2.2 European Union laws 
 
Some EU laws also provide limitations in various fields that affect the scope of CSR; for 
example, Directive 1999/44/EC calls for ‘a guarantee of at least 2 years for new goods (or 
                                                          
13
 Australia Corporation Act 2001, available at: 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/s299.html, last accessed on 19 November 
2013. 
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longer if the Member State wishes) where the seller will undertake without extra charge to 
reimburse the price paid or to replace and/or repair consumer goods if they do not meet the 
specifications set out in the guarantee statement or relevant advertising’ and the goods 
must ‘comply with the description given by the seller and posses the same qualities and 
characteristics as other similar goods; be fit for the purpose for which the consumer 
requires them and which was made known to the seller at the time of purchase; are fit for 
the purpose for which goods of the same type are used; show the same quality and 
performance, which are normal in goods of the same type and which consumers can 
reasonably expect’.14 Directives 1998/27/EC and 2005/29/EC both regulate the limit on 
consumer protection as being the minimum legal standards when companies make 
decisions that affect consumers.15  
 
All companies in EU member states are bound by this directive as a corporate duty. 
Furthermore, should they comply, companies will enhance the minimum standard in their 
CSR policy, ensure better quality of goods and services to consumers, improve the 
efficiency of corporate governance, and will ensure stakeholder profit. Therefore, the EU 
laws are the basis of the legal obligation to encourage corporations to show more loyalty 
towards their consumers in the process of achieving CSR. Under this circumstance, EU 
laws, as with other legislation, are the minimum standards for companies to comply with 
and basically inform what their board of directors should do to meet the company’s 
interest.  
 
                                                          
14
 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and the Council (1999) OJ, L171/12, available at: 
http://www.wak-tt.com/tt/2yearwarranty1.htm, last accessed on 18 April 2013. 
15
 Glinski, C., ‘Corporate Codes of Conduct: Moral or Legal Obligation’, in McBarnet, D. et al., The New 
Corporate Accountability, (ed.), Cambridge University Press (2007), 126–127; see also Directive 
1998/27/EC of the European Parliament and the Council (1998) OJ, L166/51; see also Directive 
2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and the Council (2005) OJ, L149/22. 
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2.1.2.3 International agreement 
 
As with EC treaties, when nations sign an international agreement, they are required to 
comply with it in their domestic legislation. Here, the Kyoto Protocol, which is a form of 
international agreement that affects the scope of CSR, will be taken as an example. 
According to the Kyoto Protocol,  
 
it is an international agreement linked to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. The major feature of the Kyoto Protocol is that it 
sets binding targets for 37 industrialized countries and the European community 
for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. These amount to an average of 
five per cent against 1990 levels over the five-year period 2008–2012.16  
 
All participants should meet the requirements through their national regulations, including 
legislation, governmental regulations and administrative limitations. In the protocol, 
climate change and relevant environmental issues are controlled through three 
market-based mechanisms, (1) emissions trading, (2) clean development mechanism and 
(3) joint implementation. 17  In corporate governance companies could apply the 
mechanisms as an ‘alarm’ to take environmental protection into consideration in corporate 
decision-making and as an instruction on how to implement CSR in this regard. 
 
Human rights have become a vital issue in the fields of economics, politics and society, and 
have even been applied to CSR. However, when adopting this principle in the context of 
state and corporation, human rights have different meanings for these two entities. Human 
                                                          
16
 Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, available at: 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php/, last accessed on 19 November 2013. 
17
 Ibid. 
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rights confines are more generalized in the public notion than in corporate conduct:18 for 
example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a UN document that formulates the 
obligation of human rights on states, and it could be referred to as the basis of state human 
rights law, which is as enforceable as other regulations.19 However, when human rights are 
adopted in business, corporations could find threats to these rights, such as harm to 
another’s life or health as stated in the Declaration of Human Rights, and articulate 
corporate human rights by preventing harm to employees in any way.20 The scope of 
human rights is varied in individual companies, because the decision-making on 
stakeholders’ interests and human rights is more precise than the Universal Declaration at 
state level. Therefore, human rights legislation cannot be treated as the universal standards 
for CSR. Companies will ensure the protection of human rights with respect to overriding 
moral issues derived from social norms, international agreements, legislation and so on.21 
In terms of international agreements on human rights, international organizations such as 
the International Labour Organization (hereinafter ‘ILO’) and Fair Labour Association 
(hereinafter ‘FLA’) also set standards for human rights protection.  
 
Although the state and corporations are both responsible for human rights protection, for 
the latter, international agreements and laws on human rights only justify the rationale 
behind and formulate the relevant standards of CSR rather than actually requiring human 
rights in corporate governance. Additionally, the adoption of international agreements on 
                                                          
18
 Human rights is defined differently in states and companies; for example, a state has the welfare 
obligation to its citizen to solve the problem of poverty, while a corporation may only need to provide a 
pension fund or social welfare to its employees. Therefore, the scope of human rights in a state or 
government is broader than in a corporation. See Campbell, T., ‘Normative Grounding: A Human Rights 
Approach’, in McBarnet, D. et al., The New Corporate Accountability, (ed.), Cambridge University Press 
(2007), 551–554. 
19
 See Campbell, supra note 18, 554; see also Glinski, supra note 15, 128–133. 
20
 See Campbell, supra note 18, 557. 
21
 Ibid., 555–556. 
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human rights at national level is regarded as mandatory and a legislative approach, while 
the use of international agreements on human rights within companies could be voluntarily 
and individually decided, over and above the minimum legal basis, according to the varied 
scope of human rights in each company. For instance, when member states of the ILO sign 
conventions, these conventions would be directly or indirectly applied as laws. However, 
companies in member states could willingly adopt a series of ILO standards to ensure 
human rights based on different policies of corporate governance. Therefore, states that 
comply with a human rights framework within national legislation would generally 
encourage the implementation of CSR towards human rights at company level.22  
 
2.1.2.4 Soft law 
 
As implemented by the legislation discussed above, CSR is characterised as ‘hard law’, 
which is binding and mandatory to perform. However, this law only sets up the minimum 
legal basis for achieving CSR. In contrast with hard law, ‘soft law’, such as guidelines, 
codes of conduct and declarations, does not have a legally binding effect, but has potential 
effects in practice;23 for example, the fundamental ILO conventions are mandatory to all 
member states that have ratified these conventions. However, within this framework the 
ILO also provides a series of extensive standards, guidelines, codes of practice, opinions 
and the like to instruct and facilitate the implementation of ILO conventions in practice. 
The soft law resources of the ILO are non-binding on member states, but can be adopted by 
                                                          
22
 Owing to the voluntary adoption of CSR, if human rights are adopted legally in a company, it would 
only be the minimum standard for performing CSR in corporate governance. It will also reduce the positive 
influence and scope of CSR for companies. See Campbell, supra note 18, 556–559. 
23
 Brian, B., European Labour Law, 3rd Edition, Oxford University Press (2007), 187. 
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national courts of the member states as a point of reference to make judgments, and can be 
directly applied by individual companies as precise guidelines to fulfil ILO conventions.24 
 
In addition, soft law provides the point of reference for the hard law that the broad use of 
non-enforceable resources, namely international voluntary guidelines, industrial codes of 
conduct and broadly used ethical standards in corporate codes of conduct will lead to the 
innovation of mandatory legislation. In the EU the soft law of CSR has been vitally 
developed as the basis of hard law. According to one view, soft law CSR initiatives provide 
a broad view of legislation in the fields of employment policy, social policy, public health 
and so on. 25   The research also points out that the EC directives on social and 
environmental issues, that is, the soft law instruments influence the hard laws in practice.26 
 
It is difficult to distinguish ‘which comes first’ between soft law and hard law. The former 
specifies the use of the latter and in practice fills the gap in legislation that is adopted to 
facilitate and interpret the adoption of mandatory requirements. Soft law in CSR can be 
directly applied at national or corporate level in varied respects, so that it is the broader use 
                                                          
24
 Vinkovic, M., The Role of Soft Law Methods (CSR) in Labour Law, 8–10, available at: 
http://mta-pte.ajk.pte.hu/downloads/mario_vinkovic.pdf, last accessed on 12 December 2013; see also, 
Olsen, B. E. and Sorensen, K. E., ‘Strengthening the Enforcement of CSR through Mediation and Conflict 
Resolution by National Contact Point: Finding a New Balance Between Hard Law and Soft Law’, Nordic 
& European Company Law Working Paper Series, Nos 10–38, 26, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2269555, last accessed on 29 November 2013. 
25
 Croquet, N. et al., Corporate Social Responsibility Soft Law Development in the European Union, 
University of Oxford (30 July 2009), 2, available at: 
http://www.reports-and-materials.org/CSR-soft-law-in-EU-Oxford-Pro-Bono-Publico-for-Ruggie-30-Jul-20
09.pdf, last accessed on 29 November 2013. This brief was prepared to inform the mandate of Professor 
John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on business and human rights about 
the development between soft law and traditional legislative instruments in the European Community in 
relation to CSR. 
26
 Ibid., 8–9. 
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of hard law that provides the specific legal basis used to clarify and simplify the adoption 
of legislation in social and environmental issues in practice.  
 
2.1.3 Implementation and CSR methods 
 
CSR goes beyond the scope of hard law and is performed voluntarily. It carries the explicit 
moral authority to improve social, environmental and human rights aspects in corporate 
operations; it refers to a broad and detailed range of aspects. However, due to creative 
compliance, it cannot be completely controlled only by regulatory limitation. Creative 
compliance is a technical business practice used to coordinate the adoption of law, by using 
the law in creative ways without breaking it. This is a technical circumvention to resist 
legal control without breach of law, such as tax avoidance, creative environmental 
regulation, and employee and consumer rights violations.27 Any adverse legal regulation 
can be avoided through the creative technique. Therefore, law, as solid limitation, is not 
sufficient to safeguard the social, environmental and human rights protection from 
companies’ behaviour.28 CSR will widely and deeply provide norms and standards to 
instruct the achievement of social responsibility through various approaches from 
companies, social organizations, NGOs, the market and so on. 
 
Self-regulation is an effective CSR method, and can be divided into published and internal 
regulation. The former comes in the form of ‘codes of conduct, guidelines or standards, 
requirements of securities markets, standardisation of business conduct and improvement 
of performance; while the latter is to standardize the internal behaviours in individual 
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 See McBarnet, supra note 3, 48–50. 
28
 See Campbell, supra note 18, 556. 
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companies through management handbooks or other managerial regulation’.29 Contractual 
control, in turn, is used to push the performance of CSR of the contractual parties to 
regulate all the social, environmental and ethical standards and requirement in contracts. 
Under contract and tort law, contractual parties are forced to fulfil the contractual 
obligations that are voluntarily settled in contracts among parties. Although the specific 
obligations are voluntarily established in contracts, the performance of contractual clauses 
is mandatory to contractual parties, so that the achievement of CSR is ensured under the 
enforceable contractual relations. Breach of CSR requirements in a contract would result in 
default and tort as regulated. Moreover, information disclosure and monitoring put 
pressure on companies to enable the public to get information about companies’ 
achievement of CSR, to screen their performance, and to verify the authenticity and 
reliability of information disclosure.  
 
2.1.3.1 Indirect legal effect 
 
As already stated, CSR is a voluntary matter and cannot be enforced through any 
legislation or governmental regulation. However, there are regulations that provide that 
CSR policies be adopted in different fields. Voluntary achievement is the essence of CSR. 
However, to some extent, it is necessary to impose external and solid pressure, such as 
governmental regulation, which ‘has thus quietly bolstered and, indeed, created a whole 
new level of market pressure, and indirectly fostered voluntary CSR’.30 It means that 
governmental regulation limits and regulates market behaviour in ethics, and this market 
pressure will be effective to encourage business’ CSR policy and achievement. For 
example, the European Accounts Modernisation Directive 2003/51/EC requires that 
                                                          
29
 Self-regulation is so-called meta regulation that reflects different purposes and effects of the various 
fields of law, and is applied under self-regulatory instruments in the forms of published codes of conduct 
and internal regulation within business. See Glinski, supra note 15, 121–122. 
30
 See McBarnet, supra note 3, 33. 
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companies provide a business review in their statutory annual report of principal risks and 
uncertainties, not only financially, but also non-financially relating to the environment and 
employee issues.31 Although it is not direct regulation on adopting CSR in companies’ 
corporate operation, the transparency of a non-financial report has indirectly required 
business to incorporate CSR matters in corporate governance. Only when companies 
implement CSR in corporate governance will they provide an authentic report about the 
environment and employee aspects. 
 
In addition, the strength of legislation will indirectly affect the corporate notion of CSR and 
the extent of its adoption. McBarnet described the situation in the US as ‘indirect fostering 
of CSR-related policies, particularly in more narrowly focused corporate governance – 
though also in relation to such issues as the environment and corruption – can be seen in the 
United States too, though there largely through enforcement strategies’. 32  Actually, 
enforcement is not directly imposed because of, for instance, the environment or corruption, 
it is due to the relevant strict legislation. Companies realized the importance of fulfilling 
their responsibility in these two fields; again, legislation would be the minimum standard, 
and the board of directors would incorporate the environment and corruption in their CSR 
policy above the legal standard. 
 
2.1.3.2 Codes of conduct 
 
A code of conduct is also known as ‘guidelines’ or ‘standards’ that are published to set up a 
uniform standard that all traders or producers at the same level or industry should obey.33 It 
is not statute law and does not come about through rigorous legislative procedures. The 
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 European Accounts Modernisation Directive 2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and the Council 
(2003) OJ, L178/16. 
32
 See McBarnet, supra note 3, 35. 
33
 See Glinski, supra note 15, 122–123. 
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existence of codes of conduct is not directed by government or against any legal 
background. The format is varied, from corporate initiatives to global standards, and is led 
by different kinds of organizations or individuals.  
 
In the US many trade unions and NGOs commenced the International Right to Know 
Campaign that requires companies listed on US stock exchanges to disclose information 
about the operations of their overseas affiliates and major contractors.34 The Tax Justice 
Network reported the trends in global taxation in 2003, such as tax evasion and avoidance 
through transfer pricing and off-shore tax havens, which is a reflection of conduct in 
taxation and an indirect instruction to improve this behaviour.35 Governmental regulation 
also has an indirect effect by encouraging or stressing specific behaviour in business 
through market pressure, so that there are relevant requirements for codes of conduct such 
as in the stock market. Furthermore, several international institutions also call for, and 
provide advice on, codes of conduct: the European Parliament requires a code of conduct 
for European transnational corporations (hereinafter ‘TNCs’) operating in developing 
countries, which presents a solution to improving CSR.36  What is interesting is that 
activists for the protection of the earth, Earth International, proposed that the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (hereinafter ‘WSSD’) establish a convention to 
enforce minimum environmental and social standards, and to encourage effective reporting 
                                                          
34
 Employees working for some MNCs in developing countries are treated unfairly and illegally, that is, 
their human rights are violated: they are over-worked and/or receive unfair payment. The report on the 
operations in their overseas affiliates and contractors will prevent this different treatment. 
35
 The reference about the objective and developmet in the Tax Justice Network can also be found at: 
http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/front_content.php?idcatart=2&lang=1, last accessed on 18 January 2013. 
36
 On 3 April 1998, the President of the Parliament announced that the Committee on Development and 
Cooperation had been authorized to draw up a report on EU standards on European enterprises operating in 
developing countries, see EU Standards on European Enterprises Operating in Developing Countries: 
Towards a European Code of Conduct, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&mode=XML&reference=A4-1998-508&l
anguage=EN, last accessed on 18 January 2013. 
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and provision of mechanisms for the implementation by TNCs to avoid negative impacts.37 
This means that the proposal and requirement from the social group may even be effective 
and adopted as codes of conduct. 
 
From the examples given above, it is clear that companies adopt codes of conduct broadly 
and voluntarily. They also offer guidelines and instructions to company on how to achieve 
CSR. They can be viewed as the experience and a comprehensive summary of 
stakeholders’ voice and requirements in specific countries, industries and business aspects. 
Various codes of conduct would be directly applied in a corporate charter or modified in 
terms of a particular requirement in companies, so that they boost the achievement of CSR. 
In this regard, typical and important examples will be applied to explain how codes of 
conduct promote CSR:  
 
2.1.3.2.1 International initiatives 
 
The UN Global Compact commenced in July 2000 as a completely voluntary initiative. It 
tries to encourage business to realize the importance of keeping positive relationships with 
government, civil society, labour and other stakeholders, and to ensure the activities of the 
market, commerce, technology and finance to benefit social economics and sustainability 
with respect to human rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption. 38  The 
                                                          
37
 The World Summit on Sustainable Development took place in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 
26 August to 4 September 2002 to discuss sustainable development. It was convened by the UN. The 
summit was attended by a group of entrepreneurs and leaders of NGOs. See Overview of WSSD on the 
official website, available at: http://www.un.org/jsummit/ , last accessed on 18 January 2013. 
38
 The UN Global Compact is a principle-based framework to stimulate global companies to adopt 
sustainable and socially responsible action in corporate governance, and to report on their CSR 
implementation. The voluntary initiative has been applied in a large number of companies as the guideline 
on how to exercise CSR and on information disclosure. See Overview of UN Global Compact, available at: 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html, last accessed on 19 January 2014. 
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Chairperson of the Foundation for the Global Compact, Sir Mark Moody-Stuart, 
commented on the principles and said that ‘while the Global Compact is a purely voluntary 
initiative, it is important to protect the investment that seriously committed companies and 
other stakeholders have made’.39  
 
By 2006, the number of participations had been about 3,000, including over 2,500 
companies in 90 countries. The annual report of the UN Global Compact 2011 revealed 
that more than 2,500 businesses and non-businesses had participated in the compact in that 
single year. The principles instruct the leadership on how to promote CSR through 
sustainability, disclosure and public policy, and further how to achieve the commitment of 
employees, subsidiaries and supply chains.40 The function of the compact is summarized 
as ‘adopting an established and globally recognized policy framework for the development, 
implementation, and disclosure of environmental, social, and governance policies and 
practices; sharing best and emerging practices to advance practical solutions and strategies 
to common challenges; advancing sustainability solutions in partnership with a range of 
stakeholders, including UN agencies, governments, civil society, labour, and other 
non-business interest’.41 
 
The UN Global Compact Annual Review 2011 demonstrates how companies developed 
CSR policies and strategies through the internal mechanism of corporate governance. 
Without the limitation of nations, when companies voluntarily participate in the UN Global 
Compact, the principles, such as a kind of code of conduct about CSR, have to be adopted 
                                                          
39
 See Standing, supra note 7. 
40
 See Overview of UN Global Compact, supra note 38. 
41
 Ibid. 
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into corporate strategy making and corporate governance. 42  In the meantime, the 
achievement of the UN Global Compact in registered companies should be reported 
through information disclosure, and its authenticity and reliability will be verified by the 
organization.  
 
Another global initiative on codes of conduct is that of the Human Rights Commission in 
2005 which requested John Ruggie, the former UN Secretary, to draft a report on the issue 
of human rights in connection with TNCs and other business enterprises, in order to clarify 
the standards of CSR and corporate accountability with respect to human rights.43 The 
report pointed out that to safeguard human rights, the monitoring of supply chains was vital 
for premium brands in the footwear and apparel industries, because major plants were run 
by small manufacturers of developing countries where low payment and long working 
hours always occurred. 
 
The FLA was appointed to play the role of monitoring that ‘all FLA member companies 
agree to adopt a programme of workplace standards implementation, monitoring and 
remediation in order to bring some 4,000 manufacturing sites into compliance with FLA 
standards, which go beyond the International Labour Organization’s core standards’.44 
Therefore, companies will implement CSR through the instruction contained in the Human 
Rights Commission report as the code of conduct for the protection of human rights in 
business. 
 
                                                          
42
 UN Global Compact Annual Review 2011, 4-6, available at: 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/2011_Global_Compact_Implementation_Survey.p
df, last accessed on 19 January 2014. 
43
 Human Rights Commission 2006 (replaced with the Human Rights Council), ILO: Strategies and 
Practices for Labour Inspection. Committee on Employment and Social Policy to the Governing Body, 
Geneva, GB.297/ESP/3 (2006). 
44
 See Standing, supra note 7. 
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2.1.3.2.2  State non-legislative standards 
 
In some countries, governmental bodies or NGOs establish the instructive and constructive 
standards for CSR to deal with relevant issues. Companies can voluntarily comply with 
these standards and adopt them in their internal corporate governance. With the broad use 
of non-regulative standards, some initiatives would gradually be developed as regulation 
that is enforced on all companies in corporate governance. Therefore, effective standards 
from governments or NGOs can be adopted voluntarily as strategy in corporate 
decision-making to achieve CSR in corporate governance. 
 
For example, Standard Australia is a set of voluntary standards of CSR on how to establish, 
implement and maintain issues related to employees, the environment, and health and 
safety.45 It contains 12 industry sectors, including manufacturing and processing; energy, 
water and waste service, consumer products services; and safety. In every sector the 
limitation of CSR is divided into explicit and detailed items. For example, the health and 
community services sector regulates the standard on the disposal of clinical and related 
waste that sets out the requirements for the identification, segregation, handling, storage, 
transport, treatment and ultimate safe disposal of this waste, which may be hazardous, in an 
environmentally responsible manner. 46  Waste arising from medical, nursing, dental, 
veterinary, laboratory, pharmaceutical, podiatry, tattooing, body piercing and mortuary 
practices, among others, are dealt with in this standard. Additionally, according to 
consumer products services and safety, the standard requires that the quality of children’s 
toy where ISO 8124-4:2010 was adopted in its manufacture should specify requirements 
                                                          
45
 Bottomley, S. and Forsyth, A., ‘The New Corporate Law: Employee’s Interests’, in McBarnet, D. et al., 
The New Corporate Accountability, (ed.), Cambridge University Press (2007), 314. 
46
 Standards Australia, available at: 
http://www.standards.org.au/StandardsDevelopment/Sectors/Pages/default.aspx, last accessed on 19 April 
2012. 
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and test methods, and that the activities for which the toys are used are domestic family use 
and intended for children under the age of 14 years to play on or in.47 The standards 
provide guidelines on the broad and complete range which refers to most business 
operations in most industries. As the codes of conduct are wide-ranging, it is easy and clear 
for different companies to adopt the most relevant standards in their corporate governance 
to fulfil CSR.  
 
2.1.3.2.3 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
 
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (hereinafter ‘the OECD Principles’) were 
originally created due to the requirement from the OECD Council Meeting at Ministerial 
level to develop, ‘in conjunction with national governments, other relevant international 
organizations and the private sector’, a set of corporate governance standards and 
guidelines.48  
 
Since the OECD Principles were agreed to in 1999, they have been the guideline for 
corporate governance initiatives in both OECD and non-OECD countries alike. The OECD 
Principles provide the standards in respect of shareholders’ right and role, the 
responsibility of directors and so on. They also provide the standard for the corporate 
governance framework to recognise the rights of stakeholders established by law or 
through mutual agreements, and encourage active co-operation between corporations and 
stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises 
and to ensure ‘stakeholders, including individual employees and their representative bodies, 
should be able to freely communicate their concerns about illegal or unethical practices to 
                                                          
47
 Ibid. 
48
 See Communication of the OECD Council Meeting at Ministerial Level on 27–28 April 1998, available 
at: http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/oecd/oecd98.htm, last accessed on 19 April 2014. 
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the board and their rights should not be compromised for doing this’.49  The principles of 
disclosure and transparency also require information disclosure regarding meeting 
employees and other stakeholders’ interests in corporate governance. 
 
The OECD Principles are a code of conduct complied with by thousands of businesses to 
guide the direction of corporate governance and indirectly instruct how to ensure 
stakeholders’ interests. Companies could adopt them into relevant CSR policy and practice 
as a code of conduct in the process of corporate governance. 
 
2.1.3.2.4  Securities market requirement 
 
In order to ensure ethical conduct in corporate governance, corporate codes of ethics are 
largely applied in public companies as internal, voluntary initiatives to adhere to high 
ethical standards. 50  Newberg defined corporate codes of ethics as the guidelines to 
corporate governance ‘do’s’ and ‘don’ts’ in five simple terms: ‘follow the law, be honest, 
be loyal to the company, keep the company’s secret, and treat corporate stakeholders and 
competitors with fairness and respect’.51 In the US many large public companies had 
adopted corporate codes of ethics in corporate governance for decades. However, after a 
few corporate bribery scandals such as Enron came to light, investors’ interests in 
securities markets were critically harmed, so that it became necessary to require 
transparency from public companies in these markets. Under investors’ pressure and as a 
result of market requirements, US securities law enforces the basic standards of 
                                                          
49
 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, Principle IV, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/corporateaffairs/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf, last accessed 
on 19 April 2014. 
50
 Newberg, J. A., Corporate Codes of Ethics, Mandatory Disclosure, and the Market for Ethical Conduct, 
29 Vermont Law Review (2004–2005), 258. (253–296) 
51
 Ibid., 271. 
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information disclosure that ‘a public company must disclose, on a timely basis, everything 
that a reasonable investor would consider relevant to an investment decision; no material 
misstatements or omissions are permitted’.52 Owing to the requirement of information 
disclosure, corporate financial and ethical performance is both presented in public and 
monitored by third parties.  
 
Section 406 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 is a further development of the US 
securities law with respect to ethical conduct that adopts the standards of corporate codes 
of ethics in many companies and requires boards of directors, especially senior financial 
officers, to introduce codes of ethical conduct in corporate governance.53 The section 
states that public companies should raise concerns about the ethical conduct of 
corporations and senior financial managers, and publish the ethical standards and 
performance for the benefit of public investors. It is not mandatory for issuers to disclose 
the achievement of ethical standards, but they are forced to disclose whether they have 
adopted ethical conduct in corporate governance and, if not, why not.54 
 
Under market pressure and as a result of the legal requirement, the New York Stock 
Exchange (hereinafter ‘NYSE’) Commission and NASDAQ have also provided similar 
principles about ethical conduct since 2004. For example, the NYSE Commission provides 
                                                          
52
 Ibid., 271–273. 
53
 The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 in the US is also known as the ‘Public Company Accounting Reform 
and Investor Protection Act’ in the Senate and the ‘Corporate and Auditing Accountability and 
Responsibility Act’ in the House. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act is a huge development in US Securities Law 
after some accounting scandals that required public companies to disclose reliable information and reduce 
investors’ risk in securities markets. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Section 406; see also Newberg, 
supra note 50, 272–273. 
54
 Section 406 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 imposes more specific standards of information 
disclosure on ethical conducts to public companies and is regarded as the Ethical Code of Conduct for 
public issuers to voluntarily adopt ethical codes in corporate governance. See The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 
2002, Section 406, supra note 53. 
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a requirement in section 303A. 10 of the Listed Company Manual that enforces boards of 
directors in listed companies to set up policies to prohibit the conflict of interests between 
employers and employees, and to provide a mechanism for employees or officers to 
communicate the conflict with listed company.55 NASDAQ Rule IM 4350 (7) states that 
ethical behaviour is required and expected of every corporate director, officer and 
employee whether or not a formal code of conduct exists. The requirement of a publicly 
available code of conduct applicable to all directors, officers and employees of an issuer is 
intended to demonstrate to investors that the board and management of NASDAQ issuers 
have carefully considered the requirement of ethical dealing, and have put in place a 
system to ensure that they become aware of, and take prompt action against, any 
questionable behaviour.56 
 
The NASDAQ rules are generally not enforceable and not all companies have to comply 
with these regulations. In terms of this rule, it is voluntary for companies if they are not 
listed on the NASDAQ to do so; they also do not need to obey the rules of foreign 
companies about the compliance with the law and codes of ethics. However, once 
companies have been listed or will be listed on NASDAQ, they have to concern themselves 
with the ethical behaviours that are required in their public code of conduct. 
 
                                                          
55 NYSE Listed Company Manual, Section 303A. 10 The Code of Business Conduct and Ethics, available 
at: 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4_3&manual=%2Flcm
%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F, last accessed on 24 May 2014. NYSE Listed Company Manual is a set 
of regulations applicable to all corporations who wish to sell securities by listing themselves on the New 
York Stock Exchange Commission. The manual covers regulations on how a corporation’s board should be 
composed, its internal audit and remuneration committees function, the voting rights of stockholders, 
standards for disclosure when issuing shares, and so forth. 
56 Rule IM 4350-6, The NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc. Marketplace Rules, 15 April 2004. 
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In terms of the example of the US securities market, the legal requirement of ethical 
conduct stemmed from corporate codes of ethics driven by public investors’ needs. 
Although the legislation is aimed at ensuring ethical conduct in corporate governance and 
protecting investors’ interests in transactions, it does not enforce listed companies to have 
ethical codes. Therefore, the legal requirements of the securities market are defined more 
as a guideline for listed companies to set up ethical codes voluntarily and implement ethical 
conduct under or beyond law. On the legal basis of the securities markets, both listed and 
non-listed companies can establish higher ethical standards and achieve CSR in corporate 
governance, so that the positive performance will benefit public investors and SRI much 
more.  
 
2.1.3.3  Contractual control 
 
Contractual relationships are protected under contract law and tort law. When a contract is 
set up, contractual parties have to comply with the clauses and fulfil their duties in the 
contract, otherwise there will be a breach of contract. Contractual behaviour itself is 
voluntary and parties can freely put requirements into a contract under bilateral agreement, 
and the contract is enforceable by the contractual parties. In a supply chain, contractors 
have increasingly focused much more attention on SRI, so that the supplier’s achievement 
of CSR will be the significant issue in contracts where contractors require suppliers to fulfil 
CSR as a contractual obligation. For example, Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited’s terms of 
supply regulate that 
 
the sale of CSR’s products (‘Products’) and provision of Services (as defined 
below) by CSR to the person or legal entity purchasing the Products and Services 
from CSR (‘Purchaser’) are subject to these Terms of Supply (‘Terms’), and 
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which shall also apply to all quotations and offers made by and purchase orders 
accepted by Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited.57  
 
Therefore, all business conducted with, or sale or purchase from Cambridge Silicon has to 
comply with the terms. Clause 7 requires from purchasers that products are not designed 
for use in safety-critical devices or systems such as those relating to:  
 
(i) life support; (ii) nuclear power; and/or (iii) civil aviation applications, or other 
applications where injury or loss of life could be reasonably foreseeable as a result 
of the failure of a product. The purchaser, who agrees not to use products (or 
supply products for use) in such devices or systems, shall indemnify on demand 
and hold harmless CSR from and against all losses, demands, claims, damages, 
costs, expenses (including without limitation consequential losses and loss of 
profit, reasonable legal costs and expenses and VAT thereon) and liabilities 
suffered or incurred by CSR as a result of the purchaser’s breach of this clause 7.58 
 
This clause regulates suppliers’ CSR obligations in contract through sanction of products 
without CSR support. 
 
The contractor owns the right to know what the supplier’s CSR status is if there is any 
unsatisfactory situation related to human rights, the environment or sustainability. In this 
case the supplier will break the contract and the purchaser will stop doing business with it. 
The non-legal sanction is the most pervasive, direct and effective approach to suppliers’ 
non-compliance with CSR, which is not a legal procedure, but the remedy in the case of 
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 Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited’s Terms of Supply, available at: http://www.csr.com/salesterms, last 
accessed on 23 August 2012. 
58
 Ibid. 
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breach of contract.59 If a supplier tries to maintain a long-term contract with a purchaser 
who put CSR into his or her investment, the CSR requirement must be complied with as the 
contractual clause regulates. 
 
2.1.3.4 Information disclosure 
 
In corporate governance, information disclosure is regarded as an efficient instrument to 
reduce agency cost, protect shareholders in a principal–agency problem and enhance share 
value among investors. However, the further goal of corporate governance is to meet all 
stakeholders’ needs to promote companies’ interests as a whole. Stakeholders’ issues are 
not only limited to the financial value of companies, but spread to social and environmental 
matters, related to employees, consumers, the community and so on. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, market participants prefer investing, whether financial or human resources, in 
companies with high performance of social responsibility, so that the integration of 
corporate social and environmental reporting into traditional reporting is strongly required, 
and enhances companies’ reputation and competitive advantage.60  Therefore, a large 
number of companies produce various reports in the form of CSR reports or sustainability 
which brought about significant development with respect to CSR performance and 
reporting.61 Even in the capital market, CSR reporting, focusing on pollution, health and 
safety, human rights, child labour, and other social and environmental matters, is necessary 
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 McBarnet, D. and Kurkchiyan, M., ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Through Contractual Control? 
Global Supply Chains and ‘Other-regulation’’, in McBarnet, D. et al.(eds), The New Corporate 
Accountability,  Cambridge University Press (2007), 75–79. 
60
 Lungu, C. I. et al., Corporate Social and Environmental Reporting: Another Dimension for Accounting 
Information, Working Paper Series, 2–3, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1447247, last accessed on 29 November 2013. 
61
 Cooper, S. M. and Owen, D. L., ‘Corporate Social Reporting and Stakeholder Accountability: The 
Missing Link’, 32 Accounting, Organizations and Society (2007), 655–660. 
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for investors to evaluate risk and uncertainty, and to make socially responsible 
investments.62 
 
Under market pressure and investors’ requirements, mandatory information disclosure is 
associated with a national and international legal system that is aimed at satisfying 
information users’ needs. 63  ‘Informational regulation’ is defined as rules enforcing 
mandatory disclosure of information on corporate operations or performance on third 
parties, including employees, consumers, shareholders or the community.64 Mandatory 
information disclosure stemmed from the requirement of financial reports to the capital 
market in the interests of investors and shareholders, in order to induce investor confidence 
and encourage participation in market.65 However, the need for information from market 
participants had become more diverse, so that regulatory reporting has been developed to 
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 Baumunk, J., Law and Policy of Corporate Sustainability Disclosure, Position Paper, May 2010, 2–6, 
available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1620538, last accessed on 29 November 
2013; see also FRC, Exposure Draft: Guidance on the Strategic Report (August 2013), 6–18, available at: 
http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Accounting-and-Reporting-Policy/Exposure-Draft-Guidance
-on-the-Strategic-Report-File.pdf, last accessed on 29 November 2013. The guidance states: ‘Information in 
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it.’ See also Villiers, C., ‘Corporate Reporting and Company Law’, Cambridge Studies in Corporate Law, 
Volume 5, Cambridge University Press (2006), 230-233. In Villiers’ view, sustainbility reporting refers to 
social and environmental reporting that aim at demonstrating companies’ commitment in social and 
environmental matters and making them accountable to their actions. 
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 Guttentag, M. D., ‘Accuracy Enhancement, Agency Costs, and Disclosure Regulation’, Review of Law 
and Economics, 2007, Volume 3, Issue 2, 629–630; see also Adina and Ion, supra note 11, 1407–1409. 
64
 Case, D. W., ‘The Law and Economics of Environmental Information as Regulation’, 31 Environmental 
Law Reporter (2001), 10775. ‘Informational regulation’ is also known as disclosure regulation that 
provides transparency and fairness required for market integrity, because all information should be 
reflected to investors for their decision-making of investment. See also Villiers, supra note 62, 180-181. 
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 The mandatory information disclosure regime prevents frauds and protects investors by giving them 
sufficient and credible information. It effectively avoids the agency problem that managers might 
mispresent companies’ performance to keep higher stock price, and ensures the credibility of revealed 
information. See Villiers, supra note 62, 37-39 and 180-181. 
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disclose social and environmental issues about health and safety, product safety, human 
rights and social engagement, to employees, suppliers, consumers, shareholders and 
society.66  
 
Following the regulations on general reporting of CSR, mandatory CSR reporting was 
extended to specific disclosure in different areas; for example, EU Accounts 
Modernization Directives define the environmental key performance indicators of business 
as a tool for measurement; the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act 
in the US published the Toxics Release Inventory (hereinafter ‘TRI’) to disseminate the 
TRI data to the public; and the Labour Management Disclosure and Reporting Act requires 
information about companies’ practices and financial spending on labour unions to 
promote democratic practices.67 The EU has proposed a directive on mandatory ESG 
reporting regulation that requires corporate disclosure to contain ‘non-financial key 
performance indicators relevant to the particular business, including information relating to 
environmental and employee matters’.68 At the level of the EU regulations, European 
Parliament and European Commission adopted the Directive on Disclosure of 
Non-financial and Diversity Information by Certain Large Companies and Groups on April 
5, 2014; and two resolutions of Corporate Social Responsibility: Accountable, Transparent 
and Responsible Business Behaviour and Sustainable Growth and Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Promoting Society’s Interests and a Route to Sustainable and Inclusive 
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 See Case, supra note 64, 10774–10776. 
67 The updated EU Accounts Modernization Directive is 2003/51/EC. It amended Directives 78/660/EC, 
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Recovery on February 6, 2013.69 The further development and update of EU Directives of 
CSR emphasized the importance of non-financial reporting and provided the international 
instruction of social and environmental information disclosure, including the transparent 
reports with regards to environmental matters, social and employee matters, respect for 
human rights, anti-corrupt issues, and so on. 
 
Mandatory information disclosure sets the minimum precision level of reporting, but it 
would be difficult to set a uniform and detailed requirement for information disclosure, 
because firms have different parameters and the regulatory intervention of a reportable 
mechanism is a relatively disclosure-based model that enforces the action of information 
disclosure in companies, but does not provide the accurate requirement of corporate 
performance in publishing information.70 Owing to the reporting diversity across countries 
                                                          
69
 See Commission Staff Working Document: Impact Assessment Accompanying the Document Proposal 
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC 
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Model of Disclosure Based Regulation, Working Paper Series in Harvard University, 2 and 29–30, 
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and companies, many companies cannot remain only at the level of mandatory information 
disclosure, so that voluntary information disclosure has become an effective method to 
publish much more information to the public with substantial descriptions of corporate 
operations and performance.71 
 
Voluntary disclosure in each company is directly affected by the cost of disclosure caused 
by the mental and physical work involved in preparing, analysing and editing reports to the 
public.72 Therefore, research shows that ‘some executives balance the benefit of a lower 
cost of capital with the costs of providing and preparing information and the potential 
effects of disclosure on their competitive status. Thus, companies can be expected to 
provide voluntary disclosures when the benefits exceed the direct and indirect costs of 
doing so’.73  The best prerequisite of voluntary information disclosure is: should the 
marginal benefit be equal to the marginal cost in the process of information disclosure? The 
cost of information disclosure is dependent on the size of a company. Larger companies, 
especially listed companies, often invest largely in voluntary information disclosure to 
attract investors and maintain shareholders, in order to enhance their corporate reputation 
and obtain further capital investment.74 
 
Additionally, voluntary information disclosure might cause competitive harm through the 
disclosure of confidential information. The proprietary information could give competitors 
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 See Lowenstein, supra note 11, 1341. 
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access to evaluate ‘trade secrets’. Confidential information, to some extent, has been a 
valid excuse for boards of directors to avoid voluntary information disclosure because it is 
difficult to judge the standard of whether the hidden information is confidential and might 
bring competitive harm to their company.75 In practice boards of directors implement 
voluntary information disclosure of information that does not cause sensitive competitive 
implications resulting in over-disclosure to firms’ competitors.76 
 
Mandatory and voluntary information disclosure and mandatory information disclosure are 
interdependent, and, as the ‘hard benchmark’, set the minimum and basic framework, 
while voluntary information, as the ‘soft resource’, fills the framework in terms of varied 
concerns and focus on reported issues.77 On the basis of equal mandatory disclosure rules, 
voluntary information disclosure would augment the disclosed issues as the remedy for 
imperfect mandatory regulations. In countries that lack the mandatory requirement of 
information disclosure, voluntary information disclosure will enhance corporate 
transparency through credible and comprehensive reports.78 
 
Compared with disclosure-based mandatory information disclosure that only requires 
communication from companies with investors, voluntary information disclosure is 
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performance-based, and the use, scope and quality of information would be voluntarily 
decided on by managers.79 Voluntary disclosure leans towards information on how the 
company achieved its performance or an index of particular actions. The precise statement 
of voluntary information disclosure provides information to users on the direct and clear 
path of corporate operations and performance, and enables them to make accurate 
decisions on the basis of detailed information.  
 
2.1.3.5 Monitoring and auditing 
 
Owing to the legally required disclosure in companies, there should be a group to monitor 
whether reports are authentic and how companies achieve CSR in corporate governance. 
Internal screening should be undertaken by a supervisory board which falls under the board 
of directors, but is independent of the executive directors. External screening is obviously 
done by public investors, the media and professional agency, such as auditing firms. 
Supervisory directors will monitor whether boards of directors bring CSR policies into 
decision-making and corporate governance, and how they meet stakeholders’ interests, 
such as that of employees, consumers, communities and so on. This will act as an internal 
deterrent to directors’ behaviour and promote the achievement of CSR. The credibility and 
accuracy of CSR disclosure are broadly monitored by stakeholders, and trade unions and 
civil society would identify problems with employment in the workplace; consumers 
would find defects in product quality; and the media would report any misbehaviour of 
corporate performance to the public.80 In addition, screening by public media would be 
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done through reporting or news. Negative reporting about companies’ non-fulfilment of 
CSR will damage their corporate reputation, and indirectly affect their credit rating and 
competition in the market. 
 
External auditing will be a threat to companies, if their underperformance is reported, and 
spreads directly and quickly in public.81 Professional auditing firms will audit companies 
and publish relevant audit reports – financial and non-financial, including their 
performance in terms of CSR. Companies’ information disclosure is largely audited or 
verified in public through external peer monitoring, regulator monitoring, community 
monitoring and market monitoring, so that it stimulates companies’ motive to implement 
CSR completely in order to promote their interests as a whole. Third-party auditing and 
verification of CSR reporting are required to provide assurance about the credibility of 
disclosure, including negative information of incomplete or false action of CSR matters. 
Professionals would precisely scrutinize every action according to reporting documents, 
aiming at ensuring whether company authentically achieved CSR as stated. The 
professional and strict external assurance would instruct companies on reliable disclosure 
and alarm companies about the negative effect of fake information. Companies must 
therefore offer credible CSR information to the public, and ensure real and proper 
performance in CSR. Investors with a notion for SRI will choose companies with better 
CSR performance. ‘Investors’ refers to the broad range from huge institutional investors to 
individual consumers.  
 
2.2 Implementation of CSR in the UK 
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The UK is a pioneering country that implements CSR effectively and is regarded as an 
experienced example in the field. Corporations, communities and government are all 
taking this issue more and more seriously. During the past decades, various NGOs, such as 
the Green Party and the Royal Society for Nature Conservation, were established to deal 
with relevant matters.82 This advocates taking social, environmental and ethical issues into 
selection, retention and realization of corporate operation in the long term; in other words, 
the achievement of CSR is how to integrate stakeholder’s interests into corporate 
governance that will not only enhance corporate financial performance, but social profits 
too. 
 
The next section of this thesis will demonstrate how stakeholders are involved in corporate 
governance through stakeholder engagement and how stakeholder integration can be 
ensured through the activities of boards of director. In addition, SRI and government are 
both the drivers to encourage companies to undertake CSR in their companies. 
 
2.2.1 Stakeholder engagement 
 
Particular CSR activities are due to two reasons: (1) external passive pressure from 
stakeholders and (2) improvement of internal profitability. As Campbell argued, without 
strong social pressure, managers will enhance CSR actions to increase corporate profit or 
ignore it. 83  Therefore, the implantation of CSR is largely stimulated by stakeholder 
pressure that will affect companies’ corporate reputation and public performance. 
According to Freeman, except for shareholders, there are many other interest groups ‘who 
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can affect or be affected by the firm’s behaviour’, that is, influence corporate operations 
such as employees, customers, suppliers, government and the public.84 Gray et al. maintain 
that organizations should be accountable towards all stakeholders.85 In the UK, CSR is 
implemented, to some extent, through stakeholder engagement, which will be illustrated in 
three parts, (1) standardized initiatives, (2) information disclosure and (3) the process of 
stakeholder engagement:  
 
2.2.1.1 Standardized initiatives 
 
In the UK a large number of national and international standards or initiatives have been 
adopted to regulate and instruct stakeholder engagement, such as SA8000, ISO9001 and 
ISO14000.86 The application of AA1000 Stakeholder Engagement Standard (hereinafter 
‘AA1000’), which is the new social accounting and auditing practice, strengthened by the 
Institute of Social and Ethical Accountability, and the Global Reporting Initiative’s 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (hereinafter ‘GRI’) will be explained in the following 
section: 
 
2.2.1.1.1 AA1000 Stakeholder Engagement Standard 
 
AA1000 is a generally applicable framework for the design, implementation, assessment 
and communication of quality stakeholder engagement that provides standards about 
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 Freeman, R. E., Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, Cambridge University Press (2010) 
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establishing commitment to stakeholder engagement; integrating stakeholder engagement 
with governance, strategy and operations; and determining the purpose, scope and 
stakeholders for engagement and the processes that will deliver quality and inclusive 
engagement practice, and valued outcomes. 87  AA1000 emphasises credible 
communication in stakeholder engagement, and is applicable to both internal and external 
engagement, for public, private and civil society organisations of all sizes; to managers and 
others responsible for making decisions; and to participants in stakeholder engagement. It 
directs how to adhere to the accountability principles of inclusivity, materiality and 
responsiveness, and refers to the explicit detail about how to carry on stakeholder 
engagement in the process of planning, preparation, implementation, review and 
improvement.88 
 
AA1000 tries to require the effective stakeholder dialogue mechanism to give stakeholders 
power and achieve inclusivity, which means ‘the participation of stakeholders in 
developing and achieving an accountable and strategic response to sustainability’. 89 
However, it is difficult to achieve inclusivity due to the lack of explicit instruction on how 
organizations should completely involve all stakeholders in decision-making; proceed with 
stakeholder dialogue; and appoint auditors to monitor the social and ethical reporting on 
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stakeholder engagement and implement it in corporate governance. 90  Therefore, the 
general standard of AA1000 should be modified and coordinated in detail and specifically 
in every individual company. 
 
2.2.1.1.2 Global reporting guidelines 
 
GRI-based reporting is the practice of measuring, disclosing, and being accountable to 
internal and external stakeholders for organizational performance towards the goal of 
sustainable development, and is broadly considered synonymous with other initiatives 
used to describe reporting on economic, environmental and social impacts (e.g., triple 
bottom line and corporate responsibility reporting).91 It should provide a balanced and 
reasonable representation of the sustainability performance of a reporting organization, 
including both positive and negative contributions. It is adopted in the context of 
organizations’ commitment, strategy and management. The GRI guidelines are aimed at 
assuring and assessing sustainability performance with respect to laws, norms, codes, 
performance standards and voluntary initiatives, through the external verification and GRI 
level-check application which will be introduced in the next chapter of this thesis.92  
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In stakeholder engagement it is important to embed the principles of GRI reporting 
guidelines in terms of materiality, stakeholder inclusivity, sustainability context and 
completeness in the report. GRI guidelines offer the structure for GRI-based reporting. It 
must include the CEO’s statement, profile of the reporting organisation, executive 
summary, key indicators, vision and strategy, policies, organizational and management 
systems, and performance. 93  GRI refers to the triple bottom lines in stakeholder 
engagement through specific elements, but does not provide enough guidance regarding 
the mechanisms in particular engagement, such as on how to select major stakeholders, 
identify CSR context and consult with stakeholders.  
 
2.2.1.1.3 Function of standardized initiatives 
 
The examples of AA1000 and GRI reporting guidelines show that standardized initiatives 
are not like legislation that compulsorily regulates company’s behaviour. Instead, they 
address social and environmental issues explicitly and instructively. In the UK the 
adoption of the standard helps corporate top management make better choices about more 
suitable approaches in their own companies. From a macro view, the standards provide 
catalogues to define what organizations should do.94 From a micro view, the standards 
could be used by the respective organizations in certain corporate contexts. However, 
detailed instruction are lacking in the standardized initiatives, because most of them offer 
general guidance to all organizations. The shortcoming will be exposed in every individual 
company through corporate decision-making and operation. 
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2.2.1.2 Information disclosure 
 
At national level, UK mandatory information disclosure is contained in various regulations, 
including the Companies Act, UK securities law and other administrative requirements, 
such as the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (hereinafter ‘BIS’) publishing 
statutory requirements in the form of the draft regulation on operating and financial review 
to enforce listed companies to provide information on policies to employees, customers 
and the wider community.95 CSR information disclosure is included in corporate financial 
reporting or annual accounts under regulatory requirement. The UK Companies Act 2006 
has revised the business review of directors’ reports to the strategic report, requiring 
reporting on the human rights of employees, environmental matters, and social and 
community issues.96 The UK Financial Reporting Council published the Guidance on the 
Strategic Report according to the revised Companies Act 2006 to encourage the annual 
information report to be ‘more relevant to shareholders’ and meet the need of shareholders 
for substantial information. Under credible information disclosure, shareholders would be 
protected through accurate evaluation of uncertainty and future development in 
decision-making. 97  Moreover, the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter 
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‘SEC’) mandates that CSR reporting presents sustainable matters: ‘disclosure of material 
risks and opportunities created by climate change and related government action will 
inform investors and aid them in their decision making’.98 
 
In the UK many companies adopt information disclosure to achieve stakeholder 
engagement in CSR. It is not only because stakeholders require transparency of corporate 
operation, but also because companies would make stakeholders understand corporate 
behaviours. Information disclosure is an effective way to communicate with stakeholders 
to define the business targets and policies, and evaluate how to achieve these objectives 
through stakeholder’s feedback. It was reported that in the UK, 80% of FTSE100 
companies do disclose in the form of social reporting or providing social information in 
their annual review.99 Findings in FTSE100 UK companies reveal that only 16 companies 
made no voluntary disclosures on social and environmental issues. All banks and stores 
provide information about their community involvement in their annual report. Especially 
companies in the oil, gas and nuclear industries, which are more likely to cause 
environmental pollution and crisis of sustainability, take social information disclosure 
seriously and tell the public what they have done positively in their community, and 
distract public attention away from their ‘sinning’ behaviour.100 
 
The model and requirement to evaluate corporate information disclosure vary among 
different companies, and depend on the business essence and harm or benefit that the 
companies can bring to society. Campbell et al. set up research that divided UK companies 
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into three groups. The first group consisted of those companies whose business and 
behaviours were unethical and harmful, such as tobacco and gambling; the second group 
comprised companies involved in business that might be regarded as ‘sinful’ or, when 
abused, cause health deterioration, such as brewers; and the third group involved 
companies with few ethical ‘sins’ and mostly benefits, such as pharmacies and 
supermarkets. 101  With the decrease in harm, corporate results and performance, 
stakeholders’ concerns about CSR and public performance would be enhanced. This means 
that when companies run relatively harmful businesses, they have to perform CSR more 
positively and disclose relevant information more explicitly, to prevent the destruction of 
public reputation.  
 
The Business Impact Task Force illustrates three general criteria to evaluate corporate 
information disclosure: 
 
(i) The cost or benefit of a company’s goods and services, how it treats its own 
employees and the environment, its record in respecting human rights, its 
investment in local communities – and even its record in prompt payment of bills, 
can all be significant factors affecting its reputation. 
(ii) A company’s approach to managing supplier and customer relationships, 
workforce diversity and work/life balance as well as its efficient management of 
environmental issues are central to competitiveness. 
(iii) The wide range of risks to which a business is exposed – whether financial, 
regulatory, environmental or consumers’ attitudes – demand a complex process of 
managing relationships and establishing values.102 
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Except for the general requirement of information disclosure, there are also various 
standards in different industries: for example, in the UK financial market, the Financial 
Services Authority regulates the Code of Treating Customers Fairly. It requires companies 
to ‘improve the information provided to consumers, to increase the standards of risk 
management and transparency for consumers’103 and to treat customers fairly to avoid the 
misleading or mis-selling information that causes investor’s mis-investment. 
 
Regarding information disclosure, stakeholders’ involvement is to respond relevantly. Like 
consumers, they will use their ‘purchase votes’ on CSR when they are satisfied with 
companies’ performance of CSR and their information disclosure. They prefer to be ‘green 
consumers’, and keep consumers’ loyalty to specific businesses and products. By contrast, 
the negative achievement of CSR and information disclosure will lead to consumer 
punishment, including boycotts. 104  Hence, CSR disclosure can positively attract and 
recruit more talented employees, increase consumer loyalty, get more supportive 
communities and avoid the potential reputational risk that might be caused by 
environmental incidents and product quality accidents.105 This is defined as stakeholder 
inclusive social auditing which assesses corporate performance on the ethical concerns of 
stakeholders according to economic, environmental and social aspects in sustainable 
development.106 
 
In the UK third-party auditing and verification are mostly implemented by professional 
auditing firms to provide verified and reliable statements about the quality and authenticity 
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of companies’ information disclosure. Some professional institutes would monitor 
companies’ CSR achievement without permission from the companies concerned, such as 
the environmental institution of emission measurement. In addition, some NGOs also play 
important roles in third-party verification by monitoring companies’ CSR performance and 
disclosure in their respective fields, such as Friends of the Earth, Green Peace and the 
Commission for Racial Equality. 
 
2.2.1.3 The process of stakeholder engagement  
 
With the increase of CSR ranking and surveillance, stakeholders are involved in a broader 
range of areas. Stakeholder engagement (also stakeholder dialogue) has become more and 
more sophisticated and refers to different stages. In order to make stakeholder engagement 
effective, companies should divide the process into telling, listening and communicating 
that companies could inform stakeholders what they have done, get responses from 
stakeholders and make stakeholders indirectly participate in corporate governance and 
CSR.107  This is a progressive and advanced process, called stakeholder information, 
stakeholder response and stakeholder involvement. 
 
2.2.1.3.1 Stakeholder information 
 
Information disclosure is the process of stakeholder information that companies ensure to 
convey authentic and appropriate information to their publics. Efficient information tells 
people how well companies act in CSR, and about their good intentions and positive 
decisions and actions about sustainability.108 Morsing suggests that companies should 
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provide integrated CSR information to the public about how they show CSR as a shared 
concern, such as how they link CSR to their core business and implement CSR through 
corporate support.109 
 
Stakeholder information is a direct and transparent approach for companies to present their 
achievement of CSR and enhance their public reputation. Especially businesses that are 
so-called highly harmful can reduce the public notion of their ‘sinful’ products and services 
and positively alter social attitudes. For example, the British American Tobacco reported 
that it was ‘the world’s second largest quoted tobacco group by global market share, with 
brands sold in more than 180 markets. For a business whose products pose real risks to 
health, it is even more import that we operate in a responsible way.’110 Therefore, the 
company tried to establish a robust dialogue approach through information disclosure to 
gain stakeholders trust.111 
 
2.2.1.3.2 Stakeholder response 
 
After informing, stakeholder’s response is the subsequent direct or indirect process. 
Stakeholders would reply to information indirectly such as through customer loyalty, 
employees’ popularity and support from the community. Companies can also directly get 
stakeholders’ direct feedback through opinion polls or market surveys. This is compared to 
‘the evaluative mode of measuring whether a particular communication initiative has 
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improved stakeholders understanding of the company’.112 However, the direct approach 
involves questioning stakeholders rather than communicating with them, because 
companies always ask stakeholders questions within a predominantly instructive 
framework and most of the answers are what they want to hear. Moreover, stakeholders’ 
response is only limited to ‘satisfied’ or ‘dissatisfied’ with corporate performance in CSR 
and information disclosure; it will not have further implications for corporate 
decision-making and operation.  
 
2.2.1.3.3 Stakeholder involvement 
 
At this stage, stakeholders will interact with corporate activity, which is the real model of 
stakeholder dialogue. Companies not only influence stakeholders, but also try to be 
influenced by them. Through inter-influenced communication, companies can get access to 
information on with what stakeholders are happy or not, expectations, needs and their 
advice on corporate governance in CSR. 113  It is in mutually beneficial actions that 
stakeholders express their concerns and requirements, while companies can integrate the 
information into their decision-making and develop CSR initiatives. 
 
The principal methods of stakeholder involvement include interviews, focus groups, 
workshops, seminars and public meetings. This series of activities will make stakeholder 
feel more like insiders of the companies and will make companies feel closer to 
stakeholders. It brings valuable information to companies and exerts a positive corporate 
image in public and companies will be accepted broadly in the marketplace and society.  
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2.2.2 Implementation of CSR and board of directors 
 
To some extent, good practice in, and motivation for, CSR are stimulated by boards of 
directors so that they can integrate stakeholders’ interest into decision-making and the top 
management is monitored effectively in the corporate mechanism. In the UK model, 
although boards of directors are divided into executive directors and non-executive 
directors, their duties are the same. Unlike Germany, where stakeholders will participate in 
the activities of boards of directors, such as employees’ co-operated determination,  in UK 
companies it is difficult to control whether a board of directors has included stakeholder’s 
profit in corporate governance and, at the same time, the achievement of CSR cannot be 
scrutinized by stakeholders internally. 114  Under these circumstances, stakeholder 
protection and achievement of CSR will be ensured through stakeholder-integrated 
decision-making by the board of directors and internal audit by non-executive directors or 
audit committees. The effective corporate governance by the board of directors also 
complies with the separation of ownership and control in a company. 
 
2.2.2.1 Attitude of board of directors in decision-making 
 
In the UK a market deficit exists in the lack of competition, information asymmetry and so 
on. Some scholars argue that if the information flows freely and competition is strong, 
markets would provide mechanisms for profit-seeking businesses to behave on the basis of 
serving the public interest. However, when such prerequisites are absent, it would drive 
companies to undertake harmful action in order to achieve their profit, but without 
malice.115 Consequently, breach of CSR is derived from market failure. For example, 
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some UK banks sell payment protection insurance to customers who use the loan service 
offered by the banks. Owing to the lack of information from providers, customers cannot 
make effective and correct choices. Mackenzie’s survey shows that customers buy these 
financial products at a higher price; as much as 40% of the cost of the loan and restrictive 
conditions are imposed on the insurance policy to limit payouts from the banks.116  
 
This mis-selling problem occurred widely in the UK financial market, although companies 
adopted a CSR policy in corporate governance. However, when companies pursue 
financial profit as their aim, the balance between CSR and financial profits will be upset in 
corporate obstructive actions. Even corporate staff would be confused when choosing 
between the achievement of CSR and the financial objective. That is why the UK Financial 
Services Authority requires that financial businesses treat customers fairly to guide the 
ethical concerns in the marketplace. Without external pressure, when companies 
predominantly own short-term orientation to obtain their financial interests, 
implementation of CSR will be ignored in the process of corporate governance. 117 
Therefore, in order to achieve CSR and ensure stakeholders’ interest, boards of directors 
should insist that their attitude towards CSR change from a short-term motive to long-term 
and integrated stakeholder concerns in their decision-making and operation. 
 
2.2.2.2  Stakeholder identification  
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As analysed, UK companies adopted various initiatives and standards to assure 
stakeholders’ anticipation. However, these standards can only generally demonstrate the 
requirements for company practices. This does not mean that one size fits all. They lack 
explicit illustration of how to fulfil CSR and stakeholders’ requirements through the 
activities of boards of directors. In order to ensure stakeholders’ engagement in corporate 
governance and achievement of CSR, it is most important to clarify what stakeholders need. 
This will be adopted in every individual company specifically and will fit each corporate 
situation appropriately. Clarifying stakeholder identification as explicitly as possible will 
bring specific embeddedness into particular corporate governance in CSR, so that boards 
of directors can make decisions accurately and properly. In general, the systematic and 
comprehensive approach is to identify the context in which firms and their stakeholders 
operate; the significantly particular events that might happen, such as any environmental 
incidents and reputational accidents; the nature and needs of stakeholders themselves; and, 
after the identification, to provide potential and effective management response to the three 
aspects.118  O’Riordan and Fairbrass clarified the four-stage process in detail: (i) the 
context addresses the external environment in which firms and their stakeholders stayed; (ii) 
the particular event, such as a serious health issue in a poverty region, specifies 
stakeholder’s favourable and unfavourable context and triggers CSR issues; (iii) the nature 
of stakeholders presents their various interests and expectations; and (iv) boards of 
directors’ responses in terms of the influential factors. 119  For effective stakeholder 
identification, Bondy et al. provided six phases of a recyclable process to identify, 
implement, test and modify: (i) research company’s existing CSR meanings, activities and 
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competitors’ actions; (ii) develop a strategy of CSR commitments; (iii) create a supporting 
corporate mechanism related to the commitment they made; (iv) fully implement strategy 
in CSR corporate governance; (v) review the progress and result; and (vi) improve the 
accuracy and efficiency of stakeholder identification.120  
 
Stakeholder identification can be explained as what and how organizations actually take 
into account stakeholder interests. The theoretical approach to knowing what stakeholders’ 
expectations and requirements are in stakeholder identification is stakeholder salience, 
which is strongly recommended in UK corporate governance. The classes of stakeholders 
are different, so that their requirements and interests are varied. Boards of directors can 
make decisions and classify stakeholders’ needs in accordance with the standard of 
stakeholder salience, namely power, legitimacy and urgency. 121  These standards 
respectively mean that stakeholders have the authority to bring about the outcomes they 
desire, stakeholders legitimately possess the rights to claim their interest and stakeholders 
call for immediate attention. On the basis of the three elements, stakeholders will be 
hierarchically divided into three types: (i) when stakeholders are involved in three elements 
at the same time, they will be defined as ‘high-salience stakeholder’, so-called definitive 
stakeholders; (ii) while when stakeholders only hold one element, they will be treated as 
low-salience stakeholders; and (iii) the level of salience is medium when stakeholders own 
any of two elements.122 The adoption of the sophisticated stakeholder salience into boards 
of directors’ decision-making is a logical framework to illustrate that what the boards 
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should consider in the first place should be according to the extent of the different 
stakeholders and their needs.  
 
Although the model of salience is the basis of stakeholder identification, it is varied in 
certain situations and companies. Different boards of directors will see salience and CSR in 
different ways when stakeholders bring dynamic effects to companies;123 for example, 
boards of directors treat issues that directly affect the interests of their company as 
legitimate. However legitimate interests might change, depending on temporary 
importance, timely social feedback and other aspects. This means that when employees’ 
behaviour influences the interests of the company, their rights might be identified as 
legitimacy or even urgency. It might, instead, be that consumers have an influence when 
product safety becomes a critical issue. Owing to the varied issues in terms of the interests 
of company, boards of directors will keep changing the way in which they interpret 
salience. Companies and institutions adopt an approach called ‘salience scales’ that 
determines the salience of stakeholders through ranking of shareholders, employees, 
consumers, creditors and other stakeholders. The regular ranking of salience will directly 
provide information on how to identify how important the various stakeholders are at 
different times.124 
 
2.2.2.3  Auditing by non-executive board of directors 
 
In the context of companies, the interests of shareholders and stakeholders always work 
together, and neither can profit without the other. Executive boards of directors play a role 
in achieving the profit of shareholders and stakeholders, so that the monitoring of boards of 
                                                          
123 Jones, M. et al., ‘Company’s Directors’ Views Regarding Stakeholders’, Melbourne University Legal 
Studies Research Paper, No. 270, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1023259, last accessed on 11 
September 12012. 
124
 Ibid. 
Chapter 2: Rationale for and Methods Used to Achieve Corporate Social Responsibility 
© C. YUN 138
directors’ decision-making and performance will be audited by non-executive directors. 
The Combined Code of Corporate Governance recommends that companies should 
establish an audit committee that is largely comprised of independent non-executive 
directors.125 In the monitoring mechanism, CSR audits should be implemented in the 
following aspects: good stakeholder management, good corporate leadership, greater 
priority for CSR at board level, the integration of CSR into corporate policy, regulation at 
national and international level, and the involvement of government, business, NGOs and 
civil society.126 
 
In UK companies there is a strongly recommended approach, called ‘tick-box’ or 
‘scorecard’ for audit directors to measure whether the decision-making and performance of 
boards of directors has involved CSR. Using the tick items or scorecard, non-executives 
can evaluate and rank the relevant issues directly, which is the most obvious feedback on 
corporate governance.127 In Alliance Boots, the group set up scorecard evaluation with 
respect to community, environment, workplace and marketplace.128  It is an essential 
process to get feedback, not only for scrutiny, but also support for the board of directors to 
improve future policy and actions in each individual sector. Alliance Boots said, ‘the 
Group’s framework of priorities covers four key areas: our community; our environment; 
our marketplace; and our workplace. This framework is called the Group’s scorecard. 
These four areas are relevant to all our business activities and reflect our core values.’129 
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2.2.3 SRI in the UK 
 
The UK is one of the most advanced and fastest-developed countries in the achievement of 
SRI and has many institutional investors involved in investment in companies with high 
social performance, especially in financial markets. 130  There is a trend of increased 
concern about ethics in UK society, stronger awareness of risk and risk management, and 
the growth in media exposure concerning CSR.131 Instead of forcing companies to adopt 
and undertake CSR policies, public disclosure is broadly recommended and companies 
should provide CSR self-reporting with a social responsibility statement in their corporate 
annual report.132  
 
2.2.3.1  Debate on SRI 
 
Although SRI is popular in the UK market, there is still a debate about whether SRI would 
enhance corporate profits. Campbell and Vick argued that SRI was a high-cost investment 
that did not accordingly increase returns.133 The comparison was set up to observe the 
connection between the extent to which CSR and return on investment were respectively 
achieved within ten years among the largest 100 UK companies that voluntarily published 
annual reports on social and environmental issues.134 Volumes were created to compare 
SRI and stock market returns, and the tests were repeated using monthly returns as criterion. 
It was not obvious from the analysis what the direct ‘reward’ to companies was of 
achieving CSR. Therefore, some scholars argued that there was no relationship between 
share returns and social disclosures or social performance. However, in the test, if the 
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statistics were compared yearly over a period of ten years, it was found that companies 
producing higher social and environmental disclosure got better share returns on stock 
markets.135 
 
Other research that produced similar results is the study conducted on the mean monthly 
return and volatility comparison between FTSE4GOOD UK Index versus FTSE All-Share 
Index and FTSE 4GOOD UK 50 Index versus FTSE 100 Index. The tested periods were 
divided into two sub-periods from 1 July 1996 to 31 December 1999 and 1 January 2000 to 
1 June 2003. As regards the two comparisons between FTSE4GOOD companies and 
general FTSE companies, the mean monthly return of FTSE4GOOD UK was about double 
lower than the FTSE All-Share, while the return of FTSE4GOOD 50 companies was about 
three times higher than FTSE4GOOD UK companies. The last-mentioned data showed 
that among the companies that had achieved CSR, the stock market return was relevantly 
higher in the top 50 companies in the FTSE4 GOOD Index.136 
 
The two studies confirmed that CSR definitely affects corporate financial performance and 
that SRI will enhance companies’ competitive advantage in the marketplace. In the context 
of SRI, not all investors only focus on financial return, or else the social and environmental 
concerns in business would be just educative.137 Although SRI increased costs, it reduced 
the risk that would reflect on the stock price. Effective CSR information disclosure will 
prevent investor upset. In practice, investors, especially individual investors, might only 
consider the financial interests of stock rather than CSR in a bull market. However, when 
the market becomes bearish, investors would re-consider the element of CSR when they 
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make decisions and might refuse to purchase stocks of companies who are not corporately 
socially responsible. 
 
2.2.3.2 Implementation of SRI in the UK 
 
In the UK, SRI is largely undertaken by institutional investors, such as pension funds, 
insurance companies and financing investment banks. The UK Hampel Committee 
proposed that public companies follow the London Stock Exchange’s Listing Rules to 
disclose in their annual report how they have applied principles of good governance 
(including CSR principles), whether they have complied with the provision of the 
Combined Code of Best Practice and provide reasons when they fail to do that.138 UK 
Pension Funds are required to disclose how they take social, ethical and environmental 
considerations into account when they make investments.139 
 
A large number of UK insurance companies themselves treat CSR issues as a main concern, 
such as signing a statement in 1992 to fulfil their environmental commitment. Meanwhile, 
insurers also expect companies to disclose how they have solved social, environmental and 
ethical risks. The Association of British Insurers (hereinafter ‘ABI’), according to Mary 
Francis, its General Director, provides guidelines to ‘represent an important opportunity 
for investors and companies to work together both to protect shareholder value and 
improve understanding of CSR’.140 
 
Furthermore, the Operating and Financial Review (hereinafter ‘OFR’) statement was 
introduced in the UK which demands that companies disclose performance and future 
                                                          
138
 See Campbell and Vick, supra note 81, 252. 
139
 Ibid. 
140
 Thomson, M., British Insurers Demand Corporate Social Responsibility, available at: 
http://www.socialfunds.com/news/print.cgi?sfArticleId=697, last accessed on 7 April 2013. 
Chapter 2: Rationale for and Methods Used to Achieve Corporate Social Responsibility 
© C. YUN 142
prospects. It is the basis on which to judge the performance of boards of directors and 
whether companies integrate stakeholders into corporate governance.141 The disclosure 
checklist of the OFR is applied to assess whether the board of directors had considered 
other investors, potential investors, creditors, customers, suppliers, employees and society 
more widely in financial and non-financial information disclosure. 
 
SRI companies should take CSR and stakeholders seriously when they make decisions and 
implement operations. As the main investors in most companies, institutional investors 
take CSR performance into account, so that if companies want to attract investment from 
them, they have to improve their CSR and broadly meet stakeholders’ needs. This would 
also effectively control risk and make investors confident when they invest in companies 
with good CSR practices. 
 
2.2.3.3 SRI screening 
 
The investment screening of SRI has been applied by ethical funds and mutual funds. The 
methods used in screening are different, but generally classified into negative screening 
and positive screenings. In the section that follows screening is analysed in terms of the 
model of corporate governance screening and stakeholder screening. 
 
2.2.3.3.1 Corporate governance screening 
 
Corporate governance mainly addresses the conflicts of interests between top management 
(agent) and shareholder (principal). In the process of corporate governance, managers may 
make insufficient efforts to increase shareholder value, build corporate empires and 
strengthen private benefits of control. Owing to the separation of ownership and control in 
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companies, corporate governance screening is aimed at ensuring that financial suppliers 
can get a fair return on their investment; it can, therefore, also be defined as ‘internal 
screening’.142 Shareholders can be involved in the screening procedure through dialogue 
and voting at annual general meetings which integrates their value into SRI issues in 
corporate governance.  
 
2.2.3.3.2 Stakeholder relation screening 
 
Stakeholder screening, known as external screening is more CSR-directed screening where 
stakeholders scrutinize whether companies improve their relationships with their 
employees, customers, suppliers and communities, and how they participate in social 
issues. It is evaluated by the increase in social welfare through good corporate governance, 
sound environmental standards and care of stakeholder relations.143 Stakeholder screening 
will more directly and forcefully respond to companies’ CSR that is reflected by 
customers’ popularity or boycotting, employees’ loyalty or leaving, communities’ support 
or resistance, public media reporting, and so on. Therefore, stakeholder relation screening 
is crucial to business, which is compelled to perform CSR if it attempts to get positive 
feedback. 
 
2.2.4 Government: Driver of CSR 
 
CSR is undoubtedly a voluntary concept without any enforcement from legislation and 
governmental intervention, but is closely related to government. It is argued that 
‘governments structure the behaviour of private actors to serve public ends through both 
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regulations and incentives. Moreover public policy is influenced by the articulation and 
aggregation of business (and other societal) interests and their respective lobbying 
activities.’144 Therefore, to some extent, CSR policies and initiatives reflect governmental 
focus and problems. 
 
2.2.4.1 Governmental deficit 
 
In the UK, the emergence of CSR is partly due to the governmental deficit and inability: 
‘the UK government was overloaded and losing legitimacy as a result of an inability to 
resolve such issues as industrial relations, prices and incomes policies, inflation, 
unemployment, economic growth, productivity, investment and public debt.’145 Therefore, 
British business contributed to social governance through self-regulation (especially in the 
financial system), individual relations with government departments, participation of 
industry associations and through the participation of the Confederation of British Industry 
(hereinafter ‘CBI’) in industry and economic policies.146 The CBI reported in 1981 that  
 
companies fear that if they make no attempt to find solutions to community 
problems, the government may increasingly take on the responsibility itself. This 
might prove costly to employers both in terms of new obligations and greater 
intervention in the labour market. Many companies prefer to be one step ahead of 
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government legislation or intervention, to anticipate social pressures themselves 
and hence be able to develop their own policies in response to them, so that CSR 
was regarded as the partnership with government to solve social problems.147  
 
In former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Conservative government, the crisis of massive 
unemployment, urban decay and social unrest threatened social stability. Nonetheless, the 
government was not able to solve the social problems alone. Instead, government tried to 
link with business in partnership so that companies could provide social infrastructure to 
workers and their families, including potential jobs, housing, retail outlets, education, 
medical treatment, baths, pubs and other recreational facilities.148 Corporate behaviour in 
the social crisis rescued the government from embarrassment, reduced the cost of 
governmental action in the solution of social problems, and filled the gap caused by 
governmental deficit and inability. A number of advantages from corporate social 
involvement led to the government strongly encouraging CSR to improve government 
effort and spread government policies. 
 
2.2.4.2 Governmental instruction in CSR 
 
Governmental involvement is an instructive action to CSR that would directly reflect social 
shortcoming and expectations. In order to encourage the achievement of CSR, the UK 
government positioned the Minister of CSR in the Department of Trade and Industry to 
provide CSR strategy as follows:  
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promote business activities that bring simultaneous economic, social and 
environmental benefits; work in partnership with the private sector, community 
bodies, unions, consumers and other stakeholders; encourage innovative 
approaches and continuing development and application of best practice; ensure 
decent minimum levels of performance in areas such as health and safety, the 
environment and equal opportunities; encourage increased awareness, open 
constructive dialogue and trust; and create a policy framework which encourages 
and enables responsible behaviour by business.149 
 
Meanwhile, the CSR Minister also co-operates with the Departments for the Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs for the further implementation and stimulation of CSR. In terms of 
the advantages gained from CSR, the UK government would like to promote initiatives 
through governmental funding, tax incentives and so on. Companies that are corporately 
socially responsible would not only bring benefits to society, but also receive priority 
attention from governmental incentives.  
 
Moreover, one of the initiatives for most companies who invest in CSR is self-regulation 
adopted in corporate constitutes or codes of conduct. However, when companies’ CSR 
behaviour is supported and self-regulation is accepted by government, it will amount to 
‘regulated self-regulation’. Although self-regulation is still voluntary, government itself 
will provide important incentives to encourage and push the integration of companies and 
societal interests.150 
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2.2.4.3 Governmental CSR initiatives  
 
The UK government has created a series of initiatives to directly or indirectly affect the 
achievement of CSR through rewarding or limitation. The persuasive incentives will 
enhance corporate performance to their stakeholders or prevent harmful results to society. 
The government uses its imprimatur to exhort and encourage business to perform CSR that 
government will permit. It rewards companies with CSR with specific honours which is the 
badge of CSR commitment.151 For example, permission to use the label ‘fair trade’ is a 
governmental priority for companies that achieve CSR and bring benefits to society.152 It is 
the stimulating incentive for companies that practise CSR to get a positive ‘mark’ from 
government and to enhance competitive advantages. To achieve this, companies will 
incorporate CSR into corporate governance. 
 
In addition, the UK government has introduced ecological taxes to reduce pollution and 
waste, such as the landfill levy and road fuel price escalators. In April 2001 the government 
proposed the Climate Change Levy on business energy use. This levy meant that when 
companies voluntarily entered into energy efficiency agreements and really achieved good 
practice in ecological development, their relevant tax would be reduced as reward.153 Tax 
incentives do not directly encourage CSR or force business to act or not to act. However, it 
is the soft regulatory and effective approach to persuade CSR and limit negative corporate 
behaviour towards the community. 
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2.3 CSR in China 
 
When the UK made efforts to develop CSR in corporate governance in order to improve 
companies’ performance to stakeholders and to ensure the sustainable development in the 
middle of the twentieth century, the notion of CSR was strange to the Chinese government, 
business and community. Its complicated history and situation made China grow slowly, 
and the imbalanced economic development after 1978 led to some social and 
environmental crises, such as violation of human rights, loss of natural resource and the 
like, so that until the 1990s, sustainability was only gradually taken seriously and CSR was 
introduced in China. 
 
In the beginning, China lacked a basis for, and experience in, implementing CSR, because 
misunderstanding and obstacles impeded the development of CSR in China. China is an 
emerging market and the need for CSR is urgent to enhance its reputation and 
competitiveness in the global market. As a result, CSR is largely developed and researched 
at various levels, namely legislation, governmental instruction, NGO guidelines and 
companies’ internal achievement. In the section that follows the historical context of 
Chinese CSR, the barriers that exist in the process of CSR exercise and strategies 
developed to achieve CSR in different aspects will be explained. 
 
2.3.1 Historical context and emergence  
 
2.3.1.1  Historical context 
 
CSR is not the patent of the developed West. China might be one of the earliest countries to 
refer to business ethics, with its very long history of business that made ancient Chinese 
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business popular among its neighbouring countries and made them prosperous.154 The 
applicable business ethics integrated all elements of contemporary Chinese culture and 
enabled Chinese businesses to conduct itself ethically, both at home and abroad.155 The 
notion of business ethics among businesspeople was deeply affected by the Confucian 
philosophy of Ren (morality), Yi (righteousness), and Li (propriety), and then developed 
by Dong Zhongshu, as Zhi (intelligence) and Xin (credit). Three of the five principles are 
mainly relevant to business ethics, Ren means that when there is difficulty or interest, 
people should not only consider their own interests, but also others; when other people face 
a dilemma, it is necessary to provide as much help as possible; and when people 
communicate or co-operate with others, they should be honest, trustworthy and do so in 
good faith without cheating.156 Confucianism respected collective values over individual 
values, which influenced the whole of ancient Chinese imperial rules, commercial 
activities and people’s behaviour. It established the value framework that entails 
authoritarianism, paternalism and hierarchism, which perfectly provided moral legitimacy 
and enduring stability to the imperial power, society and family. Confucianism informed, 
guided and prescribed the rights and wrongs of thoughts and deeds for common folks, as 
well as the rich and powerful. It also prescribed a vertical structure of human relationships 
and top-down system of social interactions that were based on seniority and authority. 
Institutions and practices were informed and regulated by its vision and values. Business 
was no exception to this influence.157  
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Confucianism affected businesspeople and made them realize their social significance and 
willingness to contribute to society and achieve diligence, honesty and charity in their 
business operations. In the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries many successful 
businesspeople from Shanxi Province and Anhui Province donated large amounts of 
wealth to the state. When there was war or a bad harvest and common people suffered from 
starvation, the wealthy became involved in charitable works and even took over certain 
social functions that were exercised by local government.158 In the Qing Dynasty it was 
ideal for wealthy households to dispense relief and aid to the poor even in peacetime.159 
Therefore, Confucianism reflected the traditional ideas of rich communities and the state, 
which is similar to the concept of stakeholder benefits and voluntary CSR principles in 
modern times. Confucian philosophy referred to elements such as familial collectivism, 
authoritarianism, paternalism, hierarchy, guanxi dependence, preference for social 
harmony and so on, which do have an effect on modern Chinese governmental policy, 
namely its hierarchical governance. The Chinese government relies heavily on 
family-dominated and controlled economic development.  
 
After 1949, the new China turned into a period of planned and collective economy, and all 
enterprises were state-owned and centrally controlled by government. The capital in 
enterprise was unitary, and operations were executed by governmental policies and orders. 
State-owned enterprises (hereinafter ‘SOEs’) were the work unit (qiye ban shehui) that not 
only provided production, but also bore the important burden to offer ‘cradle-to-grave’ 
welfare to their employees and their families, including the operation of educational 
institutions (e.g., kindergartens and elementary schools), healthcare institutions, old age 
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pensions, and many other facilities, such as restaurants, dormitories, barber shops and even 
bath facilities.160 Under these circumstances, companies were only accountable to their 
employees, but not their other constituents, such as creditors, consumers and local 
communities. Moreover, companies did not treat all duties to employees as CSR, but they 
had to achieve certain missions enforced by the state. This specific style in Chinese 
enterprises dragged down financial performance, made employees dependent on 
employers and there was lack of competition. 
 
In 1978 there was a huge change in the Chinese economy, from a planned economy to a 
market economy. The chief architect of the economic reform, Deng Xiaoping, illustrated 
his famous view as follows: ‘To get rich is glorious’, ‘Let a few get rich first’, and ‘Never 
mind whether the cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice’.161 These slogans 
encouraged people to pursue wealth and profit, and to do whatever they wanted to get rich. 
Consequently, companies largely became involved in exploiting naked self-interests and 
greed. Norms and ethical values were ignored or became non-existent. For the capital 
benefit, a large group of companies operated unethically on a massive scale to harm social 
and national interests. The overemphasis on material pursuits, degradation of business 
ethics and disorderly competition led to a weak legal system and civic accountability, 
imperfect market regulation, and even the trading of ‘power for money’ by government 
officials and corruption. Meanwhile, the rapid increase of benefits caused huge costs to 
environmental and social interests, due to the overuse of environmental resources, tax 
fraud, fraudulent inter-business dealings and plundering of state assets.162  
 
                                                          
160
 Zhang, H. and Li, S., ‘Theory and Practice of Corporate Social Responsibility in China’, 5 Journal of 
Beijing Normal University (2009), Social Science Edition, 97–98. 
161
 See Ip, supra note 154, 211. 
162
 Tan, J., ‘Institutional Structure and Firm Social Performance in Transitional Economies: Evidence of 
Multinational Corporations in China’, Journal of Business Ethics (2009), Volume 86, 174. 
Chapter 2: Rationale for and Methods Used to Achieve Corporate Social Responsibility 
© C. YUN 152
2.3.1.2   Emergence of CSR in China 
 
With the increase in capital, government gradually realized the negative effects of 
confusing and unethical operations, and attempted to solve the problems of the 
environmental crisis, loss of social resources and the chaotic market system, and turned its 
attention slightly to CSR. Additionally, the fast development in China had attracted a large 
amount of investment abroad. It was reported that ‘[f]rom the early 1980s to 1999, 
contracted FDI inflow to China has grown from roughly US$1.5 billion a year to over 
US$40 billion a year. And 90% of companies in Europe, the US, and Japan had set a ‘China 
first’ strategy’.163 On the one hand, the multinational corporations (hereinafter ‘MNCs’) 
preferred the Chinese investment environment with lower ethical criteria and high capital 
returns. On the other hand, MNCs were seeking reliable partners with socially and 
environmentally responsible conduct to meet basic international labour and environmental 
standards. Many companies felt the pressure from MNCs and sensed that they might lose 
competition and advantage over companies who were achieving CSR in other developing 
countries. Owing to the crisis in China and overseas needs, CSR emerged and was accepted 
by publics more and more broadly.164 
 
CSR was first demonstrated in China through Shell China’s CSR report in 1999, then 
Chinese Company Law 2005 (hereinafter Company Law) referred to the relevant issues 
from 2001 onwards. 165  Meanwhile, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission 
(hereinafter ‘CSRC’) published the Guide Opinion on Establishing an Independent 
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Director System by Listed Companies, the requirement of employing independent 
directors to implement auditing and supervise the issues of wages, nomination and major 
affiliated transactions.166 It was the beginning of CSR allegedly protecting stakeholders in 
internal corporate governance. 
 
In China the concept of CSR complied with Carroll’s four dimensions of CSR, namely 
(i) economic responsibilities, (ii) legal responsibilities, (iii) ethical responsibilities and (iv) 
philanthropic responsibilities.167 Chinese scholars divided CSR into two parts: (i) absolute 
CSR and (ii) voluntary CSR. Absolute CSR is the basic bottom line and minimum 
requirement in corporate operations and governance, including child labour, forced labour, 
working time, discrimination, environmental protection and so on; while voluntary CSR is 
not enforceable and relevant to companies’ understanding and culture of CSR, such as 
philanthropy.168 The China CSR Survey Evaluation System and Criteria conducted by 
Peking University illustrates the key indicators of CSR as: shareholder interest, social and 
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economic interests, employee benefits, legal responsibility, operation in good faith, 
charitable responsibility, and environmental protection.169 
 
2.3.1.3 Misunderstanding of CSR in China 
 
At the primary stage, Carroll’s theory of legal responsibility in the four dimensions caused 
a misunderstanding of CSR in China, namely that various laws and regulations are deemed 
to protect stakeholder’s interests, and to ensure the achievement of CSR. Essentially, CSR 
sits outside the law, goes beyond economic interest and legal enforcement, and should be 
voluntarily implemented by companies. In Carroll’s view, legal responsibility was 
included in CSR. However, this meant that on the basis of the compliance with laws, 
companies should bring many more benefits to stakeholders through a broader approach. 
Law is merely the minimum standard to instruct companies on what they should or should 
not do;170 for example, although a company spreads its income from fraudulent business to 
its employees and poor people, the fraudulent behaviour itself is illegal, so that it cannot be 
treated as achieving CSR. In China it has remained at that stage where absolute CSR has to 
be achieved, and non-compliance has to be pushed by legislation and government in the 
process of performing CSR.  
 
Additionally, top management in many Chinese companies regard CSR as window 
dressing and that its purpose is to improve corporate image, but not to achieve social 
development. The Chinese Enterprise Survey found that managers’ willingness to take on 
CSR activities was more business-oriented than morally led, and the determination of CSR 
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orientation is corporate economic features and economic incentives.171 As discussed above, 
CSR would bring long-term benefits to companies. Except for charities, there is no 
economic firm that absolutely runs beyond profit; economic return is the main driver for 
managers to achieve CSR in practice.  
 
2.3.2 Barriers to CSR in China 
 
Although China has the third-largest economy in the world, the development of CSR has 
not caught up with the standards in developed Western countries. The lagging and 
underdevelopment were caused by barriers in the field of economics, politics and society. 
This section will illustrate the economic, political and social barriers that, to some extent, 
explain why CSR in China has to be basically enforced by legislation. 
 
2.3.2.1 Economic barriers 
 
After the Reform in 1978, China has been using the market economy model. However, it is 
actually a control-based economy. In SOEs ownership and shares are tightly concentrated 
in the state, and boards of directors are assigned by government. In the Chinese Stock 
Market some of the listed companies are state-owned. Although the number of private 
listed companies is increasing, the state is still the major shareholder in the stock market. 
Communist Party leaders interfere in state-owned companies’ economic decisions at firm 
level.172 As Chinese Company Law requires, not only the board of directors, but also 
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members of the supervisory board are appointed by the SASAC. Even important affairs 
have to be determined by this governmental institution which is led by the political 
party.173 When the members of the supervisory board are acting on behalf of the party, 
their consideration might turn to political and administrative aspects. State interference and 
control make the Chinese economy less efficient, and economically targeted decisions 
complicate economic policy-making and its outcomes. It has also brought about dilemmas 
in the implementation of CSR.174 
 
2.3.2.1.1 Ineffective corporate governance and corporate social responsibility in 
state-owned enterprises 
 
China tried to establish a corporate governance based on the Anglo-American model in 
listed companies, which is to disperse system ownership among shareholders and achieve 
profit maximization in shareholder primacy through considering companies’ interests as a 
whole. However, in listed companies’ appointments in the positions of chief executive, 
most senior managers and boards of directors are subject to governmental control and 
intervention. There are few independent directors on boards of directors; instead, the 
supervisory board is small and comprises party organizations or delegated organizations 
from the State Administration of State Property (hereinafter ‘SASP’) which delegates the 
state’s interests. 
 
In many listed companies the state is the largest shareholder or one of the largest 
shareholders, which enables it to administrate companies’ operations and decisions. An 
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OECD Overview concluded that SOEs in China relied ‘heavily upon parent company and 
affiliated transaction exists; the phenomenon of the “one dominating state-owned stock 
monopolizes” is very common, which results in the lack of restriction on big stockholders. 
In this way, the big stockholders can easily manipulate listed companies or invade 
medium-sized and small stockholder’s interest by utilizing their priority position.’175 
Moreover, the independence of boards of directors is inefficient, and directors’ nomination, 
employment and wages are decided by the major shareholder – the state – and some CEOs 
are even former or current government bureaucrats, so that the decision-making of 
corporate governance in boards reflects the state’s notion, not the company itself and 
cannot be wholly brought into governance.176 
 
The Corporate Governance Assessment Report of the 100 Top Chinese Listed Companies 
2012 (hereinafter ‘the Report’) notes that control-based SOEs have obstacles of poor 
corporate governance in the following respects 177: 
 
First, the highly concentrated shareholding in the hands of governments causes the 
exclusion of other shareholders. More than 80% of controlling shareholders are central 
government or local government, so that when they keep enough equity interest, they have 
an incentive to achieve other policy goals, such as to stabilize social employment, through 
the listed company vehicle.178 Therefore, the decision of whether or not to implement 
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corporate governance is not made by the board of directors, but the state which is unable to 
make specific and effective decisions in every individual company. 
 
Second, the score in the matter of auditing in SOEs is lower than private listed companies. 
Additionally, the performance in the social and environmental report is also weak among 
all listed companies. This is due to the main control by the state that nominates boards of 
directors whose payment is not relevant to a corporate return and reward system, such as 
employee shares as reward, but paid by the state directly in high amounts. Without pressure 
from corporate financial performance, boards of directors would lose their motivation to 
enhance the efficiency of corporate governance through the achievement of CSR to their 
publics. Some of the members of the supervisory board are designated by government, so 
that the auditing in SOEs cannot be implemented efficiently and some of the information 
disclosed to public stakeholders is even hidden and/or false.179 
 
Third, compared with major shareholders, social public shareholders are in a weak position 
in the Chinese security market. It is forbidden to trade state-owned shares, the so-called 
non-circulating shares that are owned by controlling shareholders, who have priority in 
decision-making. Conversely, social individual shareholders have no voting right and 
weak power to assert their interests, so that the relevant protection is largely limited, and 
from the beginning of the twenty-first century, the loss of social public shareholders was 
becoming more and more critical.180  
 
2.3.2.1.2 Imperfect competitive system in the marketplace 
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In the Chinese market, SOEs have dominated the main position, especially in key fields, 
such as energy, steel and aviation, so that they can control the industries and get lower 
prices from the resource allocation in state-owned industries. Meanwhile, SOEs press the 
state to make up for their losses through financial subsidies and bear the heavy burden of 
pensions to retired employees.181 The invisible priority to SOEs causes unbalanced and 
unfair competition among them and private companies. Therefore, it is more difficult for 
them to derive capital benefits from the SOEs. However, in terms of Chinese competition 
law, there is only a prohibition on unfair competition among all companies, such as price 
mechanism, but no enforcement regarding the invisibly unfair competition between SOEs 
and private companies. In innovation and development, SOEs receive powerful support 
and priority from the state, which makes them retain the monopoly position in many 
industries. The government even backs the provision of various preferential policies to 
SOEs for their international competition and ensures the safety of capital investment in 
SOEs. Therefore, they are more competitive and attractive to international commercial 
partners than private companies in the global market.  
 
In order to survive, private companies take profit-making more seriously. Although CSR 
would bring long-term interests, it needs a time-span. In the imperfect but sharply 
competitive system, it is impossible for most of private companies to wait out a very long 
term. In the Report, the performance of the internal control system in private companies is 
stronger than in SOEs, because they have to improve their financial performance through 
effective corporate governance. Nevertheless, the achievement of stakeholder interests and 
environmental protection is weaker than in SOEs, because their integrated objective is to 
maximize financial returns. In order to compete with powerful competitors, private 
companies might ignore the achievement of CSR in their operations 
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Furthermore, some small- and medium-sized enterprises (hereinafter ‘SMEs’) are in the 
manufacturing business or construction industry where the work of contractors or 
sub-contractors is low technology. They employ a large number of migrant workers at very 
low salaries. SMEs do not treat CSR as being important, because most of their contractual 
relationships are short term; they do not need to improve their reputation and do not wish to 
incur the high costs involved in CSR. In the south of China there are thousands of SMEs, 
and some of them are sweatshops. They are in a very weak position in the Chinese market 
economy, so their sole objective is to make money. SMEs employ migrant workers to 
create a large amount of interest without caring about their social welfare. Overwork or 
failure to pay among these companies happens frequently and has become a critical 
problem. 
 
2.3.2.1.3  Degrading the corporate social responsibility standards of multinational 
companies in China 
 
China has become the best choice for MNCs to invest in, because of the absence of explicit 
regulations, ineffective monitoring and loopholes in MNCs business.182 In order to attract 
foreign investments, the Chinese government is willing to exempt MNCs from regulations 
in several areas, such as taxation, environmental protection and labour standards.183 
According to Su and Littlefield, ‘the Chinese will perceive greater trust and commitment of 
these Western companies in addition to their tangible help to China’s economy’.184 Some 
MNCs are shielded by their good credit and CSR performance in their home countries, and 
                                                          
182
 Lai, Q., Corporate Social Responsibility of SMEs in China: Challenges and Outlooks, available at: 
http://www.iwim.uni-bremen.de/publikationen/pdf/c018.pdf, last accessed on 19 August 2012. 
183
 Ibid 
184
 Su, C. and Littlefield, J. E., ‘Entering Guanxi: A Business Ethical Dilemma in Mainland in China’, 33 
Journal of Business Ethics (2001), 206. 
Chapter 2: Rationale for and Methods Used to Achieve Corporate Social Responsibility 
© C. YUN 161
so get the trust of the Chinese government, partners and consumers, despite the lower 
standard of CSR in China. As a result, MNCs and foreign investors invest in many 
sweatshops in China.  
 
MNCs adopt the local way to establish relationships with local government, such as 
gift-giving and kickbacks. The bribery and corruption of governmental officials cause 
serious social and political crises in China, and the cost of gifts or kickbacks is borne by 
Chinese shareholders.185 In addition, there is a lack of uniform standards to evaluate or 
monitor the performance of CSR in MNCs. The monitoring is always through the model of 
surveys or interviews with employees who are told how to answer positively to the 
questions. In order to get job opportunities, workers have to respond in the way they are 
taught.186 
 
The poor operation and protection of stakeholders in MNCs directly postponed the 
development of CSR in China. The positive performance of CSR in MNCs in the home 
countries could be used as examples. However, owing to the loose governance and 
monitoring among MNCs, the bad behaviour negatively affects Chinese companies’ notion 
of CSR, destroys Chinese stakeholders’ interests and confuses the order in the Chinese 
market. 
 
2.3.2.2  Political barriers 
 
China’s political model is the People’s Democratic Dictatorship in which the working class 
governs the state’s political power through the CCP and people in the working class are 
able to control the country. However, the controlling power is concentrated in the hands of 
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a small group of people, called representatives, who are actually the leaders in the different 
hierarchies in the CCP.187 All forms of Chinese government are dispensed from the party, 
so that all its missions, decisions and governance are closely related to the party’s 
principles and objectives. In Chinese people’s view, this phenomenon is treated as ‘the 
same group of officials is in two departments’. It means that most governmental top 
officials are guided and appointed by the party, so that they work on their governmental 
duties on the basis of the party’s instruction and decision.  
 
Company Law does not enforce the establishment of the Party Committee in SOEs. 
However, in terms of the Communist Party Constitution, it must set up the committee to 
lead party members within companies. Even in private companies there is still party 
organization. The Party Committee will directly affect the board of directors’ 
decision-making, due to the state-appointed personnel management and the mechanism of 
‘consolidated and mixed government and party’. Company Law requires the nomination of 
boards of directors, and supervisory boards are decided on by the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Institution, so that the corporate governance in SOEs is 
intervened by the party. This makes corporate operation and monitoring inefficient and 
inauthentic. Trade unions are not permitted to establish independent trade unions without 
the CCP and government. A trade union in each hierarchy is led and controlled by a higher 
level. Although SOEs’ members are elected by employees, the leaders are still designated 
by the party and government. When employees’ interests and rights cannot be protected by 
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boards of directors, to some extent, trade unions would not provide fair and sufficient 
remedy to these employees.188  
 
NGOs are one of the effective organizations that could stimulate and monitor the 
implementation of CSR. In China NGOs have increased rapidly over the past years. 
However, their formation is still limited by governmental authority and their agenda should 
be in accordance with the political environment; for example, government prefers NGOs in 
environmental protection rather than in human rights or labour protection, which are 
sensitive issues in China.189 Therefore, NGOs in China are the window dressing to drive 
the performance of CSR. 
 
Furthermore, economic development is not only the economic objective, but also the 
political aim in China, so that state and local economic increases are the solid standard to 
evaluate the local development. In most provinces, cities and even towns, local officials’ 
career achievement is closely and directly linked to the gross domestic product (hereinafter 
‘GDP’). In order to enhance political performance, local governmental officials are 
concerned with economic improvement and encourage companies to make profits as much 
as possible, but ignore the development of CSR in companies. 
 
2.3.2.3 Social barriers 
 
The achievement of CSR is relevant to corporate history and culture. When companies 
have a long history, they will have a stronger social identity and notion of corporate 
citizenship. In Western countries, some famous companies have a very long history and 
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culture, accompanied by a good reputation that is achieved through implementing CSR 
towards all stakeholders. In China most companies are in a period of transition and of 
accumulating capital. They do not have the concept of corporate citizenship and the 
obligation to benefit the community. Without social encouragement, companies would 
focus on physical income, instead of CSR towards their stakeholders. 
 
This deficit is also caused by stakeholders themselves who have a weak notion of and 
willingness to support CSR and advocate their interests, except for capital. The lack of 
social awareness in CSR exists widely among Chinese consumers. In developed countries 
consumers are ‘perceived to have a positive or less negative impact on the physical 
environment and/or the use of purchasing power to express social concerns’.190 Consumers 
could reject or boycott the goods from sellers who underperform when it comes to CSR. It 
is responsible consumption that emphasizes consumer’s importance to protect social 
interest, human rights and the environment. Their acceptance or rejection of any goods or 
services conveys consumers’ opinion and requirement of CSR.191 A survey conducted by 
the Chinese Academy of Social Science showed that consumers in developed cities, such 
as Shanghai and Hong Kong, with higher education degrees, support products involving 
good performance of CSR.192 Most consumers pay more attention to the lower or higher 
physical price of goods than to how and where they have been produced.193 Although 
Chinese consumers have been aware of the importance of CSR, they focus very much on 
post-event behaviours. For example, in 2012, one of the most famous dairy companies, 
MengNiu, was found to have used expired ingredients in its dairy food. After the revelation, 
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consumers boycotted the products produced by MengNiu within a couple of months. 
However, before the incident, few people paid attention to whether the production 
processes strictly complied with food safety and health standards. Pre-event is the 
long-term approach for stakeholders to screen companies’ performance in CSR.194 Owing 
to the public screening, companies will actively and voluntarily implement CSR in 
corporate governance to enhance reputation and competition. The post-event model merely 
makes companies passively adopt any remedy to compensate for the loss caused by their 
fault, so that CSR is no longer voluntary, but seems like crisis management.  
 
2.3.3 Implementing CSR in China 
 
According to CSR, the level of public awareness is weak in China, which is due to the 
barriers illustrated in the paragraphs above. The concentrated economic development 
caused the Chinese government and people to neglect the legal development and 
implementation at an early stage. Therefore, this directly led to the underperformance of 
law and regulations not only in organizations, but also among individuals. SOEs are 
protected by governmental policies; SMEs are finding any possible way to avoid the 
limitation and enforcement in legislation and regulation; and some individual stakeholders, 
such as consumers and employees, do not even know what rights and protection they can 
get from law, and how to apply the law to protect themselves.  
 
As Carroll alleged, legal responsibility is one of the factors in CSR, and it is necessary to let 
people and companies know what their legal responsibilities are. This is the main reason 
why legislation and regulation are adopted as an approach to stimulate CSR in China. 
Meanwhile, China is a country with highly concentrated power and governance in 
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government and the model of implementing CSR is not totally voluntary, but state-led. The 
government provides many instructions and guidelines to direct the implementation of 
CSR in companies. Nevertheless, under international influence, numerous voluntary 
initiatives have been broadly applied in corporate governance to achieve CSR, such as 
governmental opinion, industrial guidelines and codes of conduct. 
 
2.3.3.1 Legislation and governmental regulation 
 
Company Law is the new and main basis for corporate governance in China. It explicitly 
regulates the responsibility to protect social interests and perform CSR. For example, 
Article 1 stipulates that ‘[t]his Law is enacted for the purposes of regulating the 
organization and operation of companies, protecting the legitimate rights and interests of 
companies, shareholders and creditors, maintaining the socialist economic order, and 
promoting the development of the socialist market economy’, and Article 5 regulates that 
‘[i]n conducting business operations, a company shall comply with the laws and 
administrative regulations, social morality, and business morality. It shall act in good faith, 
accept the supervision of the government and general public, and bear social 
responsibilities’.195 Chapter 6 of the Company Law strictly regulates the monitoring and 
supervision of boards of directors to prevent dereliction of their duty and loss to 
stakeholders.196 
 
The Securities Law of China is another important piece of legislation to regulate listed 
companies’ corporate governance and instruct them to perform CSR. Article 5 states that 
‘when issuing and dealing securities, all concerned must abide by laws and administrative 
rules and regulations. Cheating, insider trading and manipulation of stock markets are 
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prohibited’.197 This is to ensure social individual investors’ interests in stock markets and 
also to optimize the operations in the Chinese stock markets. Many other pieces of 
industrial legislation also provide company standards on how to protect stakeholders, 
including Chinese Labour Contract Law, Chinese Product Safety Law and the Law of 
Social Welfare. Therefore, under legal protection, the rights of employees, consumers, the 
community and the environment can be ensured at a basic level. 
 
The Supreme Court in China also plays an important role in CSR: it always publishes 
notices or guides to limit companies’ operation; for example, the Notice on Related Issues 
of False Information in Securities Market clearly provides the punishment of improper 
action of false information disclosure.198 The strengthened system of legal punishment 
reduces the harm in the trading process and protects social shareholders’ investment. 
 
Governmental departments also issued varied regulations to limit companies in different 
fields; for instance, the Ministry of Finance published the Code of Accounting which is a 
mandatory governmental regulation that corporate finance officials and accountants must 
obey. It is the system used to instruct corporate accounting to provide accounting reports 
with respect to companies’ asset, income, cost and profit, and payment to their board of 
directors and top management. Through an effective accounting system, internal 
                                                          
197
 Securities Law of China 2005 [中国证券法, zhongguozhengquanfa], Article 5, available at: 
http://www.kd325.com/ShowArticle.shtml?ID=20105101615512753.htm, last accessed on 22 March 2014. 
198
 In 2003 the Supreme People’s Court of China issued a judicial interpretation about false information 
disclosure in the securities market, entitled ‘Some Provision of the Supreme People’s Court on Trying 
Cases of Civil Compensation Arising from False Statement in Securities Market’. See Dai, L., ‘The Judicial 
Application of the Causation Test on the False Statement Doctrine in Securities Litigation in China’, 
Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal (2006), Volume 15, Issue 3, 735–736. 
Chapter 2: Rationale for and Methods Used to Achieve Corporate Social Responsibility 
© C. YUN 168
stakeholders are able to get access to how the capital is distributed and whether there is 
misuse of stakeholders’ interest of gaining private profit.199 
 
2.3.3.2 Codes of conduct and guidelines 
 
In China CSR has been developed in three stages: (i) point to point, (ii) industry to point 
and (iii) industry to industry. In the early stage, only individual companies that have a 
notion of CSR require each partner or other party to achieve CSR through contracts. This 
only takes place among contracting companies and is the so-called stage of point to point. 
The notion of CSR was then broadened to include industry. However, at this stage, industry 
would only expect the requirement of CSR of an individual or a group of companies. 
Nowadays, CSR in China has evolved as industry to industry, and there are uniform and 
basic standards of CSR in companies in certain industries. This has become the foundation 
of co-operation and the development of harmony among different fields.200 In this case, 
although legislation and enforceable regulation in government had become the basic driver 
to direct Chinese companies to achieve CSR, codes of conduct and guidelines are essential, 
and should be adopted in the various industries that are adopting voluntary methods at the 
global level. CSRC extracted the standards of the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance and adopted them into the Guideline for Corporate Governance of Listed 
Companies. It offers the principles of corporate governance in listed companies and 
emphasizes the protection of investor and professional ethics. It is said that ‘the Code sets 
forth, among other things, the basic principles for corporate governance of listed 
companies in our country, the means for the protection of investor’s interests and rights, the 
                                                          
199
 Code of Accounting in Ministry of Finance, available at: 
http://www.casc.gov.cn/wjk/200608/P020060810538543620145.pdf, last accessed on 22 March 2014. 
200
 The development of CSR is summarized from the speech of Dr Xiaohui Liang, Transition of CSR from 
City to Rural Place, at the Conference of Credibility, held in Beijing, China, November 2012. 
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basic behavior rules and moral standards for directors, supervisors, managers and other 
senior management members of listed companies’.201 
 
In addition, the SASAC released the Guide Opinion on the Social Responsibility 
Implementation for the State-owned Enterprises Controlled by the Central Government in 
2008. It explained the importance of CSR for SOEs, the fundamental principles to 
implement CSR and the content of major measures to spread CSR in SOEs controlled by 
central government.202 
 
Moreover, a series of guidelines about information disclosure emerged in the first decade 
of the twenty-first century. Since 2007, the State Environmental Protection Administration 
(hereinafter ‘SEPA’) has created various models for corporate environmental reporting, 
among which, that environmental agencies and companies that pollute heavily must 
disclose true environmental information to the public. However, the guideline is limited 
and should be expanded to all companies, not only those that are heavy polluters.203 The 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges published the Guide on Environmental 
Information Disclosure for Companies Listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the 
Guide on Listed Companies’ Social Responsibility.204 Both stress the implementation of 
                                                          
201
 Code of Corporate Governance of Listed Companies in China, available at: 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/code_en.pdf, last accessed on 18 November 2012. 
202
 See Lin et al., supra note 181, 73–74; see also The Guide Opinion on the Social Responsibility 
Implementation for the State-owned Enterprises Controlled by the Central Government, available at: 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963340/n2964712/4891623.html, last accessed on 26 March 2013. 
203
 See Lin et al., supra note 181, 73–74. 
204
 See Guide on Listed Companies Environmental Information Disclosure (Opinion) [上市公司环境信息
披露指南（意见征求稿, shangshigongssihuanjingxixipiluzhinan (yijianzhengqiugao)）, available at: 
http://wfs.mep.gov.cn/gywrfz/hbhc/zcfg/201009/W020100914403449464600.pdf, last accessed on 
22 March 2014; see also Guide on Listed Companies’ Social Responsibility in Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
[深圳证券交易所上市公司社会责任指引, 
shenzhenzhengquanjiaoyisuoshangshigongsishehuizerenzhiyin], available at: 
http://www.szse.cn/main/disclosure/bsgg/200609259299.shtml, last accessed on 22 March 2014. 
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CSR in corporate governance and information disclosure to the public in the two 
exchanges.205 Additionally, there are also codes of conduct or guidelines that regulate CSR 
within industries, such as the Guideline on CSR in Chinese Industrial Companies and 
Industrial Association, which is the general guideline to companies in industry, in the fields 
of fair trade, environmental sustainability, safety production, consumer protection and so 
on.206 
 
2.3.3.3  SRI in China 
 
The Chinese government has recently begun to use financial measures to improve 
corporate social performance and SRI in China. After the Bank of China had issued the first 
SRI fund, namely the Sustainable Growth Equity Fund in China, the Chinese government 
initiated the green credit policy in 2007 to direct Chinese banks to consider corporate 
environmental performance in credit assessment.207 Then the SEPA carried out the green 
loan programme to blacklist 30 companies with heavy environmental problems and 
reported the information to the credit management system of the People’s Bank of China, 
so that some companies would provide green loans to those companies with positive 
environmental performance.208  
 
                                                          
205
 Ibid. 
206
 Guideline of CSR in Chinese Industrial Companies and Industrial Association, available at: 
http://www.siccsr.org/WebSite/crs/Upload/File/201211/20121119073915312500.PDF, last accessed on 
22 March 2014. 
207
 See Lin, supra note 158, 76–77; see also the news on: 29 Banks Sign Agreement of Green Loan 
Programme [29家银行签订绿色信贷协议, 29 jiayinhangqiandinglvsexindaixieyi], 4 November 2013, 
available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2013-11/04/c_118000494.htm, last accessed on 22 March 
2014. 
208
 The blacklist of different industries is published of official website on SEPA, available at: 
http://hjj.mep.gov.cn/zdhy/, last accessed on 23 November 2013.  
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Furthermore, with the development of the Green Loan Programme, the Green Evolution 
was launched in China’s banking sector and many banks adopted the checklist to ensure 
companies’ environmental performance and provide loans to companies who scored highly 
in environmental protection. In this programme, companies strictly bolstered the financial 
and environmental regulations, and co-operated with international banks and NGOs for 
further development, so that the Green Programme in banks also requires companies to 
provide reliable information disclosure on the corporate environmental index.209 SRI in 
China is at the very early stages, but has taken a huge step forward and made progress in the 
development of CSR. Socially responsible institutional investors will largely influence the 
economic performance and stimulate companies to implement CSR. 
 
2.3.3.4  Information disclosure and CSR assessment 
 
Voluntary reporting and internal supervision go beyond the legal requirement of 
information disclosure, and are effective to present CSR performance to the public, and 
will directly evaluate the efficiency of corporate governance and CSR. For example, in the 
Corporate Governance Assessment Report of the Top100 Chinese Listed Companies, 
information disclosure and operation of self-supervision by the supervisory board are the 
index to evaluate the performance of corporate governance. 210  A good corporate 
governance system will set up the applicable mechanism to disclose true information to 
ensure access to the information for the public, so that stakeholders will directly evaluate 
companies’ performance in corporate governance and CSR via reliable information. In 
order to improve their reputation and financial performance, companies in the lower public 
                                                          
209
 The Green Evolution: Environmental Policies and Practice in China’s Banking Sector, available at: 
http://www.banktrack.org/download/the_green_evolution_environmental_policies_and_practice_in_the_ch
inese_banking_sector/green_evolution_2008_foe_final.pdf, last accessed on 27 November 2012.  
210
 See the Corporate Governance Assessment Report of the Top 100 Listed Companies, supra note 177. 
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ranking of CSR must optimize their CSR strategy and information disclosure in corporate 
governance. 
 
China Social Compliance 9000 for the Textile and Apparel Industry (hereinafter 
‘CSC9000T’) is the voluntary standard of information disclosure and the self-assessment 
system that was created on the basis of SA8000.211 In China there is a large number of 
private textile and apparel companies run in the form of sweatshop. Workers do not receive 
fair payment and are overworked in terrible working conditions. CSC9000T is aimed at 
preventing harmful action to stakeholders and improve the performance of CSR in the 
textile and apparel industry, and requires companies to perform responsibility in areas of 
discrimination, child labour, legal working hours, legal remuneration, trade union and 
collective bargaining, safety and health, environmental protection, and fair competition.212 
The system will set up the codes of conduct above the requirement of labour contractual 
law, and improve the poor conditions and performance of CSR in the industry. For example, 
the law forces employers to ensure occupational health and safety in production, while 
CSC9000T provides detailed policies and responsibility in consultation and 
communication with employees; emergency responses to health and safe crisis; checking 
and corrective action; and so on. In addition, CSC9000T also mentions the function of 
trade union and collective bargaining, which does not appear in the labour contractual law. 
This guideline also provides the standard of information disclosure, such as GRI, that 
industrial companies will publish information in the form as instructed by CSC9000T and 
self-check the level of application according to the specific standards. 
 
2.4 Summary 
 
                                                          
211
 SA8000, see supra note 86. 
212
 CSC9000T, available at: http://www.csrchina.net/page-566.html, last accessed on 12 March 2014. 
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Under the new trend of conducting business, CSR is strongly required, but easily avoided 
in the new forms such as outsourcing and subcontracting, so that stakeholders’ CSR 
benefits might be harmed in the complex business process. With technological 
development, stakeholders have various means of access to knowledge on and monitoring 
companies’ CSR performance. When people take CSR seriously, consumers and investors 
would regard CSR achievement as a vital issue in decision-making. As a result of public 
need and market pressure, CSR is largely stimulated in the new era. The law provides 
definitions of social, environmental and sustainable issues, and broadens the public notion 
and scope to CSR. More importantly, when regulation and the public both require 
companies to disclose information, companies’ social performance would be presented to, 
and monitored by, the public so that it leads to the implementation of CSR in corporate 
governance and enhances companies’ corporate image. 
 
CSR is voluntary and goes beyond legislation. However, the law affects the concept, scope 
and implementation in many aspects. Soft law is also the main basis of CSR and is not 
binding, but extends the effect of hard law to CSR in the form of codes of conducts or 
guidelines. The broad use of such standards would also provide practical resources to the 
development and innovation of hard law. Under the indirect legal effect, a series of 
voluntary initiatives are developed as codes of conduct, such as international guidelines 
and national standards. Contractual parties can voluntarily set up CSR clauses in contracts. 
However, the contractual duty is enforced under general law. Information disclosure and 
its monitoring are some of the main approaches to ensuring the achievement of CSR and 
the credibility of its performance, and have been widely applied in corporate governance 
worldwide. 
 
As regards the general method and concept of CSR adopted globally, the UK is 
experienced and has effectively implemented CSR for decades. Stakeholder engagement is 
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strongly recommended as a strategy to meet their needs and ensure companies’ success as a 
whole by means of standardized voluntary guidelines and information disclosure among 
numerous companies, especially FTSE-listed companies on the London Stock Exchange 
Market. The process of stakeholder engagement is fulfilled through providing stakeholder 
information, getting feedback from them, and involving them in companies’ development 
of CSR. In this process, boards of directors should insist on CSR and its integration into 
long-term stakeholder benefit and corporate governance. Among the complex 
stakeholders’ needs, individual companies will identify the relative importance of interests 
and efficiently make decision on the basis of stakeholder salience.  
 
The application of SR in socially focused institutions stimulates companies’ exercise of 
CSR, because companies have to enhance attraction to SRI investors through improving 
corporate reputation and CSR performance. In the meantime, owing to the governmental 
deficit in the UK, unemployment, inflation, unfair payment and other problems arose, so 
that the government strongly encourages companies to fulfil CSR to reduce the 
governmental burden. The government has created many instructions and non-mandatory 
initiatives to encourage CSR. 
 
Contrary to the UK, China is a developing country with an emerging market. CSR was only 
mentioned as late as about 20 years ago. However, the notion of ethical conduct among the 
public dates back to Confucian theory. After the emergence of the new China, all 
enterprises in the period of planned and collective economy were centrally controlled 
under hierarchical governance of the Chinese government. This dilemma caused the 
Chinese economic development largely to fall behind the international level. 
 
Until 1978, Deng Xiaoping’s ‘open policy’ boosted the national economy and companies 
were encouraged to gain benefits by any means. The imbalanced and chaotic economic 
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development led to many negative effects, and a crisis in the domestic and global market. 
CSR was urgently needed to optimize the domestic market and seek international business 
partners. At the start of CSR there were varied mistaken notions of, and barriers in, 
economic, social and political aspects. However, CSR is still being developed in China 
with respect to its legal basis, voluntary initiatives, Chinese SRI, and relevant CSR 
assessment and verification. 
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Chapter 3: United Kingdom Companies’ Corporate Social 
Responsibility in Employment: Case Studies 
 
 
The employee is one of the most important internal stakeholders in a company and is 
treated as the human capital, which is as vital as physical capital to the fate and operation 
of the corporate.1 Managers are strengthening their approach to inculcating CSR in 
employees, as already analysed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, in order to enhance team 
production, avoid shirking among employees and to reduce the governance cost of 
employment in reaching long-term objectives. Corporate motivations for achieving CSR 
in the labour dimension includes attracting and maintaining a qualified workforce with 
potential for development; establishing positive relations with staff; enhancing 
productivity; simplifying risk management of human resources; facilitating access to 
credit when creditors take SRI into account when deciding on their investment; 
increasing credibility; and strengthening the brand and company reputation.2  
 
The UK is a pioneer in the field of CSR and has comprehensive experience in 
implementing it. UK companies meet their CSR in employment through varied 
approaches to corporate governance. Under the complete mechanism of information 
disclosure, the public would get access to information on, and to monitor company’s 
performance in terms of, their CSR. This chapter, therefore, relies on UK companies’ 
                                                        
1
 Internal stakeholders are people who are already committed to serving the company as owners, board 
members or employees. External stakeholders are people who are impacted by companies’ work as clients, 
customers, suppliers and communities. 
2
 ILO, International Instruments and Corporate Social Responsibility: A Booklet to Accompany Training, 
the Labour Dimension of CSR; From Principles to Practice, available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/WCMS_101247/lang--en/index.htm., last accessed on 18 
November 2013. 
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published information to undertake an empirical analysis of the strategies and techniques 
UK companies have adopted in the exercise of their CSR in employment. The objective is 
to examine in detail how high-level aspirations for CSR are translated into practice across 
the range of issues that are relevant for CSR in employment. 
 
3.1 Overview 
 
Through data collection, the OECD concluded that the characteristics of CSR in 
employment are a reasonable working environment; compliance with laws; no 
discrimination; respect for human rights (including no child labour and no forced labour); 
reasonable working hours and flexible working time; provision of training; monitoring; 
and other relevant issues.3 Furthermore, Section 417 of the UK Companies Act 2006 
requires that a business review forms part of the director’s report, except in the case of 
small companies. The director’s report should demonstrate how directors fulfilled their 
duty to promote the success of the company.4 The business review is necessary to fairly 
describe the company’s performance and development, and should include an easily 
understandable analysis of financial indicators, and environmental and employee 
matters.5 Furthermore, the requirement that listed companies report on their business 
review goes far beyond the main trends and factors affecting the company’s performance, 
                                                        
3
 OECD Codes of Corporate Conduct: Expanded Review of Their Contents, Working Papers on 
International Investment. OECD Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, No. 2001/6, May 
2001, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/industry/internationalinvestment/corporateresponsibility/1922656.pdf., last accessed 
on 18 March 2013. 
4
 Companies Act 2006 Ch. 46, Sections 172; The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ 
Report) Regulation 2013, 414C (4) and (7). 
5
 See the Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulation 2013, 414A and C (6) 
and Part 3 Amendments to the Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) 
Regulations 2008, supra note 4. Medium-sized companies need not comply with subsection (4) if the 
information relates to non-financial performance. 
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development and position, and must include environmental matters, the company’s 
employees, and social and community issues.6 This kind of information emerged as the 
format for reporting on CSR and resulted in a CSR report or a sustainability report, which 
could be a stand-alone document or be included in the company’s business review. 
KPMG defined the need for a CSR Report as the de facto law for business: ‘companies 
are increasingly realizing that CSR reporting is about more than just being a good 
corporate citizen; it drives innovation and promotes learning, which helps companies 
grow their business and increase their organization’s value’.7 In KPMG’s International 
Corporate Responsibility Report 2011, it stressed the function of CSR in employment as 
enhancing employee motivation at work, which was generally taken seriously by top 
global businesses.8 Using the legal minimum standard as a basis, CSR in employment 
should also be exercised through varied voluntary initiatives, such as national and 
international guidelines, and codes of conduct. At this point it is necessary to refer to 
stakeholder engagement (here ‘employee engagement’), reporting and monitoring in an 
effective CSR management system. In the sections that follow the approaches to CSR in 
employment, most of which were introduced in the previous chapter, are described. 
 
The approach to, and implementation of, CSR in employment is reflected through 
research conducted into companies’ CSR reports, including codes of ethics, and CSR 
policies that are relevant to CSR in protecting employees. In the fundamental research, 
CSR reports (or relevant materials) were selected from FTSE 100 companies in 2013, 
                                                        
6
 Ibid, 414C (7). 
7
 KPMG, ‘Corporate Responsibility Report Has Become De facto Law for Business’, KPMG Research, 
available at: 
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/corporate-responsibility/Pages/de
-facto-business-law.aspx., last accessed on 4 May 2014. 
8
 KPMG, International Corporate Responsibility Report Survey 2011, 18–19, available at: 
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/corporate-responsibility/Docume
nts/2011-survey.pdf., last accessed on 4 May 2014. 
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excluding the financial sectors and media (32 companies), and from 32 randomly picked 
companies in the industries of non-finance and non-media (100 companies in total) that 
published their annual report or CSR report on the website of the Financial Times 
database or corporate website. 9  Taken together, these 100 companies provide a 
representative sample of large companies that are subject to the UK CSR reporting 
regime in Section 417 of the Companies Act 2006. According to the general research, 
most of the companies’ CSR reports are categorized into compliance with laws; ensuring 
health and safety at work; respect for human rights; employees’ training and development; 
and fair payment and benefits. These categories are generally in accordance with the 
focused issues in the OECD research into corporate governance in the area of 
employment.10 In addition, assessment of the efficiency and reliability of CSR reports 
also depends on the effective implementation of employee engagement in corporate 
governance and the achievement of CSR, and applicable reporting mechanism and its 
monitoring. 
 
3.2 General CSR initiatives in employment 
                                                        
9
 CSR reports in most financial companies and media are not applicable, and they seldom publish this kind 
of report, because work in the two sectors is high income, but comparatively low occupational risk and 
offence. In the industries of finance and media less labour is needed, so that the violation of human rights 
or labour rights does not happen as frequently as in the industries of construction, transportation, 
manufacturer and other labour-focused sectors. See also, ft.com/markets data, available at: 
http://markets.ft.com/research/Markets/Company-Content?segid=90058, last accessed on 18 May 2013. 
10
 ‘Corporate Responsibility Practice in the Area of Employment and Industrial Relations’, OECD–ILO 
Conference on ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: Employment and Industrial Relations; Promoting 
Responsible Business Conduct in a Globalizing Economy’, 23–24 June 2008, OECD Conference Centre, 
Paris, France. The OECD implemented data collection among the FTSE ALL World Developed Index to 
evaluate the quality of CSR management systems in employment. This paper focuses on the following 
issues: equal opportunities, trade union membership, job security and training, health and safety, human 
rights, and supply chain labour standards. Among the selected UK companies researched in this thesis, 
most reported statements on their CSR with respect to health and safety, human rights, fair payment, 
employee training and development, and employee engagement.  
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The following paragraphs will demonstrate how companies achieve CSR in employment 
based on the factors mentioned above, not only by complying with legislation, but also 
referring to other voluntary initiatives. This research was obtained from their CSR reports. 
A summary of the collected data is set out in the Table 1 in Appendix. 
 
3.2.1 Compliance with minimum legal standards 
 
Legislation is not the standard for the achievement of CSR, but the minimum legal basis 
and overview for companies to implement voluntary actions in different aspects. From 
the CSR reports studied it is clear that employers have adopted precise national and 
international legal regulations when exercising CSR towards their employees. There are 
three examples to demonstrate how legislation amply ensures employees’ rights at work, 
namely in the fields of (i) health and safety, (ii) human rights, and (iii) fair payment. 
 
3.2.1.1 Health and safety 
 
Most companies alleged in their CSR reports that they complied with the regulations of 
the UK Health and Safety Executive.11 Despite these statements, the reports lacked 
detailed illustration of which regulation had specifically been complied with, since there 
are two main pieces of legislation on health and safety in the workplace. The first is the 
Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, Section 2 of which compels employers to apply 
the general and reasonable practice of ensuring employees’ health, safety and welfare at 
                                                        
11
 The Health and Safety Executive is the executive sector of the UK government and is mainly responsible 
for public health and safety. 
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work.12 Section 2(3) requires employers to make everything safe and harmless for 
anyone at workplace.13 The second piece of legislation is the expanded Workplace 
(Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulation 1992 that specifically sets requirements ranging 
from ventilation, temperature in indoor workplaces, and working in hot or cold 
environments, to floors and traffic routes, and transparent doors, gates and windows.14 
Especially with regard to working in hot or cold environments, employers are required to 
take a higher duty of care of employees by introducing engineering measures to control 
the thermal effects in a workplace environment, doing medical pre-selection of 
employees to ensure that they are suited to working in a particular environment, 
providing training, taking the necessary precautions and so on.15 
 
Besides the general regulations about health and safety, the UK government also 
established various pieces of legislation to safeguard employees’ health and safety 
regarding different worksites: for example, a few CSR reports in the construction industry 
published their compliance with the Work at Height Regulations 2007 (Amendment), 
which provides instructions on dealing with people ‘working at height engaged in caving 
or climbing by way of sport, recreation, team building or similar activities’.16 Employers 
have the duty to ensure that ‘all work at height is properly planned and organized; those 
                                                        
12 Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 Ch.37, Section 2. It is a UK Act of 2011 which defines the 
fundamental structure and authority for the encouragement, regulation and enforcement of workplace 
health, safety and welfare in the UK. 
13 Ibid. 
14
 Health and Safety Executive, Workplace Health, Safety and Welfare: A Short Guide for Managers, 
available at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/indg244.htm, last accessed on 17 September 2013; see 
Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulation 1992/3004. 
15
 Further requirements and advice on thermal comfort in the workplace can be checked on the Health and 
Safety Executive’s website at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/temperature/thermal, last accessed on 17 September 
2013. 
16
 The Work at Height Regulations (Amendment) 2007/320 came into force on 6 April 2007 and was 
derived from Work at Height Regulations 2005/735.  
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involved in work at height are competent; the risks from work at height are assessed and 
appropriate work equipment is selected and used; the risks from fragile surfaces are 
properly controlled; and equipment for work at height is properly inspected and 
maintained.’17 
 
Additionally, health and safety requirements for employers also depend on the different 
industrial sectors in which potential crises in issues of health and safety exist, such as the 
construction, transportation, chemical manufacturers, and textile and apparel 
manufacturers.18 The legislation in the construction sector, the Construction (Design and 
Management) Regulations 2007 (hereinafter ‘CDM’), is one of the main industrial legal 
requirements that appeared in some of the CSR reports, and covers general duties 
applying to all construction projects, additional duties applicable to notifiable 
construction projects, that is, those lasting more than 30 days or involving more than 500 
person days of construction work; and practical requirements for all construction sites.19 
 
3.2.1.2 Human rights  
 
Human rights is another important issue in the achievement of CSR in employment that is 
regulated in the UK and globally through numerous pieces of legislation related to equal 
                                                        
17
 Ibid. 
18
 It refers to different statutory requirements of health and safety in different industries, such as polluted 
air emission, protective clothing or masks, protection on different worksites and so on. Therefore, not only 
the general legislation in health and safety regulates employers’ accountability, but also specific industrial 
regulations. 
19
 The new CDM Regulations 2007/320 (which entered into force on 6 April 2007) revise and bring 
together the CDM Regulations 1994 and the Construction (Health Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1996 
into a single regulatory package. Construction is a disproportionately dangerous industry where 
improvements in health and safety are urgently needed. CDM regulations raised the complexity and official 
approach to duty holders about how to prevent accidents and protect employees’ health and safety at 
construction work.  
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opportunity, discrimination, child labour and so forth. International legal human rights 
requirements are largely derived from ILO conventions with respect to race, gender, 
disability, religion, ethnic origin, age and sexual orientation, which are broadly adopted 
among the majority of the companies researched.20 The main conventions relevant to 
international labour standards are the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right 
to Organize Convention (No. 87) 1948, Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining 
Convention (No. 98) 1949, Forced Labour Convention (No. 29) 1930, Minimum Age 
Convention (No. 138) 1939 and Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Convention (No. 111) 1958.21 They offer the international foundation for UK employers 
regarding compliance with the protection of employees’ human rights at work. 
Furthermore, the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights is popularly applied in 
companies as the legal basis for the protection of human rights.22 
 
UK domestic legislature also issued a series of regulations and governmental policies to 
enforce human rights on employers. Some data showed that companies complied with the 
UK Equality Act 2010, which is based on ILO standards, in ensuring employees’ human 
rights related to age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, 
                                                        
20
 See OECD–ILO Conference on Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 10. 
21
 The main ILO Conventions can be found on the ILO website, at: www.ilo.org/ilolex/index.htm, last 
accessed on 19 January 2013; see also International Instruments and Corporate Social Responsibility, supra 
note 2. 
22
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is a declaration adopted by the UN General Assembly at 
Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on 10 December 1948. The declaration arose directly from the experiences in 
World War II and represents the first global expression of rights to which all human beings are inherently 
entitled. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is treated as: 
a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and 
every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education 
to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to 
secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States 
themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction. 
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pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, and sex and sexual orientation.23 The 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995, which provides requirements for the prohibition on 
discrimination against, and providing convenience and priority for disabled employees, 
has been adopted by a minority of companies researched.24 
 
3.2.1.3 Employees’ fair payment 
 
More than 95% of companies expressed the view in their CSR report that they paid their 
employees a fair wage and offered them paid holidays, but did not clarify the specific 
legislation with which they were complying. In terms of the Employment Rights Act 
1996, employees have statutory rights to reasonable and fair payment, paid holidays, and 
child-care during working time.25  Moreover, around ten labour-focused companies, 
especially in the area of construction, and textile and apparel, showed their performance 
in terms of flexible working time and parental leave. The UK governmental department 
for BIS provides details on, and explanations of, how employees should apply flexible 
working time and parental leave through legal rights.26 
 
In addition, the data collected showed that a few companies alleged that they protected 
employees’ minimum wage rights on the basis of the National Minimum Wage Act 2012 
                                                        
23
 Equality Act 2010 Ch. 15. 
24
 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 Ch. 13. This is an Act of the Parliament of the UK which has now 
been repealed and replaced with the Equality Act 2010, except in Northern Ireland where the Act still 
applies. Formerly, it made it unlawful to discriminate against people in respect of their disabilities in 
relation to employment, the provision of goods and services, education and transport. 
25
 Employment Right Act 1996 Ch. 8. It is a UK Act of Parliament passed by the Conservative government 
to codify the existing law on individual rights in UK labour law. It has been substituted by Employment 
Rights Act (Increased Order) 2010 that came into force on 1 February 2011.  
26BIS: Giving Everybody the Rights to Flexible Working, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/giving-everybody-the-right-to-flexible-working, last accessed 
on 1 November 2013. 
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and mentioned the lowest payment based on the different rate in each year. The national 
minimum wage rate in 2012 for people at 21 years of age and over, between 18 and 21 
years, under 18 years, and apprentices were £6.19, £4.98, £3.98 and £2.65 respectively.27 
This is guaranteed to low-income worker’s payment during employment and avoids the 
over-exploitation of labour without proper payment. 
 
3.2.2 Voluntary CSR initiatives in employment 
 
In addition to compliance with minimum legal standards for employees’ protection, CSR 
in employment should be achieved through voluntary initiatives as discussed in Chapter 2, 
such as national and international guidelines, codes of conduct, and recommendations. 
The companies researched showed that UK employers adopted domestic and global 
guidelines, and codes of conduct to stimulate CSR in employment in corporate 
governance. 
 
3.2.2.1 National initiatives 
 
On the basis of legislation, NGOs set up a large number of guidelines and initiatives to 
assist them in achieving CSR in employment. The Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service (hereinafter ‘ACAS’) is one of the main organizations that provides approaches 
to improve organizations and working life through better employment relations.28 For 
                                                        
27
 The Minimum Wage Rate can be found on the BIS website, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/national-minimum-wage-rates, last accessed on 1 November 2013. This rate is for 
apprentices under 19 years of age or those in their first year. If they are 19 years or over and have passed 
their first year of study, the rate that applies to their age group can be obtained. 
28
 ACAS is largely funded by the BIS, but is a non-departmental body, governed by an independent 
council that was founded in 1975. It is aimed at determining the strategic direction, policies and priorities, 
and ensuring the statutory duties are carried out effectively. Official website available at: 
http://www.acas.org.uk/index.aspx?articleid=1342, last accessed on 23 January 2014. 
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instance, a few companies mentioned the ACAS booklet dealing with the protection of 
equality and diversity to ensure human rights in the workplace in their CSR report as the 
instruction they followed on how to improve their relations with their employees. The 
booklet advised and guided employers and employees on how to establish harmonious 
relations at work, and avoid the violation of human rights, such as discrimination and 
unequal opportunities. ACAS also offered the service of the Equality Direct Helpline for 
employers and employees to consult and report any violation.29 
 
Moreover, sectoral organizations or committees also implement industrial guidelines in 
employers’ labour practices. In the field of construction, the UK construction industry 
established the Considerate Construction Scheme (hereinafter ‘CCS’) to provide a 
national initiative namely the Code of Considerate Practice to registered companies in 
order to encourage and instruct companies to exercise CSR towards their employees and 
other stakeholders beyond the statutory requirements. 30  Of the companies in the 
construction field, 30% showed their registration and control under CCS to highlight the 
quality and safety of their buildings and employers. 
 
3.2.2.2 International initiatives 
 
                                                        
29
 ACAS, Delivering Equality and Diversity Booklet, available at: 
http://www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/l/e/Acas_Delivering_Equality_and_Diversity_(Nov_11)-accessible-versi
on-Apr-2012.pdf, last accessed on 18 January 2013. 
30
 CCS is concerned about any area of construction activity that may have a direct or indirect impact on the 
image of the industry as a whole. Construction sites and companies that register with the scheme are 
monitored against a Code of Considerate Practice, designed to encourage best practice beyond statutory 
requirements. Overview of CCS, available at: http://www.ccscheme.org.uk/index.php/ccs-ltd, last accessed 
on 18 January 2013; see also Code of Considerate Practice, available at: 
http://www.ccscheme.org.uk/index.php/company-registration/how-to-be-very-considerate/company-code-o
f-considerate-practice, last accessed on 18 January 2013. 
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In the CSR reports, about 70% of companies indicated that they applied international 
initiatives to improve the performance of CSR in employment. Among them, only four 
companies used the principle of the OECD Guidelines, while the rest of them frequently 
adopted the ILO Declaration and the UN Global Compact in their CSR reports. 
 
The Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy is derived from ILO Conventions. However, it differs from the ILO Conventions 
in that it is not ratified by governments. The declaration is the voluntary initiative used to 
guide and encourage the positive contribution of multinational enterprises to make 
economic and social progress, minimize and resolve difficulties and disputes, and 
establish good relations among enterprises, governments and employers and worker 
organizations in the labour dimension of CSR.31 According to paragraphs 8–12 of the 
MNE Declaration, it ‘invites multinational enterprises, governments, employers’ and 
workers’ organizations to respect national laws and regulations; give due consideration to 
local practices; respect international standards concerning human and labour rights; and 
honour commitments in conformity with national law and accepted international 
obligations.’32  In addition, it gives recommendations with respect to employment, 
training, conditions of work and life, and industrial relations. The declaration entirely 
guides employment promotion, equality of opportunity and treatment, security of 
employment, skills training leveraging, employees’ wages and benefits, occupational 
health and safety, and the freedom of employees to associate, and collective bargaining.33 
It is the complete guide for companies to use in the exercise of their CSR in employment 
                                                        
31
 The text of the MNE Declaration is updated regularly to include references to new instruments adopted 
by the International Labour Conference and the Governing Body that are of relevance to the issues it covers. 
The most recent update was in March 2006, available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/WCMS_094386/lang--en/index.htm, last accessed on 12 October 
2013; see also International Instruments and Corporate Social Responsibility supra note 2, 13. 
32
 See MNE Declaration, General Policy, supra note 31, paragraphs 8-12. 
33
 See International Instruments and Corporate Social Responsibility, see supra note 2, 13-17. 
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in corporate governance, and tells employees what rights and priorities should be ensured 
in employment relations. 
 
The UN Global Compact came about after companies had recognized the need to 
collaborate and partner with governments, civil society, labour and the UN.34 As pointed 
out in Chapter 2, the UN Global Compact generates ten universal principles in the fields 
of human rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption, and the core of the network 
is the Global Compact Office and six UN specialized agencies.35  Among the ten 
principles, the topics on human rights and labour are closely related to achieving CSR in 
employment relations. Distinguished from other international initiatives in CSR, the UN 
Global Compact invites companies to join formally, no matter the size or form of the 
company. The company only needs to send a letter from the CEO of the UN Global 
Compact (and endorsed by the board of directors) to the UN Secretary-General 
expressing support for the UN Global Compact and its principles, and set in motion 
changes to business operations so that the compact and its principles become part of the 
strategy, culture and day-to-day operations.36 The UN Global Compact does not police or 
control corporate operation in CSR through any detailed initiatives or guidelines, but 
requires companies to broadly commit the ten principles in different activities and events 
                                                        
34
 Overview of UN Global Compact, available at: 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html, last accessed on 12 April 2013. 
35
 The six UN specialized agencies are the (i) United Nations High Commission on Human Rights 
(hereinafter ‘UNHCHR), (ii) ILO, (iii) United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), (iv) United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), (v) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and 
(vi) United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). 
36
 Business participation of UN Global Compact, available at: 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/HowToParticipate/Business_Participation/index.html, last accessed on 12 
April 2013. Sample letter to participate in the UN Global Compact is also available at: 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/how_to_participate_doc/Business_Commitment_Letter.pdf, last 
accessed on 12 April 2013. 
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globally and locally by implementation, disclosure and promotion.37 Additionally, the 
compact is a collaboration between governments, employer organizations, workers 
organizations, civil society organizations and academia. It will more effectively and 
broadly improve and encourage the achievement of CSR, especially in employee 
protection, within entire and specific aspects.  
 
3.2.3 Employee engagement 
 
Stakeholder engagement is a vital aspect in CSR that is recommended in AA1000, which 
a few select companies had adopted as a strategy in employee involvement.38 According 
to CSR in the labour dimension, it is essential to give employees access to engage in CSR 
in corporate governance so that employers are able to communicate and obtain authentic 
feedback from employees.  
 
OECD guidelines stress the effective recognition of employees’ rights to collective 
bargaining and workers’ representatives or trade unions, which are voluntary 
organizations that employees are able to consult, negotiate with, and bring grievances and 
disputes to, through representatives.39 It is a huge project for a corporate board to get 
information from individual employees, so employers communicate with workers’ 
                                                        
37
 See Overview of UN Global Compact, see supra note 34. 
38
 AA1000 Stakeholder Engagement Standard 2011 (the final draft), available at: 
http://www.accountability.org/images/content/3/6/362/AA1000SES%202010%20PRINT.PDF, last 
accessed on 12 November 2012. 
39
 Collective bargaining is a process of negotiations between employers and a group of employees aimed at 
reaching agreements that regulate working conditions. The interests of the employees are commonly 
represented by representatives of a trade union that belong to employees. In the UK Trade Union and 
Labour Relations Act 1992, trade union is defined as ‘an organization to deal with the relation between 
whole or part of workers (or workers’ representatives) and employers (employers’ association)’. See UK 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 Ch. 52; see also International Instruments and 
Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 2, 13; see also MNE Declaration, supra note 31. 
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representatives to solve any matter with employees through such organizations within the 
company, industry, nationally or internationally.  
 
ACAS provides a code of practice on discipline; grievances, including on how to raise a 
grievance; a whistle-blowing policy to report wrongdoings at work; and on how 
employers should proceed with a grievance hearing and resolve disputes. 40  If an 
employee is not satisfied with the resolution of his or her grievance, he or she can appeal 
but should inform the employer of the reasons for the appeal without unreasonable delay 
and in writing. The employee has the right to be accompanied at the appeal meeting, and 
the outcome of the appeal should be given to the employee in writing without delay. 
 
More than 70% of companies use the instructions as a basis to introduce numerous 
policies and voluntary initiatives to achieve employee engagement, in order to efficiently 
remove the gap and dispute in relationships of employment. In terms of the published 
information, companies carry out a series of measures to implement employee 
engagement, such as a whistle-blowing policy, annual face-to-face interview, employee 
questionnaires or polls. This is the primary and most up-to-date information from 
employees regarding their advice and opinion on corporate governance and CSR. 
 
3.2.4 Information disclosure and monitoring 
 
Information disclosure is the access stakeholders and the public have to information on 
how companies achieve CSR in corporate governance, and it includes reporting on CSR 
in employment. In this area there is a regulatory requirement about voluntary reporting on 
                                                        
40
 ACAS Code of Practice on Discipline and Grievance, April 2009, available at: 
http://www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/k/b/Acas_Code_of_Practice_1_on_disciplinary_and_grievance_procedu
res-accessible-version-Jul-2012.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014. 
Chapter 3: United Kingdom Companies’ Corporate Social Responsibility in Employment: Case Studies 
© C. YUN 191
the workplace and through recommended initiatives. For instance, nearly 25% of 
companies explicitly provided information in CSR reports about the use of Reporting of 
Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (hereinafter ‘RIDDOR’) 
which is the law that forces employers and other people who are in control of work 
premises to report and keep record of work-related deaths, serious injuries, cases of 
diagnosed industrial disease, and certain dangerous occurrences within the UK.41 This 
regulation is to ensure that employers collect the minimum amount of information for 
further checks on the protection of safety and prevention of occupational diseases. It is a 
valuable tool to assist in risk assessment and the improvement of solutions to potential 
risk in the workplace. 
 
Additionally, many companies have adopted the GRI as the fundamental framework to 
report on CSR in employment through voluntary approaches. GRI is the reporting 
guideline on economic, environmental and social performance through sustainable 
reports, CSR reports or annual financial reports with respect to civil society, labour, the 
environment, human rights and so on.42 GRI also verifies the completion of information 
in reports through the paid-service GRI Application Level Check43, and free-charge 
                                                        
41
 Health and Safety Executive, Reporting Accidents and Incidents at Work: A Brief Guide to the 
Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR), available at: 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/indg453.pdf, last accessed on 19 November 2013. 
42
 The GRI guideline is being developed and the latest generation is G4; all information is available at: 
https://www.globalreporting.org/Pages/default.aspx, last accessed on 19 November 2013  
43
 There are three levels, Levels A, B and C, in the GRI Report Template, which are (i) advanced, (ii) 
intermediate and (iii) entry level respectively. Level C is intended for entry-level reporting organizations. 
For this level, there is no need to report on a set of the Profile Disclosures (1.1; 2.1-2.10; 3.1-3.8; 3.10-3.12; 
4.1-4.4; 4.14-4.15). It is not necessary to report on the Disclosures on Management Approach (hereinafter 
‘DMAs’), but the company should report fully on at least ten key performance indicators, either core or 
additional, including at least one from each Indicator Dimension (i.e., Economic, Environmental and 
Social), available at: https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/G3.1-Application-Levels.pdf, last 
accessed on 8 March 2014; see also GRI Application Levels: All You Need to Know, available at: 
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service Sustainability Disclosure Database that the GRI provides so that companies can 
self-examine their CSR performance. Companies merely upload their company GRI with 
a self-declared level of application, and the GRI application level check and the system 
will verify whether the report contains the required set and number of disclosures to meet 
the organization’s self-declared application level.44 If incomplete information is found in 
a report, the GRI will inform the company that it needs to improve the relevant statement 
and enhance the quality or accuracy of the report.45 
 
The UN Global Compact also requires all voluntarily registered companies to disclose 
their implementation of Global Compact principles through their annual reports, 
sustainability reports, or other published reports. The UN Global Compact will monitor 
the quality and authenticity of the report, which should reflect the practical actions that 
employers have taken to carry out the principles of the UN Global Compact in the 
previous fiscal year, and evaluation of outcomes or expected outcome using applicable 
indicators.46 
 
An effective reporting system is needed to provide records on, and reference to, the 
monitoring system that is aimed at auditing companies’ authentic performance and the 
effect of CSR in corporate governance as the reporting system exposes any wrongdoing 
in decision-making and operations. The process is implemented through internal 
monitoring by stakeholders and external auditing by third-party organizations 
respectively. The data collected for research purposes indicated that most of the CSR 
                                                                                                                                                                     
https://www.globalreporting.org/information/news-and-press-center/Pages/Application-Levels-all-you-need
-to-know.aspx, last accessed on 8 March 2014. 
44
 See GRI Sustainability Disclosure Database, supra note 43. 
45
 See GRI Application Level Check, supra note 43. 
46
 See Overview of UN Global Compact, supra note 34. 
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reports were accompanied by an effective monitoring system to ensure the validity and 
authenticity of companies’ exercise of CSR and the CSR report itself. 
 
Most companies published manuals, codes of conduct and reports on a public website or 
Intranet on how they protect employees’ rights and perform CSR in the labour dimension. 
Employees can directly examine their employer’s performance in CSR through routine 
work which will be an accurate and objective evaluation of whether employers acted 
according to their code of conduct as stated in their reports. In the research it was found 
that more than 75% of companies had adopted an independent audit through third-party 
assurance companies or external verification by professional organizations, so that the 
quality of the report and relevant performance would be ensured and evaluated 
objectively.  
 
Besides the use of the UN Global Compact and GRI Index, UK industries also provide a 
service to monitor companies’ performance of CSR in employment with respect to 
different aspects. For example, CCS’s monitor will assess the registered companies’ 
performance against the scheme’s Company Code of Considerate Practice, and offer 
guidance and suggestions on how to perform to a higher level. All companies publishing 
their registration in CSR reports will be controlled and monitored by the CCS mechanism 
and if the company’s performance satisfies the monitoring standard, it will be awarded 
the CCS Certificate of Registration.47 
 
3.3 Methodology 
 
                                                        
47
 The monitoring is limited within the registered companies or worksite in CCS Scheme. Information 
about CCS monitoring is available at: 
http://www.ccscheme.org.uk/index.php/company-registration-com/how-to-be-considerate-company/monito
ring-company, last accessed on 18 September 2013. 
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The analysis above illustrates the ways in which CSR is practised and different aspects of 
it in employment that are directly backed up by 90 CSR reports.48 This chapter explores 
how UK companies exercise CSR to employees through demonstrated initiatives and 
beyond them. Since it is impossible to collect primary data from a huge number of 
companies through interviews or focus groups, the database in this thesis dependent 
entirely on companies’ information disclosure in their CSR report, sustainability report, 
annual report and the like. The data obtained from the published reports of the companies 
studied are divided into five sectors, namely (i) health and safety, (ii) equality, (iii) 
training and development, (iv) fair payment, and (v) employee engagement. On the basis 
on information disclosure, effective monitoring will be the vital factor to judge the 
authenticity and reliability of the CSR reports in each column. The comparison and 
analysis of 90 CSR reports with respect to how UK companies improve CSR in 
employment will be approached from two directions (Table 1). 
 
The first approach is the so-called divisional comparison to set up companies as the 
variable and separately compare them in individual divisions (i.e., health and safety; 
equality; training and development; welfare and fair payment; employee engagement; and 
reporting and monitoring). Among the six divisions, first five issues will be individually 
analysed through examples to present how companies exercised CSR in corporate 
governance. According to the last division, an analysis of reporting and monitoring is 
included in every divisional comparison as the main standard to evaluate the quality of 
companies’ information disclosure and CSR performance. For each of the first five 
aspects, four companies in total were selected as examples, two for good and two for bad, 
which is reflected only through the selected CSR information disclosure. In this model 
                                                        
48
 Among the 100 companies selected, there are 10 companies with little information on CSR or 
information that is not applicable to CSR, (i.e., Burberry, Glencore and Intercontinental Hotel), so that CSR 
reports of these companies were not available. The total number of researched reports used in this thesis is 
90.  
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there is no objective scoring of companies’ information disclosure, so that the examples 
do not refer to the quality of reports as being or good or bad. It is relatively easy to 
distinguish extremely good or bad CSR reports from one another, but difficult to rank a 
number of reports without an objective standard to score the CSR precisely in different 
aspects; in other words, information disclosure in individual companies will also be 
judged subjectively by varied users. As in the KPMG analysis, due to the lack of a 
regulatory sustainability reporting standard, it was observed that consistent and accessible 
information on CSR was problematic.49 Moreover, with respect to the exercise of CSR in 
employment, it is not as quantified as the performance of CSR in the environment or 
charity that can be evaluated through quantified standards. For example, the achievement 
of CSR in the environment can be evaluated directly through a series of numbers, such as 
the regulatory amount of pollutant emission. However, to some extent, there is no 
objective standard in the exercise of CSR in employment, namely how many hours of 
training should be provided to employees, or how many employees had been involved in 
employee engagement per year. Therefore, it is difficult to score the performance of CSR 
towards employees objectively through quantified data. In these circumstances the index 
of positive CSR towards employees depends on companies’ reports which provide 
detailed information on how companies performed in specific factors, and necessarily 
adopts the independent monitoring of CSR reports to ensure the validity and authenticity 
that can be screened by the public. Unsatisfactory CSR achievement reporting is due to 
lack of detailed and understandable information, and effective monitoring mechanism to 
improve the credibility of the CSR report. 
 
                                                        
49
 KPMG Press, Corporate Responsibility Reporting Hits All-time High but Lacks Financial Reporting 
Rigour, available at: 
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Press-releases/Lists/Expired/corp
orate-responsibility-reporting.aspx, last accessed on 19 September 2013.  
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The second approach is the so-called comprehensive comparison to take the six divisions 
as variables and place them entirely in the same company. Through the comprehensive 
comparison among reports on CSR, the analysis provides good and bad examples 
according to the respective achievements of CSR towards employees as a whole in 
respect of their interests in the five categories not only on the basis of legal regulation, 
but also through voluntary initiatives. Good CSR reports containing descriptions in the 
first five issues also reflected a valid reporting and monitoring system to ensure that the 
information and data in the report were reliable. In terms of the comprehensive 
comparison, the standard of required information in the CSR reports was simpler and 
only depended on the available information provided in each column. If the report 
fulfilled the requirements of a detailed description in terms of the five dimensions with 
qualified reporting method and effective audit, it would be defined as a good-quality 
report; while if the CSR report only provided information on fewer than three aspects in a 
brief statement, it would be treated as bad-quality reporting. Among the good-quality 
published reports, the one with the most comprehensive statement and reliable 
monitoring system was selected as an example of good reporting in this chapter. 
 
3.4 Divisional comparison 
 
In this section the examples of information reported were compared based on divisional 
comparisons among 90 companies and the information was analysed in terms of each 
aspect, including health and safety, human rights, training and development, fair payment, 
and employee engagement, with approaches of information disclosure and monitoring. 
Positive and negative examples will present how companies sufficiently or inadequately 
achieved their CSR in employment in every sector, complying with minimum legal 
standards and advanced voluntary initiatives. 
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3.4.1 Health and safety 
 
In the division of the 90 CSR reports, the issue of health and safety is reflected in all 
reports although to a different extent. In this section two examples will demonstrate, in 
terms of CSR reports, how companies achieve CSR in respect of health and safety in 
employment, including compliance with laws, the health and safety executive, reporting 
and auditing. Two negative cases will illustrate the shortcomings when companies 
implement CSR in health and safety through reported information. 
 
3.4.1.1 Examples of good reporting 
 
i Redrow PLC 
 
Redrow PLC (hereinafter ‘Redrow’) is one of the UK’s top residential and mixed-use 
property developers, aiming to be the developer of choice for customers, employees, 
landowners, suppliers, subcontractors and investors. The company believes that it has a 
good reputation for imaginative design, build quality and customer service, with the 
qualified skills needed to complete a wide range of developments; from large greenfield 
sites to complex brownfield regeneration schemes. Its success is based on acquiring and 
adding value to land for the benefit of investors, customers, employees and suppliers, as 
well as for the good of local communities. Redrow tries to maintain environments where 
people want to live or work, and can appreciate and enjoy their surroundings.50 
 
                                                        
50
 Redrow is aiming at leadership through qualified action. The relevant information and introduction of 
Redrow PLC can be found on the company’s website, available at: 
http://www.redrowplc.co.uk/About-Redrow/Company-Activities/, last accessed on 12 March 2013. 
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Redrow not only publishes its CSR report annually, but also extended its CSR to specific 
annual reports in terms of different issues, such as a health and safety annual report, and a 
diversity annual report. According to the latest Redrow Health and Safety Annual Report 
2011, as house builder and construction company, it established the Safety Law in Action 
to comply with all UK safety laws as the minimum standard of CSR.51 The regulations in 
the UK government department of Health, Safety and the Environment were broadly used, 
namely CDM Regulations 2007, Work at Height Regulations 2007, Manual Handling 
Operations Regulations 1992 and Workplace Transport Guidance.52  It is said that 
compliance with the relevant health and safety standards highlights the guidance and 
advice about false behaviour and consequences, such as fines or other penalty. That will 
give the general and basic notion about how to implement health and safety policies for 
employees in an architectural company. 
 
Moreover, Redrow applied the Home Builder Federation (hereinafter ‘HBF’) Health and 
Safety Charter to achieve the aim of the charter, which is ‘safe by design, safe to 
construct, safe to live in, and safe to maintain’ through the Action Plan, which provided 
detail to support the overall aim of the HBF Charter.53 Using the industrial aim of health 
                                                        
51
 Redrow Health & Safety Annual Report 2011, available at: 
http://www.redrowplc.co.uk/images/file/HS%20Report%202010-11(2).pdf, last accessed on 17 February 
2013. 
52
 See CDM Regulations 2007, supra note 19; see also Work at Height Regulations 2007, supra note 16; 
The Manual Handling Operations Regulations 1992 requires an employer to carry out a risk assessment on 
all manual handling tasks that pose an injury risk. The employer’s duty is to avoid manual handling as far 
as reasonably practicable if there is a possibility of injury. The Manual Handling Assessment Chart is used 
to assess the risks posed by lifting, lowering, carrying and team manual handling activities, available at: 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/msd/backpain/employers/mhor.htm, last accessed on 19 January 2013; Workplace 
Transport Guidance includes a series of instructions about transport at work, including Delivery Safely, 
Preventing Slips, Trips and Falls from Vehicles and etc., available at: 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/tranindx.htm., last accessed on 19 January 2013. 
53
 Home Builders Federation (hereinafter ‘HBF’) is the voice of the home-building industry in England and 
Wales, and represents member interests on a national and regional level to create the best possible climate 
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and safety as a basis, the Action Plan would precisely arrange the activities in routine 
work to ensure health and safety in the workplace through a voluntary CSR approach. 
 
In Redrow, health and safety executives set up a Health and Safety Team to create a 
health and safety policy; organize health and safety training; and to manage all health and 
safety issues. Health and Safety Committees were established at both divisional and 
group level to highlight health and safety problems, provide solutions and communicate 
relevant issues to employees.54 
 
In the 2011 reporting year, in order to work correctly and provide complete protection, 
the Health and Safety Team implemented respiratory protective equipment (hereinafter 
‘RPE’) and supplied a face piece which matches each individual worker’s face.55 The 
face-fit testing and RPE selection process were carried out by competent people who had 
been trained by the Health and Safety Laboratory. Redrow had also arranged medical 
tests on forklift truck operators that were aged over 40 years to ensure that they were fit 
to drive. In this year 51 operators were medically examined and all were competent to 
work and declared fit by the external specialists.56 
 
In addition, Apprentice Safety Awareness Training is one of the main missions of the 
Health and Safety Team. The apprentice programme would intensify safety awareness 
with respect to the moral and legal reasons for health and safety; accident statistics; risk 
assessment on construction sites; employees’ duties under laws and companies’ policy; 
                                                                                                                                                                     
in which they can deliver the homes needed. The HBF Health and Safety Charter was launched in May 
2004 . It should be supported by an action plan in companies, available at: 
http://www.hbf.co.uk/policy-activities/news/browse/1/view/health-and-safety-charter/?encryptionKey=&tx
_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=2265&cHash=89b8cb43cc, last accessed on 19 January 2013.  
54
 Redrow Health & Safety Annual Report 2011, supra note 51. 
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health and safety hazards; and relevant protection.57  Apprentice Safety Awareness 
Training is an effective approach to letting people who enter the construction industry for 
the first time know what the health and safety issues and crises in the workplace are, 
teaching them to avoid harm due to omission and incorrect operation.58 
 
Furthermore, the Health and Safety Team hosted Safety Awareness Days involving 
directors and Health and Safety Alerts to communicate with both top executives and 
employees about health and safety issues.59 This initiative enabled the Director of Health 
and Safety to spend sufficient time discussing, highlighting and solving vital health and 
safety topics at work. The staff, in turn, would be advised and warned according to major 
and potential health and safety issues. 
 
In the system of health and safety reporting, Redrow strictly complied with RIDDDOR 
and adopted the Group accident potential rate (hereinafter ‘APR’) and the Group accident 
incidence rate (hereinafter ‘AIR’) as its key performance indicators (hereinafter ‘KPIs’).60 
The reports also compared the rates with previous data and analysed the nature of 
accidents. Redrow noted in its report that ‘unfortunately, our AIR is above the HBF’s all 
builder average for this period, this is the first time this has happened in the five years 
HBF have been providing sector figures.’61 The reports were objective, and did not 
blindly present the company’s health and safety achievement. In addition, Redrow 
disclosed information about the cost of accidents and compared it with previous numbers 
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 The data can be found in Redrow Health & Safety Annual Report 2011, supra note 51. The report does 
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and the average cost of accidents reported to the British Safety Council, which is another 
index to reflect the accident rate in companies. 
 
According to the reporting and achievement of CSR in respect of health and safety in 
employment, Redrow accepted both internal and external auditing by corporate and 
public executives. Within the company, the Health and Safety Improvement Scheme was 
used to evaluate the effectiveness of the health and safety management systems that could 
be audited by all divisions and staff during the whole year. All potential risks, and 
unhealthy and unsafe behaviour during work could be reported to the Health and Safety 
Team. Outside the company, all reportable accidents, including the APR and AIR were 
notified to the Health and Safety Executive under RIDDOR, so that the authenticity of the 
accident reports would be monitored by the health and safety executive. 
 
ii G4S PLC 
 
G4S PLC (hereinafter ‘G4S’) is a British multinational security services company 
headquartered in Crawley that specialises in outsourced business processes and facilities 
in sectors where security and safety risks are considered a strategic threat, with expertise 
in the assessment and management of security and safety risks for buildings, 
infrastructure, materials, valuables and people.62 The security services are provided for 
cash solutions; government solutions and non-governmental solutions, including securing 
the delivery of government services and premises at home and abroad; protecting critical 
supply chains and crucial national assets; ensuring the safety of travellers and the 
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 The introduction of G4S is published on company’s official website, available at: 
http://www.g4s.com/en/Who%20we%20are/, last accessed on 4 May 2014. 
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efficiency of the international transport system; optimising the cash cycle; assuring the 
customer experience and so on.63 
 
G4S’s 2011 CSR Report did not reflect detailed compliance with national laws, but 
generally stated that the company had completely adopted all health and safety laws 
nationally and internationally. It alleged that it had fulfilled its corporate duty under 
health and safety legislations to avoid risk to employees, customers and the public. 
Legislation regarding the prohibition of alcohol and drugs in the workplace was 
especially stressed in its health and safety management. In G4S, Occupational Health and 
Safety Advisory Services (hereinafter ‘OHSAS’) 18001 was applied in issues of health 
and safety management and its risk management system; and the Secure Solutions (UK), 
Integrated Services (for the Met Office site) and Utility Services businesses integrated 
OHSAS18001 in the company’s system of operation.64 Using the national guideline as a 
basis, G4S also set up the equivalent health and safety management systems in its Cash 
business. OHSAS18001 has become the internal assessment standard for the robustness 
of the company’s health and safety management systems. 
 
As the largest employer on the London Stock Exchange, G4S’s health and safety goals 
are to maintain positive relationships when interacting with the public; reduce slips, trips 
and falls at work; reduce risks to drivers out on the road; maintain safety in custodial and 
detention environments; and to mitigate the risks of working in complex environments.65 
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 Ibid. 
64
 OHSAS is a British standard for occupational health and safety management systems. It exists to help all 
kinds of organizations put in place demonstrably sound occupational health and safety performance. It is 
widely seen as the world’s most recognized occupational health and safety management systems standard. 
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last accessed on 13 March 2013. 
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In 2011 G4S formed the Risk Committee that meets with the board of directors twice a 
year to discuss and analyse the management of risk, and the quality of corporate 
governance in health and safety in detail.66 Communication between the health and 
safety executive and the board would give access to the shortcomings in health and safety 
management, and improve the relevant policy when making decisions. 
 
G4S offers varied secure solutions in different fields, and the company tries to stamp out 
violence at work with the Violence at Work Policy, stating that it would not tolerate 
violence in anyone’s occupation and non-consensual violence against its employees.67 
Therefore, G4S implemented Enhanced Physical Intervention (hereinafter ‘EPI’) training 
for its Secure Solution employees who were regarded as being most at risk of violence at 
work. The CSR Report noted that the frequency of violence involving Secure Solution 
employees reduced from 0.914 to 0.501 between 2009 and 2011.68 G4S also made a huge 
investment in an overall pavement protection system to provide specially fitted body 
armour that is manufactured in the UK and meets the needs of security professionals by 
providing protection against knives, spikes, bullets and blunt trauma. The body armour 
thus prevents serious injury in armed attacks.69 
 
G4S adopted the RIDDOR reporting system to publish the injury and risk of health and 
safety at work. The health and safety report was audited by the British Safety Council and 
National Security Inspectorate. G4S won the BSC Five Star Award in 2011 after the audit, 
which provides a detailed and objective evaluation of a company’s health and safety 
                                                                                                                                                                     
available at: http://www.g4s.com/~/media/Files/CSR%20Reports/G4S_CSRR11.ashx, last accessed on 13 
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management system, pointing out the strengths and weakness in its system and offering a 
systematic approach to continual improvement.70 Moreover, the CSR Report stated that 
the health and safety management system of G4S Secure Solution was awarded gold 
approval by the NSI as third-party verification.71 This was in recognition of the efforts 
taken by the company to ensure regular and accredited training for G4S managers, 
effective risk assessments and authentic reporting of incidents. 
 
Internal supervision was broadened among employees through the positive action 
introduced that any visible or potential violence or risk in any form in the workplace 
could be reported to the health and safety executives by employees, so that the threat of 
health and safety at work would be easier to discover and avoided in its corporate 
operations. However, compared with the CSR Report of Redrow, G4S lacks an external 
audit to objectively evaluate the performance of CSR towards employees in respect of 
health and safety in the workplace.  
 
3.4.1.2  Examples of bad reporting 
 
Among the 90 CSR reports, there are two examples of CSR reports that did not reflect 
complete and detailed information on the issue of health and safety, namely Rolls-Royce 
PLC and Great Portland Estates PLC. The CSR reports of these two companies published 
a general statement about how they achieved their CSR in respect of health and safety 
policy in employment, but not the precise implementation of the individual aspects, such 
as how they complied with legal minimum standards. 
 
i Rolls-Royce PLC 
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Rolls-Royce Limited is a world-famous English car- and aero-engine-manufacturing 
company founded by Charles Steward Rolls and Sir Federick Henry Royce on 15 March 
1906 as the result of a partnership formed in 1904. In 1971 Rolls-Royce was crippled by 
the costs of developing the advanced jet engine, resulting in the nationalization of the 
company as Rolls-Royce (1971) Limited. In 1973 the car division was separated from the 
parent company as Rolls-Royce Motors. Rolls-Royce (1971) Limited continued as a 
nationalized company until it was privatized in 1987 as Rolls-Royce PLC (hereinafter 
‘Rolls-Royce’).72 Rolls-Royce generally discloses information on sustainability in the 
Rolls-Royce Annual Report. However, the presentation of sustainability does not cover 
the issue of employees’ health and safety at work. The relevant reporting is published on 
Rolls-Royce’s official website in the form of a health, safety and the environment 
(hereinafter ‘HSE’) policy. 
 
First, on its website, Rolls-Royce set up the goal of achieving health and safety at work, 
including creating a safe and healthy working environment with no injury, no 
work-related ill-health, no environmental incidents; and preventing or minimizing the 
negative impacts of its products and services.73 In this regard, both employers and 
employees are expected to implement effective action to ensure healthy and safe working 
conditions and manufacturing environment; and to avoid any accident or injury in the 
workplace.  
 
Second, Rolls-Royce stated that the company would set up high standards for HSE in 
answer to the relevant regulatory requirement for best practices; manage HSE issues and 
                                                        
72
 An overview of Rolls-Royce is published on the official website, available at: 
http://www.rolls-royce.com/about/whatwedo/, last accessed on 29 May 2014. 
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 The Rolls-Royce HSE Policy, available at: 
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impacts throughout its corporate operation and drive continual improvement; integrate 
HSE into business conduct and processes; ensure employees have HSE training and 
access to health and safety professionals; and get feedback and opinion from stakeholders 
in order to improve HSE.74 
 
According to Rolls-Royce’s information disclosure, it introduced the goal of attaining 
employees’ health and safety at work in brief bullet points which lacked precise 
description of how it achieved this in practice. Compared with the good reporting 
examples cited above, Rolls-Royce did not present what the company had implemented 
in terms of employees’ health and safety in relation to the standards in its HSE Policy. 
Moreover, although Rolls-Royce’s Annual Report was verified through external audit by 
KPMG, the independent audit only referred to the reported information in the Annual 
Report. The HSE Policy and standards were not audited by third-party verification, with 
the result that the quality and reliability of information disclosure in respect of 
employees’ health and safety could be doubted. 
 
ii Great Portland Estates PLC 
 
Another example of bad reporting is Great Portland Estates PLC (hereinafter ‘Great 
Portland’) which is a British property development and investment company, listed on the 
London Stock Exchange and featured on the FTSE 250 Index. The company is based in 
London and the great majority of its assets are in London. It mainly owns office buildings, 
with a smaller amount of retail property.75 As in the case of Rolls-Royce instead of a 
specific CSR report on health and safety issues, Great Portland also generally published 
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related information on its company website. As a big property and investment company 
which owns many buildings, although it aims to maintain a high standard of health and 
safety, and reduce the risk and harm not only to its customers, but also its employees, it 
had not clearly stated its CSR performance relevant to the health and safety of employees. 
 
Great Portland disclosed its health and safety policy on its website. It reads as follows: 
‘Great Portland acknowledges and accepts its legal responsibilities for securing the health, 
safety and welfare of all of its employees, of contractors working on premises over which 
it has control, of visiting members of the public, and all others affected by their 
activities.76 Furthermore, the ‘Board of Directors is committed to ensuring the health and 
safety of Company employees and all those affected by its activities as far as is 
reasonably practicable. The Company recognizes that current legislation is the minimum 
standard to which all objectives should be set and will strive to ensure that relevant 
Legislation, Approved Codes of Practice and Health and Safety Executive Guidance 
Notes are met.77  
 
Except for the statement in its health and safety policy, there is no relevant illustration of 
how company executives complies with the Approved Codes of Practice, legislation and 
Health and Safety Executive Guidance, and with which laws and codes of practice the 
company conformed. It did not make the CSR report on health and safety particular to 
Great Portland, because any company could allege the adoption of legislation or codes of 
practice. 
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Moreover, the company did not mention any issue with respect to the reporting of 
accidents and injury at work, and auditing of corporate operations in health and safety to 
employees. Reporting is defective if companies’ CSR report lacks a reporting mechanism, 
so that the public is unable to get access to information on the company. As mentioned in 
previous chapters, information disclosure is one of the main aspects in CSR. Therefore, 
weak reporting on health and safety in the workplace indicates that CSR in the case of 
Great Portland is incomplete. In addition, how health and safety operations are monitored 
externally and internally is not known from Great Portland’s description. If the company 
was not monitored by a third party or stakeholders, the authenticity of corporate action 
and reportable data would be challenged, because it is impossible to obtain information 
about how and what the company has exercised to safeguard the health and safety of its 
employees in the workplace. 
 
3.4.2 Human rights 
 
According to the research conducted into 90 CSR reports, the issue of human rights is 
demonstrated in more than 98% of reports, although to a different extent. In this section, 
two examples will be used to demonstrate, in terms of CSR reports, how companies 
achieve CSR in terms of human rights in employment, including compliance with laws, 
human rights executives, reporting and auditing. Two cases will illustrate the shortcoming 
when companies implement CSR in human rights through report information. A large 
number of ILO Conventions are adopted as the basis for the voluntary implementation of 
human rights, namely the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 
98), 1949; Forced Labour Convention (No. 29), 1930; Abolition of Forced Labour 
Convention (No. 105), 1957; Minimum Age Convention (No. 138), 1973; Worst Forms of 
Child Labour Convention (No. 182), 1999; Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100), 
1951; and Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (No. 111), 1958. 
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3.4.2.1 Examples of good reporting 
 
i Pentland PLC 
 
Pentland PLC (hereinafter ‘Pentland’) ‘was founded in the early 1930s in Liverpool, 
England. It was then called the Liverpool Shoe Company because it dealt purely in shoes; 
first as a wholesale shoe business, then expanding into a manufacturing business. Always 
displaying innovation and creativity, Pentland was one of the first companies to 
manufacture from Asia, forming a division in Hong Kong in the early 1960s.’78 In terms 
of Pentland’s history, the company had invested heavily in the Asian market due to the 
low-cost labour available, especially in China, India, the Philippines and so on. Among 
the multinational companies that manufactured in developing countries, the abuse of 
human rights, to some extent, occurred, namely in respect of overtime work, child labour, 
poor working conditions and so forth. 79  Pentland published annual Corporate 
Responsibility Reviews that show complete protection of employees’’ human rights, both 
at home and abroad. The human rights policy could be summarized through CR Review 
to support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights; to make 
sure that employees are not complicit in human rights abuses; to uphold the freedom of 
association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; to eliminate 
all forms of forced and compulsory labour; and to uphold the effective abolition of child 
labour. 
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In Pentland’s CSR Review there was little statement regarding compliance with the legal 
minimum standard in UK legislation. It only mentions that all legal requirements about 
employment of migrant workers should be met. However, the CSR reviews recorded the 
adoption of various international conventions to regulate human rights related to 
employees.80 Based on the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (1966),81 Pentland realized that it needed to balance employees’ rights at work 
and rights to family life, and took part in a Work-Life Balance Action programme in 
Asia.82 The company applied ILO 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organize to support employee participating in trade union activities and 
collective bargaining. 83  Moreover, ILO Child Labour Conventions were used by 
Pentland to protect child labour and forbid the violation of human rights.84 
 
With respect to human rights management, the company offered various solutions that 
were reported in its CSR reviews. Its CSR Review 2009 stated that each office in the 
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 The actions of safeguarding human rights were reported in Pendland CR Review 2009, available at: 
http://www.pentland.com/_resources/files/downloads/communications/2009-corporate-responsibility- 
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Asian area had organized activities to balance labourers’ work and life, such as a flexible 
lunch break, leaving work on time, neck and shoulder massages, healthy fruit baskets and 
morning yoga classes.85 In order to improve employees’ communication, they were 
encouraged to join trade unions and labour organizations. For example, by the end of 
2009, Pentland had six labour suppliers in China, so that it co-operated with the suppliers 
and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (hereinafter ‘ACFTU’), which is the sole 
legal workers’ organization in China, to support workers entering affiliated unions and 
strengthen the representative structure. 86  Additionally, Pentland made an effort to 
eliminate discrimination against migrant workers and homeworkers in developing 
countries, because the rights of migrant workers and cheap homeworkers were sometimes 
overlooked. The company ensured that its workers were treated equally, legally and 
properly; that it paid the return travel fares of its pregnant migrant workers; provided 
medical and health treatment to workers; offered accident insurance and social security; 
and so on.87 Furthermore, Pentland’s human rights management concerned three main 
areas of child labour: (i) young workers in factories between the minimum working age 
and 18 years; (ii) verification of age; and (iii) children working with their families as 
homeworkers. It effectively abolished the abuse of human rights among child labour and 
gradually abolished the use of child labour.88 
 
Corporate action of safeguarding human rights was monitored in Pentland in that the 
diversity and inclusion monitoring system was improved to enhance the collection of 
employee diversity data as part of the company’s recruitment process.89 The monitoring 
                                                        
85
 See Pentland CR Review 2009, supra note 80. 
86
 Ibid. 
87
 Ibid. 
88
 Ibid. 
89
 The diversity monitoring system was reported in CR Review 2011, available at: 
http://www.pentland.com/_resources/files/downloads/pentland-cr-review-2011-ungc-cop.pdf, last accessed 
on 19 June 2013.  
Chapter 3: United Kingdom Companies’ Corporate Social Responsibility in Employment: Case Studies 
© C. YUN 212
system would audit the company’s achievement of human rights to ensure the diversity 
and inclusion among many workers. In addition, Pentland is signatory to the UN Global 
Compact so that, as required, its CR reports were edited on the basis of the ten principles 
of the UN Global Compact and, simultaneously, the authenticity of its CSR report would 
be monitored by the organization. Furthermore, Pentland participated in the World 
Federation of the Sporting Goods Industry (hereinafter ‘WFSGI’) which, as the industrial 
association, monitors members’ sustainable achievement in corporate governance.90 
 
ii Coats PLC 
 
Coats PLC (hereinafter ‘Coats’) was established in the 1750s, and is the world’s leading 
industrial thread and textile crafts business and the largest supplier of sewing thread, with 
operations throughout the world.91 It employs over 20,000 employers in 70 countries 
across six continents. The company serves in the apparel, footwear and accessories 
industries. Technical threads and engineered yarns are comparatively less in need of 
technology, but there is a high demand for labour.92 Therefore, Coats invested in, and 
worked with, many overseas partners, and runs the plants or manufacturers in developing 
countries where the cost of labour is much lower than in the UK.93 As the company owns 
a large number of employees, Coats took serious action to ensure the human rights of its 
workers in the workplace.94 The company provided annual CSR reports to demonstrate 
                                                        
90
 The World Federation of the Sporting Goods Industry is a non-profit organization one of whose 
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its CSR within each financial year. However, the protection of human rights is not 
presented in the company’s CSR report, but in individual human rights statements 
published on its website. 
 
Coats’s human rights statement does not precisely illustrate how the company complied 
with the legal minimum standard in this field. Nevertheless, it employed workers in many 
countries, and so was required to adopt the legal regulations in human rights within the 
legal framework of the respective country in which its labourers worked;95 for example, 
workers have the right to collective presentation. However, the legislation regarding 
collective or trade union presentation is different in different countries. Therefore, 
respecting workers’ rights to associate or join unions should be based on the local legal 
requirement. Within the group, the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
Convention of the Rights of the Child were applied to corporate governance to ensure 
workers’ human rights and to resist the violation of the human rights of child workers.96 
 
In human rights management, Coats’s policy is ‘to encourage all employees to develop 
their potential, skills and abilities, and recognizes its future depends on attracting and 
developing the right calibre of employees. No employee or job applicant will receive less 
favourable treatment on the grounds of race, colour, religion, language, indigenous status, 
caste, nationality, ethnic origin, gender, sexual orientation, marital status, union 
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 Coats PLC Equal Opportunity Statement, available at: 
http://www.coats.com/assets/files/cms/Coats_EqualOpps_web(1).pdf, last accessed on 18 December 2012. 
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membership, political affiliation, age or disability.’97 The safeguarding of human rights is 
mainly reflected in the elimination of discrimination: Coats alleges that it offers a fair 
wage, benefits and equal opportunities to all employees in the company’s human rights 
report on its website. The reported data in 2011 noted that national diversity was found in 
the senior management group (of 105), which has representatives of 25 different 
nationalities. Women were also playing an increasing role, with 18 currently in the senior 
management group (up from 12 in 2011, and 9 in 2010), and a 42% presence in its global 
employee headcount.98 Moreover, Coats held various training sessions for international 
employees which made them aware of the fact that they should be treated with dignity 
respect, honesty, integrity and fairness. The programme also trained workers how to 
avoid harassment and discrimination at work. 
 
Coats applied the GRI to ensure the quality of reported information, together with 
information related to performance indicators and any disclosure items, as well as 
guidance on specific technical topics in reporting. The disclosures and the performance 
data reported meet the requirements of the Global Reporting Initiative's application level 
‘C’.99 In addition to the reporting system, Coats also set up and expanded an internal 
auditing system among employees, especially in China. The CSR Auditor Team in Coats 
China, the accredited Lead Auditors, developed their own CSR Internal Auditor Training 
Programme, using Compliance Practitioners Initiative materials, and sharing their 
experience and knowledge by playing the trainer’s role.100 The internal auditor training 
programme, aimed at enhancing the efficiency of monitoring CSR achievement as a 
whole in corporate governance, ensures that the protection of human rights is contained 
                                                        
97
 See Coats PLC Equal Opportunity Statement, supra note 95.  
98
 Coats statement in Our People, available at: http://www.coats.com/index.asp?pageid=131, last accessed 
on 18 December 2012.  
99
 See GRI Application Level Check, supra note 43. 
100
 See Coats statement in Our People, supra note 98. 
Chapter 3: United Kingdom Companies’ Corporate Social Responsibility in Employment: Case Studies 
© C. YUN 215
in the general goal, so that auditing has become the vital tool used to scrutinize the 
exercise of CSR in a company and examines the truth about the reported CSR statement. 
 
3.4.2.2 Examples of bad reporting 
 
Two examples of companies were selected for the purposes of this research to explain 
that their CSR reports did not publish complete and detailed information on the issue of 
human rights, namely FirstGroup PLC and Kier PLC. The CSR reports in these two 
companies merely noted the general statement that the companies had roughly and 
unilaterally achieved the safeguarding of human rights in CSR in employment, without 
providing precise information on individual aspects, such as how they complied with the 
legal minimum standards, executed executive solutions to safeguard human rights, and 
exercised reporting and auditing systems. 
 
i   FirstGroup PLC 
 
FirstGroup PLC (hereinafter ‘FirstGroup’) is the leading transport operator in the UK and 
North America, is listed on the London Stock Exchange and appears on the FTSE 250 
Index.101 With revenues of over £6.5 billion per annum and approximately 124,000 
employees, it transports more than 2.5 billion passengers every year.102 It is a leading bus 
operator in the UK with a fleet of 8,000 buses, carrying approximately 2.6 million 
passengers every day, that connects a vast number of communities including 40 of the 
UK’s largest towns and cities. It operates approximately a quarter of the UK’s passenger 
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rail network, carrying over 300 million passengers a year, with a balanced portfolio of 
intercity, commuter and regional franchises, and one open access operator.103 
 
As a huge transport operator, the prerequisite for corporate operation is a large number of 
employees, so that safeguarding people’s human rights at work is a vital issue in the 
group’s corporate governance. However, FirstGroup’s exercise of CSR in human rights 
was not presented in detail in its CSR reports. First, for example, in its CSR Report 2012, 
it did not refer to any national or international legal basis to inform its safeguarding of 
human rights. Second, in the same report, the company only emphasized the equal 
opportunities between women and men workers. It said that it ‘recognise[d] the 
under-representation of women in our UK operations and in the boardroom. We aspire for 
20% of Board positions to be filled by women by 2015. Through our succession-planning 
programme, we aim to improve the diversity of representation in our senior management 
positions. This year, women comprised one third of our graduate intake. We are also 
working with Women 1st, a skills sector programme which helps young women develop 
leadership skills.’104 This paragraph is the main description of the company’s CSR 
performance in terms of human rights in its 2012 CSR report. The issues of 
discrimination, child labour and freedom of association were not mentioned at all.  
 
In addition, it was reported that training was only offered to develop supervisors of 
human rights programmes, but no mention was made of the detailed implementation of 
the supervision of human rights. Reporting on performance in ensuring a human rights 
and monitoring mechanism were shortcomings, and rated the reports low in credibility. 
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ii Kier Group PLC 
 
Kier Group PLC (hereinafter ‘Kier’) is a construction, services and property group active 
in building and civil engineering; support services; public and private home-building; 
land development; and the Private Finance Initiative (hereinafter ‘PFI’) that comprises a 
UK-wide network of regional contracting business and major projects expertise in the UK 
and overseas. 105  The Kier Services division provides a full life-cycle service for 
buildings in both the public and private sectors, including reactive and planned building 
maintenance, grounds maintenance and a host of other services.106 It is listed on the 
London Stock Exchange and features on the FTSE 250 Index. 
 
Kier did not formally publish any CSR report. All information in this regard can only be 
found on the company’s website. In terms of reportable CSR data, compared with other 
CSR issues, the company’s statement on human rights is the most incomplete. First, as is 
the case with FirstGroup PLC, it lacks clear reference to minimum legal compliance with 
legislation on human rights, so that it is difficult to know whether the company 
fundamentally protects employees’ human rights as the law requires. Second, the 
reporting information on the safeguarding of human rights was too vague to obtain detail 
on the process. It stated that ‘Kier has worked hard during the past year to take its 
equality and diversity strategy to a new level that exceeds industry standards . . . Our 
strategy statement will relate to our approach on the following areas: age; disability; 
flexible working; gender equality; harassment and bullying; racial equality, supplier 
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diversity; religion and belief; sexual orientation.’107 Through this general information, it 
is impossible to identify how Kier precisely accomplishes human rights in various aspects 
within its corporate governance. Third, the website contains no information on the 
exercise of human rights, which means that the public would not have access to 
knowledge about the true situation related to corporate action in human rights. In the 
open market where information disclosure is taken more seriously, the lack of reportable 
information would make a company unacceptable to, and shunned by, the public.  
 
3.4.3 Training and development 
 
Human resources are closely related to the corporate fate of any company. They can be 
compared to individual components working together in a machine. Therefore, ensuring 
the development and training of employees is not only to achieve CSR, but also to sustain 
the corporate lifecycle. From the research conducted on the 90 CSR reports it is evident 
that all companies implemented all kinds of training and development to broaden their 
employees’ career. Among the reports, not one referred to compliance with laws on this 
issue, because little legislation regulates career development in employment, and any 
training and development is voluntary and depends on companies’ individual 
requirements. Barratt PLC and Orascom Construction PLC published precise information, 
either through reports or on their website to illustrate how they improved their people. 
 
3.4.3.1  Examples of good reporting 
 
i Barratt PLC 
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Barratt PLC (hereinafter ‘Barratt’) was founded in 1958 and is one of the largest 
residential property development companies in the UK.108 It has been listed on the 
London Stock Exchange since 1968 and features on the FTSE 250 Index. It employs a 
large number of employees: in the 12 months to 30 June 2012 only, Barratt directly 
employed over 4,500 people who undertake a variety of roles and skills in order to 
produce residential and commercial developments, ranging from basic workers to sales 
advisers; planners to designers; and construction teams to maintenance group. 109 
Therefore, Barratt provided a series of programmes to develop employees on three levels: 
(i) professional training to workers, (ii) induction and development to apprentice and 
graduates, and (iii) improvement to senior management.110 
 
First, in the Barratt Sustainability Report 2012 the company alleged a real commitment to 
‘succession planning’' and enabling individuals to achieve their career aspiration, namely 
that everyone in the group should get access to learning opportunities in order to build 
their career in the company. 111  Under these circumstances, Barratt Academy was 
established to combine professional training (on site and in the classroom) with 
industry-accepted qualifications that aimed to deliver craft and trade specialists, site 
managers, and people with specialist technical and commercial knowledge.112  The 
Customer Service and Sales Training Programme was designed to support sales advisers 
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in understanding the procedures, policies and regulatory frameworks involved in the 
process; develop their skills and techniques in proactive selling; and gaining commitment 
from their clients.113 The training also allowed the experienced sales advisers to have a 
direct impact on profitability and prepared them to develop into a coaching role.  
 
Second, Barratt also offered apprentices and graduates various courses for training and 
development. The Benchmark course was for newcomers to receive the same welcome, 
the same information and the same opportunity for full and complete induction regardless 
of their role in the company.114 It is an activity-based induction programme designed to 
provide all that individuals need during their first few weeks in the Barratt Group. 
Benchmark has two key elements: the one contains generic activities introducing 
newcomers to Barratt, while the other focuses on the new role and the specific knowledge 
and skills needed to do the job.115 In addition, Barratt innovated an independent website 
to publish training and development opportunities to all people in the company.116 On 
this website, it introduced the programme to graduates who are prepared to take on 
challenging leadership roles in the future and to undergraduates who are given the 
opportunity to work on real projects during vacations.117 It was stated in Sustainability 
Report 2012 that ‘a total of 24 graduates have successfully completed the programme in 
2012. They have all been placed into roles within the business, with some being 
appointed to junior management roles’.118 The training opportunities offered to graduates 
and undergraduates would attract many more potential applicants in future and enhance 
the corporate image in recruitment.  
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Third, Barratt organized different training courses to improve the performance of its 
leadership, the so-called Elevations, Breaking New Management Ground and Paving the 
Leadership Way. Elevations help middle managers step up their skills, knowledge and 
management capability for the future, including setting the Barratt Standard, 
interpersonal skills, organizational skills, and managing change, leadership, coaching for 
success, personal impact making meetings work and behavioural interviewing 
skills.119 This practical training would enhance middle managers’ ability at work and 
increase the competition in higher leadership. Breaking New Management Ground is 
aimed at developing the skills of divisional directors and group heads of department who 
should master skills needed to lead specialist teams. In order to produce leaders at higher 
levels of performance, the modules cover training in the following: managing and leading, 
goal setting and problem solving, positive influencing, self-management, building 
high-performance teams, coaching, and presentations.120 The training in the routine skills 
of leaders would perfect senior managers’ performance and make them more valuable in 
corporate governance. Paving the Leadership Way is a comprehensive career programme 
that focuses on high performance leadership skills and helps senior managers reach even 
higher levels of management.121 It is divided into six parts, including building the 
frameworks of the future, leading with impact, positively influencing, teamworking 
strategically, transition and change, and mentoring.122 According to statistics contained 
in it Sustainability Report 2012, all these courses were delivered to over 600 people 
across the business, which would bring profit to the company, enhance the efficiency of 
the management team, and develop personal careers in and outside the company.123 
                                                        
119
 Ibid. 
120
 Ibid. 
121
 Ibid. 
122
 Ibid. 
123
 Ibid. 
Chapter 3: United Kingdom Companies’ Corporate Social Responsibility in Employment: Case Studies 
© C. YUN 222
 
Although Barratt had established a comprehensive and recommended framework to 
record training and development in the company, the reported information is still flawed 
as information about auditing was not mentioned in the company report or on its public 
website. Unlike in the case of ensuring health and safety or human rights, there are few 
specific organizations who externally monitor whether companies develop employees’ 
skills at work. However, due to the wide range of participation among internal employees 
and external applicants, performance in training and development can be monitored by all 
participants, especially the graduates and undergraduates in public. 
 
ii.     Orascom Construction Industries 
 
Orascom Construction Industries (hereinafter ‘OCI’) is a leading international fertilizer 
producer and construction contractor based in Cairo, Egypt, and is active in more than 25 
countries, including the UK where it is listed on the London Stock Exchange.124 It is one 
of the region’s largest corporations, with projects and investments across Europe, the 
Middle East, North America and North Africa. In the international group, OCI is a large 
employer in the region, with more than 86,000 employees located in 20 different 
countries.125 OCI’s business success is due to its people and their passion, expertise and 
dedication, with the result that the company has opened many opportunities to talented 
and highly motivated graduates and experienced professionals.126 OCI implemented 
specialized programmes to develop its people in their profession and skills. The company 
disclosed CSR information, including employees’ training and development, in its 
corporate annual reports. 
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In its Annual Report 2011 the training budget was reported as amounting to 
US$0.5 million and focused on the following four areas: (i) the training of new 
employees, (ii) improving the performance of experienced employees, (iii) solving 
operational problems and (iv) developing employees for the future.127 It was aimed at 
developing the capabilities and competencies of employees by providing training 
modules that met changing business needs and improved work performance. All training 
programmes were on site and job-related. The company stated that ‘during 2011, the Onsi 
Sawiris Institute for vocational Training partnered with Technische Universität Berlin 
(TU Berlin) to deliver young new talent into the business at an operational level.’128 
Through vocational training, OCI would provide people and the whole business with the 
best possible development opportunities available.  
 
Additionally, the company established the OCI Academy, which was launched in 2009 
and is the internal training organ concentrating on specialized development to employees 
within the company. Data is available to demonstrate how the OCI Academy works in 
training and developing programmes.129  
 
First, the Academy’s Talent Programme, which is a vocational programme aimed at 
engineering graduates with up to two years’ experience working in the field, ‘celebrated 
the graduation of 17 professional engineers who rotated for 27 months through different 
key projects and departments in the Construction Group, based on their individual 
priorities, management guidance and their supervisors’ recommendation’. 130  The 
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programme distributed participants to different working environments, people and 
activities, and helped them to develop a thorough understanding of the business, and 
improve their knowledge and skills.131 Participants would also receive advanced theory 
training and a project management professional diploma. By the end of 2013 another 19 
participants had graduated from the Talent Programme, and a fourth class was 
established. 
 
Second, the summer internship recorded in the annual report offered undergraduate 
engineering students an opportunity to work in OCI during June to August in order to 
obtain practical experience to apply the knowledge they had previously learnt in their 
respective universities. Sixty students were selected to participate in the programme 
during the summer of 2011.132 All students were interviewed and measured against 
corporate junior level competencies. The selected students were allocated to different 
projects and departments relevant to their preferred concentration and evaluated by a 
professional company manager. At the end of their summer internship, students presented 
their experiences and accomplishments during a final ceremony attended by their 
universities and OCI representatives.133 
 
Moreover, the group took responsibility for improving employees’ career in future, and 
not only limited this to the development of professionals or skills. OCI created effective 
solutions that enhanced people’s performance and created value for the company. 
Between 2010 and 2011, the human resources department of OCI, in collaboration with 
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SHL Group Limited,134 designed and implemented a wide range of leadership models 
and competency frameworks for all employees.135 The framework was set up to develop 
the company’s selection, succession planning and performance management practices. It 
was called the ‘Management Development Guides’ and launched in 2011 and defined as 
the leading workplace talent assessment solutions consultant.136 The programme was 
accompanied by a detailed post-assessment professional enhancement guide to employees, 
including career recommendations and training courses, which were offered both in the 
classroom and online. In this regard it was reported that the company’s human resource 
department had assessed 700 candidates, of which 300 were assessed for recruitment 
purposes, and 400 were employees being assessed for development and promotion in 
2011.137 
 
As regards the reported information on CSR in training and development, OCI’s annual 
report did not refer to the auditing system of reporting on this issue. However, the 
Corporate Audit Committee published the Audit Committee Charter, which is 
recommended reading, independently on the company’s website.138 The charter states 
that the company’s management is responsible for compliance with laws, regulations, and 
with the company’s policies and procedures, so that the Audit Committee of the board of 
directors has the duty to audit the performance of the company’s management.139 The 
training and development of employees conformed to the corporate policies and 
operational procedures. Consequently, the Audit Committee is responsible for monitoring 
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the performance with respect to developing people at work.140 Although the quality of 
reporting cannot be audited, to some extent, an internal audit of the real actions in the 
company would ensure the authentic achievement of CSR in training and development. 
 
3.4.3.2   Examples of bad reporting 
 
Compared with the two positive examples that reported comprehensively on CSR in 
training and development, the CSR reports of two companies, namely Berkeley PLC and 
Go Ahead PLC, would be applied as negative examples of these issues. The reports of 
these two companies’ CSR performance in training and development were unilateral, and 
only reflected one or two aspects. In addition, there is no information relevant to 
reporting on, or auditing of, the actions taken or on the report itself. 
 
i Berkeley Group Holdings PLC 
 
Berkeley Group Holdings PLC (hereinafter ‘Berkeley’) is a British home-building 
company based in Cobham, Surrey. It was listed on the London Stock Exchange and 
features on the FTSE 250 Index.141 The Berkeley Group is a leader in the business of 
urban regeneration, with a target to build over 95% of its development on brownfield 
land.142 On the company’s website, Berkeley is introduced as one of the market leaders 
in the current property development industry. It offers plenty of career opportunities and 
a range of projects, and encourages personal development and training within the 
company. 143  Berkeley has an effective CSR reporting system that publishes a 
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sustainability report every year. However, training and development occupied little space 
in the annual report. 
 
In the Sustainability Report 2011, the company mentioned that ‘as part of our ongoing 
effort to create employment opportunities, we partnered with the London Borough of 
Southwark to run the ‘Camberwelll Grove Employment and Training Initiative’ 
[hereinafter ‘CGETI’] at our South London development [site]’,144 including career 
advice, the Construction Skills Certification Scheme (hereinafter ‘CSCS’) training 
qualification,145  short training courses, work placements and full-time employment. 
CGETI provides participants with the chance to apply their knowledge on live 
construction sites. Besides the unique statement of training and development, there is no 
other information about the goals of CGETI and on how the training programme 
worked.146 Moreover, Berkeley’s training and development were limited to the basic 
improvement of all employees, and were not available to apprentices, for career 
enhancement, to graduates and newcomers, or for the development of leaders’ careers.147 
 
The company’s Sustainability Report 2012 also only referred to activities among 
employees, such as entertainment or sports. It was reported that Berkeley had set up a 
foundation to invest in a sports-based ‘training-for-work’ programme, namely 
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‘124 people dashing up Tower 42 in the City of London; 17 others bravely running the 
London Marathon; and 10 different offices taking part in Wardrobe Relief to collect 
4,778 kg of second-hand goods’.148 From the report, it is difficult to define the meaning 
of these activities, due to the lack of explanation about the relation between sports and 
training programmes. Moreover, what kinds of employees would participate in the 
programme was not illustrated, such as all employees, senior managers or apprentices. 
Furthermore, in this report, all professional training and development was not mentioned, 
which made it impossible to the report reader to gain and apply relevant information.  
 
Berkeley applied the GRI to report the hours spent on training and development, and the 
number of people attending the programmes without providing detailed information 
about these actions.149 Furthermore, the sustainability reports had not been audited 
through third-party verification, and no mechanism was in place to monitor the real CSR 
performance in training and development at work. 
 
ii Go Ahead PLC 
 
Another example of bad reporting is Go Ahead PLC (hereinafter ‘Go Ahead’), an 
international transport group headquartered in Newcastle upon Tyne, which is listed on 
the London Stock Exchange and features on the FTSE 250 Index.150 The company 
operates bus and passenger rail services in the UK, and school buses in the US. A large 
number of companies are significant contributors to public transport infrastructure in the 
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UK. The group is a leading employer that has around 23,000 employees across the 
country, and over 1 billion passenger journeys are taken on the bus and rail services each 
year.151 People are thus the most valuable asset of the group. Go Ahead published annual 
CSR reports on its website to disclose its CSR performance to its employees, including 
training and development in employment. 
 
The Go Ahead CSR Report 2012 stated that the company had invested about 
£10.2 million in staff and had provided 80,000 training days.152 Metrobus opened a new 
£500,000 training school in Crawley and Go Ahead companies continued to attract young 
people into the industry through apprenticeship schemes.153 At Go South Coast, a 
Salisbury-based engineering apprentice Clint Kelly had won the Apprentice of the Year 
award at the Salisbury District Chamber of Commerce and Industry’s Business 
Excellence Awards.154 This annual CSR report only provided information about the 
expense and time–cost to training and development, and sketchily mentioned an 
apprenticeship programme without any detail on implementation. 
 
The Go Ahead CSR Report 2011 stated that:  
 
[w]e play an active role in the work of the Sector Skills Council for the bus and rail 
industries and our businesses participate in major NVQ training programmes to 
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improve employees’ skills.155 Norfolk-based company Konectbus has worked in 
partnership with Lowestoft College to deliver a customer care course, following the 
successful Certificate of Professional Competence NVQ level two courses for 
driving.156  
 
The 2010 statement categorized the actions taken by Go Ahead to train and develop 
employees. However, it did not illustrate the purpose of the training and specific 
participants in these programmes. 
 
Go Ahead reports annually on its CSR to achieve information disclosure. However, the 
report on training and development seems more like bullet points, and there are no 
particular descriptions of each action, which might reduce the quality of the CSR reports. 
In addition, the reports or corporate information did not make any statement about the 
auditing of CSR reports or action taken in training and development, which would make 
the part on training and development in these CSR reports of little use in persuading 
report users. 
 
3.4.4 Fair payment and welfare 
 
Regarding employee payment and welfare,157 information is not only published through 
CSR reports, but also financial statements in annual reports, which is one of the most 
essential parts in these reports. Therefore, in their reports companies directly state how 
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they implemented the pension scheme or benefit plans for employees, both through CSR 
reporting and annual report. UK Mail and Severastal’ OAO PLC are the two companies 
selected as positive examples in this regard, as reflected in their reports. 
 
3.4.4.1 Examples of good reporting 
 
i UK Mail PLC 
 
UK Mail PLC (hereinafter ‘UK Mail’) has been one of the UK companies involved in the 
collection and distribution of post, since deregulation of the postal service on 1 January 
2006.158 It is the largest independent parcels, mail and logistics services company within 
the UK, offering innovative delivery solutions both locally and worldwide. With a 
national network, UK Mail provided more than 55 sites and 2,500 vehicles to offer 
business customers an integrated service, with a full range of time-sensitive and secure 
delivery options for parcels, letters and pallets.159 
 
UK Mail did not publish CSR reports applicable to the public, but concisely stated all its 
CSR information, including employee payment and welfare, on the company website. 
UK Mail’s corporate policy on employee payment and welfare states that ‘as well as 
offering competitive salaries at all levels and in every area of the business, we also offer a 
comprehensive benefits package designed to help you make more of your money, 
safeguard your future and enhance your health and wellbeing’.160 
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The company took action to afford employees benefits, which is demonstrated in the 
following:161 first, it provided a healthcare scheme and healthcare cash plan in terms of 
which some employees are eligible to enrol in the company’s private healthcare scheme, 
and the cost of cover is met by UK Mail and acts as a taxable benefit. Cover can also be 
extended to employees’ family at additional minor personal cost. All staff members can 
subscribe to the Paycare Healthcare Cashplan, whereby money is deducted via the 
company’s payroll for a cash benefit to help with medical bills. Subscribers to the scheme 
enjoy 100% refunds on all treatments up to an agreed annual limit across a diversity of 
medical bills, including optical, dental, hospital, specialist consultations, professional 
therapy and health screening.162 Second, UK Mail offers childcare vouchers. Employees 
can make significant savings on childcare costs via this scheme which allows them to 
purchase vouchers tax-free through direct deductions from their salary. The vouchers are 
widely accepted throughout the UK in a variety of childcare establishments.163 Third, the 
company also paid sick leave to employees who were entitled to be paid a full salary in 
the event of being off sick, provided they had relevant medical documentation. The 
number of weeks during which they may be off from work depends on an employees’ 
length of service and starts to accrue from six months onwards.164 Companies make 
provision for employees’ eye care, holiday entitlement, retail discounts through different 
approaches. 
 
In addition, UK Mail annual reports record all employee payment schemes offered to its 
general staff and senior management. UK Mail Annual Report 2012 referred to the health 
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and sickness insurance to executive directors that included private health cover, 
permanent health insurance and death-in-service benefits.165 This policy is similar to the 
life assurance offered to general employees. All employees are immediately eligible for 
death-in-service benefits, which equates to a minimum of one times employees’ annual 
salary.166 Simultaneously, the group currently applied a Long-Term Incentive Plan and a 
Share Matching Plan to provide longer-term, share-based incentives for executive 
directors, in order to motivate and reward the achievement of a combination of 
challenging corporate financial targets and enhancement of shareholder value.167 This 
action was matched with long service awards to employees whereby the company 
awarded people who showed a long-term commitment with the choice of a gift from an 
online catalogue featuring hundreds of products, on the achievement of certain set 
milestones.168 
 
Moreover, the company provided the Sharesave Scheme to employees, which allows 
them to purchase company shares at a discounted rate by saving a set amount of money 
each month over a fixed period.169 Additionally, the Employee Share Ownership Trust is 
another payment plan to employees where the company holds shares for transfer to 
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employees under corporate incentive scheme awards. Shares held by the trust are not 
voted at shareholder meetings and do not accrue dividends.170 
 
The information disclosed in UK Mail PLC’s Corporate Annual Report was audited by 
the external auditing agency Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP. In the audit, it was said that 
‘[t]he financial statements give a true and fair view of the state of the Group’s and of the 
Parent Company’s affairs as at 31 March 2012 and of the Group’s profit and of the 
Group’s and Parent Company’s cash flows for the year then ended; the Group financial 
statements have been properly prepared in accordance with International Financial 
Reporting Standards [hereinafter ‘IFRSs’] as adopted by the European Union; the Parent 
Company financial statements have been properly prepared in accordance with IFRSs as 
adopted by the European Union and as applied in accordance with the provisions of the 
Companies Act 200.’171 The external and independent audit of the UK Mail PLC annual 
reports, which disclosed most of the information and action about employee payment and 
welfare, was regarded as credible.  
 
ii Severstal’ OAO PLC 
 
Severstal’ OAO PLC (hereinafter ‘Severstal’) is a Russian company mainly operating in 
the steel and mining industry, centred in the northern city of Cherepovets. It is listed on 
the Moscow Exchange and London Stock Exchange.172 It employs approximately 70,000 
people and has many assets in Russia, the US, the Ukraine, Latvia, Poland, Italy and 
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Liberia, and has investments in Brazil. 173  As a potentially competitive company, 
Severstal’ offers a complete welfare system to a vast number of employees. It published 
relevant information in this regard on the company’s CSR website and in its annual report. 
The goal of Severstal’s employee welfare is described as: ‘to create conditions for 
stimulating the creative potential of employees and shape a corporate culture based on 
professionalism, private initiative and responsibility that focused on corporate and 
personal success are a key factor to long-term sustainable development’.174 
 
One of the main programmes of employee welfare is Severstal’ Medical Care which was 
implemented at Cherepovets from 2002 to improve the availability and quality of medical 
care; strengthen the first line of healthcare; create conditions for efficient medical care at 
the pre-hospital stage; prevent disease; and provide high-tech, state-of-the-art medical 
care.175 Every year Severstal’ spends about US$20 million on the corporate programme 
Severstal’s Health, and these funds allow more than 9,000 employees and their children 
to receive preventative procedures in health resorts and camps, and around 5,000 
employees to recover from health problems.176 
 
In addition, Severstal’ implemented the Housing Programme to ensure and enhance 
employees’ accommodation. The company built flats for its employees, who make a 
strong contribution to the company’s success. During 2005 to 2010, 26 blocks of flats 
were built to solve the housing problem for 2,345 families.177 In April 2012 Severstal’s 
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CEO Alexey Mordashov signed a policy on corporate contribution to improve Severstal’ 
Russian Steel employees’ accommodation in accordance with its aim, a 400-flat building 
would have been ready in the fourth quarter of 2013.178 The Costs of House Programme 
was available to check on the corporate financial statements in annual reports. 
 
As is the case in other companies, Severstal’ provided pension plans and retiree support 
to employees: ‘Since 2003, a corporate pension programme has been in place at all of our 
Russian enterprises in partnership with the non-governmental retirement fund 
StalFond’.179 In the Severstal’ Annual Report 2011, two types of retirement benefits were 
introduced: (i) defined contribution plans and (ii) defined benefit plans. 180  Other 
long-term employee benefits, such as various forms of compensation, non-monetary 
benefits and a long-term incentive programme, were mentioned in its Annual 
Report 2011. For example, the corporate compensation policy contained basic 
remuneration and regular bonuses, and employees’ compensation comprises regular 
remuneration and social benefits, including a company pension plan, health insurance and 
life insurance.181  
 
Severstal’s financial statements about employees’ welfare and pension plans were 
internally monitored by a corporate audit committee and external professional auditor, 
ZAO KPMG. ZAO provided the following audit statement: ‘In our opinion, the 
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consolidated financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial 
position of the Group as at 31 December 2011, 2010 and 2009, and its financial 
performance and its cash flows for the years then ended in accordance with IFRSs.’182 
The internal and external auditing mechanism of the corporate cost of employees’ 
payment and welfare proved the authenticity of the company’s reported achievement in 
this regard. 
 
3.4.4.2   Examples of bad reporting 
 
Compared with UK Mail PLC and Severstal’ OAO, there are two examples of companies 
that showed bad exercise in CSR in employees’ payment and welfare. In addition, the 
authenticity of information published by one company was challenged by the public, 
because its poor performance was hidden in the company’s information disclosure, but 
revealed by public news agency.  
 
i Marks & Spencer 
 
Marks & Spencer (hereinafter ‘M&S’) is the UK’s leading retailer, which provides 
high-quality, great-value clothing and home products, and food that it responsibly sources 
from around 2,000 suppliers globally.183 It employs over 78,000 people in the UK and 
abroad, and has over 700 UK stores, plus an expanding international business.184 It is a 
leading company but did not provide systematic reports with respect to CSR, with the 
result that relevant information cannot be found directly in its reports. 
                                                        
182
 Ibid, 100. 
183
 Corporate information about Marks & Spencer may be found on the company’s official website, 
available at: http://corporate.marksandspencer.com/aboutus/company_overview, last accessed on 14 March 
2014. 
184
 Ibid. 
Chapter 3: United Kingdom Companies’ Corporate Social Responsibility in Employment: Case Studies 
© C. YUN 238
 
As regards employees’ payment and welfare, M&S only mentioned the programme, Save 
As You Earn (hereinafter ‘SAYE’), which is extended to all employees, including 
executive directors, in its Annual Report 2012 in a brief description.185 Additionally, 
M&S stressed the governance of its pension scheme, both on its website and in its annual 
reports. The group’s pension scheme was divided into the defined benefit section for 
employees with an appointment date prior to 1 April 2002 and the defined contribution 
section open to those who joined the company on or after 1 April 2002 and before 1 
November 2012.186 
 
Except for the SAYE programme and pension governance, there is little relevant 
information about employees’ payments and welfare. As legally required, companies 
have the duty to provide employee welfare benefits, such as a pension or insurance. The 
information M&S published just reflected the legal minimum standard in this respect, but 
not further voluntary CSR performance in terms of employees payments and welfare. 
 
ii Associated British Food PLC 
 
Another company with a bad reporting record is Associated British Food PLC 
(hereinafter ‘ABF’) which is a British multinational food-processing and retailing 
company whose headquarters are in London.187 The company is listed on the London 
Stock Exchange and features on the FTSE 100. The international food, ingredients and 
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retail group has reached sales of £11.1 billion and employed over 100,000 employees in 
46 countries, both developed and developing countries.188 The global company owns a 
complete reporting system, including website reports, CSR reports and annual reports to 
disclose information with respect to its CSR performance. This is especially needed 
where a company has a huge staff complement, and sets for itself the aim of making an 
effort to ensure safe workplaces and of providing in employees’ needs.  
 
The ABF Annual Report 2012 refers to the domestic and overseas employee entitlements 
that were implemented through pension benefit schemes, such as unfunded overseas 
post-retirement medical schemes that were utilised in Australia and New Zealand, the US, 
Canada, the Republic of Ireland, Spain, Switzerland, Germany, France, Italy, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Mexico and South Africa.189 
 
It would seem that ABF information about ensuring employees’ welfare not only covered 
home staff, but also overseas employees, especially in developing countries. The ABF 
annual reports were audited by KPMG Audit PLC, so that the veracity of the report 
cannot be doubted. However, the biggest irony of this leading group with its complete 
CSR system is that it has been challenged by activists for failing to play the ‘good 
corporate citizen’ in the world’s poorest countries. Financial Times reported that ‘ABF’s 
Patak and Amoy Brands . . . lack[ed] public policies requiring suppliers to pay a living 
wage’ and ‘its Twining tea brand stood out for its commitments to a living wage for 
workers’ that ABF requires its suppliers to exercise CSR to ensure employee’s living 
payment, but cannot protect the fair payment to employees at its own company.190 
Although ABF illustrated how the group ensured employees’ payment and welfare in 
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reports, the news about the company’s failure to provide living wages in the poorest 
countries would make the public doubt whether a company could offer its employees 
living wages, and provide sufficient benefits and welfare.  
 
3.4.5  Employee engagement 
 
Employee engagement is not an independent aspect in CSR performance or reports, such 
as human rights, and health and safety, but is pertinent to every issue mentioned in this 
chapter. To differing degrees in individual companies, employees are allowed to engage 
in various corporate activities that are opportunities for them to obtain information about 
a company, to express an opinion about the company and to communicate with 
employers. In the UK, companies cannot be compelled to comply with employee 
engagement through legal regulations; implementation is freely decided on by companies. 
Single-tier boards of directors are normal in the UK and no employee representatives are 
involved at the board level. However, employee representatives play a vital role in 
organizations such as trade or labour unions, to represent employees’ opinion and achieve 
collective bargaining with employers. In this research, employee engagement refers to 
employees or employee representatives who maintain interests at work and express 
opinions through trade unions or employee representative meetings. Among the 90 
companies studied, roughly 85% of them referred to the exercise of employee 
engagement in their reports, while a small minority did not report in this respect. In order 
to demonstrate how companies comprehensively accomplished employee engagement in 
corporate governance, Henry Boot PLC and Bovis PLC will be taken as two positive 
examples. 
 
3.4.5.1 Examples of good reporting 
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i Henry Boot PLC 
 
Henry Boot PLC (hereinafter ‘Henry Boot’) is a British construction business, listed on 
the London Stock Exchange. It was floated on the stock market in 1919 and became the 
first house builder ever to list.191 As one of the leading British construction and property 
companies, the group owns companies in four areas: (i) property (Henry Boot 
Developments Limited), (ii) land (Hallam Land Management Limited), (iii) construction 
(Henry Boot Construction Limited) and (iv) plant (Banner Plant Limited).192 The Henry 
Boot PLC CSR report was not created separately, but was included in the company’s 
corporate Annual Report and Financial Statements. With respect to the entire reporting 
system, the company’s report was not as comprehensive as some companies’. However, 
the implementation of employee engagement in the annual report was comparatively 
comprehensive. 
 
The Henry Boot Annual Report and Financial Statements 2011 introduced the action that 
the company had taken to allow employees access to information on the health and safety 
in their workplace. In this regard the report stated: ‘The Group runs a bespoke health and 
safety audit system which is used to benchmark our sites, offices and depots over the year; 
in 2011, 191 audits were undertaken with the results reported at subsidiary board 
meetings.’193 The audited health and safety in each workplace were also disclosed to 
employees who had access to knowledge on the health and safety issues in their 
workplace. 
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In order for Henry Boot to find out what the true position of its employees was and to 
determine what further improvements could be made, the group obtained advice through 
surveys of its employees and senior managers.194 In the process of decision-making, to 
some extent, boards of directors would design plans in corporate governance that 
depended on much information. Top management would get detailed practical and direct 
feedback, and suggestions from employees on with what they were satisfied and with 
what not, and what they expected to be relevant in corporate policy and governance.195 
 
Moreover, Henry Boot highlighted its compliance with the Bribery Act and a code of 
ethics as the guiding principles of the company. The group partnered with Expolink 
Europe Limited to provide employees with a freephone helpline to which suspicions of 
misconduct, fraud or theft could be reported.196 Some of the prohibited behaviour, such 
as bribery and negligence of duty, was too difficult to prove, so the misconduct reporting 
telephone line was introduced, which is a nameless system for employees to report any 
negative action at work. This simplified the internal monitoring mechanism in the 
company.197 
 
The quality of information disclosure included in the Henry Boot Annual Report and 
Financial Statements 2011 was ensured through the independent audit conducted by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, which found that the board of directors had fulfilled its 
responsibilities as stated in the report.198 Although the third-party audit is not specific 
enough to verify the statement of employee engagement, it generally confirms the 
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authenticity of the entire 2011 annual report, so that in this example it assumes that the 
performance of employee engagement in Henry Boot is consistent with the published 
information.  
 
ii Bovis Homes Group PLC 
 
The foundation of Bovis Homes Group PLC (hereinafter ‘Bovis’) dates back to 1885 
when Charles William Bovis founded CW Bovis & Co.199 It was floated on the stock 
exchange in 1997 and features on the FTSE 250 and the FTSE4Good indices. The 
company employs more than 600 employees in locations across England and Wales, 
including its headquarters.200 Bovis publishes its CSR report annually on its company 
website and includes employee engagement on different aspects. 
 
The Bovis CSR Report 2012 introduced employee engagement in respect of health and 
safety in that all employees and workers are given a voice and the opportunity to 
influence health and safety in their workplace. Therefore, some of the problems and 
requirements of health and safety were directly reflected by employees’ feedback and 
reports.201 A similar approach was also mentioned in Bovis’s previous annual CSR 
reports. 
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Bovis implemented a series of communication platforms to bring employees into 
corporate governance through four means. 202  First, employee liaison group-elected 
representatives held meetings to provide regular two-way feedback sessions between 
employees and senior managers, with key messages from monthly Group Executive 
Committee meetings being disseminated.203 Second, employees were able to attend 
briefings with the CEO, Group Finance Director and other senior managers within the 
business, and have access to financial presentations and reports.204 Third, the quarterly 
magazine and regular group bulletins had been produced in-house by the public relations 
and graphics teams which ensured that employees were kept updated on business 
developments and newsworthy events.205 Fourth, employees also received immediate 
notification via electronic mail of any announcements made to the stock exchange that 
reflected relevant financial information about the company.206  
 
Furthermore, Bovis set up a code of ethics in terms of the UK Corporate Governance 
Code to regulate the ethical operation in corporate governance. In order to improve the 
internal monitoring of breaches of the ethical code, the group operated a whistleblowing 
reporting line for staff to report any misconduct at work.207 This four-pronged approach 
made it possible to report on all matters and for the company to resolve them 
satisfactorily. This might reduce unpredicted and undetected misconduct that would 
negatively affect the corporate reputation and performance of the company.  
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The Bovis CSR Report is not externally monitored through professional audit or 
verification. However, there are individual internal committees to supervise the board’s 
performance in particular aspects, such as health and safety or human rights. The 
Consultative Committee aims to monitor the employer’s performance in terms of the 
company’s code of ethics, including the exercise of employee engagement in practice.208 
 
2.4.5.2 Examples of bad reporting 
 
Owing to the unenforceable nature of employee engagement, companies carry out 
different actions in terms of corporate policy. Excluding those companies that did not 
mention employee engagement in their reporting material, a minority of companies 
implemented this aspect simply and unilaterally, which was reflected in their corporate 
reports. Cape PLC, and Peter Black Footwear and Accessories are two companies with 
poor performance in employee engagement according to their respective reports, which 
contained too little information about their CSR. 
 
i Cape PLC 
 
Cape PLC (hereinafter ‘Cape’) is an international leader in multidisciplinary services in 
the field of essential non-mechanical industrial services in the oil and gas, power 
generation, chemical, minerals and mining sectors, and major engineering and 
construction contractors.209 It employed 19,000 people to deliver safe, intelligent and 
qualified work across the UK, Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States, Middle 
East, North Africa and India, and into the Far East/Pacific Rim.210 Cape did not provide a 
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CSR Report. Instead, it included a brief relevant illustration in its Corporate Annual 
Review and created a section entitled ‘Corporate Responsibility’ on the group website. 
 
At a glance, the Cape reports contained no statement on employee engagement, such as 
employee reporting, surveys or communication. Only with respect to health and safety 
management can employees engage in corporate governance to report unsafe action. This 
is regulated by the CapeSafe Golden Rules.211 Cape states: ‘Reporting unsafe acts and 
faulty workmanship – always report faulty workmanship or unsafe acts to your line 
manager without delay, regardless of who might be responsible.’212 
 
The reporting of unsafe situations by employees is not typical employee engagement, but 
more similar to a reporting mechanism. Employees only have access to reporting any 
unsafe behaviour at work, but no further approach to engage in corporate activities in 
other aspects, such as respond to corporate policy and communicate with top 
management. The unique employees’ report had limited the scope of employee 
engagement in corporate governance, and obstructed the path to gain the most direct and 
realistic feedback and advice from employees on complete corporate policies and 
decisions. 
 
ii Peter Black Footwear and Accessories Limited 
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The company Peter Black Footwear and Accessories Limited (hereinafter ‘Peter Black’) 
was founded in 1947 to produce shopping bags at first. With gradual development, it 
became involved in the industries of footwear, homeware, furniture, toiletries and 
personal care until 2007, when the company was acquired by Li & Fung Group.213 
Among all the companies selected, Peter Black is one of a couple of limited companies 
on which CSR information is available to the public. This information is available on the 
company website that is linked to the Sustainability Website of Li & Fung.214 
 
In 2011 the company launched the first anonymous web-based Employee Engagement 
Survey of its staff, conducted by a third party, aimed at assessing engagement with 
employees and their customers, and finding out potential opportunities to improve the 
business and reputation through 56 closed-ended questions and one open-ended 
question.215 This is the only description that appeared in its corporate Sustainability 
Statement and contained no precise detail about how the company further engaged with 
its employees. Compared with companies providing diversified approaches to employee 
engagement, Peter Black or Li & Fung only took action to get answers from their 
employees to what the company wanted to ask, but did not offer employees the 
opportunity say what they wanted to know or to report. 
 
3.5 Comprehensive comparison 
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In the previous section companies were compared vertically on their CSR performance in 
each of the following aspects of employment: health and safety, human rights, training 
and development, fair payment, employee engagement, and relevant auditing. Good and 
bad examples were both applied to state how to achieve CSR positively in every sphere. 
In this section a sample of companies with comprehensive CSR reports was selected for 
horizontal comparison to illustrate how individual companies achieved CSR in 
employment in every area mentioned. Their reports, such as their CSR report or annual 
report, were used to judge their performance. Of all 90 companies’ relevant reports, 
Carnival Corporation & PLC was the only one that almost published relatively complete 
and detailed information in every aspect. 
 
3.5.1 Example of good reporting 
 
Carnival Corporation & PLC 
 
Carnival Corporation & PLC (hereinafter ‘Carnival’) is a global cruise company that 
owns many leading cruise brands, namely Carnival Cruise Lines, Holland America Line, 
Princess Cruises and Seabourn in North America; P&O Cruises and Cunard in the United 
Kingdom; AIDA Cruises in Germany; and so on.216 It is a British–American-owned 
company headquartered in Miami, Florida, in the US, and in London in the UK. Carnival 
is respectively listed on the New York Stock Exchange and features on the S&P 500 
index in the US, and is listed on the London Stock Exchange and features on the FTSE 
100 index in the UK.217 The group published its annual CSR report with complete and 
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credible information under GRI (G3) Index. As a corporation with 77,000 shipboard 
employees, its CSR in employment mainly occupied the CSR Report in various areas. 
 
3.5.1.1  Health and safety 
 
In order to ensure employees’ health and safety at work, Carnival set up formal joint 
management–worker health and safety committees, under the leadership of a senior 
ship’s officer, which included officers and crew from the different shipboard 
departments.218 In the committee specific workplace safety-related topics were reviewed 
and addressed during regularly scheduled meetings to discuss and recommend solutions 
for shipboard safety issues and promote safety awareness. Experiences and best practices 
would be shared throughout communications in shoreside operations departments.219 
 
The occupational health and safety management in Carnival complied with various 
international legal requirements or initiatives as the minimum legal standard. For 
example, corporate health and safety management was established based on the 
International Safety Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution 
Prevention.220 In particular, Carnival UK used ILO Convention 155 of Occupational 
Health and Safety Convention and Protocol 1981 and ILO Code of Practice on Recording 
and Notification of Occupational Accidents and Diseases 1995 as the basis for its health 
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and safety management and reporting.221 Several operating lines had obtained additional 
certification in accordance with OHSAS18001:2007; and the Occupational Health and 
Safety Management Systems Requirements Standard, with the result that the group was 
not only regulated by standards in OHSAS18001, but also audited by the system with 
respect to performance in health and safety in the workplace.  
 
Under the minimum legal standards, Carnival created its Health, Safety and Security 
Policy (hereinafter ‘HESS Policy’) to provide its employees with a healthy and safe place 
to work, and to assess the health and safety performance in management. The HESS 
Policy would make the group recognize hazards, reduce or eliminate risks that could 
result in personal injury, illness or death, and enhance effectiveness of health and safety 
management systems.222 Under the health and safety management, Carnival adopted the 
US Bureau of Labour Statistics standard to calculate and report on the shipboard 
occupational injury rate.223 The Carnival Corporation & PLC Comprehensive Audit and 
Review of Safety and Emergency Response were introduced on the corporate website to 
monitor the group’s performance on health and safety issues.224 
                                                        
221
 Carnival UK is comprised Cunard and P&O Cruises. Implementation of CSR in Carnival UK is 
available in the Cunard Sustainability Report 2010, 37, available at: 
http://www.cunard.com/Documents/Legal%20Docs/2010%20Sustainability%20Report.pdf, last accessed 
on April 27, 2013; ILO Conventions 155 of Occupational Health & Safety Convention and Protocol 1981, 
available at: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C155, last 
accessed on 27 April 2013; ILO Code of Practice on Recording and Notification of Occupational Accidents 
and Diseases 1995, available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_protect/@protrav/@safework/documents/ 
normativeinstrument/wcms_107800.pdf, last accessed on 12 January 2014.  
222 See Carnival Corporation & PLC Sustainability Report 2011, supra note 218, 73. 
223 Injury rate = (N/EH) x 200,000, where N = number of injuries; EH = total hours worked by all 
employees during the reporting year; and 200,000 = base for 100 equivalent of full-time workers (40 
hours/week x 50 weeks/year, available at: http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshdef.htm, last accessed on 
27 April 2013. 
224 Carnival Corporation & PLC Comprehensive Audit and Review of Safety and Emergency Response, 
available at: http://www.carnival.co.uk/legal/safety-security.aspx, last accessed on 2 May 2013.  
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3.5.1.2  Human rights 
 
Carnival’s main goal in human rights is to provide equal opportunity for all employees 
among people of different sexes, countries and religions, and to ensure a comfortable and 
friendly working environment to eliminate harassment, including any form of unwelcome 
conduct and hostile or offensive work environment to any person.225 As the Cruise 
Group, Carnival firstly engaged in the ILO Maritime Labour Convention 2006 to 
safeguard employees’ human rights on board ships.226 In addition, the Group applied 
ILO Conventions 87 and 98 to ensure that a vast number of employees would be entitled 
to the rights of collective bargaining.227 
 
Carnival specifically prohibited all forms of child exploitation and the recruitment of 
child labour. It stated that ‘we fully respect all applicable laws establishing a minimum 
age for employment’. 228  The group also supported laws, co-operated with legal 
enforcement authorities, and complied with international network of regulations to 
prevent and punish the crime of sexual exploitation of children.229 
 
                                                        
225
 See Carnival Corporation & PLC Sustainability Report 2011, supra note 218, 72. 
226
 ILO Maritime Labour Convention 2006 was established in 2006, including ‘all up-to-date standards of 
existing international maritime labour Conventions and Recommendations, as well as the fundamental 
principles to be found in other international labour Conventions’, available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/maritime-labour-convention/lang--en/index.htm, last accessed on 
2 May 2013.  
227
 ILO Conventions No. 98: Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention 1949, available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---dialogue/documents/publication/ 
wcms_168332.pdf, last accessed on 2 May 2013. 
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 See Carnival Corporation & PLC Sustainability Report 2011, supra note 218, 73. 
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Internal monitoring of compliance with human rights was combined with employee 
engagement so that people would audit and report the violation of human rights at work. 
In this regard Carnival established a website called ‘Carnival Compliance’, allowing 
employees to disclose suspected issues of non-compliance, and having the reports 
reviewed and investigated by the group.230 It also introduced senior engagement to force 
officers and managers to address potential labour issues, which included putting systems 
in place to prevent, report, investigate and resolve any complaints of misconduct.231 
 
3.5.1.3  Training and development 
 
As a part of Carnival’s commitment, it provided appropriate and basic support, training, 
advice and information in the fields of health, safety and security, to employees and 
others who worked on behalf of the group on board ships and shoreside.232 Moreover, 
top management was obliged to develop people to ensure that employees had the 
knowledge and skills necessary to perform their jobs properly using appraisal and benefit 
programmes.233 Furthermore, in order to improve the quality of human capital, Carnival 
assisted employees in setting personal career goals, and provided sufficient skills and 
knowledge in the process of personal development.234  
 
All training and development were available to all employees, including full-time, 
part-time and seasonal staff in all departments. In the 2011 fiscal year, the total training 
time undergone by employees was 5,944, 240 hours and each employee had obtained 
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training for 56 hours per year.235 The statistics precisely recorded and reported that 85% 
of employees on board ships and 96% of employees shoreside were respectively involved 
in training and development programmes during 2011.236 
 
3.5.1.4 Fair payment and welfare 
 
Employees’ right to fair payment was secured by written employment contracts with 
Carnival based on their different positions. The contracts set forth basic conditions of 
employment, including position, wages, work hours and duration of contract for 
shipboard employees.237 Under the contract, appropriate remedial actions would ensure 
reasonable compensation due for extra working hours, so that effective protection would 
prevent the exploitation of employees. In order to ensure fair payment to non-union 
employees, Carnival alleged that the pay and benefits packages for non-union shipboard 
employees would meet or exceed the benefits available to Carnival’s unionized 
employees and employees of other cruise lines, which often exceeded international 
standards.238 
 
The payment and pension schemes in Carnival were also disclosed in the company’s 
Corporate Financial Statement and Annual Review. The Carnival Annual Review 2011 
stated that all pension schemes were basically covered by US or UK pension regulations 
and operated single-employer-defined benefit pension plans, which cover some shipboard 
and shoreside employees.239 Carnival UK companies specifically participated in the 
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 ‘Financial statement’, Carnival Annual Report 2011, 33-34, available at: 
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industry-wide British Merchant Navy Officers Pension Fund, a defined benefit 
multi-employer pension plan, for the benefit of certain of their British shipboard officers, 
and an industry-wide British Merchant Navy Ratings Pension Fund for their shipboard 
British personnel.240 Additionally, several defined contribution plans were available to 
most of its employees, based on employee contributions, salary levels and length of 
service. The total expense on these plans was US$21 million in 2011.241 
 
Moreover, Carnival was concerned about its employees’ life quality and ensured that they 
enjoyed enough rest and recreation. Carnival Cruise Lines opened staff communication 
so that employees could apply to the executive office to change their sailing schedule due 
to personal time management.242 This led to an improvement in the working-time 
mechanism, and allowed employees reasonable rest after work, so that they could be 
energetic and healthy at work. 
 
3.5.1.5  How Carnival’s CSR Report works 
 
Analysis of Carnival’s reports regarding its CSR in employment shows that it has entirely 
achieved performance with respect to employees’ health and safety, human rights, 
training and development, fair payment, and employee engagement. Furthermore, 
information disclosure on performance is monitored through internal supervision and 
third-party audit. The group basically complied with international regulations, domestic 
laws and relevant initiatives to implement CSR as the minimum legal standards in the 
fields of health and safety, human rights, and fair payment. Carnival also engaged in 
various voluntary actions over and above the minimum level to achieve its CSR towards 
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its employees in corporate governance. Employee engagement was not independently 
mentioned in its Sustainability Report 2010, but is present throughout its CSR in health 
and safety and human rights. The sustainability report was created in the format of the 
GRI with individual reportable information in each item, such as accident and injury rate. 
The application level and completion of information is verified by the GRI, the 
application of which would be monitored in the report. 243  The accreditation of 
OHSAS18001 in health and safety, and external auditing of fair payment in the financial 
statements of Annual Review 2011 by an independent, registered public accounting firm 
both provided an effective audit of the sustainability report and real performance of 
CSR.244 In addition, employee engagement can be treated as a form of internal audit 
when corporate governance of CSR towards employees is monitored through the 
reporting of misconduct. 
 
3.5.2 Example of bad reporting 
 
Cape PLC 
 
As mentioned before, Cape was selected as an example in the horizontal comparison of 
bad reporting since it had provided an incomplete CSR report containing only a 
description on the aspect of health and safety, and one-sentence descriptions on some 
other sectors. As mentioned in the previous section, if companies’ information disclosure 
published amounts to fewer than three aspects, the report will be evaluated as bad quality. 
Under this circumstance, the Cape CSR Website Report disclosed information on fewer 
than two dimensions, with the result that it was selected as an example of bad reporting. 
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In respect of health and safety, the Cape report stated that Cape had set up a health and 
safety management system on the basis of OHSAS18001 and had managed ‘zero harm’ in 
the workplace through the reporting on unsafe situations.245  In addition, the Cape 
information briefly mentioned its general international development and management 
training initiatives to employees without any detail about how the company had 
conducted these training programmes among employees.246 Moreover, workplace control 
was exaggerated when it was defined as an internal monitoring approach to health and 
safety. 
 
The incomplete CSR information on employees that was reported made it unclear to data 
users what the detailed performance of CSR towards employees in the company was. The 
lack of statement also means the under-performance of the company in its CSR towards 
its employee in various areas in the company. More importantly, the lack of monitoring 
mechanism in Cape’s CSR reporting system, and lack of audit or external verification by 
a public organization, leave the validity of the reported information open to doubt and 
challenge.  
 
3.6 Summary 
 
The empirical research in this chapter was conducted on the basis of information 
disclosure in 90 companies. From the examples and database presented in Table 1, over 
80% of companies provided precise information in the form of different company reports 
to demonstrate their CSR performance in employment through corporate governance. The 
legal requirement primarily requires that companies publish information with respect to 
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social issues and employee matters, for example, Section 417 of the Companies Act 2006 
and RIDDOR respectively require reporting on aspects of employee, and health and 
safety in the workplace.247 Additionally, more than 45 companies had adopted the 
voluntary reporting approach to present their CSR performance in employment. Many 
companies created official reports on the basis of the GRI or UN Global Compact. 
 
The authenticity and quality of the published information is ensured through the internal 
supervision of stakeholders, especially employees, and external auditing and verification 
by third parties. For example, 9 companies applied GRI reporting and self-check 
monitoring or third-party verification by means of the Sustainability Disclosure Database. 
More than 53% of the companies, particularly FTSE 100 companies, applied both GRI 
reporting and verification, and third-party assurance company auditing to measure the 
reliability of the information they disclosed, which is accompanied by a third-party 
assurance report for the purpose of public monitoring. 
 
As regards reliable information disclosure among the 90 companies, it was found that 
there was sufficient legislation that could act as the legal minimum standard in the 
exercise of CSR in employment. Both internal corporate governance and external 
initiatives would be informed by the legal basis. Beyond law, UK governments, industrial 
committees, and NGOs set up numerous voluntary codes of conducts to inform 
companies’ CSR implementation in practice, namely the ACAS booklet in the BIS, and 
the Health and Safety Charter of the Home Builders Federation. In some particular 
industries, such as construction and manufacturing, there are also industrial standards of 
CSR that regulate employees’ health and safety at work, including the EU manufacturing 
sector’s accident rate, CCS guideline and the like. According to the examples and the 
data, 12 of the 30 randomly selected companies in the industries of manufacturing and 
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construction had adopted the national and industrial voluntary guidelines on exercising 
CSR in corporate governance. 
 
Where companies had implemented CSR, around 60% of them had applied international 
guidelines and standards in corporate governance, especially in the field of employees’ 
human rights, which is regulated by ILO Conventions, standards and the UN Human 
Rights Declaration. These guidelines are voluntary and directly adopted in company’s 
decision-making on CSR. In addition, various ISO standards are also voluntary 
instructions, and 25 companies explicitly presented information on their use to exercise 
employee protection with respect to health and safety at work and human rights. 
Moreover, 15 companies had adopted the UN Global Compact as one of the most popular 
initiatives, to exercise CSR under the principles of human rights, labour, the environment 
and anti-corruption, and the framework of information disclosure.  
 
According to the research, employee engagement in most of the companies is in 
accordance with the process of stakeholder engagement introduced in Chapter 2, 
including employee information, employee response and employee communication. In 
this process, employers not only publish information to employees, but also obtain 
feedback and advice from them, so that the employers would obtain direct knowledge 
about employees’ complaints and attitude to their companies’ performance, and gain a 
broad view on how to improve employee satisfaction through grievance reports, a 
whistle-blowing policy or employee dialogue. In more than half of the selected 
companies, the trade unions, labour unions or employee representatives are the 
organizations that challenge employers to engage employees in collective bargaining, and 
to ensure and assert employees’ legal rights at work. 
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In respect of the empirical research done in this study, there are two points to be 
emphasized in the gap in information disclosure of UK companies’ performance in CSR 
with regard to employees in corporate governance. First, the selected UK companies were 
limited to companies that were within industries such as manufacturing, construction and 
transportation, which are labour-intensive companies that are involved in more specific 
issues in employment, such as safety in work conditions, respect for human rights and 
fair payment. The research conducted into the reports collected from these industries is 
aimed at providing an overview of how these labour-focused companies adopted a CSR 
approach in corporate governance to ensure employees’ interest at work. The comparative 
examples concentrate on the applicable initiatives and quality of information disclosure 
of the companies that were researched, but do not indicate which company implemented 
any particular action. Irrespective of the division in the comprehensive comparison, it is 
difficult to compare companies in specifically the same industry, because in the process 
of information disclosure, collection and analysis, there might only be a few companies in 
the total industry that disclosed information that could be applied in this research. Among 
the few companies in the same industry, it is no coincidence that two companies can 
respectively provide good and bad examples in the same division. Furthermore, there 
might be only one company in a particular industry that forms part of the FTSE100 
companies that was chosen as an example, such as the unique food company, AB Food. 
There might not be another company in the same industry that could be used as an 
example to demonstrate the opposite. Moreover, at the beginning of the research, when 
randomly choosing studied companies, it was found that many labour-intensive 
companies in the industries of manufacturing and construction seldom published 
information in respect of CSR to employees or even lacked CSR information disclosure 
completely. For example, Peter Black Footwear and Accessories Limited was selected as 
a bad example of employee engagement; it would have been ideal if another foot 
manufacturer could have been selected as a good example. However, among all the 
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companies researched, Peter Black is a unique footwear company. Compared with other 
reports in respect of employee engagement, this company’s information disclosure is of 
relatively bad quality, and lacks precise statement of activities and third-party monitoring. 
Therefore, all comparisons are made among companies in labour-intensive industries but 
it was difficult to compare companies particularly in the same industry. 
 
Second, as mentioned in the section on methodology, the standard to evaluate the 
performance of companies’ CSR with regard to employees in corporate governance is 
basically dependent on the published information and third-party monitoring from an 
assurance company or NGO. However, although a company that performed well in 
information disclosure and verification might have been selected as a positive example, 
the screening by public investors, the media and consumers would also affect the 
evaluation of that company’s CSR exercise in this empirical research. For instance, at the 
beginning of the empirical research among selected UK companies, AB Food was chosen 
as a good example of fair payment and welfare because its Annual Report 2012 explicitly 
stated the numbers, index and actions in respect of employees’ payment and welfare, and 
the report was audited by the auditing firm KPMG. However, news in the Financial Times 
revealed that the company failed to provide workers with a living wage in poor countries. 
To some extent, this led to inconsistency between the reported information and public 
news, and negatively affected the company’s public reputation. Therefore, AB Food was 
ultimately adopted as an example to illustrate how a company performs well in its 
verified report, but fails to ensure employees’ payment in reality. 
 
This empirical research is aimed at observing companies’ CSR performance through the 
quality and content of information disclosure among selected companies, but not the real 
effect of their operation. It is assumed that all information adopted in this thesis is truly 
reflective of the real CSR exercise in individual companies and that the third-party audit 
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ensures the authenticity of reports. However, newspapers, other media and even 
stakeholders would monitor companies’ particular negative performance or accidental 
tragedy in practice, which will affect information users’ judgement and evaluation of 
these companies’ CSR performance and reports. It is difficult to solve the objective gap 
between information disclosure and observation of the real effect of CSR in companies in 
this research because the extent of public news and monitoring will always go beyond 
and update immediately the information collected for research purposes. However, 
information disclosure accompanied by a valid audit is still the most effective route for 
stakeholders to follow in gaining comprehensive knowledge of companies’ CSR 
performance rather than a news report or public comment. 
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Chapter 4: Chinese Companies’ Corporate Social Responsibility in  
Employment: Case Studies 
 
 
After the Shell company’s CSR report had first been introduced in China in 1999, 
Chinese companies tried to adopt CSR in corporate governance. This was the start of 
strategic management in the areas of environmental protection and product quality, and 
recognition that good performance on the environmental and social issues largely affected 
marketing development.1 However, until the late 1990s, the one factor, namely labour, 
which slightly influenced corporate operation internally, was still ignored in companies 
and the public. As an emerging market with the most potential, China developed 
numerous companies in huge need of human resources, in the fields of apparel and 
textiles, automobiles, electronics technology and so on. Among these, the ‘sweat shop’ 
emerged in some private and overseas companies, which greatly reduced the cost of 
human resources, and violated employees’ health and safety, human rights, and rights to 
fair payment. This had a negative social effect and was reported by the public media, 
which directly harmed corporate reputations and revenue. 
 
As a member state of the ILO, China prohibits any action that violates the human rights 
of labour, and constantly tries to improve its policies to ensure employees’ rights in the 
workplace. Many companies in developed countries prefer to invest in, or co-operate with, 
companies that have a good reputation and are corporately socially responsible, which 
includes protecting their employees in corporate governance. In order for Chinese 
companies to be competitive in the global market, they have to move their focus from 
having a solely economic impact to a social impact. They should take positive action to 
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 Lee, S. Y., ‘Fortune China CSR Ranking 2011 Report’, Fortune China, March 15, 2001, available at: 
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ensure that their employees’ legal rights and interests are protected. As in Chapter 3, this 
chapter will apply comparative case studies to illustrate the information disclosure of 
Chinese companies. Empirical research was used to compare and analyse the 
implementation of CSR in employment in Chinese companies. 
 
4.1 Overview 
 
In China the implementation of CSR in corporate governance is generally required by 
Article 5 of Company Law 2006 which stipulates that companies should comply with all 
regulations, and social and business morals; operate their business in good faith; take 
social responsibility; and accept supervision from the government and the public.2 
Articles 17 and 18 of Company Law 2005, especially, provide legal standards on how to 
ensure employees’ rights at work. Employers shall strengthen labour protection through 
employment contracts and social insurance, and offer professional development and 
in-service training.3 Employees, in turn, are conferred the freedom to participate in trade 
union activities and the right to conclude collective contracts with respect to payment, 
health and safety, working hours, working conditions, and so on. The issues that 
employees might have should be taken into consideration in decision-making and 
democratic management.4 According to CSR reporting, two Chinese stock markets 
                                                        
2 Chinese Company Law 2005 [中国公司法, zhongguogongsifa], Article: ‘When undertaking business 
operations, a company shall comply with the laws and administrative regulations, social morality and business morality. It shall act in good 
faith, accept the supervision of the government and the general public, and bear social responsibilities. The legitimate rights and interests of a company shall be 
protected by laws and may not be infringed’
. 
3 Ibid., Article 17: ‘The company shall protect the lawful rights and interests of its employees, conclude 
employment contracts with the employees, buy social insurances, strengthen labour protection so as to 
realize safe production. The company shall, in various forms, reinforce the vocational education and 
in-service training of its employees so as to improve their personal quality.’ 
4 Ibid., Article 18: ‘The employees of a company shall, according to the Labor Union Law of the People's 
Republic of China, organize a labor union, which shall carry out union activities and safeguard the lawful 
rights and interests of the employees. The company shall provide necessary conditions for its labor union to 
carry out activities. The labor union shall, on behalf of the employees, conclude the collective contract with 
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published relevant guidelines on CSR in listed companies. For example, the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange established the Guidelines on CSR in Listed Companies that stipulate 
that companies should achieve CSR towards their employees in issues of health and 
safety; human rights; fair payment and welfare; and vocational development. Information 
on their CSR must be disclosed in the format of a particular report and self-evaluated 
against the standards of the guidelines.5 
 
Many companies went beyond the minimum legal standards and gradually took voluntary 
initiatives in CSR and periodically created CSR or sustainability reports, as did 
companies in developed countries. Syntao, which is a Chinese NGO involved in 
professional ESG research, published an authoritative report on the performance and 
operation of CSR in Chinese companies after researching more than 2,000 companies in 
China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan).6 The Syntao report, ‘Revealing China’s ESG 
Issues 2011’, disclosed that issues about CSR in employment related to health and safety, 
such as occupational disease and injury; and labour conditions, such as outstanding 
payment, had been enforced by laws and improved above the legal level. However, there 
are still incidents that have been unreported and are unavoidable. Therefore, it is 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the company with respect to the remuneration, working hours, welfare, insurance, work safety and 
sanitation and other matters. Pursuant to the Constitution and other relevant laws, a company shall 
implement democratic management in the form of meeting of the representatives of the employees or any 
other ways. To make a decision on restructuring or any important issue related to business operation, or to 
formulate any important regulation, a company shall solicit the opinions of its labor union, and shall solicit 
the opinions and proposals of the employees through the meeting of the representatives of the employees or 
in any other way.’ See supra note 3. 
5
 The rules of CSR in employment and CSR reporting are respectively stated in Chapters 3 and 6 of the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange Guideline of CSR in Listed Companies [深市上市公司企业社会责任指南, 
shenshishangshigongsiqiyeshehuizerenzhinan], available at: 
http://wenku.baidu.com/view/495217c34028915f804dc26f.html, last accessed on 28 May 2013. 
6
 Syntao, which is a company founded in 2005, provides the services of professional analysis, consultancy 
and monitoring in the fields of ESG research and sustainability issues. It also works for other stakeholders, 
such as government and NGOs. 
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necessary to enhance the efficiency of CSR towards employees, and improve information 
disclosure and monitoring in Chinese companies.7 
 
In this chapter, Chinese companies’ implementation of CSR in employment is 
demonstrated and analysed through the CSR reports collected from the Top 100 
companies (2013), excluding companies in the industries of finance, real estate and high 
technology (28 companies), plus 15 randomly selected companies in the field of 
manufacturing.8 The research conducted into 87 Chinese companies, which is based on 
their CSR information disclosure, will reflect the exercise of CSR in employment, 
relating to health and safety; human rights; fair payment and welfare; employee training 
and development; and employee engagement through legal and voluntary approaches.  
 
4.2 General CSR initiatives in employment 
 
The data collected from published reports will demonstrate the approaches adopted in 
terms of legal requirements and voluntary initiatives to implementing CSR in 
employment in corporate governance. The data in Table 2 will be used in the following 
sections to introduce the actions that Chinese companies are taking according to or 
beyond legislation. 
 
4.2.1 Compliance with minimum legal standards 
                                                        
7
 Britsch, A. and Nette, A., Revealing China’s ESG Issues 2011: A Study of Chinese News About 
Companies in Connection with Environmental, Social and Governmental Issues, available at: 
http://www.syntao.com/SyntaoReport_Show_CN.asp?ID=23&FID=18, last accessed on 13 January 2014.  
8
 China Companies Top 100 is in accordance with the ranking in 2013, China Companies Top 100 2013 
[2013中国百强企业, zhongguobaiqiangqiye], available at:  
http://www.doc88.com/p-4117375805529.html, last accessed on 8 May 2013. The randomly selected 
companies refer to the industries of manufacturing, such as fashion companies, footwear companies and 
cosmetic companies, all of which applied SA8000 standards in CSR, and were recommended by the China 
National Textile and Apparel Council in 2013. 
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All companies in China have to comply with Labour Contract Law in employment that 
stipulates that corporate contracts with employees and codes would be established on the 
basis of legislation.9 The law compels companies to conclude labour contracts with their 
employees that provide comprehensive protection with respect to working conditions, a 
fair position between labour and management, and legal payment to employees. Articles 
47 and 54, particularly, regulate the capital compensation to workers, the working 
conditions in relation to the collective contract, and how trade unions represent 
employees in taking legal action against any violation in collective bargaining.10 Article 
42(4) requires the special protection of pregnant women employees, namely that the 
employer cannot dismiss women employees when they are in their pregnancy, 
confinement or nursing period.11 
 
The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Work Safety (hereinafter the ‘Law on 
Work Safety’) is the main legislation dealing with issues of safety at work that is 
applicable to all companies in the normal process of production or business activities.12 
Article 17 requires companies to clarify the responsibility of work safety and set up 
internal safety mechanisms at work. Articles 21 and 22 compel employers to implement 
                                                        
9
 The official Labour Contract Law was adopted at the 28th Session of the Standing Committee of the 
Tenth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on 29 June 2007, and came into force 
on 1 January 2008. 
10
 Labour Contract Law [劳动合同法, laodonghetongfa], Articles 47 and 56. 
11
 Ibid., Article 42. It regulates five situations that without consent, employers cannot terminate the 
contract with employees.  
12
 The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Work Safety [中华人民共和国安全生产法, 
zhonghuarenmingongheguoanquanshengchanfa], was adopted at the 28th Meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the 9th National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on 29 June 2002, and 
came into force on 1 November 2002. ‘In the normal process of production or business activities’ excludes 
particular industries regulated by regulations of fire-fighting, road traffic safety, railway traffic safety, and 
water-way traffic safety.’ 
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safety training among their employees to ensure that they take protective action at work.13 
Chapter 4 of the Law on Work Safety imposes the duty on governments to strictly 
supervise the performance of companies’ work safety: ‘make arrangements for the 
departments concerned, in keeping with the division of responsibilities, to carry out strict 
inspections in the production and business units located in their administrative regions in 
which major accidents due to lack of work safety are liable to occur’.14 Article 42(1) 
specifically mentions that companies must prevent and apply effective treatment to 
occupational health diseases, such as rescue operations, handling emergency incidents 
and routine physical examinations of employees.15 
 
The administrative government regulations also provide rules concerning the protection 
of employees; for example, the State Council published the Provisions on Prohibition of 
Child Labour that prevents companies from using child labour under 16 years of age.16 
The Ministry of Labour and Social Security decreed the Provisions on Minimum Wages 
which requires that the local standard for a minimum wage should be negotiated and 
decided among local administrative departments of government, trade unions at the same 
level and the Association of Local Entrepreneurs. The regional principle and minimum 
payment are based on local living standards, average amount of social security, industrial 
productive capacity and so forth. The provisions also present the formula to calculate 
local minimum wages.17 
                                                        
13
 See Law on Work Safety, supra note 12, Articles 17, 21 and 22. 
14
 Ibid., Articles 53 to 67 and Article 4. 
15
 Ibid., Article 42. 
16
 Provisions on Prohibition of Child Labour [禁止使用童工规定, jinzhishiyongtonggongguiding], was 
adopted at the 63rd Executive Meeting of the State Council on 18 September 2002, promulgated by Decree 
No. 364 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China on 1 October 2002, and came into force on 
1 December 2002.  
17
 Provisions on Minimum Wage [最低工资规定, zuidigongziguiding], was adopted at the 7th Executive 
Meeting of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security on 30 December 2003, and came into force on 
1 March 2004. See Articles 4, 5 and 7, and Appendix: Provisions on Minimum Wage. 
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Additionally, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security listed a series of 
ILO Conventions that China has concluded and signed as the main international legal 
requirement for the protection of employees. When China became a signatory to the ILO 
Conventions, it was obliged to adopt the global standards into its domestic legislation. 
Therefore, when companies comply with national regulations, they indirectly apply the 
international legislation. Of the 87 companies researched, 30% obviously expressed the 
use of ILO Standards as their guidelines for CSR in employment in their CSR reports. 
 
Occupational Safety and Health Convention 1981 (No. 155) is one of the major 
foundations regulating health and safety issues in the workplace.18  It enforces the 
adoption of the convention in national policies, and at national and undertaking levels. 
For example, section 2 states: ‘Each Member shall, in the light of national conditions and 
practice, and in consultation with the most representative organizations of employers and 
workers, formulate, implement and periodically review a coherent national policy on 
occupational safety, occupational health and the working environment’; Section 3 
requires that ‘[t]he enforcement of laws and regulations concerning occupational health 
and safety, and the working environment shall be secured by an adequate and appropriate 
system of inspection’. As an undertaking, companies are asked to ensure health and safety 
of equipment, machinery and the workplace in practice.19 
 
Moreover, the international conventions provide further details in various aspects, such as 
Safety and Health in Construction Convention 1988 (No. 167).20 They are aimed at 
                                                        
18
 Occupational Safety and Health Convention 1981 (No. 155) was convened by the Governing Body of 
the ILO in Geneva on 3 June 1981, and came into force on 21 June 1981. 
19
 Occupational Safety and Health Convention 1981 (No. 155), Article 4(1) of section II, Article 9(1) of 
section III and Article 16 of section IV. 
20
 Safety and Health in Construction Convention 1988 (No. 167) was convened by the ILO Governing 
Body at the 75th Meeting in Geneva on 1 June 1988, and came into force on 20 June 1988. 
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providing the legal, administrative, technical and educational framework for health and 
safety in construction to prevent accidents and diseases, and harmful effects on workers’ 
health and safety at work in construction; provide initiatives to ensure safety, health and 
working conditions, construction processes, activities, technologies and operations; and 
take appropriate measures to plan, control and enforce health and safety at work in 
corporate governance.21 
 
4.2.2 Voluntary CSR initiatives in employment 
 
Chinese administrative departments play a major role in guiding the development of CSR 
in companies. They provide instructive approaches and a framework about the 
implementation of CSR, including the issue of employees. First, the SASAC published 
the Guidelines to the Stated-owned Enterprises Directly Under the Central Government 
on Fulfilling Corporate Social Responsibility (hereinafter ‘SASAC Guidelines’), which 
had been adopted as the basis of CSR implementation in the CSR reports of state-owned 
companies. The guidelines were aimed at standardizing the performance of CSR and 
enhancing the image of state-owned companies.22 Rules 13 and 14 state the requirements 
of CSR towards employees concerning production safety and protecting their legal rights. 
The guidelines require employers to establish a responsibility system for safe production 
and an emergency management system to avoid accidents. It is necessary to ensure safe 
and healthy working conditions and living environment to improve employees’ health and 
prevent any harm from occupational diseases. Companies have to respect employees’ 
                                                        
21
 It is concluded from the Articles 14, 15, 16 and 18 of Safety and Health in Construction Convention, 
1988. The convention also guides the proper use and preventative measures in the use of specific 
equipment, such as scaffolding, ladders, cranes, and works at heights and roofing. 
22
 The Stated-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission: The Guidelines to the 
Stated-owned Enterprises Directly under the Central Government on Fulfilling Corporate Social 
Responsibility reflected the spirit of the 17th CPC National Congress and the scientific outlook on 
development and realized the sustainability of enterprises, society and environment in all respects. 
Chapter 4: Chinese Companies’ Corporate Social Responsibility in Employment: Case Studies 
© C. YUN 270
human rights at work, provide professional training and development, and pay employees 
legally and include social insurance.23 
 
Additionally, some of the companies that were researched indicated that they exercised 
CSR and created reports that relied on industrial CSR guidelines, such as Guidelines to 
Chinese Industrial Enterprises and Industrial Association of Social Responsibility 
(hereinafter ‘the Industrial Guidelines’).24 Chapter 5 of the Industrial Guidelines relates 
to CSR in employment with respect to health and safety, human rights, fair payment, 
employment engagement and professional training. For example, Rule 5.3.7.1 states that 
all employees should be protected not only under domestic legislation, but also under the 
prevention of any discrimination. Rules 5.3.7.5 and 5.3.7.7 mention that companies 
should establish trade unions under law to involve employees in the democratic 
management of companies and to allow them to express their opinion to employers.25 
 
Especially among the researched textile and apparel companies, CSC9000T is one of 
most effective and detailed industrial instructions on CSR in corporate governance in the 
industry. It is the main framework and self-evaluation system of CSR in employment.26 
                                                        
23
 SASAC Guidelines, Rule 13 and 14.  
24
 China Industrial CSR Instruction and Guideline (GSRI-CHINA 2.0) [中国工业协会及工业企业社会责
任指南, zhongguogongyexiehuijigongyeqiyeshehuizerenzhinan], Second Edition, was researched by the 
Industrial Association, academic institutions and NGOs, and originally published on 2 April 2008, available 
at:  
http://wenku.baidu.com/link?url=go-uriX5XR0P82S2f5NIOsL-VX5xH_cx_tc3V1z-0J0ShK3lA0_-NU1M
WKDnN0AJOcZocmy3zZ7DJd6JAeOtpUNebkq6IxrsGaGqQsEtiZa, last accessed on 1 June 2013.  
25
 Ibid., Chapter 5. 
26
 In the CSC9000T it is called ‘the process of PDCA: planning, doing, checking and acting’. To ‘plan’ is 
to establish the objectives and procedures necessary to deliver results in accordance with the enterprise’s 
Code of Conduct for Social Responsibility; to ‘do’ is to implement the procedures; to ‘check’ is to monitor 
and measure procedures against the enterprise’s Code of Conduct, objectives, targets, legal and other 
requirements, and report the results; and to ‘act’ is to take actions to continually improve the performance 
of the Social Responsibility Management System. 
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It set up a systematic process of ‘planning, doing, checking and improving’ CSR in 
employment under ILO Conventions which integrated the main stakeholder–employee 
interests into the business strategy and operation.27 The requirement of CSR in human 
rights; health and safety; employee engagement; fair payment; and so on was divided into 
details and turned into an evaluation sheet according to which employers are able to score 
the performance of CSR in employment specifically according to every single provision. 
 
Moreover, Chinese governments and companies widely recommended and adopted 
comprehensive international standards and initiatives in the implementation of CSR 
towards their employees. For instance, in some studied CSR reports, ISO26000 is the 
international standard of CSR that addresses the issues of organizational governance, 
human rights, labour practices, the environment, fair operating practices, consumer issues, 
and community engagement and development 28 Concerning CSR towards employees, 
provisions of human rights define that the notion and respect for human rights are widely 
regarded as essential to law, and concepts of social justice and fairness. States have a duty 
to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, while an organization has the responsibility to 
respect human rights within operations.29 The achievement of harmonized employment 
relationships, conditions of work and social protection, health and safety at work, 
employee dialogue, and human development and training in the workplace had been fully 
illustrated in the statement of labour practices.30 
 
                                                        
27 Ibid. 
28
 ISO26000 offers guidance on socially responsible behaviour and possible actions, and does not contain 
requirements that, in contrast to ISO management system standards, are not certifiable. It cannot be used as 
basis for audits, conformity tests and certificates or for any other kind of compliance statements. 
29
 ISO26000, Provision 6.3 Human Rights, available at: 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso26000.htm, last accessed on 12 March 2014.  
30
 Ibid., Provision 6.4 Labour Practices. 
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The UN Global Compact is another popular standard widely applied among Chinese 
companies. Some of the companies researched had adopted ten principles as the 
framework for decision-making and implementation of CSR. Among the principles, the 
aspects of human rights and workers are to eliminate the abuse of human rights and 
violation of enforced labour, child labour and occupational discrimination. Employee 
engagement is also ensured by the principle of collective bargaining and freedom of 
association. The adoption of the UN Global Compact is the great impetus and instruction 
for Chinese enterprises to achieve CSR towards their employees at the international level. 
 
4.2.3 Information disclosure and monitoring 
 
At the developing stage of implementing CSR, Chinese government departments show 
the major direction on how to disclose information on CSR. First, the SASAC Guidelines 
require that the state-owned enterprises under central government control should disclose 
CSR information: ‘Enterprises having experience in CSR work, should establish an 
information releasing mechanism, providing updated and regular information about CSR 
performance and sustainable development, plans and measures in carrying out CSR.’31 
 
The School of Modern Issues in the China Academy of Social Science published the 
Guideline on CSR Reporting Guides to define and improve the format and core issues of 
CSR reporting, largely applied in selected companies.32 It emphasized the different main 
                                                        
31
 See The SASAC Guidelines, Rule 18, supra note 23. 
32
 China Academy of Social Science, Chinese CSR Reporting Guide: It was firstly published in 
December 2009 as CASS-CSR 1.0, which was followed by a series of forums to discuss the operation and 
improvement of the guide. Then in September 2010 the guidebook had expanded its coverage, improved 
the indicator and updated the case studies at the international level that the academic panel, CSR experts 
and industry experts from governments, companies and academies are preparing the development of 
CASS-CSR 2.0, available at:  
http://wenku.baidu.com/view/332d131e6bd97f192279e92f.html, last accessed on 12 December 2013.  
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points of CSR in various industries through industrial research, including the factors in 
employment, and evaluated the performance, accuracy and efficiency of CSR reporting 
among companies and industries. 
 
More than 40% of companies in this research applied the GRI Reporting system to their 
CSR reports, because it is the benchmarked and globally accepted reporting initiative.33 
GRI offered companies a large amount of experience in enhancing the transparency and 
credibility in information disclosure, and made Chinese companies meet the international 
need for CSR. Furthermore, in the unified reporting system, companies can directly 
compare the performance of CSR with competitors through the clarified and identified 
reporting framework, within the same market, region or industry.  
 
Regarding CSR monitoring, some of the collected CSR reports were not verified through 
third-party audit, some of the reports had been audited by a third party, such as an 
assurance company, and some of the CSR reports were commented on by industrial or 
professional organizations or verified by a certification authority. Companies in the 
manufacturing industry use SA8000 verification to enhance the credibility of CSR reports 
that refer to the monitoring of child labour, discrimination, working hours, wages, 
freedom of association and so forth.34 Companies that submitted an application for 
SA8000 verification would be audited by a qualified authority under the SA8000 
Standard and awarded a certificate of SA8000 achievement. In addition, companies who 
                                                        
33
 The new version of GRI (G4) was officially updated in May 2013 after broad discussion and research by 
experts and companies. GRI (G4), available at:  
https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRIG4-Part1-Reporting-Principles-and-Standard-Disclosu
res.pdf, last accessed on 12 June 2013. 
34
 SA8000, the auditable certification standard that encourages organizations to develop, maintain and 
apply socially acceptable practices in the workplace, mainly in the field of CSR of employment, SA8000 
Standard, available at:  
http://www.sa-intl.org/_data/n_0001/resources/live/2008StdEnglishFinal.pdf, last accessed on 12 July 
2013.  
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allegedly applied the UN Global Compact to their CSR would be simultaneously 
monitored by the system, as mentioned in Chapter 3. 
 
4.3 Methodology 
 
According to the overview of the Chinese companies studied, the empirical and 
comparative case studies are depended on 77 CSR reports analysed with specific 
reference to their exercise of CSR in employment.35 As in Chapter 3, which dealt with 
CSR in UK companies, the collected data will be divided and summarized into five 
aspects, namely (i) health and safety; (ii) human rights; (iii) training and development; (iv) 
fair payment and welfare; and (v) employee engagement. Two additional factors will be 
included to judge the efficiency of the CSR reports in each column, namely (i) reporting 
system and (ii) monitoring. The comparison and analysis of the 77 Chinese CSR reports 
on how these companies improved their CSR in employment will also be implemented 
divisionally and comprehensively. However, because the total number of researched 
Chinese CSR reports is lower than for the UK, this chapter will only analyse one example 
of good reporting and one example of bad reporting in the vertical comparisons.  
 
4.4 Divisional comparison 
 
In this section, 77 Chinese companies that provided information in their reports were 
compared vertically and analysed according to each of the five aspects, namely (i) health 
and safety; (ii) human rights; (iii) training and development; (iv) fair payment and 
welfare; and (v) employee engagement. Their reporting and monitoring of reports were 
                                                        
35
 Among the Top 100 companies, 28 companies are in the industries of finance, real estate and high 
technology. However within the rest of the 72 companies, 10 companies lack applicable information 
disclosure about CSR in employment, so that 62 companies within Top 100 companies are eligible for this 
research. If the 15 randomly selected companies are included, the total number in the database is 77.  
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also analysed. Examples of good and bad reporting will show how companies sufficiently 
or insufficiently achieved CSR in employment in every sector, and if they had complied 
with minimum legal standards and advanced voluntary initiatives. 
 
4.4.1 Health and safety 
 
All 77 CSR reports indicated that the companies had revealed information about their 
implementation of health and safety in CSR in employment with respect to production 
safety, emergency control, professional health and other issues. China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation presented the best report in this regard, whereas Huayu Automotive 
System Corporation comparatively showed the poorest performance in information 
disclosure. 
 
4.4.1.1 Example of good reporting  
 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (hereinafter ‘CNOOC’) is the largest offshore 
oil and gas producer in China, and the biggest and monopolistic government-owned 
company operating directly under the SASAC of China. CNOOC was founded in 1982 
and is located in Beijing. The company evolved from a pure upstream 
oil-and-gas-exploiting company to an international energy company that provides 
primary businesses and a complete industrial chain. Through long-term development and 
innovation with the Second Leap Forward Programme.36 CNOOC has transformed its 
business model and adjusted the industry structure, ranging from traditional and main 
                                                        
36
 The Second Leap Forward Programme was created and pointed out by the CEO of CNOOC, Mr Yilin 
Wang, at the APEC Forum in December 2012. It was the leading innovation, aimed at enhancing the 
capacity of exploiting oil and gas in deep-sea area by the specific ‘981’ Drilling Platform System. 
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segments of oil and gas exploration and development, to refining gas, and power 
generation, engineering technical and professional services, alternative energies, and 
financial services.37 
 
As one of the most powerful state-owned companies, CNOOC implemented 
comprehensive policies on, and approaches to, CSR in employment, especially with 
respect to health and safety. According to the CNOOC CSR Report 2012, the protection 
of health and safety was divided into three aspects, namely (i) occupational health, (ii) 
operational safety and (iii) employee health care. 
 
As regards occupational health, CNOOC strictly complied with the Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on Prevention and Control of Occupational Diseases, and set up a 
systematic occupational health management system that kept close track of changes in the 
national occupational health regulations on construction projects, workplace, occupations 
such as occupational health surveillance, and other related areas, and implemented the 
assessment, review and inspection of Occupational Disease Hazards at Construction 
Projects and Health Management Rules for Offshore Workers. These data provided the 
identification, analysis and control of occupational disease risk factors with the purpose 
of improving the workplace environment and taking active measures to protect the health 
of employees. The company stated that: ‘We have, in 2012, reviewed 9 preliminary 
assessment reports, as well as reviewed assessment reports on the effects of control 
measures and inspected the completed protective facilities for occupational disease 
hazards at 3 projects. Additionally, we set forth new requirements on the assessment of 
the effects of control measures for occupational disease hazards.’38 
                                                        
37
 The overview of CNOOC is published through the corporate business introduction website, available at: 
http://en.cnooc.com.cn/data/html/english/channel_110.html, last accessed on 12 August 2013.  
38
 CNOOC, ‘Occupational health’, CSR Report 2012, 47, available at: 
http://www.cnooc.com.cn/data/kcxfzbg/2012en/online.htm, last accessed on 14 August 2013.  
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CNOOC commenced with educational programmes in occupational health, so-called 
occupational health awareness campaigns and training. It increased awareness among 
employees of the prevention and control of occupational diseases, and carried out onsite 
training for the management, occupational health managers and technical operators of the 
various companies, in order to promote proper practices for the management of 
occupational health, and the prevention and control of occupational disease hazards.39 
This mission was mainly achieved by the CNOOC General Hospital and the Worker’s 
Hospital of CNOOC Nanhai West Corporation who were responsible for providing 
medical assistance; field emergency medical service; routine diagnosis and treatment; 
healthcare; prevention; treatment of communicable diseases and food poisoning; and 
health awareness and education.40 
 
With respect to operational safety, and specifically production safety, CNOOC aimed to 
create a safe working environment, and reduce the rate of injury and accident. It had 
reported 117 cases of reportable injuries and no fatal accident among employees in 
2012.41 The company ensured operational safety through investigation, tracking and 
elimination of major hazards that endangered facilities, equipment and the onsite 
environment. In addition, the CSR Report revealed that CNOOC had compiled 
Guidelines on Preparing On-Site Emergency Response Action Plans and guided the 
various business units in developing emergency plans to push the development of the 
emergency management information system.42 
 
                                                        
39
 Ibid., 48–49. 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Ibid. 
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Employee health care in CNOOC was exercised through routine employee health tests, 
diagnoses and recovery treatment, especially in mental health care. The company 
established a specific department to deal with employees’ mental health crises; it built 
stress management models, and offered stress management and mental health services. 
This team carried out in-depth research into the cause, development and effects of mental 
stress in employees to build up employees’ psychology and optimism.43 A series of 
actions in healthcare protection ensured that employees kept physically and 
psychologically healthy at work which would enhance efficiency among the workers. 
 
The CNOOC CSR report was edited through the GRI Reporting System and verified by 
the paid-service GRI Application Level Check and free-charge service, the Sustainability 
Disclosure Database, to ensure that the information in the report was accurate and 
credible. CNOOC had invited the CSR Research Centre of the Economics Division at the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences to rate and assess the CNOOC’s CSR report with 
respect to completeness, materiality, balance, comparability, readability and creativity. 
The research centre commented as follows on the overall rating: ‘Through evaluation and 
deliberations, the rating team agreed to rate China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
Sustainability Report 2012 as leading by giving a four-and-a-half star (in a five-star) 
rating to it.’44 The third-party audit had objectively evaluated the quality of the CNOOC 
CSR report which made it reliable to the public. 
 
4.4.1.2 Example of bad reporting 
 
Huayu Automotive System Corporation 
                                                        
43
 Ibid., 69. 
44
 Third-party assessment of the report was conducted by experts in the CSR Research Centre of 
Economics Division of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. See CNOOC CSR Report 2012, supra note 
38, 83. 
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Huayu Automotive Systems Corporation (hereinafter ‘Huayu’), was listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2009. Its headquarters are located in Shanghai. The 
company focuses independently on research and development, production, and marketing 
of automotive components. It has its six core business divisions: (i) metal forming and 
dies, (ii) interior and exterior trimming, (iii) electric and electronics parts, (iv) functional 
parts, (v) hot-worked parts, and (vi) new energy parts. By the end of 2012, the company 
had held a total capital stock of 2.58 billion shares, consolidated total assets of 
RMB48.24 billion and collected sales revenue of RMB108.924 billion.45 The company 
had set up 28 invested companies and 188 bases. It employed up to 80,000 employees for 
research and development, manufacturing, and customer service in 19 provinces, cities 
and autonomous regions.46 
 
Among the CSR reports collected, the information contained in the Huayu CSR report 
was comparatively weak and incomplete, with little detail and reportable data, especially 
regarding health and safety in employment. The Huayu CSR Report 2012 stated that the 
company had strictly complied with relevant legislation to implement management in 
health and safety, evaluated safety crisis and control, and had prevented occupational 
disease from breaking out among employees. Moreover, about 44 company-owned 
businesses had been accredited by OHSAS18001, with no critical injury, accident or fire 
hazard.47 
 
                                                        
45
 Introduction to Huayu Automotive System Corporation is revealed on the company’s website, available 
at: http://www.huayu-auto.com/english/gsgk/gsjj/index.shtml, last accessed on 1 June 2014 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Huayu Automotive System Corporation, ‘Production Safety’, CSR Report 2012, 17, available at: 
http://www.sustainabilityreport.cn/ReportShow.asp?ReportId=5001, last accessed on 1 June 2013.  
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The brief description of the company’s implementation of health and safety lacks 
effective information that the public could access to show them how Huayu had 
performed corporate governance to achieve health and safety in employment in the 
workplace. First, the report mentioned the adoption of regulations. However, it did not 
explain the specific laws that applied in practice. Additionally, the report had little 
information about precise management policies and procedure in health and safety; what 
assessment the company had used; and the result of the assessment after evaluation and 
analysis. Furthermore, this report contains no reportable data on the number of injuries, 
occupational disease outbreaks and accidents at work. Moreover, the Huayu CSR Report 
2012 had not been verified by any reporting or monitoring system, such as the GRI 
Reporting System or the UN Global Compact. It had also not been audited by a third 
party, which largely reduced its credibility, the quality of the statements and the CSR 
report itself to the public. 
 
4.4.2 Human rights 
 
Human rights is both a legal and voluntary notion that had been adopted by employers as 
an important CSR issue in employment. According to the research conducted into 77 
Chinese company CSR reports, the vast majority of companies demonstrated their 
exercise of human rights in their reports, such as equal opportunities for employees, or 
respect for disabilities or women staff members. China Shenhua Energy Company stated 
comprehensively how it had achieved human rights in CSR, while the China State 
Engineering Construction Corporation is an example of the exact opposite. 
 
4.4.2.1 Example of good reporting 
 
China Shenhua Energy Company 
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China Shenhua Energy Company (hereinafter ‘China Shenhua’) is a completely 
state-owned company founded in October 1995 with the approval of the State Council. It 
is listed in Hong Kong and Shanghai, and is a so-called super large-scale energy 
enterprise with coal as its core business. It is also involved in the fields of electric power, 
railway, port, shipping, coal-to-liquids and coal chemical engineering, and integrates 
production, transportation and sales. The company is China’s largest and most advanced 
coal enterprise, and the largest coal distributor in the world. It was ranked at 234 on the 
Global Top 500 Enterprises 2012 by Fortune Magazine. The company, which employs 
211,500 employees, set itself the goal of being an internationally competitive and 
first-class coal and energy enterprise, and treated its resource of human capital as one of 
the main components in its corporate governance and development.48 
 
In the 2012 CSR report China Shenhua greatly emphasized respect for employees’ human 
rights at work, in order to build up harmonious employment relations On the minimum 
legal basis of the official labour law and labour contract law, the company set up the 
principle of ‘equality, free will and mutual agreement’ to implement the company-wide 
labour contract system, the collective contract system and the employee representative 
committee system.49 A series of policies on human rights ensured no forced labour at 
work, and employees’ freedom of association to assert their legal rights and interests. 
The company promised no sexual and regional discrimination, and provided job 
opportunities to the disabled and ethnic minority through creating work arrangements that 
were specific to the posts of the disabled. It also showed respect for the habits of ethnic 
                                                        
48
 The company introduction to China Shenhua Energy Company is revealed on the official website, 
available at: http://www.shenhuagroup.com.cn/english/about0us/profile0of0shenhua/index.shtml, last 
accessed on 12 July 2013. 
49
 ‘Human Rights of Employees’, China Shenhua Energy Company CSR Report 2012, 52, available at: 
http://www.sustainabilityreport.cn/ReportShow.asp?ReportId=5497, last accessed on 12 July 2013.  
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minorities, such as in meeting their dietary and religious need. The company’s CSR 
Report stated that at the end of 2012 the company had a total of 278 disabled employees 
and 4,551 ethnic minority employees.50 
 
China Shenhua gave employees with low levels of education access to work. The number 
of such employees reached 41,908 out of a total workforce of 89,144 employees.51 About 
half of the employees are below the level of college graduate, but enjoy respect and equal 
opportunities at work.52 The company’s Department of Human Resources is expected to 
provide lowly educated employees, who are mostly engaged in labour-focused work, with 
fair treatment and ensured welfare. Moreover, because employers generally preferred to 
recruit highly educated people, the employment of poorly educated employees was done 
with a view to reducing social unemployment.53 
 
Since the company is involved in coal mining and railway industries, male employees 
largely dominate the staff complement in the company. In the 2012 CSR report it had 
been calculated that at the end of 2012 the company had a total of 17,542 women 
employees, accounting for 19.7% of total employees.54 In order to show its respect for 
equal human rights to women employees, the company had arranged positions for women 
workers according to workload and working conditions. The Female Worker Committee, 
which is primarily responsible for matters relating to women workers, had implemented a 
special collective contract for women workers to safeguard their legitimate rights and 
special interests; introduced specific measures to safeguard the rights and interests of 
                                                        
50
 Ibid. 
51
 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., 54. 
53
 Ibid., 53. 
54
 Ibid. 
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women employees; and made rational adjustments to their vacation, healthcare 
arrangements and labour protection supplies.55 
 
China Shenhua’s CSR report was drafted on the structure and guidelines of the GRI 
Reporting System and was verified by GRI Level Application Check. It stated that ‘China 
Shenhua Energy Company had presented its 2012 CSR Report to GRI’s Report Services, 
which concluded that the report had fulfilled the requirement of Application Level B+.’56 
Moreover, the CSR Report 2012 had also been audited by KPMG China branch, which 
declared that ‘[b]ased on the procedures performed, as described above, nothing has 
come to our attention that causes us to believe that the SR Report of CSEC for the year 
ended 31 December 2012 is not presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance 
with the disclosure recommendations of the SSE Guidelines.’57 The double third-party 
audit by official and professional organizations enhances the authenticity and credibility 
of the report, and it is more persuasive and acceptable to the public.  
 
4.4.2.2 Example of bad reporting 
 
China State Engineering Construction Corporation 
 
China State Engineering Construction Corporation (hereinafter ‘China Construction’) is a 
state-owned and backed enterprises, with construction and real estate as its core business. 
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It was established in 1982 with the State Administration of Building Construction as its 
precursor.58 It developed in both domestic and overseas markets, and the corporation has 
grown into China’s largest construction and real estate industry and contractor of building 
works. It achieved its goal of becoming the largest transnational construction company in 
the developing countries and the top home-builder in the world.59 Until 2012, China 
Construction had conducted business with 100 countries around the world and had 
reached accumulated global contracts of RMB4 trillion. This state-owned company 
firmly performs its political, social and economic responsibilities. It generates 
approximately 800,000 jobs in society each year and helps over 2.5 million people from 
these 800,000 families to lead well-off lives.60 
 
As the company has a huge need for human resources, especially migrant labourers, the 
concern of employees’ interests became one of the focal issues in corporate governance. 
However, China Construction adopted a very limited range to disclose its performance 
about employees’ human rights in its CSR Report 2012. The report stated: ‘We treat all 
employees equally, regardless of their sex, age, nationality, religion and cultural 
background. We abide by the relevant laws and regulations of the project location, 
boycotting child labour and prohibiting forced labour.’61 From this statement, it seemed 
like general policies that were no different from the strategies employed in other 
companies who also protected employees’ human rights. It did not refer in detail to how 
the company safeguarded human rights among employees and what legal basis had been 
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applied as minimum standard in practice. For a company with so many migrant workers, 
the China Construction CSR Report 2012 disclosed no information relevant to the 
specific protection of this special group of workers. 
 
China Construction’s performance in protecting its employees’ human rights was 
ambiguously described in its 2012 CSR Report. However, the company contended that its 
CSR implementation and the report itself strictly complied with the GRI Reporting 
Guidelines and instructions of ISO26000. The company was monitored externally by a 
third-party auditor, Tuv Nord, and evaluated by the CSR Research Centre of the China 
Academy of Social Science through professional observation and analysis, which 
guarantees the quality and consistency of China Construction CSR Report 2012 to public 
readers.62 Although the company’s CSR Report was drafted on the basis of international 
standards, and externally verified by auditors and other professionals, the content on 
human rights lacks a precise and effective statement on the company’s CSR performance. 
The result is that the audit amounts to a ‘window-dressing’ process for the benefit of the 
public in order to ensure the reliability of China’s Construction’s CSR Report. Because 
auditing is the tool used to verify the authenticity of the report, if the information 
disclosure itself is not sufficient and precise, the monitoring is not meaningful to the 
public.  
 
4.4.3 Training and development 
 
In order to attract potential employees and improve their professional capacity, all 
researched companies carried out employee training and development. This increased 
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companies profit and broadened the career path of their employees. Among the 77 
Chinese company CSR reports, China Southern Airline Holding Company presented 
varied and systematic programmes of training and development in CSR, while Tongling 
Nonferrous Metal Group Holding Corporation only provided a brief introduction to the 
implementation of employee training and development in its published information. 
 
4.4.3.1  Example of good reporting 
 
China Southern Air Holding Company 
 
China Southern Air Holding Company (hereinafter ‘CSAH’) is a state-owned air 
transportation group, with China Southern Airlines as its core entity. Together with the 
assets and flight operations of Xinjiang Airlines and China Northern Airlines, it is under 
the direct control of the SASAC. The company was established on 11 October 2002 and 
was publicly listed in New York and Hong Kong in 1997, and the holding company was 
listed on the Shanghai Stock Market in 2003. 63  Its business interests cover air 
transportation and cargo logistics; import and export trading; financing; construction and 
development; media; and advertising. CSAH employs over 80,000 employees, manages 
assets in excess of RMB200 billion and transported more than 86.46 million passengers 
in 2012 alone.64 The potential international airline has established 42 domestic offices 
and 56 global branches all over the world to achieve its goals of ‘Customer First, 
Respecting Staff, Advantage, Continuous Innovation and Favorable Return’.65  
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As a state-owned company with a vast number of employees, CSAH created a series of 
classified training and development plans for all staff members; among both management 
and staff. The CSAH CSR Report 2012 introduced the leadership learning map for 
management that included training programmes aimed at improving employees at top, 
middle and basic management levels.66 First, the aim was to strength the training for top 
management, which improved their managerial and executive competencies. This was 
accomplished through exchanging top managers between different airports or airlines to 
learn advanced practices and effective operation in corporate governance.67 Second, the 
quality training offered mid-level managerial staff comprised on-the-job training courses, 
seminars and advanced courses to enhance managerial capability at work.68 Third, higher 
education programmes for basic-level management were offered in co-operation with 
Tsinghua University, which provided continuing education in major subjects such as 
management, law and human resources, which greatly boosted employees’ vision, talent 
and managerial skills.69 
 
In addition, in the CSR Report 2012, CSAH stated that it had adopted a system of 
ensuring the steady progress of staff training through a credit system. In terms of this 
system, frontline employees could participate in training courses related to their job 
requirements, individual interest and career development plan.70 When employees had 
earned enough credits, they would be granted a certificate and the qualification to 
compete for higher posts. Owing to the international recruitment of foreign pilots and 
flight attendants, the company offered a series of customized professional training 
courses to improve cabin service skills, communication and management.71 
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Moreover, from 2012, CSAH started the ‘temporary employees turn regular’ recruiting 
test to extend the career development path to its staff members. After a period of training 
and learning, the temporary employees could voluntarily attend the company’s internal 
recruitment process. Once they had passed the test, the company would transfer their 
temporary employment to regular employment. At the end of 2012, 35 temporary 
employees had successfully passed the recruitment competition and became regular flight 
attendants and administrative clerks. This initiative highly stimulated employees’ 
motivation to enhance their personal capability and skills, and discovered employees’ 
talent and potential in the workplace.72 
 
The CSAH CSR Report 2012 claimed the strict application of GRI Guidelines for the 
reporting system, so that it would systematically ensure the completion of information in 
the report. Furthermore, this report was also externally audited by a third party, Bureau 
Veritas, which is a global professional company that offers testing, inspection and 
certification services. It had evaluated the CSAH CSR Report 2012 and noted on the 
certificate that it issued, the Bureau Veritas Certificate, that the information and data 
included in the scope of our assurance were accurate, reliable and free from material 
mistake or misstatement. This information is presented in a clear, understandable and 
accessible manner; the report provides a fair and balanced representation of activities of 
China Southern during the year 2012. China Southern had established appropriate 
systems for the collection, aggregation and analysis of relevant information.73 The third 
party greatly confirmed the methodology and content of the report, which increased the 
credibility and applicability of the report to public readers. 
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4.4.3.2 Example of bad reporting 
 
Tongling Nonferrous Metal Group Holding Corporation 
 
Tongling Nonferrous Metal Group Holding Corporation (hereinafter ‘Tongling 
Nonferrous Metals’) was founded in December 1949 and put into production in June 
1952, It located to Tongling City, Anhui Province, which is one of the cradles of China’s 
Bronze Culture and given the name ‘Chinese Ancient Bronze Capital’. 74  After 
development of more than 60 years, the group has become an extra-large-scale 
state-owned company that has as its core business nonferrous metals, chemicals and 
equipment manufacture. It is mainly engaged in geological exploration; mining; mineral 
processing; copper, lead and zinc smelting and refining; and other metal production. In 
Tongling Nonferrous Metals the output of its main product, cathode copper, ranks among 
the international top 5 producers, leading in the volume of export and import in the 
industry. As one of China’s Top 500 enterprises, the Group established economic, 
technical and trade co-operation relationships with more than 30 countries and regions 
around the world, and participated in resource exploration and development in many 
countries such as Chili, Peru, Canada and Ecuador.75 
 
The implementation of employee training and development in Tongling Nonferrous 
Metals was reflected in its CSR Report 2012 as that the group had revised its Annual 
Training and Development Plan 2012. In terms of the plan, it was a four-step 
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arrangement, including continual study by mid and top management, post training, 
qualification and development of skills, and skills competition.76 
 
Employee training and development in the Tongling Nonferrous Metals CSR Report 
2012 were described in only four sentences, without a detailed statement about how every 
stage of the plan had been achieved through precise performance. Simultaneously, the 
whole report was disclosed in free style and not monitored by any third-party audit. 
Owing to the lack of applicable information, the CSR Report 2012 was comparatively 
impractical and useless to public users, and the credibility of the report is open to 
question. 
 
4.4.4 Fair payment and welfare 
 
Under the official labour contract law, employers are required to pay their employees 
legal salaries and social security. Using the minimum standards as a basis, many 
companies provided extra welfare, commercial insurance and funding to improve 
employees’ interests. Of the 77 Chinese company CSR reports collected for research 
purposes, 98% had illustrated how they ensured employees’ legal interest in CSR. 
Qingdao Haier Group showed good performance and disclosed the details about how it 
had implemented this issue, whereas China Northern Railway Company provided little 
reliable information in its CSR report. 
 
4.4.4.1 Example of good reporting 
 
Qingdao Haier Group 
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Qingdao Haier Group (hereinafter ‘Haier) was founded in 1984 and initially listed on 
Shanghai Stock Market in November 1993. In the past 28 years, through its innovative 
strategies and rapid development, Haier has transformed its business format from an 
insolvent collectively owned factory, Qingdao Refrigerator Factory, on the brink of 
bankruptcy, into the number 1 global home appliance brand.77 The company conducts 
business ranging from manufacturing electronic appliance and sales; to research and 
development in chemical products; real estates; information technology; and business 
consultation. Haier went through four phases during its development: (i) brand building, 
(ii) diversification, (iii) internationalization and (iv) global top branding. Until 2012, the 
business had diversified not only in Asia, but also in the US, Europe, Middle East, Africa 
and Australia. It globally owns 29 manufacturing centres, 19 overseas branches, and over 
50,000 employees.78 
 
Owing to its large need for human resources, Haier has implemented various effective 
salary and welfare mechanisms to attract potential employees and maintain stable 
employment relationships. In the Haier CSR Report 2012 the company stated that the 
Diamond Model mechanism, which ensured employees’ salaries and other welfare, was 
the most optimized and satisfactory system used among employees, including a 
programme of periodical payment, diversified welfare, and the ‘Happy Life’ welfare 
plan.79 
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The term payment programme was classified into short-term payment, medium-term 
payment and long-term payment, in respect of which employees would be paid and 
rewarded according to the respective periods that they had worked. Short-term payment is 
defined as ‘the fixed salary that employees would be paid monthly according to the 
amount regulated in their labour contract’. Medium-term payment is the incentive and 
competitive award paid at the end of each year, which is the annual bonus related to 
employees’ post, performance and achievement. 80  For example, employees in the 
Department of Sales would obtain an annual bonus by enhancing sales volumes within a 
financial year, while the reward for employees in the Department of Manufacturing 
would be related to the quantity and quality of products. Long-term payment is in the 
form of the Long-term Incentive Reward that people who have been employed for more 
than 15 years in Haier would receive. Long-term employees would receive an increased 
bonus according to the length of their employment, and longer paid holidays as incentive 
standards.81 
 
In addition, Haier offered its employees a series of welfare benefits, including legally 
required insurance and extra welfare benefits. As the Labour and Contract Law and 
Social Securities Act regulates, the company provided a welfare package, the so-called 
Five Social Securities and One Funding to all employees.82 It comprised endowment 
insurance, medical insurance, unemployment insurance, pregnancy insurance, injury 
insurance and housing funding. Furthermore, in order to improve medical treatment, 
Haier purchased extra medical insurance from commercial insurance companies and 
enhanced the amount of health care. 83  Moreover, a supplementary pension is the 
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additional welfare afforded by the employer. With the annual accumulation, employees’ 
pension will be increased after retirement. 
 
The Happy Life Programme aims to create relaxing working conditions for employees 
through paid holidays, flexible holidays and varied care to their families. The strategy of 
flexible holidays is to ensure that employees arrange their working and leisure time 
properly, and to improve effective time management. In order to encourage staff to 
concentrate at work, the family care the company offers assists employees in relieving 
family burdens. The programme includes donations to particular families that are in 
poverty or need specific help. Haier is particularly concerned about the development of 
its employees’ children and has included this in its family care action plans. Among other 
things, the company provides its employees’ children with gifts on International 
Children’s Day or on the children’s birthday.84 
 
The Haier CSR Report 2012 was disclosed under the GRI Reporting Guidelines and 
self-checked through the free-charge service, the Sustainability Disclosure Database, so 
that the completion of information would be primarily ensured within the GRI system.85 
In addition, the China Household Appliances Association (hereinafter ‘the Association) 
had commented on the report at the beginning of 2013, generally stating that its 
observation of the company’s behaviour and CSR Report 2012 was that the Haier Group 
had shown good performance in CSR and was leading the new innovation of social 
responsibility in the industry of household appliances.86 Although the comment from the 
Association is not as professional, comprehensive and accurate as that of audit firms, it 
basically verified the authenticity of Haier’s actions as stated in its CSR report. 
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4.4.4.2  Example of bad reporting 
 
China North Railway Corporation 
 
China North Railway Corporation (hereinafter ‘CNR) is a listed company approved by 
the State Council, SASAC, and China Securities Regulatory Commission, located in 
Beijing.87 This leading railway company includes the research, development, design, 
manufacturing, refurbishment, overhaul and service of rolling stock (including multiple 
units), urban rail vehicles, engineering machinery, electromechanical equipment, 
electronic equipment and related units. CNR’s rolling stock and urban railway vehicles 
occupied over 50% of the domestic market, and had been exported to more than 70 
countries and regions.88 CNR is the largest supplier of wind generators, oil drilling rigs 
and railway cranes in China. The development and competitiveness of the company is 
backed up by a huge research and innovation group comprising 11,600 professional 
technicians, 1 high-speed train state engineering laboratory, 2 state pilot innovative 
enterprises, 3 postdoctoral workstations, 4 research and development centres, 
5 high-technology enterprises and 6 state-authorized enterprise technical centres.89 
 
It is assumed that a company ranked in a top national position with a large number of 
employees would have established precise and applicable strategies to deal with 
employment payment and welfare. However, the CNR CSR Report 2012 contained little 
detailed information on how employees’ salaries and welfare had been provided. The 
report mentioned that in terms of the official labour contract law, the company only 
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ensured 100% coverage of employees’ social securities, including endowment, medical 
and unemployment insurance. In addition, CNR implemented family assistance to solve 
problems involving retired employees or employees from poor families.90 
 
The statement of employee welfare treatment looks more like headings, rather than 
proper descriptive information explaining how the employer covered assistance to its 
employees. The report also lacks a statement regarding the wage mechanism, for example, 
what is the standard for basic salaries or how are employees rewarded through 
performance-based salary increases. The little reported information leads to weak 
persuasion of the public, and the lack of external monitoring, reduced the credibility of 
the CNR CSR report among the public. 
 
4.4.5 Employee engagement 
 
Most of the 77 Chinese companies researched referred to the aspect of employee 
engagement in their CSR reports, in order to bridge the communication gap between 
employees and top management in corporate governance. As regards information 
disclosure about employee engagement, the TCL Group provided relatively the most 
comprehensive and credible detail, and had undergone a third-party audit. In contrast, Jiu 
Gang Steel Corporation showed the worst performance in all the CSR reports on the issue 
of employee engagement. 
 
4.4.5.1  Example of good reporting 
 
TCL Group 
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The TCL Group (hereinafter ‘TCL’) was founded in Guangdong Province in 1981 as one 
of the largest consumer electronics enterprises in China. It has a global presence with 
three listed companies, namely (i) TCL Corporation, (ii) TCL Multimedia and (iii) 
TCL Communication, that support the group in the international market. In over 30 years 
of diligent development and innovation TCL has created outstanding achievements and 
many ‘firsts’ in China: the first wireless landline telephone; the first 28 inch colour 
television set, the first diamond-inlaid mobile telephone and the first Chinese-made 
dual-core processor laptop computer.91 From 1999 TCL has gone beyond the domestic 
market, and moved forward in the European and US markets. By the end of 2012, the 
company employed more than 60,000 people and owned more than 40 sales offices 
around the world, supporting the TCL dream of ‘The Creative Life’.92 
 
TCL set up harmonized employment relationships in its company through varied 
approaches to employee engagement in corporate governance. In the TCL CSR 
Report 2012 the group lists five typical actions that refer to employee participation within 
the company, namely (i) employee forum, (ii) employee survey, (iii) development of 
trade unions, (iv) media communication and (v) employee voice.93 
 
In the report it is stated that the group and each department regularly held forums 
involving top management and employees to solve problems and focus on issues 
mentioned by staff members. In these forums employees were given access to publicly 
and directly reveal the shortcomings in their place of work, and to express their 
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expectations about work and life, while top management would give its response as soon 
as possible. The results of the feedback would be monitored by employee 
representatives.94 
 
The employee survey was an anonymous method used to rank employees’ satisfaction 
with the company’s corporate policy and governance in employment. The questionnaire 
was distributed among apprentices and medium- to high-level engineers who were new 
participants in the business and superior technicians. The survey covered ten factors, 
including career development, difficulty at work, communication with top management 
and harmony in teamwork.95 
 
The trade union is the basic organization that connects employees with the company and 
safeguards employees’ interests. It affords employees the opportunity to assert their rights; 
complain about, and appeal against, violations of their rights; and to claim compensation 
in cases where their rights have been violated.96 In the case of TLC, the trade union 
reflected employees’ interests and needs to the company’s decision-making body after 
frequent communication with staff and employee representatives at meetings. As the 
intermediate body, it also submitted proposals to top management referring to issues on 
how to meet employees’ interests, and to balance the company’s development and 
profit.97 
 
TCL established a media team to edit the inhouse publication, Company Newspaper, and 
to publish and update news and information for employees, in order to ensure their right 
to know. In 2012 the Company Newspaper had disseminated much news related to, 
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among other things, all important decisions, changes and activities in the company; new 
policies on corporate governance; and employee awards and punishment, which provided 
the path for employees to monitor corporate behaviour internally.98 
 
TCL created the ‘Voice Wall’ in the workplace so that employees could express their 
voice by sticking notes on the wall, anonymously. Staff posted their advice, ideas, 
expectations and dissatisfaction to the company on the wall at any time. The employer 
would duly collect employees’ opinion and take action. It has been the most regular and 
direct approach for people to speak up and has enhanced the efficiency of communication 
in employment.99 
 
The TCL CSR Report 2012 was edited under the Shenzhen Stock Market CSR Disclosure 
Guidelines and GRI Guidelines, so that the company could verify the completion of 
information through the GRI free-charge Sustainability Disclosure Database.100 The 
report was monitored by the China Electronic Image Association and Commercial Value 
Magazine as an external audit and for comment. Commercial Value Magazine said that 
TCL had largely achieved CSR and the goal of ‘green business’ in corporate governance, 
and created a positive corporate image in the competitive global market.101 This valuable 
evaluation of the performance of CSR in TCL confirmed the implementation of CSR in 
the company, and enhanced the authenticity of the published information in TCL’s 2012 
CSR report.102 
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4.4.5.2  Example of bad reporting 
 
Jiu Gang Steel Corporation 
 
Jiu Gang Steel Corporation (hereinafter ‘JISCO) was founded in 1958 in Jiu Quan, Gansu 
Province. The main sectors in which the company is involved cover steel mining and 
production, iron making, mechanical manufacture, and welding material. 103  The 
company has been among the China’s Top 100 companies for decades and was listed on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2000 and has assets worth RMB87 billion. JISCO is a 
state-owned company that employs 37,800 employees, and owns more than 50 
subordinate units and more than 30 controlled branches and affiliates.104 
 
The JISCO Sustainability Report 2012 reflects the goal of building up positive 
employment relationships through collective bargaining and democratic management. 
The company organized different levels of trade unions to ensure its staff’s interests and 
to protect employees’ rights to know, to engage and to monitor, so that people were able 
to participate in corporate affairs within the broadest range.105 In addition, in order to 
enhance corporate cohesion, trade unions hosted various employee activities monthly, 
such as entertainment shows, football matches and yoga training.106 
 
As regards the Sustainability Report, the information on employee engagement was more 
like a general policy or notion, and provided no detail on how the company engaged 
                                                        
103
 Overview of Jiu Gang Steel Corporation is published on corporate profile, available at: 
http://www.jiugang.com/structure/ywlm/ezjjg/gp, last accessed on 1 November 2013. 
104
 Ibid. 
105
 JISCO Steel Sustainability Report 2012, the chapter on Protecting Employees’ Interests, available at: 
http://www.sustainabilityreport.cn/ReportShow.asp?ReportId=5144, last accessed on 1 November 2013. 
106
 Ibid. 
Chapter 4: Chinese Companies’ Corporate Social Responsibility in Employment: Case Studies 
© C. YUN 300
employees in corporate governance and activities. Employee engagement should be 
achieved through some approaches to communication or connection. The report 
contained little description in this respect, which leads to incomplete information 
disclosure. Moreover, although employees are conferred the rights to internal monitoring 
of the company’s CSR performance, the sustainability report had not been monitored or 
audited externally by a third party. Therefore, the authenticity and reliability of the brief 
report might be doubted and questioned by the public. 
 
4.5 Comprehensive comparison 
 
Divisional comparison is different from comprehensive comparison of companies’ good 
or bad CSR performance in employment, which is assessed through their CSR reports. In 
this section a sample of companies will be used to assess comprehensive CSR reporting 
in a horizontal comparison to illustrate how Chinese companies achieved CSR in 
employment in every area mentioned as reflected in all reported material, such as their 
CSR report or annual report, with respect to health and safety; human rights; training and 
development; employee payment and welfare; employee engagement; and relevant 
auditing. Among the 77 company reports that were researched, China Resources Power 
Holdings Company provided the public with the highest-quality CSR report, whereas 
Shanxi Coal Import & Export Group Corporation showed poor performance in 
information disclosure in its CSR report. 
 
4.5.1 Example of good reporting 
 
China Resources Power Holdings Company 
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China Resources Power Holdings Company (hereinafter ‘CR Power’) wholly owns 
coal-fired generation projects all over China and was incorporated in Hong Kong on 
27 August 2001. The company has authorized capital of HK$10 billion and was listed on 
the Main Board of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited on 12 November 2003.107 
It is involved in the investment, development, operation and management of power plants. 
The company is the leading power generation business. CR Power’s overall power 
capacity is 40% in Eastern China, 21% in Central China, 20% in Southern China, 10% in 
North-eastern China and 9% in Northern China. 108  CR Power employed over 
400,000 people in the fields of production and distribution of daily consumer goods, 
properties and related industries, infrastructure, and utilities.109 As one of the most 
powerful companies in China with a large number of employees, CR Power performed 
positively in CSR in employment. The company ensured its employees’ interest in 
various aspects which was accurately reflected in the CR Power CSR Report. In the 
section that follows, the CR Power CSR Report 2011 will be used as the most updated 
information, to demonstrate how the company comprehensively achieved CSR in 
employment.110 
 
4.5.1.1 Health and safety 
 
To attain the goal of ‘no accidents, no threats to health and responsibility to the society’, 
CR Power has created a professional and efficient five-tier safety management and 
surveillance system to assure health and safety in the workplace. In 2011 CR Power 
issued the Safety Evaluation Criteria, 28 Key Measures for Prevention of Major 
                                                        
107
 China Resource Power Holdings Company, the overview of, and introduction to, the company were 
stated in the company’s profile’ on the company’s website, available at: 
http://www.cr-power.com/en/article.asp?cid=95&nav=1, last accessed on 12 September 2013. 
108
 Ibid. 
109
 Ibid. 
110
 Ibid. 
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Accidents in Power Production, Accident Investigation Procedures, and Regulations 
Against Rule Breaking Behaviours; and compiled safety management guidelines such as 
the Comprehensive Emergency Plan.111 In the process of production safety management, 
CR Power focused on its emergency management system to prepare emergency drills and 
set up a rescue team for dynamic crisis management, which enhanced safety awareness 
among employees and trained their ability to respond to emergencies.112 
 
Additionally, the company implemented a range of safety and risk prevention systems, 
within the framework of the regulations set by the National Occupational Safety 
Association (hereinafter ‘NOSA’), called the ‘Safety, Health and Environmental 
Protection System’, and incorporated it into its corporate governance. Spot inspection and 
regular technical supervision were successfully launched to reduce the danger of 
accidents and injury during work. The indicator of injury and accidents at work was also 
disclosed independently and in the company’s CSR report to the public. Under the NOSA 
five-star safety management system, CR Power carried out a series of safety education 
and training programmes among employees, including Safety Month Activities, Safety 
Essay Contests and Fire-fighting Skills Competition.113 
 
Moreover, CR Power strictly complied with the Code of Occupational Disease 
Prevention, and the regulations on occupational disease prevention in local provinces and 
cities. The company tried to improve employees’ health management network and 
provided health checks for them on a regular basis. The company paid much more 
attention to frontline employees, such as coal miners. It offered them specific physical 
                                                        
111
 ‘Production Safety and Employee Health and Safety’, CR CSR Report 2011 (English Edition), 46-49 
and 63, available at: http://www.cr-power.com/download/CPS1210014_E.pdf, last accessed on 12 March 
2014. 
112
 Ibid. 
113
 ‘Emergency Control and Management’, see CR CSR Report 2011, supra note 111, 48–49. 
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examinations of their lungs, liver, heart and nose, in order to prevent occupational disease 
due to the dust, polluted air and radiation.114 
 
4.5.1.2  Human rights 
 
CR Power adheres to the philosophy that ‘everything depends on the people and 
everything is for the people’.115 In the light of this, it pursues the mutual development of 
both employees and the business. Therefore, it is necessary to fully respect employees’ 
human rights and create a friendly, harmonious and pleasant working environment for all 
employees. Under the official labour law and labour contract law, the company 
conducted a transparent and free recruitment and promotion programme; and provided 
equal opportunities to its staff, regardless of sex, religion, race or age.116 Discrimination 
and forced labour in employment are absolutely forbidden under national and 
international legislation.117 
 
By the end of 2011, CR Power, including its subsidiaries, employed 6,400 women staff 
members in a total of 36,400 employees, making up 17.6% of the total number of 
employees. Except for male-specific work, such as coal mining, all posts and work 
opportunities are equally available to women employees. Furthermore, the company 
showed special respect to women employees, through its protection of pregnant women 
employees, special health checks for women employees and gifts to women employees 
on International Woman’s Day.118 
 
                                                        
114
 ‘Employee Health and Safety and Occupational Disease’, see CR CSR Report 2011, supra note 111, 63. 
115
 ‘Employees’ Human Rights’, see CR CSR Report 2011, supra note 111, 62. 
116
 Ibid. 
117
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4.5.1.3 Training and development 
 
In order to improve employees’ value, CR Power implemented the Job Sequence 
Management Scheme of CR Power, which allows employees to develop on a dual-career 
path in their professional development through systematic training. In its 2011 CSR 
report it stated that the company had organized training for more than 38,000 staff 
members, involving 11 training opportunities to managers, covering 152 core managers. 
Such courses were designed for the training of highly talented employees, newly 
appointed general managers and current general managers.119 
 
In addition, varied training was offered in the latest division, the Renewable Energy 
Department. The training courses were specially designed for ‘newly appointed chief 
commanders’ and ‘newly appointed leaders of wind farms’, including all newly promoted 
managers. A series of training benefited potential employees at head office, that is, over 
389 individuals, lasting a total of 371 hours (53 days).120 
 
4.5.1.4 Fair payment and welfare 
 
CR Power provided statutory social insurance for employees on a monthly basis in 
addition to supplemental commercial insurance as an extra benefit to employees.121 
Furthermore, it complied with relevant provisions of the Regulations of Paid Annual 
Leave of Employees, including legal holidays, annual leave, marriage leave, bereavement 
leave, family leave, maternity leave, nursing leave and other paid holidays. The company 
also improved its internal welfare system by handing out holiday entitlements, providing 
                                                        
119
 ‘Dual-Career Path Plan’, see CR CSR Report 2011, supra note 111, 64. 
120
 Ibid. 
121
 ‘Employees’ Welfare’, see CR CSR Report 2011, supra note 111, 64. 
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on-duty meals and dormitories, and offering housing benefits to settle employees’ 
dependents.122 
 
4.5.1.5 Employee engagement 
 
The CR Power CSR Report 2011 mainly introduced the approach it followed to give 
employees access to knowledge on how the company worked and to express their opinion 
on corporate governance. At the end of 2011 the company invited high-performance 
employees to visit the CR Power Head Office in Hong Kong to experience first-hand how 
the policies and strategies were decided from top management. After learning about the 
decision-making process, employees directly presented the shortcomings in the 
workplace to the management at head office, and personally advised top management on 
how to improve the process of corporate governance and decision-making.123 
 
4.5.1.6  How the CR Power CSR Report 2011 works 
 
In the report it is stated that CR Power had fulfilled its CSR performance in terms of 
SASAC CSR Guidelines and CASS CSR Guidelines. The CR Power CSR Report 2011 
was edited under the GRI Guidelines and completed through the self-check free-charge 
service sustainability database.124 Moreover, CR Power stated that the company had 
adopted the UN Global Compact Principles in its CSR report, so that the report would be 
accredited by the UN organization. Therefore, the validity and authenticity of the CR 
                                                        
122
 Ibid. 
123
 ‘Employee Participation was included in the section on ‘Care for Employees’ Life’’, see CR CSR 
Report 2011, supra note 111, 65. 
124
 CR Power adopted GRI Guideline (3.0) into CSR Report and the GRI was revealed in the Report. See 
CR CSR Report 2011, supra note 111, 87–92. 
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CSR Report 2011 were ensured through various third-party monitoring and verification 
systems.125 
 
In addition, CR Power had implemented internal monitoring in specific departments and 
among employees, such as in the mentioned supervision of production safety at work, 
thus the reliability of information in the published information could be monitored by 
employees. The report also included comments from stakeholders, such as employees and 
local communities, and third-party organizations, such as magazines and CSR 
committees, which indirectly evaluated the truth and quality of CSR performance and 
information disclosure in CR Power.126 
 
4.5.2 Example of bad reporting 
 
Shanxi Coal Import & Export Group Corporation 
 
Shanxi Coal Import & Export Group Corporation (hereinafter ‘Shanxi Coal’) was 
founded in 1980 in Shanxi Province. With over 30 years’ innovation and development, 
Shanxi Coal has grown into a large-sized enterprise, integrating coal production and sales, 
the high-end manufacturing industry, and financial investment. Since 2009, the group has 
integrated more than 50 local coal mines with total annual production capacity reaching 
30 million tons within Shanxi Province.127 By the end of 2012, Shanxi Coal owned 21 
                                                        
125
 The use of UN Global Compact Principles was reflected in CR Power CSR Report 2011. See CR CSR 
Report 2011, supra note 111, 93. 
126
 CR Power CSR Report 2011 illustrated some of the stakeholder’s (employees and external 
organizations, such as Forbes Global Magazine, The Capital Magazine, and China Securities Golden 
Bauhinia Award Committee) and commented on the company’s CSR performance. See CR CSR Report 
2011, supra note 111, 79–81. 
127
 Overview of Shanxi Coal is presented on official website, available at:  
http://www.shanxicoal.cn/english/About%20SCIEG.aspx, last accessed on 23 August 2013. 
Chapter 4: Chinese Companies’ Corporate Social Responsibility in Employment: Case Studies 
© C. YUN 307
main pits, located in the cities of Da Tong, Xin Zhou, Jin Zhong, Lin Fen, Chang Zhi and 
Jin Cheng, and formed 4 large coal production bases (i.e., steam coal, coking coal, 
anthracite and semi-anthracite production base). It employs over 17,000 people in total. It 
is transforming from a traditional coal industry to a railway energy industry to produce 
the first world-class high-speed train wheel.128  
 
As a state-owned company, Shanxi Coal showed the poorest performance when it came 
to information disclosure among all the Chines company CSR reports researched. 
Information on how it implemented CSR in employment occupied only one page in its 
report. Every aspect was introduced in the Shanxi Coal CSR Report 2012 but only in a 
couple of sentences or slogans, which stated that Shanxi Coal fully supported safety in 
the workplace, and dealt with employees’ physical and psychological health in routine 
work.129 Under the official labour contract law, the group ensured employees’ legal 
salary and provided a series of social securities, such as endowment insurance, medical 
insurance and unemployment insurance. Shanxi Coal also focused on employees’ career 
development and stimulated the function of employee representatives to achieve 
employee engagement in corporate governance.130 
 
According to the brief statement, it is not clear what the processes and actions are on how 
Shanxi Coal performs CSR towards its employees in respect of each issue. Furthermore, 
this simple CSR Report had not been accredited by broadly adopted reporting and 
monitoring systems, or a third-party audit. Therefore, both the content that did not 
contain substantial data or information and the published report that had not been 
subjected to an external audit reduce the reliability and authenticity of the report in the 
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mind of public users, and leads to doubt and questions about the deficiencies in the 
Shanxi Coal CSR Report 2012. 
 
4.6 Summary 
 
The empirical research in this chapter is established on the basis of information disclosure 
in 77 Chinese companies. The examples and entire database in Table 2 show that all 
companies publish information about CSR in employment. Of these CSR reports or 
sustainability reports, 45% provided relatively precise statements to demonstrate their 
CSR performance to employees through corporate governance; while the reports of the 
rest of the companies lack descriptive statements on CSR implementation and merely 
contain brief introductory sentences. The legal requirement primarily compels companies 
to disclose information with respect to financial performance. However, except for 
Article 51 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Work Safety which requires 
that health and safety hazards at work must be reported, there is little legislation that 
regulates information disclosure about social performance in employment.131 The Central 
Government of SASAC established guidelines to instruct centrally controlled state-owned 
companies on how to exercise and report on CSR in their companies. Most state-owned 
companies primarily comply with this regulation and in private companies it is complied 
with on a voluntary basis. Additionally, 38% of companies had adopted a voluntary 
reporting approach to present their CSR achievements in employment under the 
instruction of the GRI, the UN Global Compact and SA8000 to create standardized CSR 
reports. 
 
Of the companies researched, 42% ensured the authenticity and quality of the published 
information through self-declared supervision, and external auditing and verification by 
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third parties, such as the free-charge GRI Sustainability Disclosure Database, the service 
of GRI Application Level Check and the third-party professional audit from assurance 
companies. The minority of companies applied internal employees’ monitoring and 
third-party comments obtained from famous scholars, academic institutions and the 
media to evaluate the companies’ performance in terms of the achievement of CSR. 
 
The information disclosure among the 77 Chinese companies indicates that legislation 
has set up the legal basis for the CSR exercise in employment in which companies make 
decisions on corporate governance and external organizations create voluntary initiatives 
in respect of CSR. Beyond law, the Chinese government, industrial councils, securities 
markets and NGOs set up numerous guidelines to inform companies’ CSR 
implementation in practice, namely stock markets’ guidelines to listed companies, such as 
CSR, CASS CSR Guideline (2.0) and CSC9000T. Almost 75% of companies basically 
used the national voluntary initiatives to expand the scope and approach of their CSR 
exercise in practice, especially state-owned and listed companies. 
 
According to the research, around 40% of the companies studied applied international 
guidelines and standards in corporate governance, particularly various ISO standards, 
such as ISO26000 and OHSAS18001, are largely adopted to protect employees with 
respect to health and safety in the workplace, and human rights. Among the companies 
using international standards, 30% preferred SA8000 as the instruction on CSR practice, 
and disclose information and third-party assurance under this guideline. As in the case of 
UK companies, the UN Global Compact is also broadly accepted among Chinese 
companies to provide guidelines to companies in the exercise of CSR and a framework 
for information disclosure.  
 
From the database and case studies it is clear that over 60% of companies achieve 
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employee engagement through trade unions or the mechanism of employee 
representatives. Most of the companies that made information about employee 
engagement available had implemented an employee survey or anonymous ballot to track 
employees’ satisfaction or attitude to corporate governance, and a few of the companies 
communicated with employees to exchange information and ideas. Individual CSR 
reports revealed that many companies’ employee survey is the only route for employees 
to speak up about their complaints or ideas to employers, but they have no access to 
information and responses from top management.  
 
Trade unions, in turn, organized entertainment activities, such as employee sports 
competitions or annual entertaining performances to gather employees together and to 
improve corporate cohesion to fulfil employee engagement. Companies also provided 
financial assistance or special care to employees’ families in poor living conditions. Only 
two companies explicitly pointed out that employees’ collective bargaining to negotiate 
and assert their rights with employers was achieved through trade union or employee 
representative delegation, whereas more than 45% of companies presented the 
performance of employees’ collective bargaining or negotiation in blurred expression. 
 
Compared with UK information disclosure, which mostly adopts exact numbers, statistics 
and precise statements to clarify the implementation of CSR to employees in corporate 
governance and which is accompanied by external auditing to ensure the reliability of 
reports, most Chinese companies prefer to use simple words or ‘slogans’ to demonstrate 
their CSR actions generally and briefly. The lack of statistics or detail confuses 
information users, and prevents them from exploring the real exercise and effect of 
companies’ CSR performance, and decreases the quality and accuracy of published 
information in practice. More than half of the companies examined for the purposes of 
this research do not officially apply third-party audit or verification but, instead, use 
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internal monitoring and third-party comments made by magazines, other media or 
academic institutions. Different from third-party audit or verification, which is instructed 
through uniform and objective standards, internal monitoring by employees or senior 
managers might cause unfair or untruthful screening and reflection of companies’ real 
performance in CSR. Third-party comments voluntarily elicited by any institution are 
implemented according to standards drafted by the institution, so that the validity of 
comments can ensure the objective evaluation of companies’ CSR and information 
disclosure. The difference in the quality of CSR information disclosure and auditing 
between UK and Chinese companies will be compared in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Comparison between and Analysis of United Kingdom and 
Chinese Companies’ Exercise of Corporate Social 
Responsibility in Employment 
 
 
In Chapters 3 and 4 the information disclosure on CSR in employment in UK and Chinese 
companies was analysed using the data contained in two databases to demonstrate the 
similarities and differences in the implementation of CSR in corporate governance between 
the two countries. More than 85% of companies that had provided complete reports had 
categorized their information into five factors: (i) health and safety; (ii) human rights; (iii) 
training and development; (iv) fair payment and welfare; and (v) employee engagement. 
CSR practices were published in the form of a written narrative accompanied by various 
numbers and graphs to clarify the statements made. However, the format of the written 
material regarding CSR in employment among UK companies was more varied. It was 
published in independent CSR reports, included in annual reports or even published on 
corporate websites; while all selected Chinese companies officially presented information 
on their CSR performance in a unified format, namely a CSR report which could be applied 
to the company website. 
 
For this thesis, it was difficult to get access to the actual implementation of companies’ 
CSR towards their employees, because it is impossible to observe the internal workings of 
each company. Therefore, all comparison and analysis in this thesis are dependent solely 
on information disclosure. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the standard to evaluate companies’ 
performance of CSR in employment is the quality of their CSR report, taking into account 
valid audits to ensure the reliability of the information. Although many companies have 
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adopted applicable external auditing to verify the information disclosure, the authenticity 
of reports is still questionable, especially among companies without effective auditing.  
 
In this circumstance, it is assumed that all information disclosure applied in this research is 
authentic and actually reflects companies’ exercise of CSR in employment. In addition, it is 
impossible to compare the real effect and substance on corporate governance of every CSR 
action taken by the researched companies or countries using individual CSR reports, 
because any exercise implemented in a company was specific to its corporate governance 
decision-making and strategy. In this chapter the information disclosure will be used to 
compare the differences in CSR implementation among companies in the two countries 
and to analyse whether Chinese companies can adopt the experience of UK companies 
with respect to fulfilling their CSR in employment in the context of corporate governance. 
 
5.1    Quality and accuracy of information disclosure 
 
When the two tables of CSR reports of the UK and Chinese companies researched were 
compared (Tables 1 and 2), it was found that 89% of the selected Chinese companies that 
had completed their CSR reports fully in respect of all five aspects, had provided a 
statement in each category, as opposed to 81% of UK companies. However, UK companies 
had presented more precise information about their performance in each field by providing 
descriptions, statistics and graphs to demonstrate the facts, results and trends in their CSR 
performance in employment. These companies had mostly adopted a detailed statement 
with information on ‘what’, ‘when’, ‘where’, ‘who’ and ‘how’ in the process of exercising 
CSR.1 
 
                                                        
1
 ‘What’ means the goal of each action; ‘when’ means the time of the action; ‘where’ means the place 
where the exercise is to be completed; ‘who’ means people or department organizing and participating in 
the exercise; and ‘how’ means the precise approach to, and process followed in, the exercise. 
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As an example of a UK company, Pentland Group presented the implementation of CSR in 
its Corporate Responsibility Review 2012, as follows:  
 
[B]etween March 2011 and May 2012, we participated in a project that focused on 
the rights of children and young workers in China, led by the Centre for Child 
Rights and Corporate Social Responsibility (CCR CSR). Pentland was one of 
seven brands supporting the project, which ran workshops designed to help young 
workers under the age of 25 develop communication and teamwork skills, and to 
raise awareness of health issues and the importance of drug prevention. In total, 
800 young workers at nine factories – including 100 working for a Boxfresh 
manufacturer – participated in the workshops. Complementary training for nearly 
300 line managers focused on how to communicate better with a younger 
workforce. As part of the initiative, participating brands also worked together on 
the development of a practical underage worker remediation plan.2  
 
In this description the company has cited exact statistics to state that between 2011 and 
2012 it had undertaken a series of exercises to protect child labour and young workers in 
one of its manufacturing countries, namely China, through workshops involving young 
workers and training of line managers to improve young people’s skills and awareness of 
health and safety, and enhance better communication between line managers and young 
employees. In the example, it adopted the numbers and detailed narrative statement to 
present the action of employee training and development in information disclosure. 
 
Conversely, a large number of Chinese companies preferred ‘slogans’ or ‘phrases’ to 
enumerate their actions without providing details due to the Chinese language customs that 
                                                        
2
 ‘Our People’, Pentland Group Corporate Social Responsibility 2012, 33-34, available at: 
http://www.pentland.com/_resources/files/downloads/policies/pentland-group-cr-review-2012-ungc-cop.pd
f, last accessed on 12 November 2013.  
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short phrases and Chinese idiom are generally applied in report writing in China;3 for 
instance, Taiyuan Iron and Steel Group (hereinafter ‘TISCO’) demonstrated its 
performance in protecting human rights in its CSR Report 2012 as: ‘We firmly respect 
employees’ human rights regardless of race, religion, and sex’; ‘no child labour, no forced 
labour at work’; ‘we specially safeguarded female employees’ rights’; or ‘more respect, 
better performance’.4  In this illustration, which contains no specific information, the 
company did not convey detail on how its employees’ human rights had been largely 
respected in corporate governance, especially according to the protection of child labour 
and women employees.  
 
The lack of information on the matter of the protection of health and safety as reported by 
some of the Chinese companies selected for the research is particularly critical. In the UK, 
companies that complied with the requirement of RIDDOR had not only to disclose the 
actions and processes they employed to protect employees’ health and safety, but also the 
accurate number of injuries and accidents at work in their relevant reports. In the G4S CSR 
Report 2011, the company stated its performance in health and safety as follows:  
 
In 2011, we began implementing the new health and safety standards and 
benchmarks which had been developed during the previous year. The new 
standards covered areas such as training, communication, reporting, risk 
assessments, KPIs and formal reviews. In 2011, we began our programme of 
                                                        
3
 In China it is a common approach when editing reports or documents for editors to adopt ‘four-character’ 
or ‘six-character’ words or idioms to express or conclude the meaning of a couple of sentences in a whole 
paragraph. However, to some extent, this way omits exact and complete processes or meaning of the 
specific expression. 
4
 ‘Social Responsibility in Employment’, TISCO CSR Report 2012, 53-55, available at: 
http://www.tisco.com.cn/zrbg2012/zrbg2012.html, last accessed on 21 March 2014. TISCO was established 
in 1934 and is a giant iron and steel complex that integrates mining, iron and steel production, processing, 
delivery and trade. It is also the largest stainless steel producer in the world with the most advanced 
technologies and equipment, and a full range of products and specifications. 
Chapter 5: Comparison between and Analysis of United Kingdom and Chinese Companies’ Exercise of Corporate Social 
Responsibility in Employment 
© C. YUN 316
Critical Country Reviews (CCRs) which focused on those countries where more 
than two work-related fatalities had occurred during 2010.5  
 
These reviews are conducted by internal health and safety experts who have worked with 
local management teams to review the fatalities that have occurred, to ensure that 
appropriate actions have been taken to prevent recurrence and to share best practice from 
their own business experiences. In total, 11 CCRs have been conducted and management 
feedback has been very positive. 
 
One of the paragraphs in the report describes precisely the action the company had taken to 
improve its health and safety standards and communication. G4S also provided data and 
comparison of fatalities among employees at work:  
 
There was a continued reduction in the number of fatalities related to attacks on 
our employees by third parties in 2011, reducing from 30 to 28. Sadly, the overall 
number of work-related fatalities increased from 59 to 76. This increase was due 
mainly to the high number of road traffic fatalities which rose from 14 in 2010 to 
30 in 2011. Providing ideas and sharing internal best practices on road safety will 
be a major focus for 2012. In addition, the number of incidents in which there 
were multiple fatalities rose from one in 2010 to five in 2011 with a number of 
tragic events including a helicopter crash in Papua New Guinea and an insurgent 
attack on the British Council in Kabul leading to a total of five employee 
fatalities.6 
 
G4S’s information contained trends, and the number of injuries and accidents in the 
                                                        
5
 ‘Securing Our People, G4S CSR Report 2011’, 16–18 and 30–31, available at: 
http://www.g4s.com/~/media/Files/CSR%20Reports/G4S_CSRR11.ashx, last accessed on 21 March 2014.  
6
 Ibid. 
Chapter 5: Comparison between and Analysis of United Kingdom and Chinese Companies’ Exercise of Corporate Social 
Responsibility in Employment 
© C. YUN 317
workplace in the form of bar charts and diagrams that explicitly presented accurate 
statistics. In addition, the company appeared to admit quite openly that there had been an 
increase in the number of tragic incidents. This was suggestive of a positive and honest 
attitude and willingness to take action to address the problem. 
 
However, among the Chinese companies selected, many remained at the level of 
information disclosure through brief introductory or bulleted points when it came to health 
and safety implementation, such as health and safety policies, executives, training, and risk 
assessment. Companies seldom applied exact statistics to report the injuries and accidents 
on duty, and avoided revealing any negative trends or events in health and safety in 
corporate governance. Only a couple of central state-owned companies, such as SINOPEC, 
CNOOC and CHINAPETRO, had begun publishing annual data on occupational fatalities 
in employment. This phenomenon on information disclosure regarding health and safety is 
in line with the Report on Fulfillment of the Social Responsibility of Central State-owned 
Enterprises 2012 that only 33% of researched central state-owned enterprises used the 
indexed approach to disclose health and safety-related mortality and accidents in their CSR 
performance in employment. The rest of the companies merely showed that they had 
exercised health and safety management, training and control in corporate governance, 
without a particular statement on the relevant exercises.7 In China the lack of exact 
statements and indicators in information disclosure largely reduces the persuasive impact 
of the institutional statement on practical performance. This prevents the public from 
directly monitoring how companies achieve CSR in employment in corporate governance 
and whether the published information about implementation is authentic in reality. 
 
5.2 Third-party supervision of information disclosure 
                                                        
7
 Zhao, Y. et al., Report on Fulfillment of Social Responsibility of Central State-owned Enterprises 2012, 
China Economic Publishing House (2012), 298–302 and 311–312. 
Chapter 5: Comparison between and Analysis of United Kingdom and Chinese Companies’ Exercise of Corporate Social 
Responsibility in Employment 
© C. YUN 318
 
In most of the selected UK companies, information disclosure is monitored following a 
varied approach. It may be through international standards verification, administrative 
audit and/or professional auditing organizations, as shown in Table 1 on UK CSR reports. 
First, many UK companies adopted international standards in the implementation of their 
CSR and information disclosure as formal external verification, such as the UN Global 
Compact and GRI Reporting System. When companies register as a member of the UN 
Global Compact, they report in accordance with ten principles evaluated and verified by 
this NGO. Some of the companies researched adopted the GRI in their CSR reports and 
participated in the Application Level Check and the GRI Application Level Check 
Statement that all GRI-checked reports receive. The statement should be included in the 
published report as formal confirmation of the application level of the report. Second, some 
administrative bodies played a role in supervising companies’ performance in specific and 
critical aspects, especially in the field of health and safety. About ten companies 
specifically stated that their performance in employees’ health and safety in the workplace 
had been critically audited under the enforcement of RIDDOR by the British Safety 
Council or UK Health and Safety Committee. Third, professional auditing organizations 
such as KPMG or Pricewaterhouse Cooper LLP were also approached to check the 
authenticity and reliability of published information by providing the service of deep 
investigation and supplying independent audit reports.  
 
Among Chinese companies (Table 2), the UN Global Compact and GRI Reporting System 
had been broadly adopted as basis in the process of editing their CSR reports. However, 
few companies had officially registered with the UN Global Compact to receive 
independent accreditation, or applied the GRI Application Level Check to confirm the 
application of their report. In addition, third-party comment has been developed in China 
as a new way of measuring CSR performance or CSR reports. Evaluation is done by 
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various individuals or groups whereby entrepreneurs and experts are organized by local 
governments or institutions to observe and score companies’ CSR performance and reports. 
The media, such as Southern Weekly and First Finance, hold CSR annual conferences to 
publish the ranking of CSR reports among a large number of companies.8 However, no 
matter what the experts’ evaluation or media’s ranking is, the process and benchmarking 
are voluntarily regulated by sponsors or powerful companies. The result is that comments 
are not uniform or very diverse, which makes the approach of third-party comment 
doubtful. Moreover, instead of third-party audits, employees’ comments on CSR 
performance are always placed at the end of CSR reports and acted as internal inspection. 
Only a few employees’ positive statements on how their employers accomplished CSR in 
employment were provided. However, the authenticity of employees’ statements is 
doubtful, because it is not known whether employees willingly and honestly confirmed 
their companies’ top management CSR performance. Given the complimentary nature of 
most of the comments, it may be the case that editors simply excluded negative comments 
regarding employers’ performances from the CSR reports.  
 
In the researched CSR reports, only two companies had applied the GRI Application Level 
Check, and 30 companies were independently audited by a third party, while the rest of 
them used third-party comment or internal comment in the process of monitoring, or had 
not adopted any approach at all to monitor information disclosure in their CSR reports. 
 
5.3 Different exercises in employee engagement 
 
                                                        
8
 Southern Weekly and First Finance are two famous magazines in China. The Southern Weekly is a 
popular social magazine, while First Finance is a professional financial publication that publishes analyses 
of financial markets, reports company news comments professionally on financial news. The two 
magazines both hold CSR annual conferences to rank companies’ performance and information disclosure 
of CSR. 
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From the databases in Table 1 and 2 it is clear that both UK and Chinese companies used 
employee engagement in their CSR reports as the path for employees to communicate with 
their employers. Of the 90 UK companies CSR reports studied, not all had stated the 
implementation of employee engagement. However, reports that did refer to it indicated 
that the company encouraged employees to express their complaints, grievances and 
advice, and to safeguard their right to collective bargaining to get relief from their company. 
A series of exercises to ensure employee engagement were mostly carried out by the body 
of employee representatives or trade unions who worked with employees to negotiate 
common goals with employers, such as protecting the integrity of their trade, receiving 
higher pay, hiring more employees and creating better working conditions. In these reports 
companies introduced different approaches for employees to express their voice, such as a 
whistle-blowing system, face-to-face communication with directors and a 
grievance-reporting mechanism. For example, Bovis PLC described its employee 
engagement in detail in its CSR Report 2012 as follows:  
 
Employee Liaison Groups, made up of elected representatives, continued to meet 
during 2012. These meetings provided regular two-way feedback sessions 
between employees and senior managers, with key messages from monthly Group 
Executive Committee meetings being disseminated. Regular departmental team 
meetings also took place and any issues arising at these meetings were taken back 
to Employee Liaison Groups for discussion . . . and Employees also attended 
briefings with the Chief Executive, Group Finance Director and other senior 
managers within the business, which included presentations on the financial 
results and reports on the Group’s performance during the year.9 
 
                                                        
9
 ‘Supporting Our Staffs’, Bovis PLC CSR Report 2012, available at: 
http://www.bovishomesgroup.co.uk/pdfs/CSR_2012.pdf, last accessed on 1 April 2014. 
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From the statement it appears that the company conferred on employees the right to 
knowledge about the corporate decision-making process and operation, and forced 
employee representatives to convey the workers’ will through two-way communication 
with top management. Employee representatives are an effective group to use to negotiate 
collectively with employers and all employees engaged in labour protection, and impact on 
employer’s decision-making in corporate governance.  
 
In the Chinese CSR reports companies almost all referred to CSR performance in 
employee engagement through one of the vital corporate organs, namely trade unions. 
Trade unions are a crucial form of organization for employees to use to bargain collectively. 
The role of Chinese trade unions in the companies selected was different from the function 
of employee representatives or trade unions in UK companies. Some of the companies that 
had adopted the notion of a ‘trade union’ in their CSR reports had also implemented 
employee surveys, such as an employee poll, employee communication or employee 
complaints. This information is available in Table 2 in the column ‘Employee Engagement’. 
However, from the precise statement in the reports it is clear that most of the employee 
communication was one way. Employees only expressed their opinion to top management 
without solution or further feedback from their employers. This means that trade unions in 
many Chinese companies are only regarded as a channel for workers to speak out, not to 
negotiate and broker efficient solutions from employers through collective bargaining. 
Additionally, among these Chinese companies, employee engagement is presented in the 
form of participation in a variety of employee activities that were mainly organized by 
trade unions, such as annual employee athletics and employee entertainment. Trade unions 
in a small number of companies involved employees in companies’ special care 
programmes through extra help and assistance to employees who had difficulties in their 
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private life or a heavy family burden. This is shown in the column on ‘Employee Payment 
and Welfare’ in Table 2.10 
  
5.4 Adoption of international conventions and standards in CSR Reports 
 
Table 1 shows that UK companies largely applied international standards in their CSR 
practice, both in corporate governance and information disclosure. The UN Global 
Compact and GRI have both generally been adopted among companies as the basis for 
CSR implementation and information disclosure. Moreover, some specific international 
standards were also used, such as ISO9001 and ISO14001, which respectively control 
qualified and safe manufacturing of products to employees and customers, and ensure the 
environmental protection to public and in the workplace; and the OHSAS18001 is the 
professional international standard in health and safety at work. Human rights were 
referred to in like SA8000; and the OECD Principle on CSR was also adopted in a couple 
of companies’ decision-making and CSR policies. In contrast to Chinese companies, many 
UK companies directly applied a series of ILO standards or conventions related to human 
rights in CSR in employment that are different from the ILO standards and conventions at 
national level, namely the ILO Child Labour Convention, UN Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, and the Convention of the Rights of the Child, which are generally 
mandatory as legal enforcement. Their use at company level is voluntary and specific to 
individual companies, as they may be regarded as a reference in making precise policies 
and strategies in terms of particular needs.  
                                                        
10
 Employee engagement refers to the process in which employees express their opinion, lodge complaints, 
obtain corporate information from top management and negotiate their legal rights with employers. This is 
the strategy used to involve employees in companies’ decision-making and impacts on corporate 
governance through employees’ unions. However, in China some trade unions neglect employees’ 
collective bargaining, but provide extra financial help to employees in poor living conditions. This 
primarily misleads the real effect of employee engagement, and presents the companies’ decision-making 
and actions without employees’ real engagement in corporate governance. 
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The Chinese government has signed 22 ILO conventions. However, few companies in this 
research have directly adopted them as guidelines in CSR implementation.11 Excluding the 
frequently mentioned UN Global Compact and GRI, only a small number of companies 
researched (Table 2) applied ISO26000 in their CSR process. This is a new guideline on 
how companies should operate CSR and is currently being introduced into the Chinese 
market. In addition, some companies in the manufacturing industry apply SA8000, which 
is the first auditable social certification standard for decent workplaces, and obtained 
third-party verification under this standard. Most of the other Chinese companies in Table 2, 
irrespective of whether they were state-owned companies or private companies, primarily 
preferred the domestic guidelines or standards in CSR, such as the Stated-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission Guidelines of Stated-owned Enterprises 
Directly under the Central Government on Fulfilling Corporate Social Responsibility 
(hereinafter ‘SASAC Guidelines’); China Academy Social Science CSR Report 
Guidelines (hereinafter CASS CSR Guidelines); and two Stock Market CSR Information 
Disclosure Guidelines.12  
 
5.5 Can Chinese Companies adopt the UK model of CSR in employment in 
Corporate Governance? 
 
The comparison of CSR implementation in employment between UK companies and 
Chinese companies has shown some critical differences in the two countries as reflected by 
                                                        
11
 The 22 ILO Conventions include ILO Convention No. 7, 11, 14, 15, 16, 19, 22, 23, 26, 27, 32, 45, 59, 80, 
100, 144, 159, 170, 122, 138, 150 and 167. The enumeration of ILO Conventions was ordered 
chronologically based on the date of signing. 
12
 The China SASAC Guidelines are aimed at improving the fulfilment of CSR in stated-owned companies, 
so that it is compulsory for all centrally controlled state-owned companies to comply with the guidelines, 
while other state-owned companies and private companies were not enforced to adopt them, so that SASAC 
Guidelines are treated as the voluntary basis of CSR implementation in corporate governance. 
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all the CSR reports researched and listed in Tables 1 and 2. The dissimilarities in the 
disclosed information in each report were compared, but not the specific actions taken by 
individual companies. Every company had undertaken a particular CSR exercise that might 
not be suitable for other companies due to their different corporate backgrounds and needs. 
It would, therefore, not be accurate to compare the individual actions taken by companies 
or even between the two countries. In the following section the reason for the common 
differences between the UK and China concluded from the information disclosed in the 
reports will be analysed and the feasibility for Chinese companies to apply UK experiences 
in their corporate governance will be examined.  
 
5.5.1 Mandatory requirement of information disclosure and audit 
 
In the UK, company information disclosure, including social and environmental 
information, is strictly required in regulations, as the main legal obligation and standard to 
evaluate whether companies were qualified in corporate governance through the reported 
information. As discussed before, the UK Companies Act 2006 (Stratgic Report and 
Directors’ Report) Regulation 2013 regulates CSR information disclosure in Section 414C 
(7) as follows: ‘In the case of a quoted company the business review must, to the extent 
necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or position of the 
company’s business, include . . . information about—(i) environmental matters (including 
the impact of the company’s business on the environment), (ii) the company’s employees, 
and (iii) social and community issues, including information about any policies of the 
company in relation to those matters and the effectiveness of those policies’ and ‘[t]he 
review must, to the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, performance 
or position of the company’s business, include—(a) analysis using financial key 
performance indicators, and (b) where appropriate, analysis using other key performance 
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indicators, including information relating to environmental and employee matters.13  
 
Following the requirement of information disclosure in directors’ reports, Section 481 
requires directors to provide a statement on the purpose of the audit; and Section 496 also 
requires auditors to confirm that directors’ reports for the financial year are consistent with 
those accounts.14 The UK Companies Act 2006 basically regulates information disclosure 
in the form of the Annual Directors’ Report, including environmental and employee 
matters in business reviews, and refers to the notion of an audit of published reports. 
Among researched UK companies, some of them provided independent CSR information 
disclosure that its audit is not enforceable under Companies Act 2006. However, as a part 
of directors’ reports, business review which has to include the performance to environment 
and employees, would be audited as required. Moreover, from the selected reports, a large 
number of companies specifically presented the implementation of sustainability and CSR 
in directors’ reports, so that the information disclosure of CSR in directors’ report would be 
verified under legal requirement. 
 
In particular, RIDDOR specifically enforces the duty of information disclosure regarding 
health and safety incidents in the workplace among employers, self-employers and people 
in control of work premises. RIDDOR covers the reported issues precisely: non-fatal 
                                                        
13
 The UK Companies Act 2006 (Stratgic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulation 2013, Section 414C 
(7). The requirement of information disclosure about environmental issues and employee matters, in 
relation to CSR, is the precise content of companies’ annual business review, which is a part of the 
directors’ report, but different from the general information regulated in Article 416 of the UK Companies 
Act 2006. 
14
 See UK Companies Act 2006, supra note 13, Section 481 (2) and Section 496. In these articles relevant 
audit information is defined as ‘information needed by the company’s auditor in connection with preparing 
his report’. Articles on the directors’ report, do not explain the exact definition of company auditor, 
internal or external audit. In the researcher’s opinion, it should be regarded as the general notion, both 
corporate audit and third-party audit, because in some companies, the position of auditors may not be a 
corporate component.  
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injuries to workers and non-workers; work-related fatalities; dangerous occurrences; 
occupational diseases; exposure to carcinogens, mutagens and biological agents; offshore 
diseases; gas-related injuries and hazard; and mines, quarries and offshore site 
disturbance.15 In respect of the published information about health and safety incidents at 
work, the report need not be audited by third-party auditors. Instead, the information 
should be reported through companies’ website, telephone and in paper form to the UK 
Health and Safety Executive, which is one of the governmental organs that mainly monitor 
the accuracy and authenticity of reported incidents. This would be regarded as external 
auditing of employer’s information disclosure with respect to health and safety. 
 
Moreover, among the UK regulations researched, UK Stakeholder Pension Schemes 
Regulations 2000 refer to information disclosure of concerns related to the socially 
responsible investment of pension schemes. The Article on the Requirement for Statement 
of Investment Principles for Scheme not Established Under Trust regulates that the 
statement must cover the manager’s policy about ‘the extent (if at all) to which social, 
environmental or ethical considerations are taken into account in the selection, retention 
and realization of investments’.16 It emphasizes employers’ duties to publish information 
to stakeholders about how CSR had been taken into consideration in decision-making in 
corporate governance when employers made investments in stakeholder pension schemes.  
 
Research on UK legislation on CSR information disclosure and monitoring is limited. 
However, the analysis above shows that it is valuable to publish information about 
environmental and social matters in the process of decision-making and implementation in 
                                                        
15
 The Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulation 2013/1471. 
16
 Stakeholder Pension Schemes Regulations 2000/1403, Article 9 of the Requirement for Statement of 
Investment Principles for Scheme not Established under Trust. Stakeholder Pension Schemes Regulations 
2000 came into force in the UK on 6 April 2001 as a result of the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 
which is aimed at encouraging longer-term saving for retirement, particularly among those with low to 
moderate earnings. 
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corporate governance. The UK has established the complete legal requirements related to 
information disclosure in companies’ reports that are not only limited to the regulations of 
financial reporting or business review in the UK Companies Act, but have also been 
categorized into different areas, such as health and safety, human rights, and the 
environment, through particular regulations.  
 
In China it seems that information disclosure accompanied by a valid audit is still a new 
concept that is being developed both in legislation and voluntary corporate governance 
among Chinese domestic companies. Among the researched company CSR reports, only a 
few companies had shown relatively complete performance with respect to information 
disclosure and monitoring. In practice most of the others had adopted an attitude of wait 
and see. In Chinese Company Law 2005, Article 175 requires a company, after the end of 
each fiscal year, to formulate a financial report that includes information on its balance 
sheet, profit and loss record, financial change, financial statement and allocation of profit.17 
It only regulates companies that disclose financial information through their Annual 
Financial Report without the further requirement of reporting in other fields, such as social 
or environmental issues, and relevant monitoring of reports. 
 
After the 17th CPC National Congress, the SASAC Guidelines were aimed at 
accomplishing sustainable development with respect to society and the environment within 
centrally controlled state-owned companies. Article 18 of the SASAC Guidelines requires 
information disclosure about the fulfilment of CSR in corporate governance, as follows:  
 
Enterprises having experienced in CSR work, should establish an information 
releasing mechanism, providing updated and regular information about CSR 
performance and sustainable development, plans and measures in carrying out 
                                                        
17
 Chinese Company Law 2005, Article 175 in Chapter 6 of Corporate Finance and Accounting. 
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CSR. Meanwhile, a regular communication and dialogue mechanism concerning 
CSR should be established, so that the enterprise can have feedback from its 
stakeholders and give its response quickly. All the information and feedback 
should be publicized to receive supervision from stakeholders and society.18  
 
This article regulates that centrally controlled enterprises release detailed information 
about CSR decision-making and implementation in corporate governance. However, the 
authenticity of the reported information would only be supervised by stakeholders, but not 
third-party auditors or through professional external verification of CSR reports. As one of 
the main central administrative regulations, the authority of the SASAC Guidelines is 
equal to legislation that is mandatory for state-owned companies directly under the central 
government and not enforceable on common state-owned companies and private 
companies. Companies would voluntarily adopt the standards and requirements of CSR 
implementation and information disclosure in their CSR policies and decision-making.  
 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated the Administrative Measures 
for the Disclosure of Information of Listed Companies (hereinafter ‘CSRC Measures’) that 
would regulate listed companies’ information disclosure acts and strengthen the 
administration of the reportable information to their publics. Articles 2 and 5 require an 
information disclosure obligor to disclose its information completely and accurately to all 
investors, and ensure simultaneous information publishing in the overseas and domestic 
markets if the listed company issues securities and derivatives thereof in both markets. The 
disclosed information mainly includes stock prospectuses, bond prospectuses, listing 
announcements, periodic reports and temporary reports.19  Article 37(7) mentions the 
                                                        
18
 SASAC Guidelines, Rule 18, available at: http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963340/n2964712/4891623.html, 
last accessed on 21 May 2014. 
19
 Administrative Measures for the Disclosure of Information of Listed Companies, China Securities 
Regulatory Commission, Articles 2 and 5, available at:  
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internal control and supervision mechanism in financial affairs and accounting calculation. 
Article 53 regulates the external audit of reported information that a qualified public 
accountant shall strictly perform the risk-oriented audit in accordance with the practising 
rules and relevant provisions applicable to certified public accountants, and scientifically 
select the authentication methods and technologies to obtain adequate and appropriate 
proof so as to issue authentic conclusions.20 Although the CSRC Measures only require 
financial information disclosure from listed companies, and internal and external audits of 
published reports by internal control and public accountants, it basically creates the 
Chinese standard of financial information disclosure of listed companies, and would 
gradually lead to the emergence of socially responsible investment and relevant 
information disclosure. The Guidelines of Environmental Information Disclosure in Listed 
Companies is a further step that requires listed companies to publish information on the 
issue of the environment, namely action taken in respect of environmental protection or on 
critical environmental accidents. However, the guidelines have not come into force and are 
still in the process of revision and obtaining feedback and advice from the public.21 
 
Besides the SASAC Guidelines, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Work Safety 
firmly regulates the reporting of injuries and accidents on duty. In terms of the provisions, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
http://wenku.baidu.com/view/0523c1232f60ddccda38a076.html, last accessed on 22 May 2014. CSRC 
Measures are the administrative regulation of information disclosure in listed companies: enforcement on 
listed companies is the same as legislation, formulated in accordance with the Company Law, the Securities 
Law and other laws and administrative regulations. It was promulgated on 16 December 2006 and came 
into force on the same day.  
20
 See Stakeholder Pension Schemes Regulations 2000, supra note 16, Articles 37(7) and 53. An audit by 
qualified public accountants can be regarded as the third-party audit of financial information disclosure by 
UK companies referred to before. 
21
 The Guidelines of Environmental Information Disclosure in Listed Companies, available at: 
http://www.hbepb.gov.cn/gzhd/yjzj/201009/P020100915381138573491.pdf, last accessed on 
23 March 2014. It was created by the Ministry of Environmental Protection of China in November 2010, 
and is aimed at strengthening the responsibility of listed companies to protect the environment. The 
guidelines are applied to both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange Market.  
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the principal who leads members of production and business units are charged with the 
following responsibilities for work safety in their own units: ‘submitting to higher 
authorities timely and truthful report on accidents due to lack of work safety.’22 The 
Disposal of Information Disclosure of Production Safety Accidents (hereinafter ‘the 
Disposal’) also precisely regulates the procedure and requirement of reporting health and 
safety injuries and accidents to the local, as well as higher, authority, the Bureau of Safety 
Supervision.23 The Disposal only requires the Bureau of Safety Supervision at all levels to 
disclose information on safety accidents to the public in a timely manner, but does not 
enforce employers’ duty to directly reveal information about accidents to the public. 
 
The analysis of the legal requirement of information disclosure in China shows that 
employers’ reporting responsibility is largely limited to financial information disclosure to 
public investors, so that reporting on relevant CSR issues, especially in employment, is 
seldom regulated through legislation. This makes employers reluctant to report information 
about CSR implementation in corporate governance. The lack of legal requirement and 
standard mainly leads to an incomplete reporting system in corporate information 
disclosure, namely less use of indicators or exact statistics in CSR reports. Additionally, the 
third-party auditing is only widely used to control the quality and authenticity of financial 
reporting in listed companies, but not applied to monitor company’s information disclosure 
in other issues; rather, the information would be supervised by internal control or 
administrative departments. Employers failed to apply independent third-party audit or 
verification as a common approach to certify the quality and authenticity of reported 
information in CSR reports. 
                                                        
22
 The Law on Work Safety, Article 17(6). 
23
 Disposal of Information Disclosure of Production Safety Accidents is the administrative regulation, in 
accordance with the Safety Laws, administrative regulations and other bylaws, decreed by the General 
Bureau of Safety Supervision on 27 May 2009 and came into force on 1 July 2009, available at: 
http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2009-06/19/content_1345127.htm, last accessed on 11 June 2014. 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, China is increasingly on the way to achieving CSR at both 
national and corporate levels, with the result that government played a key role in 
encouraging the development of CSR among companies. Especially in state-owned 
companies, the state, as the main shareholder, largely affects the extent of companies’ CSR 
performance in corporate governance in areas such as CSR policymaking, CSR operations, 
CSR information disclosure and auditing. In China the implementation of CSR in 
companies is primarily supervised and controlled by government departments and 
industrial committees such as the Departments of Environmental Protection, Bureau of 
Safety Supervisions, or certain national or provincial industrial committee.24 SASAC 
particularly established the CSR Commission to instruct and monitor the achievement and 
performance of CSR among Chinese and overseas companies in China. 
 
Compared with the UK, in China the requirement of information disclosure and auditing in 
CSR in employment is still at an elementary and state-instructed step. However, CSR is 
exercised on the basis of minimum legal standards and is voluntarily exercised by 
companies in corporate governance, so that although the Chinese legal requirement of CSR 
information disclosure is not complete and as strict as UK legislation, Chinese companies 
could still voluntarily develop the performance of information disclosure as do UK 
companies, through the use of accurate statistics in reports, or reporting comprehensively 
on negative information to the public. In addition, instead of administrative supervision, 
the third-party audit and verification, which was mostly adopted in the UK companies 
researched, made CSR reports persuasive and reliable to report users and public investors. 
The adoption of the UK experience of CSR information disclosure and auditing is not a 
                                                        
24
 See SASAC, supra note 18. The report states that Chinese provincial governments had established CSR 
offices to supervise CSR implementation by companies in provinces. The government newspaper also 
monitors companies’ CSR performance and publishes information on the abuse of social and environmental 
matters in corporate governance. 
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legal requirement and may be freely applied in corporate governance by each Chinese 
company. Therefore, the level of information disclosure on CSR and auditing in corporate 
governance, to some extent, could avoid the limited legal regulation at national level and be 
voluntarily enhanced through an effective strategy in corporate governance.  
 
5.5.2  Achievement of employee engagement through effective  
corporate organs 
 
Of the UK companies’ CSR reports researched, not all the companies had provided 
information on employee engagement or stated the organization of trade unions or 
employee representatives. However, most of the employee engagement was aimed at 
achieving labour’s collective bargaining whereby employees had access to expressing their 
grievances and complaints, and received feedback and effective solutions from their 
employers. According to the reports of the companies researched that had ensured 
employee engagement, if the company had a trade union or employee representatives, the 
prime task of the two organizations was to strive for better treatment of employees and to 
safeguard employees’ legal rights at work through negotiation between employee leaders 
on behalf of the employees and employers. If the company did not refer to the actions of 
trade unions or employee representatives, in order to get employees’ opinion and solve 
labour problems, the exercise of employee engagement would also be achieved through 
other means between employees and top management, such as grievance reporting, 
director meetings, whistle-blowing policy and employee communication. 
 
From the research conducted among UK companies (Table 1) it is clear that the extent of 
employee engagement to satisfy employees’ legal rights at work is not dependent on the 
existence of trade unions or employee representatives, but an effective corporate organ to 
implement employee engagement on the basis of their needs and negotiation in practice. In 
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the UK employee engagement mainly means that workers have access to becoming 
involved in corporate governance through communication with employers to express their 
complaints and ideas, and to get efficient feedback from their company, irrespective of 
whether the communication is achieved in the form of delegated negotiation by trade 
unions or individuals talking to their employer. In this analysis of employee engagement in 
UK companies, reference is only made to the form of implementation to ensure employees’ 
rights and interest at work, whether through a trade union or other corporate department, 
and not the precise actions taken in each company about employee engagement (Table 1).  
 
As regards the research on Chinese companies, most of the companies disclosed 
information about trade unions in terms of implementing employee engagement in CSR; 
the minority carried out their actions through employee representatives. Different from UK 
companies, employee engagement was largely in the form of employees’ activities as 
mentioned before, such as athletics for workers, employee entertainment or even employee 
assistance for poor families. A corporate trade union is an independent organ that ensures 
employees’ interests through particular treatment, which is specific to an individual 
company. However, in terms of the explicit information obtained from some of the 
company reports researched, employee activities are, to some extent, not required by 
employees, and cannot really meet labour’s need and collective bargaining for better 
treatment. 
 
The Constitution of Chinese Trade Unions and in the Trade Union Law of China both stress 
that the main duty of trade unions is to safeguard the legal rights and interests of employees 
through ‘liais[ing] closely with employees, listen[ing] to and reflect[ing] their views and 
requirements, car[ing] for their livelihood, assist[ing] them in overcoming difficulties and 
serv[ing] them wholeheartedly’, and to organize employees to participate in trade union 
activities aimed at ‘the construction and reform’ and stimulation of economic, political, 
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social and cultural development.25 The CCP states that the main goal of trade unions has 
been to protect the working class’s interest and rights since the mid-1990s, so that the 
operation of all-level trade unions reflects and complies with the principle of the CCP; and 
the Trade Union Law of China regulates that ‘trade union organizations at the higher level 
shall lead the trade union organizations at the lower level’. The ACFTU is the 
national-level headquarters of trade unions.26 In the top-down model, the responsibility 
and function of trade unions are an integral part of the CCP that stimulates trade unions’ 
development through the CCP’s principle.27 As the initiator of Chines trade unions, the 
CCP’s requirement and attitude had been integrated into trade unions’ implementation at 
all levels. For example, among the companies researched, most of their employee activities, 
such as athletics or employee assistance, were not particularly designed for employee 
engagement in an individual company, but due to the requirement of the higher-level trade 
union that accurately reflected the party’s principle and needs to gather employees and 
enhance collective cohesion through various group activities.28 
 
Additionally, the notion of a trade union in China is conceptually defined as ‘an 
organization voluntarily comprised of the working class under the CCP’s leadership’. In 
                                                        
25
 Two main duties are concluded from Trade Union Law of China, Articles 6 and 7, and the Constitution 
of China Trade Unions. Trade unions primarily take responsibility for democratic management of 
employees’ legal rights and for the organization of various employee activities for collective cohesion of 
the further development in companies and in the state. 
26
 See Trade Union Law of China, supra note 25, Articles 8 and 9. 
27
 Clarke, S., ‘Post-socialist Trade Unions in China and Russia,’ Industrial Relations Journal (2005), 
Volume 36, Issue 1, 4–5. In this article Clark summarized some scholars’ saying and described trade union 
in socialism state as the ‘Party–state apparatus’, because trade unions do not to fight for employees’ interest, 
but encouraged workers to support the policies of the Party–state and implemented a series of state social 
welfare programmes. 
28
 Sun, Z., ‘The Nature and Independence of Trade Union’, Magazine of Managerialist, December 2011, 
available at: http://doc.mbalib.com/view/cfaca5bbb121b90cbed19c5c78ce5b99.html, last accessed on 12 
November 2013. Employee activity had been the traditional action in employee engagement in accordance 
with the CCP’s goal to strengthen collective cohesion in the working class at the level of company, region 
and state. 
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the Constitution of the CCP, the first sentence describes the CCP as ‘the vanguard of the 
Chinese working class and of the Chinese people and nation’, so that the CCP members are 
all included in the working class.29 In the employment relationship, the working class is 
the opposite body to the employers. Therefore, employers do not belong to trade unions. 
According to the definition in the Constitution of the CCP, all CCP members in the 
working class should be associated with trade unions. Nevertheless, the meaning of 
working class under the CCP’s lead and working class in relation to employment is 
different.30 All CCP members are conceptually located in the working class. However, the 
conceptual working class is divided into employers and employees who are the real 
working class within companies and some of the CCP members in companies, especially 
state-owned companies, play the role of employer or top management in the employment 
structure. Therefore, trade unions are not only comprised of employees in the working 
class, but also employers or top managers of companies. Trade unions are established 
voluntarily by employees to assert their interests and requirements. However, when 
corporate employers or managers participate in this group, employees’ rights would not be 
completely represented by the trade unions. Owing to the CCP’s leadership in trade unions, 
CCP members are even appointed as trade union leaders by the party, so that trade unions 
cannot independently serve to accomplish employees’ collective rights. 
 
In China, as regulated, the funds of trade unions come from membership fees and 2% of all 
employees’ income from their company. In practice, a large part of the funds are allocated 
from corporate finance by the company, so that the development of trade unions would 
financially depend on corporate support. At the local level, the funds of local trade unions 
are largely controlled by local government. In view of the high cost involved in supporting 
trade unions, local governments, to some extent, do not support ACFTU’s policies and 
                                                        
29
 ‘General Programme’, The Constitution of Communist Party of China, available at: 
http://wenku.baidu.com/view/d639be2658fb770bf78a557c.html, last accessed on 23 November 2013. 
30
 See Trade Union Law of China, supra note 25, Articles 1 and 2. 
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principles of developing local trade unions, so that governments would reduce the financial 
support to trade unions.31 Owing to the lack of independence, the function of trade unions 
has been changed from protecting employees’ collective interest to balancing the profit 
between employee and company or state. To be specific, trade unions should be the 
organization for employee representatives and employers to fight for employees’ interests. 
Trade unions are, in fact, the body that mediates with employees, in order to reduce the 
harm to companies’ profits or stated interests. As a result, the model of ‘employee and 
employer in trade union’ had become the model of ‘trade union for employer and 
government’, which means the employees’ collective bargaining had been replaced with 
collective consultation. 32  Owing to the economic dependence of companies on 
government, the leadership position of the trade unions in some companies and local 
governments have respectively been taken over by corporate managers or directors and 
governmental officers and leaders. In the hierarchical mechanism, trade unions at company 
level would be governed by trade unions at a local level who obtain financial support from 
local government. Thus, local government would indirectly supervise workers’ attitude to 
government policy and respond immediately to eliminate a negative effect among 
labourers through feedback from trade unions at company level.33 
 
In China, owing to typically Chinese problems in trade unions as analysed above, the 
                                                        
31
 Research Centre of General Trade Union in Hebei Province, ‘Trade Union Should Urgently Improve the 
Achievement of CSR’, Journal of Beijing Federation of Trade Unions Cadre College (2007), Volume 22, 
Issue 4, 8. In this article it is said that although the funds of trade unions are regulated by the Law of Trade 
Unions in China, by the mandatory formula mode, companies or local governments will still allocate a part 
of their funds as the administrative budget for the maintenance of trade unions. 
32
 See Trade Union Law of China, supra note 25, Articles 1 and 2. The model of ‘employee and employer 
in trade union’ means that employees achieve collective bargaining through trade unions’ negotiation with 
employers; while the model of ‘trade union for company and government’ means that trade unions mediate 
with employees to protect corporate and governmental interest.  
33
 Fang, L., ‘Ownership Change and Reshaping of Employment Relations in China: A Study of Two 
Manufacturing Companies’, The Journal of Industrial Relations (2002), Volume 44, Issue 1, 31–33; see 
also Trade Union Law of China, supra note 25, Articles 1 and 2. 
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responsibility of trade unions cannot be exercised in the way that it is in the UK. It is not a 
problem specific to individual companies, but rather a general phenomenon at all levels of 
trade union organisation in China. It is currently not possible to improve the capacity of 
trade unions, but the efficiency of employee engagement to ensure the collective 
bargaining of employees’ interests and rights can be achieved through employee 
representatives’ participation in boards of directors. Different from the composition of 
boards of directors in UK companies, boards of directors in Chinese companies are two-tier 
with an executive board and supervisory board.34 Chinese Company Law regulates that the 
number of employee representatives shall be above 1/3 of supervisory directors and elected 
by all employees. 35  Especially in state-owned companies, the executive board shall 
include some of employee representatives who are chosen by employees. Although trade 
unions in some of Chinese companies cannot achieve collective bargaining to ensure 
employees’ interest, employee engagement of corporate governance can still be ensured 
through effective employee representatives’ participation in supervisory board to inspect 
employers’ misbehaviour to employees and represent employees’ opinion to executive 
boards.  
 
In addition, in order to move employee engagement from the stage of participating in 
employee activities to ensuring employees’ interests at work, Chinese companies should 
                                                        
34 Chinese two-tier board is so called ‘parallel’ boards that include executive board and supervisory board. 
Under this circumstance, executive board is in charge of making decision and corporate operation in the 
comprehensive corporate governance; while supervisory board is to inspect company’s financial situation, 
supervise executive board of directors’ acts in corporate governance and provide advice to directors’ 
decision-making and act. Chinese ‘parallel’ model is different from German ‘vertical’ two-tier model. In 
German companies, directors in supervisory boards are appointed by shareholders and in charge of 
supervising and instructing executive boards’ decision-making and behaviour in corporate governance that 
the members in latter are all elected by former. See Sina Financial, Type and Composition of Boards [董事
会的类型与结构, dongshihuideleixingyujiegou], available at: 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/leadership/mzzjg/20071217/16584301221.shtml, last accessed on July 2, 2014; 
see also Chinese Company Law, Article 54, supra note 17. 
35 See Chinese Company Law, Article 51 and 71, supra note 17. 
Chapter 5: Comparison between and Analysis of United Kingdom and Chinese Companies’ Exercise of Corporate Social 
Responsibility in Employment 
© C. YUN 338
not only limit themselves to the function of trade unions to negotiate with employers, but 
should absorb UK experiences to spread the auxiliary exercise of employee engagement to 
other corporate organs, such as the department of human resources or even top 
management that they would provide varied opportunities for employees to communicate 
with companies.36 
 
5.5.3 Use of international standards in CSR implementation 
in employment 
 
Table 1 shows that most of the UK companies researched had directly applied international 
conventions and standards in the exercise of CSR in employment as the basis of 
decision-making of corporate governance.37 International standards were used in CSR 
actions and relevant approaches to information disclosure, so that the instruction would 
improve CSR performance and the efficiency of corporate governance in companies. For 
example, within the 90 companies studied, some of them had complied with the UN 
Universal Declaration of Human rights and had directly adopted it as guideline in their 
decision-making about employee human rights in CSR. Some companies had applied 
international standards, such as SA8000, OASHS18001 or ISO26000 as the measure in 
their individual CSR mechanism to standardize implementation in various aspects of CSR. 
Moreover, international standards also directed the way in which information should be 
                                                        
36
 In the UK companies researched, the communication with, and feedback to, employee engagement is 
still not only achieved by trade unions, but also other corporate departments. Employee engagement in CSR 
in employment had been implemented through varied approaches among companies, The common goal of 
employee engagement is to get any information from employees, no matter whether or not they are 
grievances or advice, and to ensure employees’ interests, both in CSR in employment and improvement of 
corporate governance.  
37
 In this part of the analysis, international convention means the global convention which is mandatory to 
member states, such as ILO Conventions; while, international standards includes the standards in the ISO 
system, such as ISO9001, and other globally used standards and principles, which would be voluntarily 
applied in states or companies, namely the UN Global Compact, SA8000, and so forth. 
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disclosed and reports audited, such as the GRI Reporting System and UN Global 
Compact.38 The general use of international standards of corporate governance and CSR in 
employment has largely enhanced the strength and quality of CSR exercise at the global 
level. 
 
In China the government had signed international conventions as the mandatory regulation 
at national level or regarded them as primary principles when drafting national legislation. 
The adoption of international standards is still at an early stage but the Chinese government 
has strongly urged that they be used among state-owned companies in order to meet the 
international requirement of CSR implementation. Many companies, especially private 
companies, are at the stage where they are waiting to see the result of using international 
standards in corporate governance. Many Chinese companies are in a transformational 
process, developing from profit-focused businesses to sustainability-focused businesses 
and the notion of CSR had been popularly absorbed into their decision-making on 
corporate governance. However, most Chinese companies could only comply with the 
domestic standards or guidelines of CSR, because the local standards are typical and 
appropriate to Chinese companies’ capacity for CSR development. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, numerous companies in China still treat economic growth and profit as the 
prime task in business, so that the use of international standards, which are, to some extent, 
higher than local standards, might increase the cost of corporate governance and reduce the 
financial profit in companies. 
 
In reality, it is a critical requirement for many Chinese companies, which have just started 
                                                        
38
 International standards not only outline the principles and basis for companies to establish a CSR 
strategy in employment, but also demonstrate the general structure and focal points when companies edited 
their reports and disclosed information on their CSR. Some of the international standards also provide a 
service to verify corporate information disclosure or would be the social auditable certification standards, 
such as SA8000. 
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focusing and implementing CSR in corporate governance, and a voluntary method for 
companies to practise CSR. The experiences of UK companies show that it is possible for 
companies, which had relatively complete CSR exercises, to largely adopt international 
standards in decision-making in order to improve their performance and competitiveness in 
the global market. If companies had taken steps in CSR, they can incorporate international 
standards properly into their CSR policy and standard as reference, so that the strict global 
guidelines would enhance individual companies’ CSR criteria and develop their capacity 
to achieve CSR. However, for companies who still focused on economic profit as the sole 
goal of corporate governance and paid little attention to social matters, it would be too 
expensive and rigorous to comply with international CSR standards in decision-making on 
corporate governance.  
 
5.6 Summary 
 
The comparative studies between UK and Chinese companies on the differences in the 
information they disclosed directly reflect the evident gap between the two countries. First, 
in Chinese companies the system of information disclosure is incomplete in that most of 
the CSR reports applied brief statements or short sentences to illustrate their exercise of 
CSR, rather than adopting exact numbers, statistics or detailed descriptions in their 
information disclosure, especially with respect to reporting on the issue of health and safety. 
Employers also neglected third-party audits or verification of information disclosure as 
effective accreditation of reported information. The shortcoming is mainly due to the 
shortage of regulation and public recognition of information disclosure and the relevant 
audit or verification. Second, because of the lack of independence in trade unions, which 
are the main organizations used to harness employees and are typically led by the CCP, 
employee engagement in many Chinese companies remained at the stage of providing 
different employee activities or providing welfare or employee assistance, and could not 
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ensure employees’ collective bargaining for the safeguarding of their interests and legal 
rights. Third, numerous Chinese companies are at the start of including CSR in 
decision-making on corporate governance and some of them have only just begun to 
appreciate the notion of CSR, so that the adoption of international CSR standards would be 
difficult for some companies and, to some extent, increase the cost of CSR in corporate 
governance. 
 
The analysis of the obvious differences directly demonstrated by the information revealed 
by the reports researched shows that the UK experience of CSR practice in the issues of 
information disclosure and audit, employee engagement and use of international standards 
can be completely or partly adopted into Chinese CSR exercises. First, according to the 
information disclosure, although few pieces of legislation require that precise CSR 
information be published and audits conducted, companies could reveal accurate statistics, 
make detailed statements, and disclose both positive and negative incidents in their CSR 
report to ensure the specification and authenticity of disclosed information, and apply 
external audit or third-party verification to prove the reliability of information to the public. 
Second, employee engagement in Chinese trade unions was partly limited to organizing 
recreational and sports activities or ‘collective consultation’ with employees. It is difficult 
to overcome trade unions’ current dilemma of protecting employees’ right of collective 
negotiation in their interests. However, employees’ collective bargaining for their legal 
rights and interests could be achieved by other corporate departments and the approach can 
be varied as in UK companies, but it has to ensure that employees’ conditions are being met 
by employers. Third, in the UK, international conventions are not only applied at the 
national level as mandatory regulation, but are also directly used by companies as basic 
instruction on CSR in strategies of corporate governance, and even more broadly adopted 
as the guideline for CSR implementation and outline of information disclosure. The 
empirical analysis of UK companies, using international conventions and standards, 
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showed that the adoption had largely improved companies’ CSR performance, which put 
the UK CSR exercise at an international level. At national-level adoption, international 
conventions and standards could be voluntarily and directly applied within Chinese 
companies as the corporate guidelines to enhance the quality of CSR implementation and 
corporate governance. However, the extent to which international standards are used would 
primarily depend on the degree of companies’ economic development and CSR 
performance. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis, firstly, provided a theoretical discussion of corporate governance and CSR in 
respect of their emergence and function, shareholder protection, stakeholders’ interests, 
relevant decision-making, and the positive correlation between the two concepts. The 
thesis presented an analysis of the approaches and mechanisms used in CSR in respect of 
the rationale for its emergence and general voluntary initiatives widely used worldwide. 
Specifically, it introduced the approaches to CSR in the UK, which is experienced and 
has a long history in this regard, and the methods developed in China under particular 
situations and against a certain background of a developing country labouring under the 
CCP’s monopoly. 
 
According to the analysis of stakeholders, employee interests and rights are a main issue 
and should be taken seriously in corporate governance and CSR, because 
employee–employer relations in employment, to some extent, do affect companies’ 
destiny. Therefore, the thesis conducted empirical and comparative research on CSR in 
respect of employees in corporate governance between UK and Chinese companies. The 
research relied on information disclosure, such as that contained in various corporate 
reports. The comparison made in the thesis was used to finally analyse the feasibility of 
Chinese companies adopting UK models of CSR towards employees in corporate 
governance. 
 
The thesis argues that corporate governance is a central component in a company for 
shareholders, board of directors and management to coordinate the relations among the 
corporate constituents, such as employees, consumers and suppliers, and reduces 
transaction costs that may arise due to the firm specificity and uncertainty of transaction. 
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When firms’ property is separated into ownership and control between shareholders and 
the board of directors, the latter becomes the former’s agent in decision-making to ensure 
maximization of shareholders’ interest. In corporate governance, contractual participants 
who are so-called stakeholders, largely affect companies’ success, with the result that 
stakeholder theory is adopted in corporate governance whereby the board of directors 
concerns itself with stakeholders’ profit, which is in the shareholders’ interest, when 
making decisions.  
 
CSR is the outcome of stakeholder theory, which concerns stakeholders’ interests in the 
social and environmental issues in transactions. Therefore, it improves the efficiency of 
corporate governance in reducing transaction costs, stimulates team production, 
maximizes shareholders’ profit and meets more stakeholders’ needs to achieve company 
success. CSR is a strategic and voluntary approach to corporate governance that goes 
beyond the legal requirement to optimize relationships with stakeholders. It is also the 
standard used to evaluate the quality of corporate governance through whether the board 
of directors makes decisions on shareholder profit maximization, and companies’ success 
with respect to financial, social and environmental issues relating to all stakeholders. 
 
With increased concerns about social and environmental benefits in business, CSR 
emerged from public need and market pressure, especially due to the legal and public 
requirement of information disclosure of companies’ performance. Comprehensive 
disclosure to the public on the implementation of CSR in corporate governance improves 
companies’ corporate image and competitiveness in the marketplace. It is adopted 
voluntarily on the basis of legal regulation, which affects its concept, scope and approach. 
A series of voluntary initiatives was developed as codes of conducts, such as international 
guidelines and national standards, and contractual parties can voluntarily set up CSR 
clauses in contracts. However, the contractual duty is enforced under law. Moreover, 
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information disclosure and monitoring are both effective tools to use to ensure the 
achievement of CSR and credibility of companies’ performance, and have been widely 
applied in corporate governance worldwide. 
 
With respect to the general initiatives, the UK is an experienced country and for decades 
has implemented CSR effectively on the basis of comprehensive legal regulations. In this 
country stakeholder engagement is strongly recommended as a strategy to meet 
shareholders’ needs, and to ensure companies’ success as a whole by means of 
standardized voluntary guidelines and information disclosure among numerous companies, 
especially FTSE-listed companies on the London Stock Exchange. Additionally, 
governments and SRI also drive the way and stimulate companies to exercise CSR in 
corporate governance, in order to enjoy governmental abatement of duty or preferential 
policy and attract social investment from institutional investors.  
 
Contrary to the UK, China introduced CSR in the late twentieth century, because Deng 
Xiaoping’s ‘Open Policy’ had led to unbalanced economic development and lack of 
sustainable development. With the rapid economic growth that took place among Chinese 
companies, a social and environmental crisis occurred, so that CSR was urgently needed to 
optimize the domestic market and to seek international business partners. In the beginning, 
when CSR was first exercised, there were various mistaken notions and barriers in the 
economic, social and political aspects. However, CSR is still being developed through the 
Chinese government’s drive, innovation in the legal basis, voluntary initiatives, SRI in 
business, and relevant CSR assessment and verification. 
 
In order to catch up with the global pace of CSR development, Chinese companies have 
to learn from countries such as the UK, with its abundant experience in CSR in various 
aspects. Employees are vital constituents in corporate governance, and positive relations 
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in employment will enhance team production and improve companies’ performance. CSR 
towards employees is a critical issue when boards of directors make decisions. Against 
this background, empirical research was conducted and comparative studies made for this 
thesis. Data on information disclosure of companies’ CSR towards their employees in 
corporate governance were collected from UK and Chinese companies and analysed, and 
the feasibility of Chinese companies adopting UK models of CSR towards their 
employees in corporate governance assessed. 
 
According to the case studies and database, most of the UK companies had published 
corporate information through precise description in the form of CSR reports, annual 
reports or sustainability reports, accompanied by third-party audits or verification to 
ensure the quality and reliability of information disclosure. In contrast, some Chinese 
companies’ reports only provided brief and general statements on CSR achievement, and 
less than one third of companies applied efficient third-party monitoring to control the 
authenticity of their information disclosure. Additionally, international standards, such as 
ILO standards and the UN Global Compact, are broadly and directly used in corporate 
governance among UK companies to instruct the implementation of CSR, and its 
reporting and audit; whereas most of the Chinese companies preferred domestic CSR 
guidelines from their government, academic institutions, securities markets and so forth, 
although international guidelines are also adopted in a few Chinese companies. Moreover, 
most of the UK companies researched had achieved employee engagement in CSR 
through the process of stakeholder engagement, which involves stakeholders totally in 
corporate governance by reflecting their opinion and communicating with top 
management. Trade unions, labour unions or employee representatives also work 
efficiently in more than half of companies to achieve employees’ collective bargaining 
and protect employees’ legal rights in the workplace. However, employee engagement in 
many Chinese companies is one way: here, employees would express their opinion 
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without receiving feedback from top management. Trade unions are more likely to 
organize employee activities rather than collective bargaining to ensure employees’ 
interests at work. 
 
Based on the comparison, this research comes to the conclusion that Chinese companies 
can either entirely or partly adopt UK approaches to their CSR towards their employees 
directly in corporate governance, without external economic, legal and political 
influences. First, Chinese companies can increase the internal standard of information 
disclosure completely to provide precise and authentic statements in CSR reports, and 
adopt third-party audit or verification to control the reliability of information disclosure 
to the public. Second, international standards as the guideline can be voluntarily referred 
to in companies’ codes of conduct or directly applied to CSR practices in corporate 
governance, regardless of whether the international conventions or agreements have been 
ratified at national level. However, the extent to which international standards are 
adopted depends on companies’ economic capacity: the cost of such implementation 
might be over-budget in individual companies that do not perform strongly economically. 
Third, compared with the function of trade unions in UK companies, Chinese trade 
unions are not able to achieve employees’ collective bargaining wholly, because of the 
dilemma in the national operational mechanism. However, the approaches of employee 
engagement to express opinion and complaints, and to communicate with employers can 
be used through the supervisory board in corporate governance to strengthen the 
connection between employees and employers. Employees’ collective bargaining can 
also be achieved in companies’ other departments, and not only through trade unions, to 
ensure employees’ rights of negotiation with top management. 
 
Although UK and Chinese companies both voluntarily implement CSR with regard to 
employees in corporate governance, differences still largely exist in the two countries due 
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to the difference in the extent of CSR development. First, under the comprehensive 
regulations, UK companies will comply with the minimum legal standard and voluntarily 
adopt applicable initiatives to report information in public. In reality, if companies are 
only dependent on the legal requirement of social and environmental information 
disclosure, the quality and reliability of their reports are still at a higher level than that of 
Chinese companies. In China little legislation regulates the exercise of social and 
environmental information disclosure. Although selected Chinese companies voluntarily 
provide CSR reports, there is still lack of instruction and a minimum legal basis to direct 
the approach and standard of information disclosure and verification, so that the scale of 
using voluntary reports to reflect the CSR performance to employees will only be decided 
by companies’ consideration of the importance of information disclosure. 
 
Second, in the UK, a developed country with full experience of CSR, companies have 
moved from the stage of profit-seeking to social and sustainable development. Therefore, 
the voluntary adoption of international standards will be the effective approach to 
enhance the CSR performance and establish positive corporate reputation in public. In 
China, most companies are still in the transitional period from profit-seeking to 
sustainability. That is to say that companies are implementing CSR and take social 
burdens in corporate governance. However, the cost of a CSR exercise is a critical issue 
that Chinese companies should consider when deciding whether to implement it. 
Applying international standards will bring higher cost in practice, with the result that 
many Chinese companies choose national initiatives or industrial guidelines as the 
voluntary approach to implement CSR in corporate governance in the early stages of 
achieving CSR. It is clear from observation in the empirical research conducted among 
Chinese companies who had adopted international standards that most of them are 
state-owned companies or famous companies because they have the strong financial 
capacity to support the implementation of CSR at the global level. 
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Third, in UK companies employees do not sit on the board of directors and cannot 
directly affect the decision-making, so that the efficiency of trade unions and employee 
representatives is the most functional way in which to make employees’ voices heard, 
and to ensure collective bargaining and workers’ interests with the employer. Employees 
organize trade unions voluntarily and their representatives are democratically elected 
from among the ranks of the employees. Therefore, trade unions and employee 
representatives ensure employee engagement in corporate governance without external 
influence from the board of directors or the government. Whereas in Chinese companies 
employee representatives have a position on the supervisory board in order to monitor 
and participate in corporate governance. In reality, the chairperson or employee members 
on the supervisory board are always dominated by Party members or government 
officials, especially in state-owned companies. Trade unions in Chinese companies are 
hierarchically controlled by the CCP, and work on behalf of the Party and State, so that in 
many companies the leaders of trade unions nominated by the Party are still the members 
of top management. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to guarantee that 
employees’ opinion and collective bargaining would be achieved by trade unions and the 
supervisory board. This highlights the negative performance of employee engagement 
through employee representatives and trade unions in Chinese companies. 
 
From the comparison in reporting performance between UK and Chinese companies, it is 
evident that the exercise of information disclosure in selected UK companies is generally 
better than in Chinese companies. As discussed, CSR information reporting is a voluntary 
action in corporate governance to make the public aware of the real performance in social 
and environmental matters, so that the extent and scale of CSR information disclosure 
and monitoring are dependent on companies’ decision-making. However, CSR reports do 
not tell stories or are not window-dressing. The board of directors should ensure the 
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comprehensiveness and authenticity of published information. The UK has provided good 
examples of companies who have adopted a precise approach to reporting, by including 
numbers, charts and an index in their reports, and honestly revealing the negative aspects 
in the workplace. The reliability of information disclosure is ensured through third-party 
audit or verification by assurance companies or qualified NGOs. Compared with the UK, 
information disclosure in many Chinese companies is in the form of an overview or 
blurred information couched in short sentences or ‘slogans’ to demonstrate the 
performance of CSR in employment. Chinese companies seldom mention negative 
incidents in their reports. This thesis discusses the respective UK and Chinese experience 
of information disclosure on CSR in corporate governance by examining the UK 
initiatives of publishing CSR information as precisely and reliably as possible, instead of 
the ‘Chinese special’ third-party comment or internal monitoring, using effective external 
auditing and verification to enhance public credibility of companies’ CSR performance 
and information disclosure.  
 
This research on the implementation of CSR to protect employees concludes that the 
most important element to improve CSR performance in employment is to strengthen 
employees’ rights to know and engage in corporate governance. To be specific, when 
employees are conferred the right to know, they will focus on corporate information 
disclosure to monitor the substantial performance of CSR in corporate governance. The 
important need for published information and monitoring from employees compels 
companies to reveal high-quality and reliable information. In this way, employees’ 
internal supervision will be effective and will ensure the authenticity of companies’ CSR 
performance. Top management will also be stimulated to achieve employee protection of 
higher standards. In addition, when employees are able to express their opinion and 
participate in corporate governance through collective bargaining and employee 
engagement, CSR towards employees will be taken seriously in decision-making and the 
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abuse of employees’ interests will be avoided in corporate governance. Therefore, 
employees should have the freedom to elect their representatives on supervisory boards 
and the leaders of trade unions, in order to safeguard their interests by ensuring that the 
labour unions serve on their behalf.  
 
At the macro-level, the development of CSR in China is delayed and different from the 
UK due to its social communism economy, which is largely dominated by state-owned 
companies and controlled by CCP and governments. However, it is essential and possible 
to improve CSR and its information disclosure in corporate governance. In China’s 
economic reform, both state-owned companies and private companies face the same 
market competition as UK companies; in other words, provided that laws require social 
performance; consumers buy goods or service from companies with clear CSR; 
institutional investors make SRI; assurance or auditing companies provide authentic 
monitoring; and the market mechanism works, market participants will directly stimulate 
companies to make decision in respect of social and environmental issues, and disclose 
CSR information to provide stakeholders with knowledge of the CSR achieved in 
corporate governance. 
 
For this thesis, the data were directly collected from validated corporate information 
disclosure and, to some extent, external audit, so that the empirical research provides a 
comparison between UK and Chinese companies’ exercise of CSR towards their 
respective employees in corporate governance. In the Chinese emerging market, many 
companies’ goals are changing from economic benefit to sustainable development, so that 
legislators, governments and markets have begun to develop and research CSR through 
legislation and governmental regulation; academic and industrial associations; NGOs; 
and even local governments have established different voluntary standards and guidelines 
of CSR towards employees. However, many companies merely observe approaches to 
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CSR, and do not actively engage in CSR in corporate governance because some of them 
do not have the practical basis for implementation. The broad database and analysis in 
this research were used to suggest that companies should adopt experience from UK 
companies to perform CSR in corporate governance without external influence. 
 
China has a large number of labour-intensive industries comprising both domestic 
companies and MNEs. Many of them have adopted the attitude to employees of ‘paying 
and gaining, no more concerns’, that is, employees are only paid for their work without 
extra protection and interest in achieving CSR. In some small enterprises the ‘sweat shop’ 
still exists where employees are over-exploited and their legal rights in the workplace are 
not safeguarded. Therefore, this research provides a broad overview and cautions 
companies’ top management to emphasize employee protection at work through the 
effective exercise of CSR in corporate governance. 
 
Furthermore, this research provides implications for UK MNEs about how to implement 
CSR towards employees in corporate governance in China; in other words, although the 
UK has established a complete mechanism of CSR towards employees, UK MNEs still 
need to learn from typical Chinese situations when they invest in the Chinese market. For 
example, as mentioned in Chapter 2 on the economic barriers in China, in order to absorb 
overseas investment, some Chinese companies have reduced the standards of CSR to 
MNEs, especially in respect of protecting employees in ‘sweat shops’ and even illegal 
forced labour that exists in overseas companies. In these circumstances, UK MNEs in 
China should strictly comply with the same standards of CSR towards employees, both in 
the domestic and overseas market. If UK companies applied international standards to 
home employees, they have to equally protect employees in Chinese companies. They 
cannot degrade the standards of CSR protection to employees in developing countries and 
cause the abuse of workers’ human rights. It is an effective approach to urge boards of 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
© C. YUN 353
directors in Chinese branches to make decisions on stakeholders’ interests on the basis of 
higher standards. In the meantime, the implementation of CSR among MNEs in China 
will also set positive examples to local companies and directly present instruction to 
domestic employers on how to meet the international level to achieve CSR towards 
employees in the Chinese market. 
 
The comparison shows that there is a visible difference in the function of trade unions 
between UK and Chinese companies. In UK companies a trade union is an organization 
voluntarily gathered by employees to express their opinion and negotiate with employers 
for their own interests at work; whereas in Chinese companies, some trade unions are 
groups convened to organize employee activities, such as athletics, and to assist 
employees in poor living conditions. It seems that those trade unions deviate from the 
proper function to achieve employee engagement and collective bargaining as in the case 
of UK companies. However, many Chinese companies, particularly state-owned ones, 
were transferred from the collective economy, so that the notion of ‘collectivism’ still 
exists in current corporate governance. When UK MNEs invest in Chinese market, the 
top management will coordinate the relationship with Chinese local managers and staff. It 
is an indigenous approach for overseas companies in China to associate with Chinese 
circumstance in corporate governance and strengthen the function of trade unions to 
convene employees through traditional collective activities in order to establish 
companies’ cohesion with Chinese workers. The typical Chinese approach can even be 
introduced in UK companies’ trade unions to implement CSR in employment, because 
such employees gathering would diversify the function of trade unions, and would largely 
improve the connection between employees and companies. 
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Table 1: UK Companies’ CSR Practices in Employment (First 21 companies present in the sequence of examples followed alphabetically by rest of companies.) 
 
Company Law Codes of conduct Health and 
Safety 
Human rights Training and 
development 
Payment and 
welfare 
Employee 
engagement 
Monitoring and 
reporting 
Redrow PLC Equity Act 
2010, 
Health and  
Safety at  
Work etc Act 
1974, 
RIDDOR, 
Work at  
Height Regula-
tions 2007 
ACAS Booklet, 
OECD Guideline, 
Health and Safety 
Charter of the 
Home Builders  
Federation 
HSEs, 
HS harm alert, 
Safety training 
No 
discrimination, 
Right to trade 
union 
Apprentice 
training, 
Graduates  
training 
Pension 
Scheme, 
Annual  
appraisal 
Talk initiatives(HS), 
Whistleblowing  
policy 
HS monitoring, 
HS auditing 
G4S PLC  OHSAS18001, 
Security Industry 
Authority  
Licences 
Safety, health and  
environmental 
awareness,  
Alcohol and drug 
clamp-down 
 Learning & 
Developing 
BTEC LEVEL2 
 Whistleblowing for 
wrongdoing, 
Tapping in employee 
opinion 
British Safety  
Council audit 
Rolls-Royce   HS Management, 
HSE Weeks 
Ethical human 
rights, 
Female promotion 
Support 
employee 
development, 
Apprenticeship 
 Employee 
engagement 
KPMG Audit 
Great Portland 
Estates PLC 
  Corporate HS 
policy, 
HS manual 
No discrimination All level 
development, 
external degree 
24 hrs 
legal and 
financial advice 
to minimum 
payment 
Appraisal process, 
employee 
communication, 
Whistleblowing 
policy 
Supervision 
Pentland PLC    Safe handling of  
workplace 
chemicals 
Human rights, 
Children labour 
Migrant worker 
Empolyee 
training 
Benefit and  
rewards, 
National 
minimum 
payment 
Grievance 
mechanisms, 
Worker interviews 
Third-party audit 
Coats PLC  Ethical Trading 
Initiative 
(‘ETI’) Base Code 
HS management, 
USA 
Occupational 
Safety and  
Health 
Administration 
Diversity, 
Collective 
representation 
Learning and  
rewarding 
Coats pension 
plan 
Whistle-blowing 
policy, 
Employee 
engagement 
survey 
HS audit 
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Company Law Codes of conduct Health and 
Safety 
Human rights Training and 
development 
Payment and 
welfare 
Employee 
engagement 
Monitoring and 
reporting 
(OSHA) 
Firstgroup PLC   Work-life health 
management 
No 
discrimination, 
Diversity  
policy 
Rigorous 
training 
programmes 
Recognition and 
rewards 
Various survey Third-party 
audit 
Kier PLC Equity Act 
2010, 
Health and  
Safety at  
Work etc Act 
1974, 
Work at Height 
Regulations 
2007 
ACAS Booklet, 
CCS 
HS management 
system, 
occupational safe, 
HS policy 
No 
discrimination, 
Diversity  
policy 
Apprenticeship Pension 
Scheme, 
Welfare, 
Minimum wage 
Whistleblowing 
policy, 
Anti-bribery report 
SSSTS  
supervision, 
GRI Reporting 
and verification 
Barratt PLC Work at Height 
Regulations 
2007 
Injury Incidence 
Rate (IIR), 
ISO14001, 
OHSAS18001, 
CSCS 
Constructing 
KPIs, 
CCS 
Executive H&S No discrimnation Formal training, 
Barratt 
Academy, 
Graduate 
develop, 
Apprenticeship(
NVQ) 
Annual award 
for self-study 
Long-term  
relationship 
with 
employees, 
Flexible 
working hour 
Whisteblowing 
policy, 
Annual engagement 
survey to employees 
(Get recognised 
program) 
Monitoring 
visiting 
Orascomci PLC  ISO9001 
ISO14001 
HSE policy  Training for 
local 
employees in  
developing 
countries, 
OCI EDU. 
Foundation 
Share-based 
payment 
 Employee's  
supervision 
Berkeley PLC  CCS Good work 
program 
H&S standards 
 CGETI training  
Initiatives, 
CSCS training 
   
Go Ahead PLC Equality Act 
2010, 
RIDDOR 
ISO9001, 
ISO14001， 
OSHAS18001 
HS policy and 
occupational 
health 
Diversity of  
human rights 
PCV Training, 
Driver 
Certificate 
of Professional 
Competence 
Long-term  
incentive share, 
Increased 
pension 
scheme 
Grievance, 
Employee review 
 
UK Mail PLC  UN Global  
Compact 
Occupational 
health service 
No discrimination Apprentice 
training 
(NVQ), 
Competitive 
pay, 
Employee share, 
Employee consulting 
group,  
Employee suggest 
HS audit 
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Company Law Codes of conduct Health and 
Safety 
Human rights Training and 
development 
Payment and 
welfare 
Employee 
engagement 
Monitoring and 
reporting 
First line 
manager  
Pension scheme programme 
Severstal'OAO   HS management, 
Labour Safety  
Project, 
medical 
programme 
No 
discrimination, 
Freedom to trade  
union 
Training 
program, 
Higher 
education, 
Graduate 
training 
Housing 
program, 
Pension and  
retiree support 
Benchmarking survey Safe inspection 
Marks & Spencer  
PLC 
Mini-mum  
Age 
Convention 
ACAS Booklet Occupational  
health, 
safety and 
fire, 
Health and Safety  
Committee’s 
Terms 
Equality M&S Career 
Path 
Sharesave ‘Investing in  
You’ 
employee engagement 
GRI Level-check, 
External Review 
Committee 
AB Food RIDDOR, 
Employment 
Right Act 1996 
 Risk management, 
Reducing injury,  
Reporting  
accidents,  
Transportation, 
safety, 
healthy workplace 
Disable  
Employees, 
No discrimination 
Sustainable 
training, 
Apprenticeship 
  Third-party audit 
Henry Boot PLC   Reduce accidents, 
Constructing KPIs 
No discrimination Internal training 
927 day, 
External 
training, 
Manager 
training  
Long-term  
relationship 
with 
employees, 
Pension Scheme 
Bespoke 
Health&Safety 
Audit System, Survey 
of employees, Bribery 
suspicions 
 
Bovis PLC RIDDOR, 
CDM 2007 
NHBC ALL 
Builder  
Average 
Reduce accidents 
Health and Safety 
Management 
 Time off to 
study, 
training plan, 
NVQ study 
 Employee 
reprensentation  
Talking with group, 
Anti-bribery report, 
One to one talking 
HSECC, 
CDM auditing 
Cape PLC  ISO9001, 
ISO14001， 
OSHAS18001 
H&S quality 
management 
system, 
HS KPI, 
0 injuries 
 International 
development  
and  
management 
training 
Welfare KPI Unsafe reporting Working place 
control by third-
party 
Peter Black 
Footwear  
and Accessories 
 ACAS Booklet HSE initiatives Equal and  
diversity policy, 
Disability 
Learning and  
developing 
 Employee 
engagement 
survey 
Third-party audit 
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Company Law Codes of conduct Health and 
Safety 
Human rights Training and 
development 
Payment and 
welfare 
Employee 
engagement 
Monitoring and 
reporting 
Carnival   HESS Policy, 
HS Training, 
Safety 
management, 
HS Committee 
No 
discrimination, 
No forced labour 
Standard 
training, 
Training of anti-
corruption and 
bribery, 
Career 
development, 
Annual 
competition 
Reasonal pay 
for 
extra work hour, 
Pay and benefit  
package, 
British 
Merchant  
Navy Ratings 
Pension Fund, 
Pension scheme 
Trade union collective 
bargaining, 
Employee 
communication 
Deloitte LLP  
third-party audit 
Anglo America   Safety control, 
Safety 
management, 
Health incidents 
control, 
Health reporting, 
Occupational 
health  
management 
Diversity, 
Female protection 
Formal training 
and 
practice, 
Personal 
education 
way, 
Basic education 
Social welfare, 
Flexible 
working 
hour and Child 
care 
 Pricewaterhouse  
Coopers LLP  
third-party audit 
Aggreko  UN Global 
compact, 
UN universal  
declaration 
HS Management, 
Best practice, 
Higher standard, 
Safety reporting 
Diversity and 
equal 
opportunities to 
employees, 
Employment of  
disable  
employees 
 Pension fund, 
Sharesave 
Whistle blowing 
policy, 
Employee grievance 
hotline 
DNV third-party 
audit 
AMEC  UN Global  
Compact 
Going beyond 
zero, 
HSE Management 
system, 
Security 
management, 
Occupational 
health, 
Trackwise 
Diversity, 
Diversity of  
thought 
AMEC 
Academy, 
Professional 
training, 
Career 
development, 
Graduates and 
Apprenticeship 
training 
Equal pay Global Survey, 
"My Opinion" survey, 
Collective bargaining 
by  
employee represen-
tatives 
GRI Reporting, 
BV third-party 
audit 
Antofagasta  OHSAS18001 HS Management, 
Zero harm 
Division-wide 
HS policies 
No 
discrimination, 
Female promotion 
Profesional 
training 
Skill 
competence 
 Employee 
consultation 
Trade Union Group 
Face-to-face 
negotiation 
GRI Reporitng 
Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers LLP 
ARM Holdings   EHS Management Equal  Graduates Fair benefit Whistle blowing Deloitte LLP  
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Company Law Codes of conduct Health and 
Safety 
Human rights Training and 
development 
Payment and 
welfare 
Employee 
engagement 
Monitoring and 
reporting 
opportunity connection, 
Professional 
training, 
Feedback and 
development 
programme 
procedure, 
Open door to 
employees, 
Global survey, 
Employee  
communication 
third-party audit 
Augean PLC RIDDOR ILO Standards 
SA8000 
HS protection, 
HSE, 
British Safety  
Council, 
COMAH 
 Learning, 
Developing 
at various level 
Employee 
pension 
fund, 
Employee share 
Internal  
communication, 
Public consultation 
GRI Reporting 
and Level-Check, 
HS Monitoring 
Babcock 
Internationl 
RIDDOR, 
Companies Act 
2006 
ISO 9001 
ISO 14001 
OHSAS18001 
Work safely, 
Safety Lens, 
Challenging 
safety 
Diversity, 
Female workforce 
Babcock MBA, 
Professional 
training, 
Apprenticeship, 
Babcock 
University 
Employee 
benefit, 
Pension fund 
Whistle-blowing 
policy, 
Employee 
communication 
Third-party  
verification 
BAE Systems  UN Universal 
Declaration of 
human rights, 
UN Global 
Compact 
HS management 
to 
employees, 
Safety teams 
Diversity, 
Leadship diversity 
Early career  
programme, 
Primary 
education and 
training 
Share  
incentive 
plan  
Ethic helpline, 
Listening to 
employees 
GRI Reporting, 
LRQA third-
party audit 
Balfour Beatty Employment 
Right Act 1996, 
CDM 2007 
UN Universal 
Declaration of 
Human rights, 
ILO standard 
Zero harm, 
provide safety 
tests 
resources, 
free health check 
Respect human 
rights,         
Women 
managers 
recruited 
Graduate 
develop, 
Management 
develop, 
International job 
Pension Fund Traction(risk report), 
Ethics helpline 
GRI Index and 
verification 
BG Group  ILO Health and 
Safety in Mines 
Convention 1995, 
HS  
Employee 
assistance, 
24-hours HS  
counselling, 
Occupational 
illness 
reporting 
Diveristy, 
equal treatment 
Practical guide 
of  
professional 
skill, 
E-learning, 
 Employee  
speak-up 
KPMG Audit 
BHP Billiton Companies  
Act 2006, 
RIDDOR 
 Safety risk 
management, 
Air safety, 
Risk report, 
Identifying health 
risk, 
No 
discrimination, 
Care for female 
Leadership 
Development 
Programme, 
Training 
session, 
Professional 
Pension scheme  Ernst&Young 
LLP 
third-party audit 
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Company Law Codes of conduct Health and 
Safety 
Human rights Training and 
development 
Payment and 
welfare 
Employee 
engagement 
Monitoring and 
reporting 
Occupational 
exposure, 
Protecting 
occupational 
illness 
devlopment 
Big Yellow PLC Equity Act 
2010, 
Health and  
Safety at  
Work etc Act 
1974, 
RIDDOR 
UN Global 
compact, 
ILO, 
UN Universal  
Declaration 
HS policy Diversity, 
Leadship diversity 
Career training Employee 
benefit 
pension fund, 
Employee 
benefit 
trust, 
‘Flexitime,  
staggered hours,  
home working  
and sabbaticals’ 
Employee  
communication, 
Whistleblowing 
policy, 
Employee attitude 
survey 
HS audit 
BP  ISO9001 Safety 
management, 
Personal HS 
Control, 
Prevention  
of accidents of oil 
spill 
Diversity and  
inclusive, 
Female leaders 
Graduates 
programme, 
Management 
development, 
Talent 
management, 
Expertise 
programme 
Rewarding to  
employees, 
Competitive 
salary, 
Minimal 
standard 
Employee satisfaction 
index, 
Employee annual 
survey, 
Discussion  
with employers 
 
BT   HS scorecard, 
Physical health, 
Mental wellbeing 
Inclusive manage-
ment, 
Human dignity 
E-learning, 
Development 
action plan, 
Route to learn, 
Professional 
learning 
Flexible work, 
Reward and 
benefit to work 
Two-way 
conversation, 
Survey, 
Trade union for 
collective bargaining 
Pricewaterhouse  
Coopers LLP  
third-party audit 
British American 
Tobacco 
 UN Global  
Compact 
‘Close the gap to 
zero’ 
Risk assessment, 
HS Management, 
Prevention of 
fatalities, 
Prevention of 
AIDS 
Diversity Long-term 
development, 
Leadership and 
employee 
capability 
training, 
Executive 
training 
Better treatment 
to  
employees for 
good value 
Global employee 
survey, 
Feedback to 
employee's opinion 
GRI Reporting, 
Ernst&Young 
LLP third-party 
audit 
Bunzl  ILO Convetions, 
OHSAS18001 
HS Management, 
Accidents control 
Diversity E-Learning 
programme, 
Professsional 
development 
  GRI Index (3.1) 
and 
Verification, 
LQRA Assurance 
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Company Law Codes of conduct Health and 
Safety 
Human rights Training and 
development 
Payment and 
welfare 
Employee 
engagement 
Monitoring and 
reporting 
third-party audit 
Centrica  UN Guiding 
Principles  
on business and 
human rights 
HS Commitment, 
HS Management, 
Healthy and 
wellbeing 
 ‘Extraordinary 
You!’, 
Training and 
development, 
Leader's 
journey, 
Supporting 
early career 
Fair-reward, 
Mixed payment 
and 
benefits 
Open communication, 
Engagement and 
feedback, 
Employee 
consultation 
in Trade Union  
GRI Level-check, 
External Review 
Committee 
Compass Group   HS Control 
Safely Everyday 
HSE Team 
Equal 
opportunity to 
all employees, 
Young people in 
decent 
workplace 
Job training 
Apprenticeship 
Graduates 
training 
 Employee survey 
Listening Panel, 
Labour Union 
GRI Reporting, 
Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers LLP 
CRH RIDDOR OHSAS18001 HS Policies, 
Fatalities 
elimination, 
Safety training, 
Safety  
record, 
Annual review, 
Employee health 
check 
Diversity, 
Female promotion 
at administrative 
positions 
Professional  
training, 
Best practice  
sharing, 
Management 
development 
Improvement  
of 
employee  
welfare, 
Sharesave, 
Competitive  
pay, 
Social and 
pension 
fund 
Trade union for  
bargaining  
about any  
dispute 
 
Croda Int'l PLC   Best practice in 
occupational 
health promotion  
and Monitoring 
Human rights 
safeguard 
Employee 
development 
Remuneration 
and  
benefits 
packages 
Employee 
engagement 
survey, 
Whistleblowing 
 
Coca Cola HBC  UN Global  
Compact 
HS management, 
Healthy wellbeing 
 Talent training, 
Career plan, 
Leadership 
development 
Personal cost  
ownership 
 GRI Reporting, 
KPMG third-
party audit 
Dawson Ltd Companies Act  
2006 
 HS management  Training 
programm, 
especially for 
disabled staff 
Employee 
benefit 
pension fund 
Information spread Internal audit 
Diageo   Zero harm, 
Health control and 
wellbeing, 
Diversity, 
Women 
empowerment 
Functional 
training, 
Leadership 
Executive 
reward, 
Base pay, 
Whistle blowing, 
Tradeunion open 
dialogue about 
GRI Reporting, 
ERM 
Certification 
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Company Law Codes of conduct Health and 
Safety 
Human rights Training and 
development 
Payment and 
welfare 
Employee 
engagement 
Monitoring and 
reporting 
Occupational 
health, 
Combat with 
AIDS 
training, 
Graduates 
training 
Benefit 
package, 
Intencive pay 
collective bargaining 
EasyJet Compa-nies  
Act 2006 
UN Global  
Compact, 
ILO Standards 
Safey First 
Action, 
Risk management, 
Composite Risk 
Value 
No  
discrimination, 
Free to election 
Right people on  
right position 
Graduate 
Project 
Professional 
training 
Employee gift, 
Extra welfare, 
Save as You 
Earn, 
Buy as You 
Earn, 
National 
insurance 
CEO weekly meeting 
employee  
representatives  
to collective rights, 
European employee  
 
union 
Independent 
audit 
Falkland PLC   HS commitment, 
Employee control 
Freedom of  
association, 
 Pension 
arrangement, 
Employee 
benefit 
  
Ferrexpo PLC  Universal Human 
Rights, 
ILO Standards, 
OSHAS18001 
Organizational  
HS standard 
No discrimination Technical 
traing, 
Higher training 
Retirement and  
pension benefit 
Employee 
engagement 
Trade union collective 
bargaining 
Internal  
reporting and 
auditing 
First Quantum 
Minerals LTD 
 UN Universal 
Declaration of 
Human  
rights, 
ILO Standards 
HSEs,  
HS Committee, 
hygiene and  
medical 
checks 
Equal 
opportunity, 
Gender  
diversity 
Advance 
employee's 
skills, 
Apprenticeship 
   
Fresnillo  ISO14001 
OHSAS18001 
Safety control, 
Occupational 
illness 
prevention, 
Safety 
programme, 
Hazardour  
materials 
control 
‘Play Fair’, 
No  
child-labour 
Next generation  
skill training, 
Professional 
development, 
Graduates skills 
Competitive 
salary and 
benefit 
Employee survey， 
Collective bargaining 
GRI Reporting, 
Internal audit 
External audit 
HS audit 
GSK  ISO14001, 
OHSAS18001 
Zero harm, 
health promotion, 
Disease 
prevention, 
Healthy and 
resilent 
workforce 
High inclusive, 
Women 
employees 
engagment, 
Disable  
employees 
Leaders and 
manager 
development, 
‘Future Strategy  
Group’ Project, 
Early Career, 
Graduate 
High executive 
pay, 
Putting value at 
the heart of pay, 
Pension 
schemes, 
Long-term  
Employee survey, 
Employee 
consultation 
forums 
Pricewaterhouse  
Coopers LLP  
third-party audit 
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Company Law Codes of conduct Health and 
Safety 
Human rights Training and 
development 
Payment and 
welfare 
Employee 
engagement 
Monitoring and 
reporting 
programme Incentive Share 
Hallmark   HS policy No 
discrimination, 
No child-  
labour, 
No forced labour 
Career 
development 
 Individual disclosure, 
Whistleblowing 
policy 
A day-and-A-half  
audit  
Henkel PLC  BSI18001 Occupational 
safety, 
HSE 
Focus on 
female employees 
Training and  
education 
Performance-
based 
compensation 
Reporting violation, 
Open dialogue 
 
IMI  ILO Convetions Track and report  
harm, 
HS Management, 
Safety training 
   Employee 
engagement 
and communication 
Pricewaterhouse  
Coopers LLP  
third-party audit 
Imperial Tobacco  OECD Guideline Zero harm, 
‘Our people’  
to ensure  
employee's life 
and health, 
Safety inspection 
Equality Our people 
workshop, 
Enhance  
employee's 
value 
Fair pay, 
Employee  
benefit 
trust 
Employee council to  
discuss any  
dispute 
GRI Reporting, 
KPMG third-
party audit 
Intertek Local,national, 
international 
laws 
 Safe working 
environment, 
HS Audit and 
report 
Diversity  
project 
Professional 
conduct, 
Training to 
personal 
development, 
Global leader 
training 
Fair reward Employee survey, 
Satisfaction 
responding 
Pricewaterhouse  
Coopers LLP  
third-party audit 
JD Sports  UN Global 
Compact, 
ILO Child Labour 
Conventions, 
ACAS Booklet, 
Ethical Trading 
Initiative 
(‘ETI’) Base Code 
HS management Equal  
opportunity, 
No harass 
Employee 
training 
Employee 
pension 
fund 
Employee 
communication, 
HS employee  
representatives 
Diversity 
monitoring 
of human rights, 
screening agency 
John Lewis   Occupational 
health 
Respct of 
human rights  
Career 
development， 
Apprentice 
programme 
Annual bonus The partner 
survey, 
Grievance and 
appeal 
HS Committee 
audit 
Johnson Matthey  UN Global  
Compact 
Health scorecard, 
Healthy illness  
Equal 
opportunity, 
Attracting 
potential 
Shareholding 
among 
Employee 
communication, 
KPMG Audit 
Appendix 
© C. YUN 410
Company Law Codes of conduct Health and 
Safety 
Human rights Training and 
development 
Payment and 
welfare 
Employee 
engagement 
Monitoring and 
reporting 
OHSAS18001 prevention, 
Annual health 
review, 
Zero accident 
Gender diversity people, 
Graduates 
training, 
Challenging 
jobs 
employees Trade union  
representative, 
Employee bargaining 
J Sainsbury  UN Guiding 
Principles  
on business and 
human rights 
HS Executive, 
Zero harm 
Diversity to  all Investing the  
training, 
Food college 
and bakery 
college, 
‘Youth Can’ to  
promote carrer 
‘Best All  
Employee Share 
Plan’, 
Sharesave 
 GRI Reporting, 
Ernst&Young 
LLP third-party 
audit 
Kingfisher   HS policy, 
Making safety  
priority 
Equal  
and  
diversity policy, 
Disability 
Employee  
training  
and support, 
One Team 
Academy 
 Employee  
survey, 
Collective bargaining 
in labour unions 
GRI Reporting, 
Ernst&Young 
LLP third-party 
audit 
Low & Bonar PLC  UN Global 
Compact, 
SA8000, 
OECD Guideline,  
ILO Standards 
HS management, 
Zero accidents, 
Global HS policy, 
EU manufacturing  
sector's accident  
rate 
Equal  
opportunity 
Career 
development, 
international  
opportunity 
Employee share, 
Pension fund 
Bespoke policy, 
Bribery report 
GRI Reporting 
May Gurney PLC Health and  
Safety at  
Work etc Act 
1974 
OHSAS18001 HS management, 
make a  
difference 
Occupational 
health 
No forced  
labour 
Training and  
development 
Sharesave, 
Share incentive 
plan 
Employee forum, 
Have your say  
survey 
Audit Ranking 
Supervision 
MISC    HS policy,  
HS emergency 
Respect of human 
rights, 
Learning 
orientation 
   
Mondi   Occupational 
health, 
Zero harm, 
Safety 
management 
Equal  
opportunity, 
No harassment 
Leadership 
development, 
Educating 
employees 
  KPMG  
third-party audit 
NEXT RIDDOR  HS executives, 
Accidents report, 
Safety control, 
Target zero 
 Job training and 
support, 
Management 
development  
programmes, 
Life long 
Automatic 
pension 
enrolment, 
UK pension  
schemes, 
Payroll giving, 
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Company Law Codes of conduct Health and 
Safety 
Human rights Training and 
development 
Payment and 
welfare 
Employee 
engagement 
Monitoring and 
reporting 
learning, 
E-learning, 
Succession plan 
Childcare 
voucher, 
Sharesave 
Persimmon PLC Equality Act 
2010, 
RIDDOR 
C2E Standard 
(company), 
CCS, 
CSCS 
HS Executives, 
Long-term HS 
training 
Equality BTEC 
qualification 
HS management 
training 
Various pension 
and benefit  
scheme, 
Employee Share 
Scheme, 
 Internal HS 
monitoring& 
auditing 
Petrofac  UN Universal 
Declaration of 
Human rights, 
ILO Standards, 
OECD Guidelines 
for MNEs, 
UN Global 
Compact, 
OHSAS18001 
Safety Control, 
24 hours  
safety support 
Diversity and 
inclusive  
policy, 
Local 
employment  
Talent 
management, 
Leadership  
exellence, 
Partnership with 
LSE 
 PetroVoice Employee  
Survey, 
Employee commun-
ication, 
Breach Report 
GRI Reporting, 
AA1000 
Assurance, 
Third-party audit 
Randgold  OHSAS18001 
SA8000 
HE Management, 
HS training and 
communication, 
Medical support, 
Occupational 
health 
High respect to 
human rights, 
Specific human 
rights policy 
Skilled 
workforce 
Exceed the 
minimum  
wage to local 
labour, 
Better working 
environment, 
Retirement 
funding, 
Health 
insurance 
Employee  
representatives, 
Whistle blowing, 
Collective bargaining 
GRI Reporting, 
Ernst&Young 
LLP third-party 
audit 
Reckitt Benckiser   Zero fatality, 
Reduce lost 
workday  
accident  
rate, 
HS management, 
Fighting Diesease 
Diverse culture Competitive 
training 
and 
development, 
Experience-
based  
development, 
Performance 
development 
review 
Competitive 
remuneration, 
Annual bonus, 
Benefit 
Whistle blowing, 
Internal audit of  
breach of employee's  
rights 
GRI Index (3.1) 
and 
verification 
Rexam  UN Universal 
Declaration of 
Human  
rights, 
HS Metrics, 
Accident report 
and  
record, 
Fairness and 
respect to all 
employees 
‘Winning 
Organization’ of 
right 
development 
 Employee represen-
tatives to report,nego-
tiate, and audit, 
Open Channel for 
Pricewaterhouse  
Coopers LLP  
third-party audit 
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Company Law Codes of conduct Health and 
Safety 
Human rights Training and 
development 
Payment and 
welfare 
Employee 
engagement 
Monitoring and 
reporting 
UN Global  
Compact 
HS management and training, 
Rexam Business 
School, 
Crossknowledge 
online course 
communication  
Rio Tinto Compa-nies  
Act 2006, 
Equity Act 
2010 
 HS eduction 
Health wellbeing, 
Health check, 
Personal  
safety check 
No  
discrimination, 
Female  
representation 
Learning 
roadmap, 
Graduates 
training, 
Formal 
classroom 
Ensuring 
employee's 
interest 
Whistle blowing 
policy, 
Employee grievance 
Ernst&Young 
LLP 
third-party audit 
SABMiller   Safety workplace, 
Fight for AIDS, 
Prevention  
and test 
Valuing diversity 
and equality, 
Full  
respect, 
Female  
promotion 
Functional 
training, 
Graduates 
training, 
Individual  
development 
plan 
   
Severn Trent  UN Universal 
Declaration 
Employee HS 
operation, 
Off-site safety 
No child labour, 
No force labour 
Specific 
training, 
Manager 
development, 
Apprenticeship 
 Annual employee  
meeting, 
Board discussion 
Independent 
audit 
Shell Equity Act 
2010, 
Health and  
Safety at  
Work etc Act 
1974, 
RIDDOR 
ISO14001, 
OHSAS18001, 
UN Global 
Compact, 
AA1000 
HS Framework, 
Annual safety 
days, 
Road safety 
Diversity of  
human rights 
Flexible 
working 
practice, 
Training, 
Leadership 
skills 
Better welfare 
to 
employees 
around  
world 
Staff council, 
Trade Union for 
bargaining  
GRI Reporting 
and self-check, 
AA1000 
Assurance 
Shire   Healthy working 
environment, 
Healthy lifestyle, 
Health 
programme 
Equal  
opportunity 
E-learning, 
‘On-the-job’ 
experience, 
Leader future 
development, 
Traditional  
training of 
technical skills 
Sharesave 
benefit 
One-on-one meeting 
between  
manager and 
employee, 
Views  
exchange 
 
SportsDirect   HS standard, 
Safety 
management, 
  Bonus share 
scheme, 
Performance-
Employee satisfaction 
Survey, 
Employee chatting 
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Company Law Codes of conduct Health and 
Safety 
Human rights Training and 
development 
Payment and 
welfare 
Employee 
engagement 
Monitoring and 
reporting 
Accident report based reward 
Sirius Minerals  Universal 
Declaration, 
ILO Standard, 
UN Global 
Compact 
Zero harm 
risk assessment 
No discrimination Staff training 
and 
learning 
Share based 
payment 
 GRI reporting 
and 
Verification 
Smiths Group Equality Act 
2010, 
RIDDOR 
 EHS manage-
ment system, 
EHS auditing, 
HS training and 
inspection 
Diversity and  
inclusive 
Career 
progression, 
Top-
management 
development, 
Talented 
developent, 
Succesion 
management 
Personal reward  
for competition 
Employee survey, 
Employee discussion 
with employers 
GRI Index and 
verification 
Deloitte LLP 
third-party audit 
SSE Equality Act 
2010, 
Equality 
Regulations 
2006, 
Companies Act  
2006 
 Prevention 
accidents, 
HS policy, 
HS management 
Diversity Professional 
training, 
Youth skill 
training 
Long-term  
incentive share, 
Pension  
scheme, 
Discount on gas 
and electricity  
supply 
Internal survey, 
Joint Negotiating and  
Consultative  
Committee of 
employees 
 
Syngenta AG  GRI Index, 
OSHAS18001, 
ISO31000 
HSE management Labour rights Career 
development for  
professionals 
and graduates 
Share based 
payment 
Employee meeting 
with 
manager frequently 
Safety  
Committee audit 
Talviaaran  OSHAS18001 Safe and healthy 
workplace,  
Systematic risk 
assessments and 
hazard and 
operability 
(HAZOP) studies 
Male-dominated 
due to the heavy 
work burden 
 Share incentive 
plan  
 GRI, 
AA1000 
Assurance 
Tullow Oil  OHSAS18001, 
AA1000 
Land transport 
safety, 
Occupational 
health, 
Risk control 
Localisation, 
Equal opportunity 
Functional 
development, 
Competitive 
development, 
Career 
promotion 
Compen-sation 
package, 
Reward to local 
employees 
 AA1000 
Assurance 
Unilever   Occupational 
safety, 
Respect to 
human rights 
 Fair treatment 
and living 
 GRI Reporting, 
KPMG third-
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Company Law Codes of conduct Health and 
Safety 
Human rights Training and 
development 
Payment and 
welfare 
Employee 
engagement 
Monitoring and 
reporting 
Travel safety, 
Living Plan 
party audit 
United Utilities  OHSAS18001, 
UN Universal 
Declaration of  
Human Rights, 
UN Global  
Compact, 
SA8000 
Healthy  
wellbeing, 
Ensuring  
safe workplace, 
Get fit and health, 
Rigorous 
reporting 
 E-learning, 
New training 
centre, 
Smoothy 
workshop, 
Female talent 
Competitive  
reward  
and benefit 
Employee  
engagement and 
communi- 
cation, 
Feedback to 
employees 
GRI Reporting, 
DNV third-party 
audit, 
URS Report 
Vedanta  OHSAS18001 HS framework, 
Zero harm, 
Fight for AIDS, 
Risk mitigation, 
Safety  
management, 
Occupational 
safety 
No 
discrimination, 
No child labour, 
No forced labour 
Talent 
development, 
‘Star to 
business’ 
professional 
competence, 
Expert study 
Benefit for  
resettlement, 
Remuneration, 
Allowance, 
Welfare 
package 
including health 
support 
Employee  
reporting system 
 
Victoria PLC  UN Universal  
Declaration,  
The Convention 
of the Rights of 
the Child 
Omission, Health 
and 
safety ranking 
 Various training 
program, 
Aprrentice 
training 
Employee share, 
Pension fund 
 GRI Reporting 
and 
level-check 
Vodafone   HS management, 
Risk management, 
Occupational HS, 
Reportable 
incidents 
Diversity, 
Inclusive 
leadership 
Formal training, 
Potential 
employee plans, 
Vodafone 
academy, 
Leader 
development 
Long-term  
incentive share, 
Vodafone share 
to employees, 
Competitive 
benefit to 
employees, 
Medical 
insurance, 
Retirement fund 
Vodafone survey and 
communication, 
Employee 
consultation council 
GRI Reporting 
Weir  ILO Standards 
Principles 
and  
Standards 
HS Policy, 
Accident-free 
workplace, 
EHS duty of care, 
Risk assessment 
 Apprentice  
training, 
Personal 
Development 
Plan, 
Individual plan, 
Management 
project 
Employee 
earning share 
Ethics Hotline, 
Collective bargaining 
GRI Index and  
verification, 
DNV Assurance  
third-party audit 
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Company Law Codes of conduct Health and 
Safety 
Human rights Training and 
development 
Payment and 
welfare 
Employee 
engagement 
Monitoring and 
reporting 
Wolseley RIDDOR UN Universal 
Declaration of 
human rights 
HS steering  
group, 
Ten safety 
commitment, 
Safety alert, 
Risk assessment, 
HS leadership, 
Fleet safety, 
Occupational 
health 
 Team member  
development 
and  
training, 
Management  
training, 
E-learning 
 Employee  
communication, 
Bi-annual meeting  
between top  
management and 
employee 
representatives 
GRI Reporting 
WS Atkins PLC  OHSAS18001 
CSCS, 
CCS 
HSE, 
Industry 
involvement 
(Consulting 
engineer  
safety committee) 
No discrimination Personal and 
career 
development 
Employee 
pension 
plan,  
Long-term 
share, 
Executive bonus 
Employee 
engagement 
survey 
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Table 2: Chinese Companies’ CSR Practice in Employment (First 12 companies present in sequence of examples followed alphabetically by rest of companies.) 
 
 
Company Law Code of Conduct Health and 
Safety 
Human Rights Training and 
Development 
Payment and 
Welfare 
Employee 
Engagement 
Monitoring and 
Reporting 
CNOOC Law of 
Occupational  
Disease 
Prevention  
and Treatment 
of P. R. C 
CASS CSR  
Guidelines, 
SASAC 
Guidelines, 
Industrial 
Guidelines 
Offshore safety 
work, 
Occupational 
health at work, 
H&S 
management, 
Safety equipment, 
Health 
Management 
for Offshore  
workers 
Respect for  
human rights 
Overseas training, 
Position development 
Medical insurance, 
Legal holiday 
Trade union, 
Employee 
communication 
GRI reporting, 
Third-party audit 
Huayu Auto Labour 
Contract 
Law 
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
Market CSR 
Guidelines, 
OHSAS18001 
H&S 
management, 
H&S training 
 Career path, 
Professional 
development 
Social securities 
retirement welfare 
Trade union, 
Employee survey, 
Employee assistance 
 
Shenhua 
Group 
Labour 
Contract 
Law, 
Trade union 
Law 
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
Market CSR 
Guidelines 
0 harm 
safety mechanism, 
Annual H&S 
control, 
H&S safety, 
Health care 
Care for special 
employees, 
Care for disability, 
Equal 
opportunities 
Developing career 
platform,, 
Network college 
Internal competence, 
Future career plan 
Performance-based 
salary, 
Medical insurance 
Social securities 
Employee survey, 
Trade union, 
Director's mailbox 
GRI reporting, 
Third-party audit 
Southern 
Airline 
 SASAC 
Guidelines, 
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
Market CSR 
Guidelines 
Safety 
management, 
Safety control, 
Aircrew H&S 
management, 
Catering health 
 Competitive 
employment, 
Career development at 
management levels, 
Steady progress of 
staff training 
Basic and  
performance-based 
salary, 
Endowment insurance, 
Medical and injury 
insurance, 
Housing fund 
Care about contract 
employees, 
Listen to frontline 
workers, 
Exchange of ideas 
and interactions 
GRI reporting, 
BV third-party 
audit 
Tongling 
Nonferrous 
Metal 
  H&S education, 
Professional  
health training, 
H&S evaluation 
 Technique 
improvement 
Stimulate employee's 
salary 
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Company Law Code of Conduct Health and 
Safety 
Human Rights Training and 
Development 
Payment and 
Welfare 
Employee 
Engagement 
Monitoring and 
Reporting 
Haier  CASS CSR  
Guidelines 
Health exam, 
Psychological care 
Safety crisis 
management, 
H&S education 
 Apprentice training, 
Career plan, 
Skill enhancement 
Share-based incentive, 
Employee financial 
assistance, 
Competitive salary, 
Complete welfare 
1001 employee 
consult, 
Employee 
communication 
GRI reporting, 
Third-party audit 
China 
North 
Railway  
Labour 
Contract 
Law 
SASAC 
Guideline, 
CASS CSR 
Guidelines， 
ISO26000 
H&S control, 
H&S education, 
H&S standardize, 
Emergency 
solution, 
Professional 
health 
Fair treatment, 
No forced labour 
Apprentice 
development, 
Employee training 
Employee assistance Employee 
representative 
information 
conference 
GRI reporting, 
Third-party audit 
TCL Law of 
Occupational  
Disease 
Prevention  
and Treatment 
of P.R.C 
SZ Stock 
Exchange 
Market CSR 
Guidelines 
A series of 
regulation  
of H&S at work, 
Annual meeting of 
H&S, 
H&S evaluation, 
H&S training, 
Professional H&S 
 Apprenticeship, 
Post-work training, 
Overseas graduates 
training 
 Employee 
entertainments, 
Employee survey, 
Trade union 
Third-party audit 
Jiugang 
Steel 
Labour 
Contract 
Law 
 H&S 
management, 
Health control 
Care for women 
employees 
Employee after-work 
training 
 Employee activities  
CR Power Labour 
Contract 
Law 
SASAC 
Guideline, 
CASS CSR 
Guidelines, 
NOSA 
H&S mechanism, 
H&S crisis  
evaluation, 
Accident 
management, 
H&S training 
Equality 
rights to holidays 
Career development, 
Manager programme, 
Professional training 
Commercial 
insurance, 
Housing fund, 
Social securities 
 GRI reporting 
Shanxi 
Coal 
Labour 
Contract 
Law 
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
Market CSR 
Guidelines 
Production 
safety, 
Protection of 
professional 
health 
Equal respect on  
all employees 
Competitive 
professional training, 
Career plan 
Floating payment, 
Performance-based 
salary, 
Welfare package 
Democratic 
governance, 
Employee 
representatives 
 
China 
Constru-
ction 
  Occupational  
health 
Equal 
employment, 
Care for women 
employees 
Staff training, 
Career development 
Social securities, 
Medical insurance, 
Overseas workers 
care 
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Baoshan 
Steel 
Labour 
Contract 
Law, 
Trade union 
Law, 
Social 
Securities 
Act 
UN Global 
Compact, 
SASAC 
Guideline, 
Industrial 
Guidelines 
H&S training, 
H&S education, 
Improve H&S 
construction 
Respect varied 
sex, age, 
nationality and 
religion, 
Special care of 
women employees 
Professional  
globalization, 
Training of ‘Complete 
Engineer’ 
Enhance, Employees’  
skill 
Competitive salary, 
Competitive bonus, 
Social welfare, 
Shift subsidies 
Employee's right to 
be  
informed, 
Employee activities 
GRI reporting, 
Third-party 
comment 
Beauty 
Yaurient  
Cosmetics 
Accessory 
 SA8000, 
CSC9000T 
Health care, 
Health exam 
No discrimination  Varied mechanism of 
payment 
Employee 
entertainment 
SGS third-party 
verification 
Beijing  
Smart 
Garment 
 SA8000, 
CSC9000T 
Health Fund, 
Health care 
Human rights 
safety 
Employee training, 
Spiritual development 
Special care to 
employees, 
Help to poor 
employees, 
Social welfare 
Trade union, 
Employee 
assistance, 
Employee activities 
BV third-party 
audit 
Black 
Peony 
Labour 
Contract 
Law, 
Trade union 
Law, 
Social 
Securities 
Act, 
Law of 
Occupational  
Disease 
Prevention  
and Treatment 
of P.R.C 
SA8000, 
CSC9000T 
HSE  
management 
No forced labour, 
Freedom of 
association 
Employee 
development 
Employee bonus, 
Social welfare, 
No dismissal 
Trade union, 
Employee activities, 
Employee family 
help 
BV third-party 
audit 
Bosideng 
Garment 
 CSC9000T 
SA8000 
Health 
management, 
Safety care 
No discrimination Employee progress, 
Skills training, 
Daily professional 
check 
   
CCCC Social 
Securities 
Act 
SASAC 
Guideline, 
CASS CSR 
Guidelines， 
ISO26000 
H&S mechanism, 
H&S audit, 
Health exam 
Protection of 
migrant 
workers, 
Equal 
opportunities 
Professional 
competition, 
Internal training 
Professional college 
Medical and social  
insurance 
Employee  
activities 
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Champion 
Union 
Sticker 
Products 
 ISO9001, 
SA8000 
Health and  
safety executive, 
Health exam 
Respect for 
human rights, 
No discrimination 
Skill training, 
Employee 
development 
Social welfare, 
Fair payment 
Trade union, 
Employee 
representative 
gathering 
TUV Rheinland 
third-party audit 
Chang 
Hong 
Group 
  H&S protection, 
Health treatment 
 Professional training, 
Career plan 
Social insurance, 
Professional subsidies 
  
China 
Airline 
Labour  
Contract Law 
SASAC 
Guideline, 
Industrial 
Guidelines, 
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
Market CSR 
Guidelines， 
CASS CSR 
Guidelines 
SMS safety  
crisis 
management, 
Improve safety 
capacity, 
Safety skill and 
facilities, 
H&S Manuals 
No forced labour, 
No child labour 
Professional training 
mechanism 
Employee medical  
charity 
Employee 
representative, 
Employee survey 
Mobile survey 
GRI reporting, 
BV third-party 
audit 
CHINA-
CDC 
Labour 
Contract 
Law, 
Company Law 
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
Market CSR 
Guidelines 
H&S 
management, 
H&S training 
Equality Apprentice training, 
Internal development 
Fair payment, 
Welfare package 
  
China  
National 
Building 
Material 
Company 
Law of 
Occupational  
Disease 
Prevention  
and Treatment 
of P. R. C 
CASS CSR  
Guidelines 
Safety production, 
Health 
management 
   Employee activities  
China  
Railway 
Labour 
Contract 
Law 
UN Global 
Compact, 
Industrial 
Guidelines 
Safeguard 
measures, 
Safety education, 
Occupational 
health 
Human rights 
protection, 
Equality 
Leadership training, 
Specialists award 
Performance-based 
salary, 
Medical insurance, 
Social securities 
Employee 
representative, 
Secret ballot, 
Employee 
supervision 
GRI reporting 
China 
Railway 
Erju 
 UN Global 
Compact, 
Industrial 
Guidelines 
Health care, 
Health exam 
 English Course, 
Internal training 
Position salary  GRI reporting 
China 
Railway 
Construc-
Law of 
Occupational  
Disease 
ISO26000, 
CASS CSR 
Guideline 
Production safety, 
H&S control, 
Emergency 
Equal 
employment, 
Care for migrant 
Employee 
development, 
Encouraging 
Based salary, 
Welfare package 
Trade union, 
Collective 
bargaining, 
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tion Group Prevention  
and Treatment 
of P. R. C, 
Labour 
Contract Law 
management, 
Professional 
health 
workers and 
women employees 
incentive, 
Employee training 
Employee 
representative, 
Employee complaint 
China 
Refrige-
ration 
Industry  
Company 
 SA8000 Safety control, 
Health 
management 
No discrimination, 
No forced labour 
Employee training, 
Professional 
programme 
Social welfare, 
Varied welfare 
package 
Employee 
representatives 
meeting, 
Labour union 
SGS third-party  
verification 
China Ship 
Building 
Industry 
Labour 
Contract 
Law 
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
Market CSR 
Guidelines 
H&S duty, 
Danger check, 
H&S education, 
Professional 
health care 
Respect for  
human rights, 
No forced labour 
Various training, 
Promotion incentive, 
Leader development 
Social and medical 
insurance, 
Annual bonus 
 GRI reporting 
China 
Southern 
Railway 
  H&S 
management, 
H&S education 
 Overseas training    
Chongqing 
Hoping 
Pharmaceuti
cal CO. 
 SA8000  Respect for 
human  
rights 
Sales training Fair payment  INEPT third-party 
verification 
CIMC  SZ Stock 
Exchange 
Market CSR 
Guidelines, 
Industrial 
Guidelines 
H&S Committee, 
H&S control, 
H&S training 
Care for women 
employees 
Talent project, 
i-Learning, 
Leadership training 
Social and medical 
insurance, 
Legal holidays, 
A series of subsidies 
Employee 
representative, 
Democratic 
governance 
GRI reporting, 
Third-party 
comment 
CNPC Labour 
Contract 
Law, 
Trade union 
Law, 
Social Security 
Act, 
Law of 
Occupational  
Disease 
Prevention and 
Treatment of 
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
Market CSR 
Guidelines, 
CASS CSR 
Guidelines, 
UN Global 
Compact 
HSE, 
Safety emergency 
control, 
H&S education, 
On-site and 
offshore safety, 
Professional 
health 
Fair competence, 
Equality, 
Respect on all 
employees 
Professional training, 
International 
development, 
Long-distance 
training, 
Career plan and 
development 
Performance-based 
salary, 
Medical insurance, 
Social securities, 
Employee assistance 
Employee act, 
Employee 
communication, 
Trade union 
GRI reporting, 
Third-party audit 
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P. R. C 
COFCO  UN Global 
Compact, 
CASS CSR 
Guidelines 
Professional H&S 
management, 
Emergency 
manage-ment, 
Safety hazard 
control 
Human rights 
policy, 
Equal opportunity 
Varied training course, 
Leadership training, 
Core competence 
Social securities 
welfare package 
Employee 
representative 
conference 
GRI reporting 
COFCO 
Bio-
chemical 
CO. 
 ISO9001, 
SA8000 
Health check, 
Safety production, 
Occupational 
safety 
management, 
Safety control 
Respect for 
human 
rights, 
Freedom of 
association 
Employee training, 
Professional 
improvement 
Social and commercial 
insurance 
Trade union, 
Employee 
representative, 
Labour activities 
SGS third-party 
verification 
Colin 
Industrial 
Limited 
 ISO9001, 
UN Global 
Compact, 
SA8000 
Health check, 
Safety production, 
Occupational 
safety 
management 
Equality Employee training, 
Apprenticeship  
programme 
Fair payment， 
Subsidies, 
Social securities 
Trade union, 
Employee 
expression 
BV third-party 
audit 
Dalian 
Shengjia 
Color 
Print and 
Packing 
CO. 
 SA8000  No forced labour Professional training, 
Career development 
Social securities 
welfare package 
Employee  
representative 
conference 
SGS third-party  
verification 
Datang  
Power 
Labour 
Contract 
Law, 
Law on the  
Protection of  
Women’s 
Rights  
and Interests 
SASAC 
Guideline, 
Industrial 
Guidelines, 
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
Market CSR 
Guidelines 
H&S mechanism, 
H&S crisis  
prediction, 
H&S evaluation, 
Professional 
safety protection 
Prohibition of  
discrimination, 
Respect for sex 
and 
religion race 
Professional training, 
Professional 
competition 
Fair payment, 
Medical insurance, 
Endowment insurance 
Employee survey, 
Employee 
representative, 
‘General Manager 
Contact’ 
GRI reporting, 
third-party audit 
Dereko 
Fashion 
Company 
 UN Global 
Compact, 
SA8000 
Occupational 
health, 
Health and safety 
management, 
Occupational 
protection 
No forced labour, 
No child labour 
 Fair and on-time 
payment, 
Social insurance 
 BV third-party 
audit 
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Dongfeng 
Motor 
 SASAC 
Guideline, 
CASS CSR 
Guidelines 
One-vote 
negotiation 
about safety 
production, 
Safety index 
control, 
Protection of  
professional 
safety crisis 
No discrimination, 
Employment of 
disability 
Integrated training 
mechanism, 
Skill competition 
Competitive salary, 
Collective wage  
bargaining, 
Various insurance 
and subsidies 
Democratic 
management, 
Employee Congress, 
Fair collective 
negotiation 
GRI reporting 
Dongguan 
Dongchang 
Footwear 
Company 
 SA8000, 
CSC9000T 
Health and safety 
control 
Equal respect to 
all employees, 
No forced labour 
 No delayed and  
reduced payment 
Labour 
representative in 
survey 
TUV Rheinland 
third-party audit 
Dongsen 
Clothing & 
Weaving 
Company 
 ISO 26000, 
SA8000, 
CSC9000T 
Health control, 
Health check 
Respect to women 
employee, 
No forced labour 
 Fair payment, 
Annual reward 
Labour Union BV third-party 
audit 
Eastern 
Airline 
Labour 
Contract Law 
UN Global 
Compact, 
SASAC 
Guideline, 
CASS Report 
Guidelines, 
ISO26000, 
ILO Standards, 
CCAR-121FS 
Physical  
examination, 
Limited working 
time, 
Physical convale-
scence, 
Psychological care 
Respect for 
human  
rights regardless 
of 
sex, race, age 
religion 
Flying Plan, 
Staged career plan, 
Professional training 
Post wage, Social 
security, 
Subsidies Allowance 
Collective 
bargaining, 
Employee 
entertainments, 
Employee SOS 
GRI reporting 
Foton  
Motor 
Labour 
Contract 
Law 
 Health profile 
employee health, 
Professional H&S 
certification 
(GB/T28001) 
No discrimination Competitive 
employment, 
Professional 
certification, 
Overseas training 
Fair payment， 
Subsidies, 
Social securities 
 Internal comment 
GREE  OHSAS18001， 
SZ Stock 
Exchange Market 
CSR Guidelines, 
CASS CSR 
Guidelines 
Health care  Internal training, 
Career development, 
Apprentice guide, 
After-work study and 
education 
Varied mechanism of 
payment, 
Housing fund, 
Social securities, 
Subsidies 
 GRI reporting 
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Guodian 
Power 
 SASAC 
Guidelines 
H&S 
management, 
Health protection 
   Trade union GRI reporting, 
BV third-party 
audit 
Hebei Steel Labour 
Contract 
Law 
Industrial  
Guidelines 
H&S  
Management 
No discrimination 
on race, sex, age 
or 
religion, 
Human rights 
 Talent-payment, 
Social securities, 
Injury insurance 
Manager mailbox, 
Employee survey 
 
Huadian 
Power 
Labour 
Contract 
Law, 
Trade union 
Law, 
Company Law 
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
Market CSR 
Guidelines 
H&S mechanism, 
Production safety 
Equality Professional  
improvement 
Medical insurance   
Huaneng 
Power 
Labour 
Contract 
Law 
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
Market CSR 
Guidelines 
Production 
safety, 
H&S evaluation 
 Competitive 
employment, 
Career development at 
top management 
Performance-based 
salary, 
Medical insurance 
Trade union， 
Complaint handling 
GRI reporting 
Hunan  
Hualing 
Labour 
Contract 
Law 
 H&S duty, 
H&S education, 
Health profile 
 Professional training Social insurance   
Lenovo Labour 
Contract 
Law 
CASS CSR  
Guidelines 
H&S 
management, 
Bureau Verilas, 
Safety 
evaluation 
Respect for 
human 
rights, 
No discrimination 
on 
race, sex, religion 
Career plan, 
Professional 
improvement, 
Apprentice training 
Competitive award, 
Performance-based 
salary, 
Commercial insurance 
Employee 
communication, 
Employee survey 
trade union 
GRI reporting, 
Third-party 
comment 
Ma Steel Labour 
Contract 
Law, 
Labour Law 
 H&S protection, 
Professional  
sickness control 
 Educative internet, 
Three-step training 
Social securities   
MCC  SASAC 
Guidelines, 
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
Market CSR 
Guidelines 
Occupational  
health, 
Psychological care 
No forced labour Skill enhancement   GRI reporting, 
Third-party audit 
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Minmetals Law of 
Occupational  
Disease 
Prevention  
and Treatment 
of P. R. C 
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
Market CSR 
Guidelines 
H&S 
management, 
Professional 
crisis control, 
H&S education 
 Internal training  Employee 
representative, 
Trade union 
 
New Hope  
Liuhe 
Labour 
Contract 
Law 
CASS CSR  
Guidelines, 
SA8000 
H&S 
management, 
Health exam, 
First aid 
Equality to all  
employees 
Internal training, 
Internal promotion, 
Professional ethics  
education 
Employee assistance, 
Social securities, 
Employee awards 
Employee 
representative 
conference 
GRI reporting 
Niutang 
Chemical 
Plant 
Company 
Social 
Securities 
Act, 
Law of 
Occupational  
Disease 
Prevention  
and Treatment 
of P. R. C 
ISO9001, 
ISO14001, 
SA8000 
Health care, 
Occupational 
safety, 
Safe production 
Equal opportunity 
to 
all employees 
Apprenticeship, 
Training and 
development 
programme 
Bonus, 
Company welfare 
Trade union, 
Employee activities 
BV third-party 
audit 
Pan Steel   Notion of H&S, 
Standardized  
construction of 
H&S, 
H&S education, 
H&S Profile 
Equality, 
No discrimination 
on human rights 
Professional training, 
Managerial 
improvement 
Basic and  
performance-based 
salary, 
Endowment insurance, 
Medical and injury 
insurance 
Employee survey, 
Director's Day 
 
Pang Da 
Auto-
mobile 
   Human rights 
protection, 
No forced labour 
Employee training, 
Apprenticeship  
programme 
Social Welfare   
Sany Group Labour 
Contract 
Law 
 H&S education, 
Health exam, 
Safety protection 
 Annual training, 
OLM Online study, 
Career development 
Fair and competitive 
payment, 
Share-based payment, 
Social insurance 
  
Shanghai 
Electricity 
 Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
Market CSR 
Guidelines, 
CASS CSR 
Guidelines 
HSE  
management 
Open and equal 
opportunity to all 
employees 
Apprentice training, 
Promotion training, 
CEO development 
 Employee activities GRI reporting 
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Shanghai 
Medicine 
  Safety crisis  
management, 
Improve 
professional 
health 
 Cooperation with  
universities 
Enhance payment   
Shanghai 
Motor 
 Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
Market CSR 
Guidelines, 
CASS CSR 
Guidelines 
H&S control, 
H&S education 
Prohibition of  
discrimination in 
employment 
Public lecture, 
Leadership 
development, 
Talent evaluation 
Increased salary, 
Welfare package 
Employee 
representative 
survey  
and evaluation 
 
SINAOPHA
RM 
Labour 
Contract 
Law 
SA8000， 
SASAC 
Guidelines 
H&S system, 
H&S audit and 
enhance, 
H&S education, 
Professional 
health 
Care for women 
employees, 
Freedom of  
association 
‘At work college’, 
Educational plan, 
Manager training 
Competitive award, 
Performance-based 
salary, 
Commercial 
insurance, 
Minimum payment  
assurance 
Trade union 
mechanism 
and activities 
GRI reporting, 
Third-party 
comment 
SINO-
CHEM 
 OHSAS18001 H&S 
management, 
Chemical control, 
Office safety, 
H&S competition 
Equal 
employment, 
Care for women 
employees 
KTP Programme, 
STP Programme, 
Teamwork 
Encouraging 
incentive, 
Annual bonus 
Trade union, 
Financial help 
 
SINO 
HYDRO 
Labour 
Contract 
Law, 
Labour Law 
SASAC 
Guideline, 
Industrial 
Guidelines, 
ISO26000 
H&S mechanism, 
H&S education, 
Potential crisis 
control 
 Career development  
incentive 
Employee care of  
welfare package, 
Employee assistance 
 GRI reporting 
SINOMA  CASS CSR 
Guidelines, 
SASAC 
Guideline 
Health care, 
Safety 
management, 
Safety production 
Respect for 
human 
rights, 
Freedom of 
association 
Employee future 
achievement, 
Employee 
development, 
Skill training 
Employee welfare, 
Employee concern 
Social and commercial 
insurance 
Trade union 
activities 
GRI reporting, 
Third-party 
comment 
SINO-
MACH 
Auto 
Labour 
Contract 
Law 
 Health care, 
Safety guard 
Respect for 
employee's 
rights 
Employee promotion, 
Employee 
improvement, 
Employee 
development 
Fair payment, 
Social insurance 
Employee activities  
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SINOPEC  Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
Market CSR 
Guidelines, 
CASS CSR 
Guidelines, 
UN Global 
Compact, 
OHSAS18001 
HSE 
On-site safety, 
Public H&S, 
Emergency 
control, 
Health care, 
Health profile 
Human rights 
equality 
Position training  Employee 
representative 
GRI reporting, 
Third-party audit 
SINOPEC 
Shanghai 
Labour 
Contract 
Law, 
Trade union 
Law 
Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
Market CSR 
Guidelines 
Professional  
health care, 
Health exam, 
Production safety 
Equality, 
Respect for 
human 
rights 
 Welfare package, 
Competitive payment 
Trade union, 
Help to employees 
in poor condition 
 
Sitong 
Group 
Labour 
Contract 
Law, 
Production 
Safety Act 
SA8000 Occupational care, 
Health 
improvement, 
Safety at work 
Equality, 
No child labour 
Employee 
development, 
Professional training, 
Further career 
Subsidies, 
Social securities 
Employee 
representative 
SGS third-party  
verification 
TISCO Labour  
Contract Law 
ISO26000, 
UN Global 
Compact, 
CASS CSR 
Guidelines, 
Industrial 
Guidelines 
Production 
safety, 
Safety operation, 
H&S education, 
Professional 
H&S 
No forced labour, 
No child labour, 
Respect on race, 
sex,  
nationality or 
religion 
‘Whole training’, 
Position improvement, 
Professional 
competition, 
Development on  
top management 
Minimum payment 
assurance， 
Legal holiday, 
Social and medical 
insurance 
Trade union GRI reporting 
Weichai 
Power 
Women's 
Rights 
Protection Law 
SASAC 
Guideline, 
CASS CSR 
Guidelines, 
Industrial 
Guidelines, 
ISO26000 
H&S mechanism, 
H&S audit, 
Professional  
disease control, 
Health profile 
Care for women 
employees 
Annual employee 
training 
Leader training 
Social and medical 
insurance 
 GRI reporting 
Wuhan 
Steel 
Labour 
Contract 
Law, 
Social 
Securities Act 
SASAC 
Guideline, 
CASS CSR 
Guidelines 
H&S 
management, 
Emergency 
control, 
H&S education, 
Professional 
health 
 Employee training, 
Talent development, 
Employee innovation 
Employee assistance, 
Prioritized payment, 
Competitive salary 
Employee 
representative 
conference 
GRI reporting 
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Xinxing 
Ductile 
Iron Pipes 
Labour 
Contract 
Law, 
Production 
Safety Act 
SZ Stock 
Exchange 
Market CSR 
Guidelines 
H&S mechanism, 
Safety standard 
 Competitive 
employment, 
Employee training, 
Employee career plan 
Social securities 
Welfare package 
  
Yangquan 
Coal 
Company 
 ISO9001 Safety production, 
Health and safety 
management to 
miner 
No forced labour, 
No child labour 
Employee recruitment  Employee 
engagement, 
Poor employee 
assistance 
 
Zhongmei Law of 
Occupational  
Disease 
Prevention  
and Treatment 
of P. R. C, 
Labour 
Contract Law 
 H&S system, 
H&S crisis 
management, 
Risk control, 
H&S indicator 
Respect for 
migrant 
worker 
Employee professional 
training 
 Democratic  
governance 
 
Zhonglv Labour 
Contract 
Law 
 H&S protection, 
Crisis control, 
H&S mechanism, 
Psychological  
care 
Care for women 
employees, 
Respect on 
disability, race, 
sex or 
religion, 
Freedom of 
association 
Apprentice training, 
Professional 
competition, 
Career mechanism, 
Top management, 
MBA 
Welfare of retirement, 
Performance-based 
salary, 
Social securities 
Collective 
bargaining, 
Employee 
complaints, 
Employee 
participation of 
activities 
 
ZTE  OHSAS18001, 
UN Global 
Compact, 
ISO26000 
Professional H&S 
management, 
Health survey, 
Employee 
Assistance 
Programme 
Respect for  
human rights, 
No forced labour, 
No child labour 
Online training, 
Overseas training, 
Apprentice training, 
ZTE Award 
Performance-based 
salary, 
Medical insurance 
Social securities 
Trade union, 
Internal forum, 
CEO mailbox 
GRI reporting 
 
